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CONFIDENTIAL.

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PART XVIII.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

AFFAIRS OF PERSIA.

April to June 1909.

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136	Sir A. Nicholson ..	203 Tel.	16.	Tahreez. Refers to No. 103. Russian Government have instructed Russian Consul to concert with Mr. Wratislaw, and consider that two Consuls should be left to deal with negotiation ..	63
137	Sir G. Barclay ..	267 Tel.	16.	Foreign subjects in Tahreez. Refers to No. 116. Has received no reply to introduction of food. His Majesty's Consul-General thinks deporting of foreigners impracticable. Does not contemplate further action than reported in No. 736 ..	64
138	" ..	268 Tel.	16.	Anglo-Russian representation to Shah. Inquires what are points (a), (b), and (c) in No. 71 ..	64
139	" ..	269 Tel.	16.	Bluejackets at Bashire. Refers to No. 131. Major Cox has suggested to Government of India replacement by troops at Yash. Is suggesting that bluejackets be retained for the present ..	64
140	" ..	270 Tel.	16.	Publication of representations to Shah. Inquires whether solutions of representations may be published, as effect on Shah might be useful ..	65
141	" ..	271 Tel.	16.	Tahreez. Transmits telegram (No. 17) from His Majesty's Consul-General giving result of two Consul's deliberations on the situation ..	65
142	" ..	272 Tel.	16.	Foreign subjects in Tahreez. Russian Government have instructed Amush-Bowah to facilitate departure of, but refuse to allow introduction of food ..	66
143	" ..	273 Tel.	16.	Bashire customs receipts. Refers to No. 117. Suggests as to procedure which will, if necessary, payment of monthly instalments on 240000 tomans. Demand of Tahreez local Assembly of 500000 tomans from the Shah ..	66
144	To Sir G. Barclay ..	159 Tel.	16.	Tahreez. Appendix A. No. 501 to 600 in No. 157 ..	67
145	" ..	160 Tel.	16.	Russian representation to Shah. No. 178. Proposed to be sent to the Shah. Attached to the letter is a copy of No. 155. "Mat" ..	67

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
146	To Sir G. Barclay ..	161 Tel.	Apr. 16, 1909	Oil Syndicate. Refers to No. 1. Mr. Preece has communicated a letter from Salghes-Saltanah (of Kensington), who claims to be Imperial Commissioner. To ascertain facts ..	67
147	To Admiralty	16.	Replacement of bluejackets at Bashire by Indian troops. His Majesty's Representative at Tehran deprecates suggestion, and expresses hope that proposal will not be pressed ..	67
148	To Messrs. Ph. Ziegler and Co.	16.	Search for arms on Company's premises at Isfahan. Gives substance of report from His Majesty's Representative at Tehran ..	68
149	To Mr. Preece	16.	Payment of Syndicate's February instalment. Transmits despatch from Vice-Consul at Ahwaz reporting demands by Serdar Mullahshem as to, and reply given ..	68
150	India Office	16.	Non-attached branch of Imperial Bank. Transmits copy of letter to Imperial Bank relative to working of ..	68
151	"	16.	Karun irrigation. Refers to No. 122. Lord Morley cannot approve proposal unless it can be carried out without imposing a charge on Indian revenues. It would be in accordance with last paragraph of No. 133 if Sheikh could be put in communication with suitable applicant for Concession ..	69
152	"	16.	Mohammurah. Refers to No. 123. Concurs ..	69
153	Sir A. Nicholson ..	206 Tel.	17.	Tahreez. Minister for Foreign Affairs learns from Russian Charge d'Affaires that Persian Government refuse to permit introduction of food, and ask that Consul should have town. Proposes introduction of small quantities of food at intervals ..	69
154	" ..	207 Tel.	17.	Astendol. Minister for Foreign Affairs informs him that, in view of events at, Russian Consul-General at Gumbet-i-Kaboura has been instructed to proceed there with escort ..	70
155	Sir G. Barclay ..	274 Tel.	17.	Nationalists and Herzing exile. Nationalists have stopped mining operations. How long can Mr. Weir postpone shipments without loss? ..	70
156	" ..	275 Tel.	17.	Tahreez negotiations. Gives text of telegram from His Majesty's Consul-General stating that only hope of Nationalists lay in intervention of Powers ..	70
157	" ..	276 Tel.	17.	Situation at Kerman. Refers to No. 121. His Majesty's Consul reports improvement in ..	70
158	Mr. E. Gerst ..	17 Tel.	17.	Sir W. Willcocks. Refers to No. 130. Sir W. Willcocks has modified his plans, and is now on the Tigris ..	70*
159	Sir A. Nicholson ..	308 Tel.	17.	Proposed loan. Refers to Nos. 99 and 135. A misunderstanding must have arisen with regard to meaning of No. 439*, Part XVII. Defines suggestions made ..	71

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
159	To Sir G. Barclay ..	163 Tel.	Apr. 17, 1909	Food for Tabreez. Requests views on proposals in No. 153	71
160	" " ..	164 Tel.	17,	Sheikh of Molammarah. To inform Sheikh that support promised in 1902 will be given, and that assurances, if desired, can be extended to "his heirs and successors"	71
161	Sir A. Nicolson ..	211 Tel.	18,	Anglo-Russian representations to Shah. Refers to No. 158. Russian Government accept modifications	72
162	Sir G. Barclay ..	277 Tel.	18,	Tabreez. Consul reports food is scanty and riot threatens Europeans. Tabreez suggests delegates be sent from all towns to arrange compromise	72
163	" " ..	278 Tel.	18,	Proposed loan to Persia. Neither two Representatives nor Financial Adviser approve proposed Commission of Control. M. Rhot concurs in general proposals in No. 129	73
164	" " ..	279 Tel.	18,	Astrabad and Reshit. Shah's troops are marching on Reshit	73
165	" " ..	280 Tel.	18,	Representations to Shah. His Majesty Constantine and state of Tabreez and news referred to in No. 164 about Reshit. Therefore His Majesty's Representative and Russian Representative will represent at once, but thinks success is unlikely	73
166	" " ..	281 Tel.	18,	Tabreez. Turkish Representative will demand that food should be allowed to be sent in. Refers to No. 156. Two Representatives think representations pressing, but are not sanguine	73
167	Sir A. Nicolson ..	238	19,	Escort for Russian Consulate-General at Meshed. Refers to No. 52. Transmits copy of <i>aide-memoire</i> received from Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs respecting	73
168	Messrs. Ziegler and Co. ..	17,	17,	Search for arms on Messrs. Ziegler's premises at Isfahan. Refers to No. 148. Express warmest thanks to Mr. Graham, and note with satisfaction that Sir G. Barclay considers apologies tendered by Samsam were ample	74
169	Sir A. Nicolson ..	214 Tel.	19,	Situation at Tabreez. Refers to No. 166. Russian Government are considering advisability of threatening Shah that unless food is admitted to Tabreez they will take steps to introduce it themselves—by force, if necessary	74
170	Sir G. Barclay ..	282 Tel.	19,	Tabreez. Consul reports food very scarce. Danger of starving poor rushing houses	75
171	" " ..	283 Tel.	19,	Tabreez. Refers to No. 520, Part XVII. Consul reports "Nationalists hope for intervention by killing British subjects; population have lost their heads." Is in former Mr. Wratiaslaw, for transmission to Nationalists, he will represent on Wednesday	75
172	" " ..	284 Tel.	19,	Tabreez. Refers to No. 171. Consul reports blockade will be attempted to be broken to-morrow, and perhaps Consulates attacked. Consul fears representations will not restrain Nationalists, but ultimatum might	75

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173	Sir G. Barclay ..	285 Tel.	Apr. 19, 1909	Tabreez. Following to Tabreez: Representations will include a menace	76
174	" " ..	286 Tel.	19,	Tabreez. Has informed Consul. He will represent to Shah that he will be held personally responsible for any injury to foreigners	76
175	British Subjects, Tabreez	Telegraphic	19,	Tabreez. Imminent danger to British subjects in the town	76
176	To Sir A. Nicolson ..	351 Tel.	19,	Food for foreigners at Tabreez. Refers to No. 158. Concurs in No. 166. Russian Government to be informed. Warning might be addressed to Shah	77
177	" " ..	561 Tel.	19,	Tabreez situation. To inquire views of Russian Government as to dispatch of troops to Julfa	77
178	To Sir G. Barclay ..	168 Tel.	19,	Anglo-Russian representations. To proceed with at once (see No. 161)	77
179	" " ..	170 Tel.	19,	Tabreez. Approves instructions in No. 162. To instruct His Majesty's Consul-General to impress on Nationalists that they should protect foreign Consulates in case of necessity	77
180	" " ..	171 Tel.	19,	Tabreez situation. Approves instructions given to His Majesty's Consul-General (see No. 171). His Majesty's Government would not object to dispatch of Russian troops	77
181	To Mr. Fairley ..	Telegraphic	19,	Tabreez. His Majesty's Government are making every possible endeavour to insure safety of British subjects	78
182	To Sir F. Bertie ..	168	19,	Ziles-Sulim's taxes. Refers to No. 101. To inform Zil that His Majesty's Government cannot undertake to instruct His Majesty's Consul-General at Isfahan to intervene	78
183	Mr. Preece	19,	Payment of February instalment to Bakhtiari Chief. Arrangements made by His Majesty's Representative at Tehran are perfectly satisfactory	78
184	Sir A. Nicolson ..	215 Tel.	20,	Situation at Tabreez. Refers to No. 177. M. Iavolsky has sent orders to Russian Representative at Tehran to warn Shah that Russian Government would themselves take steps to introduce food unless he gave orders for its admission. "Cum-punctively large force will be necessary"	78
185	" " ..	216 Tel.	20,	Situation at Tabreez. Refers to No. 184. Minister for Foreign Affairs has decided to send Russian force to Tabreez. Orders to be given to the officer commanding	79
186	" " ..	218 Tel.	20,	Situation at Tabreez. Nationalist cause must necessarily be favoured by presence of Russian troops, as steps would be practically raised. But chief object is safety of Consuls	79
187	Sir G. Barclay ..	1287 Tel.	20,	Tabreez. Has sent telegram to Consul to inform Nationalists that any outrage on foreigners would be severely punished, and any amnesty would exclude them	79

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
188	Sir G. Barclay ..	288 Tel.	Apr. 20, 1909	Tahreez. Refers to No. 171. Shah has promised an armistice up to 20th, and to allow introduction of food. This should afford good basis of negotiations, and Nationalist demands should not exceed scope of representation	80
189	" "	289 Tel.	20,	Tahreez. Refers to No. 187. Consul reports at dawn Nationalists attacked Samad Khan with no result. Hopes danger will blow over, but can offer good resistance. Sister Dames Bagher Khan for plot against Consulate	80
190	To Sir A. Nicolson ..	563 Tel.	20,	Assistance and protection of foreigners in Tahreez. Refers to No. 160. Steps of Russian Government will have cordial approval of His Majesty's Government. Necessity for prompt action	80
191	" "	565 Tel.	20,	Publication of Anglo-Russian representations. If Russian Government have no objection to (see No. 110), it would have excellent effect. To ascertain their views	80
192	" "	570 Tel.	20,	Persian financial reforms. Refers to No. 625. Proposal to be made to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting advance	81
193	" "	571 Tel.	20,	German proposal as to guards for foreign Legations at Tehran. Refers to No. 125. His Majesty's Government agree that no reply is necessary	81
194	" "	574 Tel.	20,	Tahreez. His Majesty's Government have no objection to offer suggestions of two Consuls (see No. 141). To ascertain views of Russian Government	81
195	" "	576 Tel.	20,	Tahreez. Concurs in proposal in No. 181	81
196	To Sir G. Barclay ..	173 Tel.	20,	Shiraz-Ispahan road. Approves instructions in No. 427	82
197	" "	176 Tel.	20,	Bushire and Tahreez customs. Approves No. 113	82
198	" "	181 Tel.	20,	Tahreez situation. Approves action reported in No. 188. Refers to No. 141. Is communicating with Russian Government	82
199	" "	186 Tel.	20,	Concession for road from Kala-Malik-Shah to Navastabad. Refers to Nos. 559 and 560, Part XVII. Delegates scheme for military and economic reasons. Government of India oppose granting of Concession to Kiliagh. Persian Government should be urged to undertake improvements	82
200	India Office	20,	Relat. garibon. Transmits telegram to Viceroy of 20th March approving No. 135, Part XVII	82
201	Sir A. Nicolson ..	219 Tel.	21,	Situation at Tahreez. Refers to No. 188. In consequence of armistice Russian force has been ordered not to cross frontier	83
202	" "	229 Tel.	21,	Joint representation at Tehran. Refers to No. 191. M. Isvolsky does not favour the idea of publishing the text of the programme	83

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203	Sir A. Nicolson ..	221 Tel.	Apr. 21, 1909	Financial assistance for Persia. Refers to No. 192. M. Isvolsky's criticism of scheme of His Majesty's Government for controlling advance	83
204	" "	222 Tel.	21,	Tahreez. Russian force will remain at Jafra until effect of armistice is seen. M. Isvolsky's suggestion of small escort for bringing foreigners out of Tahreez	84
205	Sir G. Barclay ..	230 Tel.	21,	Russian troops for Tahreez. Refers to Nos. 195 and 198. Trains troops may be ready to start at any moment in case of failure of general representations. Escort may also be necessary for supplies	84
206	" "	231 Tel.	21,	Mediation between Shah and Nationalists at Tahreez. Transmits telegram (No. 19) to His Majesty's Government at Tehran authorizing him to concert with Russian colleague with a view to	84
207	To Sir A. Nicolson ..	579 Tel.	21,	Tahreez. Refers to No. 186. If Shah rejects advice he will be to blame for advantage which may accrue to Nationalists from Russian intervention	84
208	Sir G. Barclay ..	232 Tel.	21,	Russian Consulate-General at Bushire. Suggests preventing appointment of Dvorenko	85
209	" "	233 Tel.	21,	Kitabji's projected road. Believes real object of Kitabji's visit to Tehran was to fish in troubled waters	85
210	" "	234 Tel.	21,	General representations to Shah. Audience today postponed; are pressing for one to-morrow	85
211	" "	235 Tel.	21,	Tahreez. Attitude of Turkish Charge d'Affaires, Sadrudin Bey, informs him that Turkish Consulate-General has asked for a guard. German Minister probably unconnected	85
212	" "	236 Tel.	21,	Tahreez. Gives text of telegram from His Majesty's Consulate-General requesting His Majesty's Representative at Tehran to bring pressure on Amol-Dowleh	86
213	Sir G. Barclay ..	190 Tel.	21,	Tahreez. Approves Nos. 174 and 187	86
214	Sir A. Nicolson ..	223 Tel.	22,	Tahreez. Arrives. Russian Consul at Tahreez says no instructions to him since they have reached Amol-Dowleh. M. Isvolsky thinks it better that Russian force should cross frontier	86
215	Sir G. Barclay ..	237 Tel.	22,	Tahreez. An demanding prolongation of armistice for thirty-six hours	87
216	" "	238 Tel.	22,	Tahreez. His authorized His Majesty's Consulate-General to concert with Russian colleague in a companionable dose	87
217	" "	239 Tel.	22,	Introduction of food into Tahreez. Refers to Nos. 169 and 206. Two Consuls General have informed Amol-Dowleh that troops to the supply stores being for next 10 days	87
218	" "	300 Tel.	22,	General representations to Shah. Reports interview with Shah. His Majesty expressed interest in wall	87

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219	Sir G. Barclay	101 Tel.	Apr. 22, 1909	Tahreez. Refers to No. 215. Reports joint audience of the Shah. His requested prolongation of armistice. Shah says all instructions as to admitting supplies have been sent, but refuses prolongation of armistice	87
220	" "	302 Tel.	22.	Tahreez. Reports Khatib has been occupied by Samad Khan. Position serious	88
221	" "	303 Tel.	22.	Tahreez. His Majesty's Consul-General reports no supplies yet sent. Provisions very necessary. Cossacks might escort Jaffa caravan	88
222	" "	304 Tel.	22.	Tahreez. Transmits copy of telegram to His Majesty's Consul-General concerning Samad Khan	88
223	To Sir A. Nicholson	305 Tel.	22.	Russian Consul-General at Bushire. If His Majesty's Government were to ask Russian Government not to appoint Mr. Bressanelli (see No. 208), they might ask us to make changes in our Consular service. No harm, however, in representing desirability of maintaining former friendly relations with His Majesty's Consul-General	89
224	" "	600 Tel.	22.	Programme of Russian and British Governments. Not necessary to publish actual text (see No. 202), though effect would be better if substance were published	89
225	To Sir G. Barclay	194 Tel.	22.	Tahreez. Approves No. 211	89
226	To Persian Transport Company	" "	22.	Messrs. Lynch's shed at Shelleh. Gives substance of No. 327, Part XVII, and No. 30	89
227	India Office	" "	21.	Oil Syndicate. Lord Morley suggests that His Majesty's Government should reply, and that they are doubtful whether it would be in their interests, that His Majesty's Minister at Tehran should raise matter with the Persian Government, but that they would support Syndicate if latter decide to proceed with the work on their own responsibility	90
228	" "	" "	22.	Proposed loan to Shah of Mohammadh. Transmits copy of telegram to Viceroy, dated 14th instant, relative to	93
229	Mr. F. C. Strick	" "	22.	Island of Hailah. Refers to No. 125. Inquires as to ownership of	93
230	Sir A. Nicholson	225 Tel.	23.	Situation at Tahreez. Refers to No. 214. Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs says that Russian detachment has been ordered to proceed to Tahreez	94
231	" "	226 Tel.	23.	Tahreez. Composition of Russian force for. Instructions to Commander	94
232	" "	228 Tel.	23.	Russian Consul at Bushire. Refers to Nos. 208 and 223. Mr. Foxley knows nothing of the proposed appointment of M. Ossekenko. Any Russian Consul who might be appointed to Bushire would be instructed to maintain former good relations with His Majesty's Consul-General	94

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233	Sir G. Barclay	306 Tel.	Apr. 23, 1909	Tahreez. Refers to No. 222. Nothing has been done to facilitate entry of provisions	94
234	" "	306 Tel.	23.	Sir G. Barclay. Refers to No. 222. Nothing has been done to facilitate entry of provisions	94
235	" "	307 Tel.	23.	Situation at Tehran. Administrator of Customs has been informed that Persian Government can no longer answer for behaviour of troops unless they receive 200,000 toman	95
236	" "	308 Tel.	23.	Tahreez. Khatib was not captured yesterday as reported in No. 220	95
237	" "	308 Tel.	23.	Tahreez. Gives extract from His Majesty's Consul-General's telegram No. 36	95
238	" "	310 Tel.	23.	Tahreez. Two Consuls are withdrawing their Delegates from Basrah. As Ahmed Dowlah has not facilitated introduction of food	96
239	" "	311 Tel.	23.	Shahand Constitution. Reports conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs concerning guarantees for Shah, bank, &c.	96
240	" "	312 Tel.	23.	Tahreez. Gives text of telegram No. 38 from His Majesty's Consul-General	97
240*	To Sir G. Barclay	198 Tel.	23.	Tahreez. Approves Nos. 215, 216, and 217	97*
241	To Sir F. Bertie	320 Tel.	23.	Persian financial reform. Trusts there will be no further delay in appointment of Inspector of Finances and Treasurer-General	97
242	To Sir A. Nicholson	601 Tel.	23.	Tahreez. Only course now left open is that recommended by Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs in No. 214. Russian Government must protect Consulates and foreigners. Statement should be issued in England explaining nature of Russian intervention	97
243	" "	607 Tel.	23.	Instructions to the two Representatives. Russian Government have already (see No. 204, Part XVII) been asked to give their consent to as suggested in No. 235. To state facts and repeat request. Moment seems favourable for bringing Shah to Tehran	98
244	To India Office	" "	23.	Bahrein. Refers to No. 104, Part XVII. Transmits, with comments, Nos. 36 and 79. Asks opinion of India Office	98
245	To Mr. F. C. Strick	" "	23.	Island of Hailah. Refers to No. 125. Inquires of uncertainty of status of	94
246	Treasury	" "	23.	Penitentiary of Basrah. Refers to No. 508, Part XVII. Do not generally make contributions towards upkeep or repair of courtyards attached, and therefore cannot share expenses incurred in repairing tombs, &c. but will accept as charge to British (make a note of the rest of the proposed expenditure)	99
247	Sir A. Nicholson	229 Tel.	24.	Tahreez. Has recommended No. 212 to M. Foxley. Latter concurs. Delay in despatch of Russian force. Question of ending advance guard	99

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218	Sir G. Barclay	313 Tel.	Apr. 21, 1909	Belgian Director of Bishire Customs and "Persopolis." Gives extract from Major Cox's telegram No. 287	99
219	" "	314 Tel.	21.	Tabreez. Quotes His Majesty's Consul-General's telegram No. 30	100
220	" "	315 Tel.	24.	Persian Government and new issue of oil shares. Persian Government "consider their rights prejudiced"; would like to be able to reassure Minister for Foreign Affairs	100
221	" "	316 Tel.	24.	Karun irrigation. Refers to No. 157. Inquires whether Sir W. Willcocks' views, received from His Majesty's Consul at Mohammara, are to be telegraphed	101
222	" "	317 Tel.	24.	Tabreez. Quotes His Majesty's Consul-General's telegram No. 100	101
223	" "	318 Tel.	24.	Bishire Customs and "Persopolis." Refers to No. 218. Quotes Major Cox's telegram No. 289	101
224	" "	319 Tel.	24.	Shah and Constitution. Reports Shah's favourable attitude re. hopes of gaining point soon	101
225	" "	320 Tel.	24.	Tabreez. He has interviewed Minister for Foreign Affairs on Royalist General's obstruction of food supply. Fault lies with Amir doing. Shah had sent necessary instructions	102
226	" "	321 Tel.	24.	Tabreez. Turkish Consul-General at His Majesty's Consul-General reports colleagues are conspiring cowardly, and Turkish Consul-General has secured his support. Turkish Charge d'Affaires has asked Consul-General for explanation of his attitude	102
226*	Sir F. Beane	68 Tel.	23.	Treasury-General and Inspector of Finances for Persia. Refers to No. 211. Has informed Political Director that His Majesty's Government will proceed at once with selection of	102*
227	To Sir G. Barclay	201 Tel.	21.	Oxide in the Gulf. Approves No. 251	102
227*	" "	202 Tel.	21.	Approves Nos. 237, 238, 239, and 240	102*
228	" "	201 Tel.	24.	Karun irrigation. Requests summary of Willcocks' views on subject of, by telegraph	102
229	" "	205 Tel.	24.	Situation at Bishire. Approves action reported in No. 218. Has instructed His Majesty's Consul-General at Bishire not to allow His Majesty's ship "Persopolis" to leave without further orders	103
230	To Sir L. Gorst	19 Tel.	24.	Karun irrigation. Sir G. Barclay has received Sir W. Willcocks' views on	103
231	To Major Cox	75	21.	Situation at Bishire. Not recall or departure of His Majesty's ship "Persopolis" without instructions	103
232	To Sir A. Nicholson	231 Tel.	25.	Review at the British Consulate. Refers to No. 218. Sense of regret, indications of relief. German Charge d'Affaires has been instructed to join his British colleague in making	103

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233	Sir G. Barclay	322 Tel.	Apr. 25, 1909	Analistan irrigation. Refers to No. 251. Sir W. Willcocks thinks Engravers and Tigris scheme should come before Karun scheme	103
234	" "	323 Tel.	25.	Arabistan irrigation. Refers to No. 238. Discusses possibilities of	101
235	" "	324 Tel.	25.	Tabreez. Consul reports on attitude of populace to Russian advent. Taki and Bader Khan are raising agitation against Russians	101
236	" "	325 Tel.	25.	Anglo-Russian representations. Minister for Foreign Affairs has asked documents to repeat in a private letter verbal assurances already given (see No. 129, Part XVI)	101
237	" "	326 Tel.	25.	Tabreez. Refers to No. 247. In view of delay in dispatch of Russian force, six days' armistice extension will be jointly asked for	103
238	" "	327 Tel.	25.	Tabreez. Provisions for. Has sent following to Consul-General: Shah has ordered Generals to allow passage of food. Nationalists object to Russian advance. Would it be safe to stop advance?	103
239	Sir A. Nicholson	211	15.	Russian action in Northern Persia. Reports audience of Emperor and latter's remarks on subject of British and Russian action in Southern and Northern Persia respectively	103
240	" "	213	16.	Amendments proposed by His Majesty's Government in programme of Persian reforms. Refers to No. 135. Transmits copy of <i>amendments</i> communicated by Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs, respecting	104
241	" "	211	15.	Proposed modification at Tabreez. Refers to No. 136. Transmits copy of <i>amendments</i> received from Ministry for Foreign Affairs respecting	104
242	" "	218	19.	Programme of reforms. Minister for Foreign Affairs accepts modifications in (see No. 138). Necessary instructions will be sent to M. Saline	104
243	" "	252	20.	Dispatch of Russian troops to Astrakhan. Refers to No. 151. Transmits copy of note received from Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting	104
244	" "	263	20.	Proposed introduction of food into Tabreez. Refers to No. 135. Transmits note from M. Isvolsky respecting	104
245	" "	255	20.	Tabreez. Reports conversation concerning alarming situation and measures to be taken for meeting it	104
246	" "	265	21.	Tabreez. Transmits translation of a communique published in "Official Messenger" relative to situation at, and despatch of Russian troops	110
247	" "	261	23.	Tabreez. Reports conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs concerning situation at. Transmits copy of letter from Minister for Foreign Affairs reporting that orders have been sent to move on the detachment at Julia	111

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278	M. Iwolsky to Count Benckendorff	..	Apr. 23, 1909	Tabreez. Russian Government have warned Shah that unless steps are at once taken to provision foreigners' troops will be sent from Juffa ..	112
279	Mr. F. G. Strick	..	24.	Island of Hahli. Thanks for No. 215. Agents are prospecting on islands of Sirri, Farut, the Taulis, Behandi, and Sir Alot Nwar. Is instructing them also to call at Hahli. As to Little Tauli (see No. 102, Part XVII) is informed that Man's men are working scale in one of the Taulis ..	112
280	Mr. Carter	..	25.	Tabreez. Inquires whether American citizens may rely on protection of relief expedition ..	112
281	Sir G. Barclay	..	328 Tel.	26. Tabreez. Refers to No. 298. Has received following from Consul-General's Local Assembly with advance delayed till Shah's orders are seen to be not obeyed, but thinks troops should be within reach ..	113
282	" "	..	329 Tel.	26. Tabreez. Consul-General reports. Hopes troops will not be stopped ..	113
283	" "	..	330 Tel.	26. Tabreez. Assembly has urged Shah to stop Russian advance by granting constitution ..	114
284	" "	..	331 Tel.	26. Joint communication to Shah. Refers to No. 281. Would like to include reference to Bafire in ..	114
285	To Sir G. Barclay	..	206 Tel.	26. Tabreez. His Majesty's Consul-General may be authorized to make proposed joint declaration (see Nos. 281 and 282) of Russian Government have sent similar instructions. To join with Russian Charge d'Affaires in addressing note in same sense to Persian Government ..	114
286	" "	..	207 Tel.	26. Hornuz oxide. Inquiry in No. 155 has been referred to Ellinger, who cannot give definite reply. Also has not notified his firm of any interference with mining operations ..	114
287	" "	..	208 Tel.	26. Assurance to Shah. To repeat assurances (see No. 121, Part XVII) in confidence with request in No. 266 when Shah has officially accepted programme ..	114
288	Sir A. Nicolson	..	266	21. Tabreez. Details concerning Russian relieving force ..	115
289	" "	..	252 Tel.	27. Guarantee to Shah. M. Iwolsky does not like proposed suggested commitment, and asks if His Majesty's Government would give Shah guarantee if he accepts joint programme. If so, in what form ..	115
290	" "	..	253 Tel.	27. Tabreez. Refers to Nos. 281 and 282. Russian force will encamp outside, and only small party will enter. Minister for Foreign Affairs sees no necessity for joint note, but Consul may make it known ..	116
291	Sir G. Barclay	..	332 Tel.	27. Recent transfer of Meski. Consul reports Russian detachment arrived town over ..	116
292	" "	..	333 Tel.	27. Tabreez. Refers to No. 298. Shah being pressed for concessions ..	116
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296	" "	.. 337 Tel.	27.	German Consul at Tabreez. Is opposing two Consul-General. Count Quadt has been asked to instruct him ..	117
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301	Mr. M. Ellinger	..	27.	Red oxide. Transmits copy of telegram inquiring whether Messrs. Weir have monopoly ..	119
302	Sir G. Barclay	.. 338 Tel.	28.	German Consul at Tabreez. German Minister has instructed him and asked for explanation (see No. 296) ..	119
303	" "	.. 339 Tel.	28.	Joint note to Russian troops. Refers to No. 290. Hopes Russian Government will agree to in order to remove false impression ..	119
304	" "	.. 310 Tel.	28.	German war-ship for Bafire. Consul has asked for one ..	120
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309	" "	..	28.	Site on Aladan Island. Proposes to open negotiation with Sheikh of Mohammarah by contribution to proposed dam ..	121

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314	" ..	315 Tel.	29.	Removal of troops from Boudal. Has informed Indian Government of inadvisability of removing troops from Boudal	123
315	" ..	316 Tel.	29.	Shah and Constitution. Shah proposes to appoint his uncle Nalib-Sultaneh, a prominent reactionary, as Grand Vizier. This will not come within requirements of our programme	124
316	To Sir G. Barclay ..	211 Tel.	29.	Bushire. Approves No. 313	124
317	" ..	215 Tel.	29.	Appointment of Persian Grand Vizier. Approves action reported in No. 315	124
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319	To Mr. Carter	29.	Tahreez. Refers to No. 290. Information that Russian troops have been dispatched and that American citizens may rely on protection	124
320	India Office	28.	Increase of salaries awarded to Sheikhs of Mohammedan, Kuwait, and Bahrain. Transmits copy of secret letter from Government of India recommending Lord Mervat's recommendations should be approved	125
321	Mr. J. R. Preece	29.	Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Refers to No. 293. Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs has written to Sir G. Barclay under a misapprehension. Names of Messrs. Langley and Langley were inserted in advertisement as collectors to Imperial Commissioners, but it was too late to insert them in the prospectus	132
322	Sir A. Nicholson ..	235 Tel.	30.	John guarantee for Shah. Refers to No. 306. Has informed M. Telarykoff that His Majesty's Government is not object to tax Representatives. Giving Shah assurances limited to those given in December 1906 if two Representatives agree	132
323	" ..	236 Tel.	30.	Russian force in Tahreez. Russian Charge d'Affaires in an ultimatum of arrival of a Russian officer is to be sent to Tehran to command Persian Consulates	132

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325	" ..	317 Tel.	30.	Tahreez. Consul-General reports: Sattar Khan has expressed his gratitude to His Majesty's Government. Food supply improved. 300 troops to enter town	133
326	" ..	318 Tel.	30.	Tahreez. Consular-General reports: Royalist army dispersing. Postal service to be resumed. Entrance of 150 Russian troops	133
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329	To Sir G. Barclay ..	218 Tel.	30.	Bushire. To instruct His Majesty's Consul-General in case of No. 328. No need for Admiral's stay to be cut short	134
330	To India Office	30.	Cemetery of Bussidin. Refers to No. 508, Part XVII. Transmits No. 216. Sir G. Barclay's opinion in proposal of Government of India	134
331	To Mr. M. Ellinger	30.	Hornay oxide. Acknowledges No. 301. Has informed His Majesty's Representative at Tehran that it is impossible to say definitely how long shipments of oxide can be delayed without loss. Sir G. Barclay's paper for inquiring	134
332	Mr. J. R. Preece	29.	Oil Company. Imperial Commissioner is anxious about his salary, which he is apparently entitled to. Asks for authorization to pay	135
333	Sir G. Barclay ..	320 Tel.	May 1.	Shah and Constitution. Dismissal of Shah. Dismissal of Minister for Foreign Affairs. Appointment of Nalib-Sultaneh. Refusal to include Saad-Ed-Dowleh	135
334	" ..	351 Tel.	1.	Russian officers at Tehran are still under Government orders from Russia	136
335	To Mr. W. R. D'Arcy ..	Private and Conf.	1.	Indian owned at works of Commissioners Syndicate. Refers to No. 33. His Majesty's Minister at Tehran has reported that difficulties might arise owing to undue interference of Beyhale understudy	136
336	To Sir G. Barclay ..	219 Tel.	1.	John guarantee for Shah. To act in accordance with No. 322 as soon as Russian college has received instructions	136
337	" ..	220 Tel.	1.	Oil Syndicate. Refers to No. 509, Part XVII. His Majesty's Government will, if necessary, support claim of Syndicate if latter prepared to proceed with construction of telephone and telegraph lines along the line on their own responsibility without consulting Persian Government. Better to discourage Beyhale's proposal for telegraphic communication between Syndicate's plant and plant on Shatt-el-Arab	137

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337	Sir G. Barclay ..	352 Tel.	2,	Russian troops for Armenia. Consul-General at Tabreez reports Russian force relieved three men of their unhappiness at Marand. These are probably the last men. Movement of troops to Armenia might have serious results, as Nationalists are strong	136
338	Mr. M. Ellinger	1,	Red oxide. Company jealous Nationalists should not ship oxide from Hormuz, as they bought monopoly from Moulin	137
339	Sir G. Barclay ..	334 Tel.	3,	German at Basra. Has informed Consul of No. 329, and he reports obstructive policy of German Consul, who encourages Seyyid	137
340	" ..	354 Tel.	3,	Russian troops for Armenia. M. Sadiq leaves his Government consider dispatch of troops mentioned in No. 337 unnecessary	138
341	" ..	335 Tel.	3,	Isfahan. In reply to note to Persian Government holding them responsible for damage to foreigners, the Shah informs him troops are returning to Kachan	138
342	" ..	356 Tel.	3,	Isfahan. Samsarous-Saltanah has arrived at, and telegraphed to Legations thanking for assistance taken for Tabreez, and demanding to further internal interference	138
343	" ..	357 Tel.	3,	Shah's birthday. If Shah accepts programme His Majesty might congratulate	138
344	" ..	358 Tel.	3,	Tabreez. Consul-General reports telegram from Shah to Qazvinyeh he had now complied with wishes and asking his rights should be respected. Numbers of Russian troops	139
345	To Sir A. Nicholson ..	630 Tel.	3,	Persian Cabinet. His Majesty's Government state view of Russian Government respecting composition of, and content in No. 336	139
346	To Sir E. Groschen ..	183 Tel.	3,	Budape. To inform Minister for Foreign Affairs of incidents reported in No. 339. To tell Minister for Foreign Affairs that Cox has throughout consulted his German colleague as to protection required by German subjects	139
346*	To Sir G. Barclay ..	221 Tel.	3,	Oil Syndicate. Salary of Imperial Commissioner. Syndicate wish to know result of inquiries as to No. 116	139*
347	" ..	223 Tel.	3,	Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Refers to No. 250. Informs of No. 321	139
348	" ..	224 Tel.	3,	Persian Cabinet. To meet on No. 344 as well as Russian Charge d'Affaires receives instructions to make joint representation (see Nos. 336 and 344)	140

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350	" ..	61	3,	Saad-ol-Dowleh. Persian Minister has communicated telegram from Shah expressing hope that British and Russian Representatives would not press for reinstatement of. Reply of His Majesty's Government	140
351	Sir G. Barclay ..	359 Tel.	4,	Oil Syndicate. Concurs in reply proposed in No. 335 b	141
352	" ..	360 Tel.	4,	Oil Syndicate. Is pressing Persian Government for reply to No. 316*	141
353	" ..	361 Tel.	1,	Shah and Constitution. In view of official acceptance of advice, assurances will be given to Shah	141
353a	Sir F. Bertie ..	69 Tel.	4,	Dismissal of Saad-ol-Dowleh. Persian Minister has announced. Shah trusts British and Russian Legations will take no heed of any representations Saad-ol-Dowleh may make. Possible successor	141*
353a	Consul-General Cox to Sir G. Barclay ..	428 Tel.	4,	"Persopolis." "Persopolis" must go to to Shatt-el-Arab taken supplies of water. Sees no objection	141*
354	To Sir F. Bertie ..	339 Tel.	3,	Reappointment of Saad-ol-Dowleh. Shah argues that the Representatives of the two Governments should not press for. Persian Minister has been informed that His Majesty should not delay the appointment of a Grand Vizier and Prime Minister desiring the approval of British and Russian Representatives. Cabinet must include Saad-ol-Dowleh and Nasr-ol-Mulk	141
355	To Sir G. Barclay ..	228 Tel.	1,	Bushire. Refers to No. 353a. "Persopolis" may be allowed to leave on certain conditions	141
356	To Persian Transport Company	4,	Akchaz-Isfahan road. Transmits Memorandum on incidence of responsibility for defraying cost of repairs to Isfahan Bridge. Sir E. Cox would suggest appointing Bahktiar Khan with a view to obtaining their consent to refer the matter to arbitration	142
357	Mr. M. Ellinger	4,	Red oxide. Takes note that Sir G. Barclay is alive to necessity of preventing shipment by Nationalists and will not need upon resumption of mining sulphur, War and Fire, suffer no loss	143
358	India Office	5,	Representations to Shah. Transmits telegram to Viceroy, dated 5th May, relative to	143
359	Sir A. Nicholson ..	239 Tel.	5,	Turkey and Persia. Refers to No. 362. Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs informs him of departure of 250 Turks to protect Turkish Consulate at Erzerum; asks for support of His Majesty's Government if Russian Government had it necessary to protest	144
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366	"	368 Tel.	"	Shah and Constitution. Has taken act of receipt. Will not assure Shah is proposed in No. 323 till Naibos-Sultanch resigns	146
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368	To Mr. M. Ellinger	"	"	Hormuz oxide. Refers to No. 338. Informs of substance of No. 349	146
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370	Sir G. Barclay	369 Tel.	"	Rosh revolutionaries. Refers to No. 334. Shah has ordered Cossacks to proceed against. Also said to be under Captain Lazebki	147
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381	Sir G. Barclay	373 Tel.	"	Shah and Constitution. Refers to No. 377. Question of Calahet. Attitude of Tabreez. Palace claimed re Rosh	150
382	"	371 Tel.	"	German Consul at Bushire. Refers to No. 361. Consul denies interference. Clement to be accepted. Significance of action in connection with No. 340	151
383	"	375 Tel.	"	Russian officers of Persian Cossacks. Has no further information (see Nos. 516 and 535, Part XVII, and No. 376). Can give no definite answer to No. 380	151
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388	"	72	Apr. 3.	Theft of Imperial Bank of Persia's notes. Announces presentation of notes with seal of High Commissioner forged. Is reminding Persian Government of its responsibility	152
389	"	73	"	Departure of Austrian Minister. Reports audience of M. de Boshorn with Shah, and transmits text of address read to His Majesty on danger of course he was following	152
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391	"	75	"	Sistan telegrams. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General to Government of India in regard to Sistan-Bandha section of Sistan-Mashhad line	153

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397	" "	85	22.	Events in Persia. Transmits summary of for past four weeks	171
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399	" "	87	22.	Representations to Shah. Transmits text of statement read to Shah	179
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401	Sir A. Nicolson	277	May 1.	Guarantee to Shah. Refers to No. 322. Reports interview with M. Telatykhoff on Transmits Memorandum left with M. Telatykhoff	181
402	" "	278	1.	Russian troops for Tahreez. Refers to No. 324. Russian Charge d'Affaires informed him of arrival of advance guard, which was well received by Sattar Khan. Hostilities at an end	182
403	" "	283	3.	Dhimish of Saad-ol-Dowleh. Transmits copy of letter from Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs giving views on substance of No. 333	182
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405	Sir G. Barclay	378 Tel.	10.	Shah and Constitution. Issue of rescript for Constitution	183
405*	Sir A. Nicolson	244 Tel.	10.	Protection of Rehr-Tehran road. Refers to No. 327. Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs informs him that Russian Government have decided to keep some Cossacks at Isfahan in case of necessity	184*

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407	To Sir G. Barclay	235 Tel.	10.	Protection of Bahreinis. Refers to No. 56. Leaves wording of communication to Persian Government to his discretion. His Majesty's Government cannot allow Persian Government to exercise sovereignty over Bahreinis	184
408	" "	236 Tel.	10.	Anglo-Russian representations to Shah. Refers to No. 377. If Nationalists are not satisfied, two Powers cannot be responsible, and two Representatives should then adopt neutral attitude	184
409	" "	237 Tel.	10.	German Consul at Bushire. Refers to No. 322. In view of lack of proof and denial of German Consul, His Majesty's Government will take no further action at Berlin	184
410	Sir A. Nicolson	291	7.	Russian troops in Persia. Reports article in "Novoye Yevrona" commenting on attitude of English press towards	185
411	Sir A. Herbert	31	4.	Russians at Tahreez. Russian Charge d'Affaires hinted that Russian occupation might be permanent (see No. 252)	185
411*	Admiralty	Confidential	10.	Relief of crew of His Majesty's ship "Fox," landed at Bushire. Refers to No. 124. Transmits telegram from Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, respecting. Lords Commissioners hope crew may be re-embarked	185*
412	Sir G. Barclay	379 Tel.	11.	Shah and Nationalists. In instructions in No. 108 preclude action indicated in last paragraph of No. 405?	185
413	" "	380 Tel.	11.	Situation at Bushire. Daria Beggi met with cordial reception on his arrival on 10th May. Would prefer departure of blue-jackets to synchronize with that of Russians from North Persia	186
414	" "	381 Tel.	11.	Situation at Tahreez. Transmits telegram from His Majesty's Consul-General at Tahreez	186
415	To Sir G. Barclay	258 Tel.	11.	New Persian Ministry. Nasr-ol-Mulk has refused to return to Tehran, as he fears for his personal safety	186
415*	Admiralty	Confidential	11.	Affairs in the Gulf. Refers to No. 411*. Transmits copy of telegram from Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, respecting	186*
416	Messrs. Ellinger and Co.		11.	Hormuz oxide. Mohi informs them that caralancers have stopped his mining operations. Asks that Sir G. Barclay may be asked to take steps to have carabiniers removed	186
417	" "		11.	Hormuz oxide. Informs of information given by the Mounteur regarding present position in Tehran and Hormuz	187
418	Sir G. Barclay	382 Tel.	11.	Sigalar. Refers to Nos. 370, 377, and 412. Russian colleague's views on his attitude	188
419	" "	383 Tel.	12.	Nasr-ol-Mulk. Refers to No. 415. Hopes Nasr-ol-Mulk will return. Two Legations might guarantee his safety	188

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420	Sir G. Barclay ..	384 Tel.	May 12, 1908	Nationalists at Reht. Refers to No. 412. Matter is pressing	188
421	" " ..	385 Tel.	12,	Nationalists and Shah's concessions. Dissatisfaction with	188
422	Sir A. Nicholson ..	249 Tel.	12,	Loan to Persia. Refers to No. 406. Mode of disbursement. Reports interview with Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs	189
423	" " ..	250 Tel.	12,	Tahreez. Action of Russian General. M. Tchernyoff says Russian General has demanded surrender within forty-eight hours of the persons who shot at Russian sentry. Russian authorities think they were Russian revolutionaries. M. Tchernyoff hopes Sir G. Barclay may be instructed to support request	190
424	To Sir G. Barclay ..	252 Tel.	12,	Efforts to reconcile Shah and his people. Refers to No. 412. Instructions do not preclude action indicated in last paragraph of No. 405	190
425	" " ..	240 Tel.	12,	Bluejackets at Bushire. Refers to No. 413. Admiralty have been informed that retention of it is desirable for a week, at end of which they may be replaced by Indian troops if extra guard is necessary	190
426	To Admiralty ..	Unofficial	12,	His Majesty's ship "Fox." at Bushire. Refers to No. 411*. Sir E. Grey hopes that bluejackets will be retained on land another week	190
427	India Office	12,	Proposed transfer of Tehran-Meshed and Khat-Nasratabad telegraph lines. Lord Morley does not see why principle of equal division between the two Exchangers should be departed from, and trusts Sir E. Grey will obtain Treasury sanction to this principle	191
428	" "	13,	Financial assistance to Persian Government. Transmits telegrams concerning	191
429	Sir G. Barclay ..	386 Tel.	13,	Tahreez. Consul-General reports dispersal of Royalist army	192
430	" " ..	388 Tel.	13,	Bluejackets at Bushire. Refers to No. 425. Bluejackets might be withdrawn now, and in view of Russians in north might be replaced by sowars	192
431	To Sir G. Barclay ..	241 Tel.	13,	Advance of British Nationalists. His Majesty's Government sanction proposal in No. .. To urge acceptance of Shah's overtures on Spalding	193
432	" " ..	242 Tel.	13,	Tahreez Governor. Refers to No. 425. To support Russian colleague if to objection. To press Persian Government to send without delay, but selection must suit Nationalists	193
433	To Sir A. Nicholson ..	671 Tel.	13,	Persian loan. Refers to No. 422. British share cannot be advanced without sanction of Assembly. If troops are paid and Shah's liability rests on Russian Government, who should prevent reaction on Shah's part	193

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434	Mr. M. Ellinger	May 13, 1909	Hormuz oxide. Presumes arrangement with regard to payments for Hormuz oxide only refers to money payable by Moir for Concession, and not to oxide purchases price payable by A. Weir and Co. Asks for information as to this point.	193
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ERRATA.

Page 54, No. 167, line 2.—For "your telegram," read "my telegram."
 Page 54, No. 158, line 3.—For "Sir A. Nicolson's telegram No. 486" read "telegram No. 486 to
 Sir A. Nicolson."
 Page 71, No. 158, line 5.—For "No. 228" read "No. 328."
 Page 94, No. 257, heading.—For "Tehran, April 20, 1909," read "Tehran, April 23, 1909."
 Page 145, No. 365, line 3.—For "your telegram No. 288" read "your telegram No. 228."
 Page 197, No. 114, line 1.—For "your telegram No. 38" read "your telegram No. 388."
 Page 226, No. 516, line 3.—For "the 21st March" read "the 21st May."
 Page 240, No. 561, heading.—For "Gulabok, May 1, 1909," read "Gulabok June 1, 1909."

Sir A. Nicolson.

[This Paper should have appeared as No. 1.]

[12315]

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 1.)

(Confidential.)

Sir.

Admiralty, March 31, 1909.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram, dated to-day, from the commander-in-chief, East Indies, respecting the state of affairs in the Persian Gulf.

I am, &c.

C. I. THOMAS.

Inclosure.

Commander-in-chief, East Indies, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.)

Bombay, March 31, 1909.

FOLLOWING report received by telegram from His Majesty's ship "Fox" regarding situation in Persian Gulf:—

"Towns on the coast have without exception yielded to the national party, no resistance being experienced. Pending some agreement as to the sums payable to the local committees the custom-houses are, so far as issues are concerned, closed. In this connection it is pointed out that several foreign loans were granted on the security of the customs, hence any negotiations are difficult. For the present the result is that there is a scarcity of food, and it is feared that unless the above agreement is arrived at soon there will be an attack on the custom-houses, with a view to plundering them. Apparently there is, in the opinion of the Resident, no immediate peril to Europeans, but he has made the suggestion that in order to reassure foreigners His Majesty's ship 'Fox' might be sent to Bushiro. For the meanwhile the ship will not leave the Gulf."

CONFIDENTIAL

Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Persia.

PART XVIII.

[12440]

No. 1.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 216.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 1, 1909.

OIL Syndicate.

Please inform Syndicate that Minister for Foreign Affairs desires that from the 1st instant the 1,000*l.* a-year due to the Commissioner should be paid to him.

[12460]

No. 2.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 217.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 1, 1909.

WITHDRAWAL of Indian guard for Oil Syndicate.

I have received the following telegram No. 23 of the 31st March from His Majesty's Consul at Ahwaz:—

"The moral effect of the Indian guard at the oil works, which is a most important factor, is declining; and, in my opinion, in which Lieutenant Wilson concurs, it has already served its purpose. The present arrangement, by which the Syndicate pays the officer and men, may complicate the situation when Mr. Reynolds goes on leave. Moreover, as long as the Indian troops remain the Syndicate's authorities here will not appreciate the necessity for being in a position to place reliance on the Bakhtiari guards.

"An Agreement has lately been drawn up by Serdar Bahadur and Serdar Muhtashen, by which the Syndicate, commencing on the 1st April, will control and pay the guards; for this purpose they will be permitted to deduct 600*l.* per annum from the instalment due by them to the Khans. The Agreement has been signed by these two Chiefs only. They claim to act on behalf of the whole body. The remaining Khans, however, have not been consulted. Should the Agreement come to anything, I think that it would afford the best opportunity possible for the withdrawal of the present guard. It will, however, be advisable to seize this opportunity without delay, as it can hardly be done.

"I would venture to suggest that His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire be given full and immediate authority to sanction withdrawal of these troops whenever he may concur with His Majesty's Consul at Ahwaz as to its expediency."

I have telegraphed as follows to Major Cox and Captain Lorimer:—

"I concur in your suggestion as to the powers to be given to His Majesty's Consul-General, but he and Consul at Ahwaz must first satisfy themselves that the Agreement in question is binding on all signatories and legally in order before acting upon them."

[12451]

No. 3.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 218.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 1, 1909.

"DAILY NEWS" correspondent at Tabreez.

(Confidential.)

His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez reports that during his absence yesterday afternoon Mr. Moore, the correspondent of the "Daily News," left the Consulate-General and took up his abode with Ijlal-el-Mulk. Mr. Wratishaw fears, from a letter which Mr. Moore left for him, that he intends to join the Nationalist cause.

Mr. Moore, with a view evidently to avoid embarrassing Mr. Wratishaw, gave the latter no warning that he was about to leave the Consulate-General.

[12452]

No. 4.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 219.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 1, 1909.

BRITISH newspaper correspondent and Nationalists at Tabreez.

I have sent the following telegram No. 26 to His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez:—

"You should, with reference to your telegram No. 58, warn the gentleman in question that should he take part in hostilities he cannot rely on British protection to save him from the results of his own action, and that if he identify himself with the cause of the Nationalist party he does so at his own peril."

[12595]

No. 5.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 2.)

(No. 184.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, April 2, 1909.

M. ISVOLSKY asked me to-day whether I should be likely soon to receive the reply of His Majesty's Government to his last proposals in regard to Persia. I said the messenger who arrives to-morrow might bring them, but I would ask you.

It is feared that the Caucasian revolutionaries may give trouble at Kasvin, and perhaps destroy the bridge at Menzil, and a Council of Ministers is being held to-day to consider what measures can be taken for protecting the Resht-Tehran road.

I asked why the Russian Government did not take steps to prevent Caucasians leaving Baku or even landing at Enzeli. M. Isvolsky said he would bring this point to the notice of Council this evening.

[12555]

No. 6.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 2.)

(No. 220.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 2, 1909.

RUSSIAN Consul-General at Tabreez. My telegram No. 206 of the 29th ultimo.

Mr. Wratishaw reports the departure yesterday of Russian Consul-General (see my telegram No. 206 of the 22th ultimo).

[12556]

No. 7.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 2.)

(No. 221.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 2, 1909.

A TELEGRAM has been sent to Sansam-es-Sultaneh by the Persians in London pressing him to march on Tehran in view of the perilous position of Tabreez.

I have refused to authorize Mr. Grahano to give Sansam any information as to real situation at Tabreez for which the latter has asked.

[12557]

No. 8.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 2.)

(No. 222.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 2, 1909.

RECALL of Rahim Khan.

Your telegram No. 111 of the 26th ultimo.

M. Sahline and I consider that it would serve no useful purpose to demand that Rahim Khan should be recalled. M. Sahline has received no instructions, and in these circumstances I do not propose to act.

I have already held both the Shah and the Persian Government responsible for all loss and injury to British subjects and property.

[12504]

No. 9.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 119.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 2, 1909.

CRUISER to Bushire. Please see your telegram No. 215 of yesterday.

A ship has already started from Henjam for Bushire (His Majesty's ship "Fox," a 2nd class cruiser).

With regard to the landing of men, she must observe the orders which have already been issued to His Majesty's ship "Redbreast."

[12504]

No. 10.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.

Sir,

Admiralty, April 2, 1909.

WITH reference to your letter of the 1st instant, respecting the unsettled state of affairs at Bushire, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to request you will inform the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's cruiser "Fox" (complement 319) has left Henjam for Bushire, and that the orders already issued with regard to the landing of men will hold good.

I am, &c.

(Signed) C. I. THOMAS.

[12744]

No. 11.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 3.)

(No. 223.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 3, 1909.

MOHAMMERAH customs

Referring to my telegram No. 199 of the 27th ultimo.

According to a telegraphic report from His Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah, the Sheikh has called upon the Director of Customs to retain for the present the receipts in the custom-house safe. In order to prevent possible disturbances, he has also demanded that the Customs steamer "Mozafferi" be kept at Mohammerah.

His Majesty's Consul has been instructed by Major Cox to urge the Sheikh very strongly not to touch the customs receipts himself, and to repeat to him the advice of His Majesty's Government not to involve himself in party politics.

[12745]

No. 12.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 3.)

(No. 224.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 3, 1909.

"DAILY NEWS" correspondent at Tabreez: My telegram No. 219 of the 1st instant.

Mr. Wratislaw suggests that he might proceed against Mr. Moore under Article 281 of the Persian Order in Council if he can obtain proof that he has taken or is about to take part in hostilities.

I shall not authorize Mr. Wratislaw to take any action without your sanction, in view of Mr. Moore's position as a correspondent.

[12746]

No. 13.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 3.)

(No. 225.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 3, 1909.

SITUATION in Azerbaijan.

I have received the following telegram, No. 61, from His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez:—

"The Governor of Urumia, who is also the President of the Persian section of the Turco-Persian Frontier Commission, has been deported to Sulmas by the Nationalists of Urumia, who have now risen. The archives of the Commission have been seized."

It seems extremely probable that this manoeuvre has been instigated by the Turks.

[12750]

No. 14.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 3.)

(No. 227.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 3, 1909

MESHED situation: My telegram No. 204 of the 28th ultimo.

His Majesty's Consul-General at Meshed reports that Prince Dabija, the Russian Consul-General, has announced that 100 cossacks with two guns will shortly arrive there.

I am informed by my Russian colleague that his Consul-General has asked for an increased guard because the recent disturbances were due to an anti-Russian propaganda, that the Russian Consul-General was threatened and a Russian subject has been killed.

[10476]

No. 15.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 455.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 3, 1909.

ANGLO-RUSSIAN Agreement respecting Persia.

Reference is to your telegrams Nos. 152 and 155 of the 18th and 19th ultimo respectively.

Point 1. If the Shah makes a special point of the Amir Bahadur Jung being retained in the Palace, His Majesty's Government will raise no further objection.

Points 3, 4, and 7 (see my telegram No. 328 of the 17th ultimo, which contains the views of His Majesty's Government).—I presume that when M. Isvolsky made the last proposals he was not in possession of the substance of this telegram. Please ascertain whether his Excellency would be satisfied if a list of suitable candidates were supplied privately to the Shah.

You should point out to his Excellency the advisability of adopting a solution on the lines indicated above, and suggest that, as regards members of the Council, the

[12749]

No. 13*.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 3.)

(No. 226.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 3, 1909.

"DAILY NEWS" correspondent at Tabreez.

I have received the following telegram, No. 62, from His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez to-day:—

"Referring to my telegram No. 60, Mr. Moore was publicly drilling recruits yesterday. A leading member of the American Mission has joined him."

Shah should obtain our opinion in the same way as in the case of Ministers. You should urge the acceptance of this compromise on his Excellency very strongly, and call his attention to the important concessions with regard to other points which we have made.

Point 5.—His Majesty's Government agree to the revised version.

[12745]

No. 16.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 121.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 3, 1909.

"DAILY NEWS" correspondent at Tabreez.

His Majesty's Government are of opinion that the suggestion of His Majesty's Consul-General should not be acted on (see your telegram No. 224 of the 3rd instant); they consider that the warning which you suggest in your telegram No. 26 to Tabreez will suffice.

[12891]

No. 17.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 5.)

(No. 205.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, April 1, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note which I have received from M. Isvolsky, informing me of the reinforcement of the Russian Consular guard at Astrabad.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

Inclosure in No. 17.

M. Isvolsky to Sir A. Nicolson.

Mon cher Ambassadeur,

Saint-Petersbourg, le 13 (31) mars, 1909.

JE crois devoir vous faire savoir que des troubles sérieux ayant éclaté à Astrabad, nous avons trouvé prudent de renforcer de vingt-cinq hommes l'escorte de notre Consulat dans cette ville.

Votre sincèrement dévoué,
(Signé) ISVOLSKY.

[12856]

No. 18.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 5.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 29th ultimo, relative to the proposed loan to the Sheikh of Mohammerah.

India Office, April 3, 1909.

Inclosure in No. 18.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

March 29, 1909.

MOHAMMERAH. Your telegram of the 19th March as to loan to Sheikh was communicated to Foreign Office for consideration before decision conveyed in telegram of the 25th instant to Sir G. Barclay, repeated to you, was arrived at by His Majesty's Government.

[1649]

C

[12987]

No. 19.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 5.)

Sir,

India Office, April 3, 1909.

IN REPLY to your letter of the 31st ultimo, as to the recent interview between the Sheikh of Mohammurah and the Resident in the Persian Gulf, I am directed to state that Viscount Morley concurs in Sir E. Grey's proposal to approve the action of His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, and to defer the consideration of any other action in the matter pending the receipt of further Reports from Sir G. Barclay.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

[12750]

No. 20.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 458.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 5, 1909.

SITUATION at Meshed.

Is there any truth in the report in Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 227 of the 3rd instant? If the answer is in the affirmative, you should ask the Russian Government to give an assurance similar to that which they gave in connection with a like question at Resht on a previous occasion.

[12556]

No. 21.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 122.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, April 5, 1909.

YOUR telegram No. 221 [of the 2nd instant: Telegram to Sansam from Persians in London].

Action approved.

[11468]

No. 22.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 126.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, April 5, 1909.

YOUR telegram No. 181 [of the 22nd ultimo: Appointment of Momtaz-ul-Mulk as Persian Minister in London].

Appointment agreeable to the King.

[12987]

No. 23.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 127.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 5, 1909.

MOHAMMERAH.

His Majesty's Government approve the action which you have taken, as reported in your telegrams No. 190 of the 28th ultimo (last paragraph) and No. 223 of the 3rd instant.

[9806]

No. 24.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 97.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 5, 1909.

I HAVE to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Minister at Tehran has reported that the post of Turkish Consular Agent at Lingah, on the Persian coast, has been offered to an employe of the German firm of Wöckhans and Co., Mr. Brown, with the alternative that he should select an inhabitant of Lingah for the post. It is further stated that Mr. Brown has refused the offer.

His Majesty's Government have under consideration at present a proposal to appoint a Vice-Consul of English birth at Lingah, and it has occurred to me that as soon as the British Vice-Consul is appointed he might also take charge of Turkish interests.

I request that your Excellency will, if and when you think it advisable, discuss the matter with the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs and let him know that His Majesty's Government are willing to make arrangements in this sense.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[12207]

No. 25.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 15.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 5, 1909.

I HAVE received your telegram No. 212 of the 30th ultimo reporting riots directed against Jews at Kernanshah.

I approve your action in the matter.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[13121]

No. 26.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 6.)

Sir,

India Office, April 5, 1909.

IN reply to your letter dated the 27th ultimo, I am directed to say that Viscount Morley concurs in the proposal of Secretary Sir E. Grey to approve the action taken by His Majesty's Minister at Tehran in consequence of the demands made by the Samsam-ud-Daulah with regard to telegrams passing through Isfahan.

I am to add that Mr. Kirk has been informed by Mr. Barker that the Persian Minister of Telegraphs has been told that messages from Tehran to Shiraz can be transmitted by land line to Karachi, by cable from there to Bushire, and thence to Shiraz, thus avoiding Isfahan.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

[13148]

No. 27.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 6.)

(No. 188.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, April 6, 1909.

PERSIA. Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 227, and your telegram No. 458 of the 5th instant.

The Russians have increased their Consular guard at Meshed. I fear that I forgot to telegraph this information, which was communicated to me by M. Ivolosky the day before yesterday.

I was told to-day by M. Ivolosky that the Meshed guard is being increased under exactly the same conditions as in the case of the increase of the Resht Consular guard.

[13129]

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 6.)

(No. 228.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 6, 1909.

SITUATION at Tabreez.

His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez reports that the Royalists for the first time shelled the interior of the town in the course of an artillery duel which took place yesterday. A certain amount of damage was done to buildings, and several non-combatants were killed and wounded.

[13131]

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 6.)

(No. 230.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 6, 1909.

SITUATION at Tabreez.

The representation indicated in your telegram No. 115 of the 28th ultimo is not one which I should like to make alone, and my Russian colleague has not yet received instructions. It might be worth while to remind the Russian Government.

Pending the receipt of our general instructions it is all we can do for Tabreez though it would probably have little effect.

[13139]

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 6.)

(No. 231.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 6, 1909.

SITUATION in Azerbaijan.

I have received the following telegram No. 66 from His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez:—

"The party here in favour of peace are trying to enter into negotiation direct with the Shah.

"There have been reports for some time past that a strong relieving force is advancing from Sulmas. There seems to be some truth in this, and it is understood that the force has reached Dizakhalil."

[12891]

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 493.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 6, 1909.

SITUATION at Asterabad.

Reference is to your despatch No. 205 of the 1st instant.

When you make the request concerning reinforcements for Meshed (see my telegram No. 458 of the 3th instant) you should also include that for Asterabad.

[13131]

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 464.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 6, 1909.

SITUATION at Tabreez.

Please try to get authority for which the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran has applied (see Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 250 of to-day) sent to him immediately by Russian Government. Great indignation would be aroused here against the Shah if His Majesty's Consulate or British subjects came to any harm, or if His Majesty were to treat Tabreez with barbarity.

[13131]

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 128.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 6, 1909.

SITUATION at Tabreez.

With reference to your telegram No. 230 of the 6th instant concerning the representations to be made to the Shah, I am communicating with the Russian Government.

In any case the Shah should again be urged to send definite and imperative orders to provide for the protection of His Majesty's Consulate and of British subjects, or failing this to see that they are supplied with a safe conduct from the town. You should add that His Majesty's Government will hold him responsible for their safety, and will strongly resent any harm to them.

[12515]

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Louthen.

(No. 100.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 6, 1909.

THE Turkish Chargé d'Affaires called on the 1st instant, and informed Sir C. Hardinge that he was instructed to intimate to His Majesty's Government that, as soon as order had been restored in Persia, the Ottoman Government would be ready to continue the discussion of the Turco-Persian frontier question, and that, in the event of their failure to come to an agreement, they proposed to have recourse to the mediation of His Majesty's Government.

Sir C. Hardinge remarked that on a previous occasion there had been a joint Anglo-Russian Commission, which had delimited part of the frontier and laid down a frontier zone.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[13234]

Mr. Preece to Foreign Office.—(Received April 7.)

Dear Mr. Mallet,

1, St. James' Place, London, April 6, 1909.

WITH reference to your note of the 3rd instant, the necessary instructions for the payment of 1,000*l.* per annum due to the Persian Commissioner will be paid as requested to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

We shall be glad to know who will act for the Persian Imperial Commissioner in the future.

Yours, &c.
(Signed) J. R. PREECE.

[13260]

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 7.)

(No. 189.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

St. Petersburg, April 7, 1909.

I HAVE received Memorandum from the Russian Government stating that, in view of increasing alarm in the north of Persia and of failure of measures hitherto taken to prevent passage of arms and of Caucasian anarchists into Persia, Russian Government have decided to send a gun-boat to Enzeli as a stationnaire and another man-of-war to do police duty off Enzeli.

Similar measures are to be taken in the Gulf of Asterabad.

[13250]

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 7.)

(No. 232.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 7, 1909.

ASSURANCES to Sheikh of Mohammedrah.

I have received the following telegram, No. 299 of the 5th April, from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire:—

"With reference to the second part of my telegram No. 251.

"May I give the Sheikh some assurance in regard to the extension of the existing guarantees made to him to his immediate offspring, and as to whether these guarantees will protect him against any possible encroachment by a constitutional Government?

"I hope that, as regards the possible event of intervention by foreign Powers or the break up of Persia, the Sheikh will be satisfied by His Majesty's Government's reply, which you repeated to me in your telegram No. 69 of the 28th March."

[13254]

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 7.)

(No. 233.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 7, 1909.

FINANCIAL assistance to Sheikh of Mohammedrah.

Following telegram, No. 300, dated the 5th April, has been received from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire:—

"With reference to your telegram No. 69 of the 28th March, I think that maladroitness on my part must have caused the seemingly unsympathetic tone of His Majesty's Government's reply as to the granting of a loan to the Sheikh. He is merely relying on our close attachment to his interests, and makes no suggestion that we are under an 'obligation to grant him a loan.' This great anxiety, however, as to his self-preservation at this moment may have made him somewhat vehement.

"The following analogous considerations, in themselves reasonable enough, have inspired his application for a loan:—

"He thinks that his best method of self-protection is to commence immediately some utilitarian enterprise in his territory (which Sir William Willocks, in recently communicating his views to me, declared to be an admirable field for the employment of British capital), but is unable to do so for lack of money. He, however, confidently expects that, when money is required for such purposes, His Majesty's Government will help him, either by introduction of private capital or Government loan. He has been led to these considerations by the recent menace of a Dutch Concession, and by the desire to safeguard himself against any non-British Concession which may be sprung upon him by the corrupt Central Government.

"May I reply to him on the following lines, in view of the vital importance of keeping his good-will in the immediate future? That, in the event of some serious utilitarian scheme being instituted requiring a large sum of money, and which would recommend itself to His Majesty's Government, he might rely on our general good-will towards himself to secure him either a direct Government loan or the means of obtaining money from private British sources. Or, secondly, that, in the event of a small sum, when he had stated the amount necessary and the object in view, the Indian Government would do their best to satisfy him.

"As regards a small loan, it would be difficult to explain to him why the Government of India were unwilling to finance him temporarily as they had done for his friend Sheikh Mubarek."

[13239]

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 7.)

(No. 234.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 7, 1909.

GENERAL situation.

I received a visit from the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires yesterday, who came to say that he learned that a movement of the Nationalists from Isfahan and Resht on Tehran was contemplated for the 18th instant. He said he had this information from a sure source.

He said that he had telegraphed to his Government for a guard of 100 men, who would, he thought, cross into Persia at Kasri Shirin; he had done this as a crisis was evidently approaching, and his Embassy would then be in especial danger, owing to the presence of his bastis, on whom the Royalists would wish to revenge themselves.

[13240]

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 7.)

(No. 235.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 7, 1909.

SITUATION at Meshed. My telegram No. 227 of the 3rd instant.

Some of the Russian revolutionaries have gone to Turlat-i-Haidari.

His Majesty's Consul-General apprehends that the anarchy at Meshed will increase.

[13256]

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 7.)

(No. 236.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 7, 1909.

FINANCIAL assistance to Sheikh of Mohammedrah.

I venture to support Major Cox' suggestion as to a reply to the Sheikh, contained in his telegram No. 300 of the 5th instant, in view of the importance of maintaining our influence over him and keeping his good-will at the present critical moment in our struggle against German influence in the Persian Gulf. It is, I presume, clear that we shall be obliged to find money for the Sheikh when he really requires it, whether we now give him any assurance on this question or not, in order to avoid the danger of his applying for it elsewhere.

If His Majesty's Government does not approve of Major Cox' suggested reply, might not a general assurance be given to the Sheikh that we should do everything to facilitate his raising money in London, should he require it for any purpose to which we have no objection?

[13258]

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 7.)

(No. 237.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 7, 1909.

SHEIKH of Mohammedrah.

Telegram No. 80 from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire which I repeated to you in my telegram No. 232 of to-day's date.

I venture to suggest that Major Cox might point out to the Sheikh of Mohammedrah that the time is probably remote when a constitutional régime, even should it desire to encroach upon his rights, will be strong enough to do so. He might, however, be told that the assurances which Sir A. Harlinge gave him in his letter of the 7th December, 1902, would hold good should the case arise.

I have no observations to offer in regard to the question of extending to his immediate offspring the guarantee given to himself.

[13259]

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 7.)

(No. 233.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 7, 1909.

SITUATION at Tabreez.

It would, I think, be preferable to omit for the present mention of safe-conduct referred to in your telegram No. 128 of the 6th instant. It would probably evoke from the Shah a request that His Majesty's Consul-General and British subjects should leave the town immediately.

In my opinion, our repeated notes to the Persian Government holding them and the Shah responsible secures as far as is possible the safety of British subjects.

[13240]

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 472.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 7, 1909.

YOU should ask the Russian Government that the Russian guard at Meshed may be instructed, in case of necessity, to protect the lives of British subjects there.

[13239]

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 474.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 7, 1909.

ENDEAVOUR to obtain the support of the Russian Government to our representations at Constantinople on the question of the guard for the Turkish Embassy at Tehran (see Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 234 of to-day and my reply).

[13239]

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 220.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 7, 1909.

WE strongly deprecate the dispatch of 100 Turkish soldiers to Tehran as a guard for the Turkish Embassy there, which is quite unnecessary (see Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 234 of to-day), and you should do all you can to induce the Sublime Porte to refuse the application of their *Chargé d'Affaires*.

The brigade of Persian Cossacks has always sufficed for the maintenance of order in Tehran.

Our Legation is guarded by six sowars only, and the Russian by fourteen Cossacks.

[13264]

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 131.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 7, 1909.

HIS Majesty's Consul-General at Bushiro should be instructed to protect Ottoman subjects there if necessity arises.

See my telegram No. 100 of the 20th ultimo.

[13280]

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 127.)

Sir,

Berlin, April 6, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith translation of an inspired statement which has appeared in the "Süddeutsche Reichskorrespondenz," contradicting the report as to the recent financial support having been given by Germany to Persia.

The latter portion of the statement contains a strongly worded protest against the allegations in the foreign press as to the anti-Russian tendency taken by German policy during the Near Eastern crisis.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. E. GOSCHEN.

Inclosure in No. 48.

Extract of Article in the "Süddeutsche Reichskorrespondenz."

(Translation.)

THE "Birshcheyi Vvedomosti" is trying, by reference to English sources, to make it appear credible that the Shah of Persia has received a considerable sum of money from Germany. The "Bureau Reuter" received a communication from St. Petersburg to the effect that according to reports received there the German Government have offered to intervene between the Shah and the Persian revolutionaries. On the very day, however, when this announcement reached the Russian capital, Prince Billow made a statement in the Reichstag respecting the position we had taken up with regard to the Persian disturbances and he specially emphasized the fact that we do not intend to interfere in the internal affairs of Persia. This statement removes all grounds for discussion about Germany giving financial help to the Shah in order to continue the war with his own people, and also with regard to our alleged intervention in the Persian party struggles.

False reports which try to add something to our policy in Persia, are comparatively harmless. The clumsy untruths regarding a terrorizing of Russian diplomacy by Germany, a rude note, an ultimatum, threats of German mobilization, and even of a German invasion must be more seriously considered. The authors of these stories know that there is nothing behind them but their own imagination. It appears, however, as if a great part of the European press systematically attempted to outguess Russian public opinion in a mesh of anti-German lies. Our diplomacy has nothing to explain away or to hide with regard to what it did in St. Petersburg towards the maintenance of peace. We do not need to withdraw one word; but we do not want to be credited with statements that have not been made.

[13394]

Mr. D'Arcy to Foreign Office.—(Received April 8.)

Dear Mr. Mallet,

Stannore Hall, Stannore, April 6, 1909.

I HAVE to thank you for your letter of the 3rd instant, which I had an opportunity of discussing with some of the friends interested in Persia with me, and we are quite prepared to fall in with the recommendations that you make subject to the conditions detailed in your letter.

We would, however, beg that when and if the guard is removed a hint be conveyed to the Persian authorities and local Chieftains, something to the effect that, although owing to the amicable relations existing between them and British subjects engaged in their business in Southern Persia the guard in question is being removed, they may expect its prompt reappearance should there be a change in the nature of those relations such as might cause His Majesty's Government to consider a return of the guard desirable.

[1640]

We would also be very much obliged if you would be so good as to explain to us more fully, or to ask the Consul at Ahwaz to explain more fully, what was in his mind when he said that he considered "that difficulties may arise in future, especially when Mr. Reynolds proceeds on leave."

Yours, &c.
(Signed) W. K. D'ARCY.

[13332]

No. 50.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 8.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 6th April, relative to the affairs of the Oil Syndicate.

India Office, April 7, 1909.

Inclosure No. 50.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

India Office, April 6, 1909.

(Telegraphic.) P.
PLEASE see telegram of 15th ultimo from His Majesty's Minister, Tehran, forwarded with Secretary's letter of 19th ultimo, as to Ahwaz oil guard. Telegram of 1st instant from Minister reports that agreement permitting Syndicate to control and pay oil guards has been signed by two Sardars claiming to act for whole body, and that, as best as possible occasion for withdrawing Indian guard is thereby given. Consul at Ahwaz proposes that authority to sanction withdrawal should be given to Cox, provided, after consultation with Consul, he is satisfied that withdrawal is expedient and that agreement is in order and binding on all original signatories. This has concurrence of Foreign Office. Necessary instructions should at once be issued to Resident. Consul telegraphs that opportunity will be fleeting when it comes, and that delay should therefore be avoided.

[13408]

No. 51.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 190.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburg, April 8, 1909.*

YOUR telegram No. 464 [of the 6th instant: Tabreez].
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that he is telegraphing to Russian Charge d'Affaires at Tehran to concert with British Minister as to communication to be made to the Shah meeting the eventuality of massacres and reprisals by his troops and partisans in the event of Tabreez falling.

He adds that the Cossecks for Meshed have not yet crossed the frontier, but that instructions given to them and to those for Asterabad are identical with those given in the case of Resht.

[13415]

No. 52.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 192.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburg, April 8, 1909.*

PERSLA.

Your telegrams Nos. 172 and 471 of the 7th instant.

I am informed by M. Isvolsky that instructions will be sent as to protection being afforded to the lives and property of British subjects by the Russian guard at Meshed.

His Excellency also promises to instruct the Russian Representative at Constantinople to support the representations which Sir G. Lowther is to make there.

No. 53.

[13416]

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 193.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburg, April 8, 1909.*

SUGGESTED joint representations to the Shah.

Russian Government agree to the modifications which we recently suggested, and I have received an *aide-memoire* from M. Isvolsky containing the following programme:—

(R.) 1. The two Governments demand of the Shah the resignation of the Grand Vizier as well as of Ameer Behadur Jung; the last to be removed from all his offices in the Cabinet and at the Palace. If the Shah presses very hard to retain him at the Palace, this point may be conceded.

2. Governments will obtain from Shah [?] group omitted—promise to] re-establish constitutional régime after the introduction of the following reforms.

3. The composition of a Cabinet composed of persons worthy of confidence, and the addition without delay to the Council of Empire of enlightened persons belonging to different parties.

The Council to elaborate and promulgate a new Electoral Law. The Legations will privately submit to the Shah a list of candidates for the Cabinet and the Council. If the Shah chooses people not inspiring the necessary confidence, no money advance will be made to Persia.

4. Two Governments will obtain from the Shah a general amnesty with the limitations previously announced.

5. Two Governments will demand that a date for the elections and for the convocation of the Assembly be immediately announced. These dates to be made known to the whole country without delay.

6. Russian Government may, if they think it necessary, advance to the Persian Government 100,000, as soon as preparatory measures enumerated in paragraphs 1 to 5 have been taken by the Shah. British Government will, if they consider it necessary, make a similar advance to the Persian Government when the elected Assembly will have accepted a foreign loan [?] more or less considerable.

Assistance of the two Governments for the foreign loan will only be granted on condition that a special Commission composed of Directors of British and Russian Banks and of Persian Delegates is constituted. Commission would control expenditure, would supervise elaboration of the annual departmental budgets as well as their application in conformity with the Budget which will be drawn up by the Minister of Finance with the aid of the Commission, and will assist the Minister of Finance in revising and regularizing the law on Mullat.

Russian Government consider that, if the Shah does not accept this programme in all its details, the two Governments should desist from giving the Shah advice and leave him to his own resources, and he can no longer count upon any support from them. In submitting the programme to the Shah the two Representatives should make a categorical declaration to the above effect.

Russian Government would like to hear, as soon as possible, whether His Majesty's Government agree with the above programme so as to send the necessary instructions by telegraph. (End of R.)

It is not quite clear to me whether you are in accord with the views of the Russian Government as to the Special Commission and the functions which it is proposed that it should exercise; I am also not quite clear as to whether its proposed functions would not clash in some measure with the duties assigned to the Financial Adviser and to the Treasurer-General.

[13417]

No. 54.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 194.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburg, April 8, 1909.*

AT our interview to-day M. Isvolsky informed me that a dragonn from the Russian Legation at Tehran is being sent to Kazvin with an escort of five Cossecks for the protection of the officers employed by the road administration at the latter place.

[13405]

No. 55.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 239.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 8, 1909.

BAKHTIARI at Ispahan.

According to a report which I have received from His Majesty's Consul-General at Ispahan, Sardar Assad is expected to arrive there in a week with cavalry said to number 2,000.

On the 5th instant two of the Khans from Tehran left Kashan for Ispahan. They will be met at Nenehlikhar by several Khans from Ispahan. The Bakhtiari at Ispahan announce their intention of starting "at the new moon" (viz., the 20th instant) on their march on Tehran.

[13414]

No. 56.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 240.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 8, 1909.

PROTECTION of Bahreinis.

I am afraid that we shall run the risk of raising the general question if I take action in the sense of the last paragraph of your despatch No. 32 of the 17th ultimo. Unless His Majesty's Government are prepared to press the question to an issue I should be loath to do this. (Please see your telegram to Mr. Marling No. 100 of 1908.)

Have we not sufficiently asserted our position in regard to this question for the present by our success in obtaining the withdrawal of the objectionable note?

[13259]

No. 57.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 133.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, April 8, 1909.

YOUR telegram No. 238 [of the 7th instant: Situation at Tabreez].

I agree.

[13526]

No. 58.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 135.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 8, 1909.

COORDINATE to information which has been received by the Russian Government, the population of Tabreez would be ready to capitulate if they could obtain reasonable terms from the Shah, and they suggest that the Consuls-General at Tabreez should be instructed by the British and Russian Representatives at Tehran to report what they consider the most practicable manner of arriving at an agreement between the Royalists and the Nationalists in order to avoid the bloodshed with which the town is now threatened.

[13423]

No. 59.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 9.)

(No. 211.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 9, 1909.

BUSHIRE situation.

In a telegram No. 87,315, dated to-day, His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire reports that yesterday one of the numerous bands which had been brought into the town by Seyyid Murteza got out of control and made a raid on part of the bazaar during the day. Several robberies, some of a considerable quantity of British merchandise, took place during the night. Major Cox adds that in consequence the bazaar was closed to-day.

[13424]

No. 60.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 9.)

(No. 242.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 9, 1909.

SITUATION at Bushire.

I have received the following telegram from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire, No. 316, of the 8th April:—

The position has become still more serious than as reported in my immediately preceding telegram.

My Russian, Turkish and German colleagues have been urgently representing to me to-day the necessity for His Majesty's Government to intervene so as to restore order; and, in any opinion, we should greatly lose prestige were we not to do so.

Seyyid Murteza repudiates all responsibility for the maintenance of order, and the disorderly band of Tufangchis which he has collected are now apparently completely out of hand.

The *bande* fide Constitutional Party, on the other hand, have to-day informed me that they have broken their connection with him, and can no longer be held responsible. They have for the past week been trying to get rid of him or bring him to reason, but without success.

This afternoon I informed Seyyid Murteza that I could no longer believe in his protestations of good faith after his persistent retention of these Tufangchis and their lawless outbreak of last night. I further informed him that I should have to report to my Government that we could no longer rely on the good intentions of the so-called Nationalist leader, and that measures must be taken for the protection of British interests, unless the Tufangchis were immediately disbanded or greatly reduced. He replied this evening that though he still disclaimed all responsibility he was nevertheless doing his utmost to maintain order, that he was now paying off his riflemen and doing his best to get rid of them.

To-night the promiscuous rifle firing of last night is being renewed, and it appears to me to become urgent that we take our own measures for the restoration of order, unless these riotous elements are removed or reduced to-morrow.

If I were to inform the Seyyid and leaders of Tufangchis that His Majesty's ship "Fox" would land men and guns to remove them, if they would not leave of their own accord, I think the threat would be sufficient, if His Majesty's Government were prepared to put it into execution.

I would venture to point out that this is merely a question of suppressing brigandage, and implies no interference with Nationalism.

[13425]

No. 61.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 9.)

(No. 243.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 9, 1909.

BUSHIRE situation.

I have sent the following telegram, No. 85, to His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire to-day:—

"You are authorized to use the threat you suggest in your telegram No. 85/316 of yesterday's date. You may also carry it out if it produces no real improvement in the situation.

"Before landing a force, should it become necessary to do so, you should issue a notification to the effect that it is in the interests of order solely that this step is taken."

Mr. Sabine is being informed of the situation.

[1649]

F

[13426]

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 9.)

(No. 214.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

BUSHIRE situation.

Tehran, April 9, 1909.

Following telegram, No. 87, sent to-day to His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire:—

Please substitute in my telegram No. 85 of to-day the words "for the protection of British subjects and foreigners," for "in the interests of order."

Offensive action should of course be avoided by the troops unless the lives of foreigners are in danger without it, in the event of your being compelled to land a force.

[13505]

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 10.)

Sir,

India Office, April 7, 1909.

IN reply to your letter of the 6th ultimo, I am directed to inclose copy of telegraphic correspondence with the Viceroy respecting M. E. Kitalji's application for a Concession to construct a road from Koh-i-Malik Shah to Nasratabad.

Viscount Morley concurs generally in the views expressed by the Government of India, and thinks it would be desirable to oppose the grant of the Concession.

On the general question of policy involved, I am to say that Viscount Morley would be opposed, for the military and economic reasons referred to by the Government of India, to any ambitious scheme of road construction in these regions. The best course to be pursued in present circumstances appears to be that indicated in Sir A. Hardinge's despatch to the Government of India of the 19th December, 1902, to which you call attention, and to continue, as occasion offers, to urge the Persian authorities to make such improvements in the existing track as are most needed for the purposes of Indian trade. It must, however, be admitted that the efforts of His Majesty's Consul to persuade the local officials to take action have not led to any practical result.

I am, &c.

(Signed) COLIN G. CAMPBELL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 63.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, March 11, 1909.

REPORT from Sir G. Barclay states a Concession for road from Koh-i-Malik Shah to Nasratabad is being sought by Edward Kitalji at Tehran. Kitalji says he will form a British Company to work Concession, but he does not apparently represent any English group. He wishes to negotiate privately, and has not invoked the aid of the British Legation. Apparently he is not qualified for naturalization, although he declares his intention of becoming a British subject. Inquiry is made by Foreign Office as to expediency of opposing application. For Kitalji's antecedents please refer to Preece's letter to Foreign Office of the 15th April, 1907, inclosed with letter of the 10th May, 1907, from Political Secretary, India Office.

Inclosure 2 in No. 63.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P.

March 30, 1909.

YOUR telegram of the 12th March: Road from Nasratabad to Koh-i-Malik Shah. Application of M. Kitalji should, in our opinion, be regarded with suspicion. Genuine Company would never derive benefit from Concession, but it could be used to hamper our trade, to subvert British influence, and to obtain rights amounting

to domination over the Soistan landholders, through whose land would run the only portion of road requiring construction, and whose labour would make the road, if it were constructed. Road dues, moreover, in addition to existing heavy charges for freightage, cannot be borne by trade on this route. On strategical grounds, Concession is strongly opposed by military authorities. I consider that attempt to frustrate application should be made in the interests of trade, no less than on political and military grounds.

[13527]

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 10.)

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Admiralty, April 10, 1909.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram dated 9th instant from the Commander-in-chief, East Indies.

I am, &c.

(Signed) C. I. THOMAS.

Inclosure in No. 64.

Rear-Admiral Sir G. Warrender to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) P.

Bombay, April 9, 1909.

THE Commanding Officer, His Majesty's ship "Fox," reports as follows from Bushire:—

"We have been asked by the Representatives of the foreign Powers to restore order, as continued firing is taking place and mob law prevails in the town. The bazaar has already been sacked."

In reply, the following orders have been sent by me to His Majesty's ship "Fox":—

"The disembarkation of any of the crew of His Majesty's ship 'Fox' for service on shore is not to be allowed unless the state of affairs is serious, and you are to restrict yourself to affording assistance and protection to British and European subjects."

[13545]

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 10.)

(No. 215.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 10, 1909.

THE Shah's jewels.

It is said that Mr. Kitalji and a British subject named Richard are negotiating secretly for the purchase of the Shah's jewels. They are believed to be in the employ of the French firm of jewellers, Cartier.

The success of such a transaction would much strengthen the Shah. The transfer of money to Tehran would be difficult except through the Imperial Bank of Persia or the Russian Bank, and I would suggest that the Imperial Bank might be requested to demand a prohibitive rate for any considerable transfer to Kitalji or Richard. M. Sabine is suggesting a similar course to his Government with regard to the Russian Bank.

[13546]

No. 66.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 10.)

(No. 246.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 10, 1909.

ROYALIST troops at Kashan.

I learn that the Royalist troops now at Kashan under the command of Prince Farman Farnia's deputy number some 1,600. It is an even chance whether they will fight Samsan-es-Sultanch or go over to his side.

[13547]

No. 66^a.*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 10.)*

(No. 247.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 10, 1909.

SITUATION at Tabreez.

I have asked Mr. Consul-General Wratishlaw for his observations in regard to the suggestion of the Russian Government conveyed to me in your telegram No. 135 of the 8th instant.

As the result of *pourparlers* carried on by the Nationalists direct with the Shah the party in favour of peace at Tabreez are sending delegates to-day to open negotiations at Basimindi.

[13425]

No. 67.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 483.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 10, 1909.

INFORM the Russian Government of the substance of telegrams Nos 241, 242, 243, and 244 from Tehran of the 9th instant, which have been repeated to you.

[13425]

No. 68.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.^a

(No. 151.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 10, 1909.

IF the German Government make any inquiry on the subject, you may inform them that, in case the necessity arises, His Majesty's Government have authorized their Consul-General at Bushire to have men landed from His Majesty's ship. This measure would be taken solely for the protection of foreigners.

[13425]

No. 69.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 134.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, April 10, 1909.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 241, 242, 243 and 244 [all of the 9th instant]: Bushire.

I approve your instructions to His Majesty's Representative at Bushire.

[13554]

No. 70.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 11.)

(No. 248.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 11, 1909.

THE Shah's jewels.

Referring to my telegram of yesterday, Mr. Kitahji is properly impressed by the resentment which would be felt by the Nationalists at the purchase of the Shah's jewels.

I have now received from him a written assurance that he will not enter upon any such transaction.

[13555]

No. 71.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 11.)

(No. 249.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 11, 1909.

NEGOTIATIONS between Tabreez and the Shah.

I have received the following telegram, No. 72, of 10th instant, from His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez:—

"The Nationalist party will probably still hold out for a Constitution, though any terms satisfactorily guaranteeing lives and property would be acceptable to the bulk of the population.

"I think, with reference to your telegram No. 33 of to-day, that we should wait for a request from the Nationalists, or at the least a favourable opportunity, before offering mediation. In the meantime I might, with my Russian colleague, agree on the suggestions to be made, and find out unofficially from the Nationalists what terms they would be willing to accept.

"It is, I presume, the desire of our two Governments that any action should be entirely confined to the British and Russian Consulates.

"May I mention this matter to the Russian Consul-General, with whom I am on the best of terms?"

I presume that it would be the wish of the Russian Government that the two Consuls should act alone in the event of their being called on for mediation. My Russian colleague has no instructions, and I have told Mr. Wratishlaw to await orders before taking any action.

Reference is to my telegram No. 247.

[13556]

No. 72

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 11.)

(No. 250.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 11, 1909.

LANDING of bluejackets at Bushire.

I have received the following telegram from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire No. 321 of 10th instant:—

"As no serious reply had been received to the ultimatum, which was delivered yesterday at 5 p.m., in the terms approved by you, I had a Proclamation made according to your instructions, and 100 men were landed from the ships, the *Intafagh*, being still on the island and less order control than ever. All Europeans who had need of them have been provided with guards.

"There was no opposition to the landing, which was effected without a hitch, fifty men being received at the custom-house and fifty at the town Residency."

^a Also to Sir G. Lowther, No. 222, Telegraphic, *mutatis mutandis*.

[13557]

No. 73.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 12.)

(No. 251.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 12, 1909.

TABREEZ situation.

My telegram No. 249 of to-day.

I have received a telegraphic report from Mr. Consul-General Wratislaw to the effect that the German Consular Agent has offered his services as intermediary at Basimch. The Tabreez Local Assembly, on the ground that outside interference is not desired, have declined his offer.

The post of German Consular Agent was only created a few weeks ago.

[13416]

No. 74.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 486.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 12, 1909.

It would be better if the proposal with regard to the Financial Commission could be reserved for decision at a later date, so that the composition and the duties of the Commission could be more fully discussed by the British and Russian Governments in consultation with the Financial Adviser to the Persian Government and our Representative at Tehran.

The criticism which I have to make with regard to this proposal is that the two Governments would be making themselves practically responsible for the Government of Persia, and that, if it were accepted, the appointment of managers of banks in Persia—institutions of which the object is to make money—might be unwise.

With regard to the rest of the proposals I have no objection to make, and you may urge the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to instruct his Representative at Tehran to concert with His Majesty's Minister for joint representation on the subject.

In the matter of the Financial Commission, you should ask him to defer giving a decision.

[13638]

No. 75.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 19.)

Sir.

Tehran, March 16, 1909.

As reported in my telegram No. 153 of to-day, my Russian colleague was received in private audience by the Shah yesterday. I am indebted to M. Sabline for the following details of this audience.

His Majesty expressed concern at the delay in the representations which are to be made by the two Legations as the outcome of the *pourparlers* now proceeding between London and St. Petersburg, and to which His Majesty appeared to look as offering him a means of escape from the almost desperate situation in which he finds himself. He asked M. Sabline whether he could not in the meantime give him advice as to the course he should follow. M. Sabline replied that it would tend to relieve the situation if His Majesty gave his consent to a proposal submitted to him by the Minister for Foreign Affairs that a meeting should be held of persons representing different classes and parties to consider the situation. With regard to this proposal, I should explain that, in bringing it to the notice of the two Legations, Saad-ed Dowleh had explained that the object he had in view was that the meeting should result in such a pronouncement in favour of the restoration of a constitutional régime as could not be disregarded.

In reply to M. Sabline, His Majesty promised his consent to the proposed meeting.

The Shah then related to M. Sabline the following most improbable story. He said that he had been approached by the German Legation with promises of support if

No. 73 A.

[13558]

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 12.)

(No. 252.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 12, 1909.

TABREEZ situation.

I have received the following telegram, No. 73, from His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez:—

"The Anjuman professes to be very sanguine as to the possibility of relief by the force from Salmas, which is said to number 3,000 men (this is probably exaggerated), including—as well as Persians—Kurds, Turks, and Armenians. According to a letter received from this force, it is about to take the offensive."

[13559]

No. 73 B.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 12.)

(No. 253.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 12, 1909.

BUSHIRE situation.

I have received the following telegram, No. 327, from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire:—

"News reaches me to-day of the approaching appearance of the Daria Begi, who has been appointed Governor by the Shah. He is thought at present to be at Bagdad. Could you by any means get his progress stopped by the Tehran authorities?"

"As the Tangistanis have for the greater part, temporarily at least, left Bushire, I was about to make proposals for the removal of Seyyid Murtza, a step which would insure the restoration of order, when the above news arrived. In these circumstances, I am afraid that the disposal of the Tufangchis and the expulsion of Seyyid Murtza would only facilitate the entry of the Daria Begi into Bushire by Bander Kig or some other route, and the consequent reacquisition of the town to the Shah's interests. The Nationalists' faith in us would thus be greatly weakened, as they would certainly imagine that our recent action had been inspired by the wish to restore the old régime in Bushire."

In reply, I have telegraphed to His Majesty's Consul-General as follows:—

"I am informing the Persian Government that the bluejackets who have been landed at Bushire are there solely to protect the lives and property of foreign subjects. They cannot, therefore, if the Nationalists should seek to prevent the arrival of the Daria Begi, interfere in any way with their resistance. I have telegraphed at the same time to His Majesty's Consul at Bagdad to inform the Daria Begi in the above sense."

I do not feel at liberty to use stronger language than this to the Persian Government without your instructions, although it is most undesirable that Daria Begi should be enabled to take up his post by the restoration of order due to our bluejackets, and moreover disorders may break out afresh on his arrival.

He would, however, in normal circumstances be a good enough Governor.

[13560]

No. 73 C.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 12.)

(No. 254.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 12, 1909.

FOOD for foreign subjects at Tabreez.

I have received the following from His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez:—

"A meeting was held at the British Consulate-General yesterday, at which French, Turkish, Russian, and American Consuls were present. It was decided that we should appeal, in view of existing circumstances, to our various Legations to send us

[1619]

G*

171 kharvars of flour—seven for the use of British subjects in the town and the remainder for foreign subjects and their households.

"The following is confidential. Though the Local Assembly has as yet taken no definite steps in the matter, I understand that it has already had under discussion the advisability of warning the Consuls that food can no longer be supplied to foreign subjects by the town. The British subjects are not so hard-pressed as the others, particularly French and Russian, though the question of finding food for my escort may arise at any moment, and we have considerable difficulty in supplying our servants. I, however, thought it best to fall in with my colleagues' suggestions."

Notes to the above effect have been presented to the Persian Government by the five Representatives.

I have asked, after consultation with His Majesty's Consul-General, that general instructions should be issued to Ain-ed-Dowleh to provide, in the event of an application by Mr. Wratislaw, a safe-conduct for all British subjects.

Private information has reached the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires, who has 500 nationals at Tabreez, that the Shah will refuse to allow the entry of flour into the town. I presume that in this case we cannot claim it as a right.

he would enter "into closer relations with the Legation." The support was to take the following form: Germany would induce the bastis to leave the Turkish Embassy, would persuade the Mujtaheds at Kerberla and Mejez to change their attitude and advice against the Constitution, and finally would bring about the withdrawal of the Turkish troops from the Turco-Persian frontier.

At the conclusion of the audience the Shah made some unfavourable remarks on the Anglo-Russian Agreement, which he said was greatly to Russia's prejudice. M. Sabline, in reply, pointed out how much it was to Persia's benefit. Persia, he said, had become anything but a desirable neighbour to Russia, owing to the present misgovernment, and had it not been for the self-denying arrangement between the two Great Powers, Russia would long ago have intervened in Azerbaijan.

It may be asserted with some confidence that the Shah would regard this fact as a most unwelcome result of the Agreement.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

P.S. *March 25, 1909.*—Since writing the above, I learn from M. Sabline that, when at his audience with the Shah, he informed His Majesty that forty Cossacks were being sent to reinforce the Consular guard at Resht, His Majesty said that 700 at least should be sent. He then asked M. Sabline to telegraph to St. Petersburg that His Majesty invited the Russian Government to send a strong force to Resht to punish the rebellious inhabitants.

G. B.

[13640]

No. 76.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 51.)

Sir,

Tehran, March 19, 1909.

MR. CHURCHILL reports that he delivered the Ziles-Sultan's box to His Highness at Nice on 27th ultimo, and obtained his receipt for it.

During the course of conversation His Highness touched upon the political situation in Persia, and expressed his gratitude for having been prevented from returning to Persia at this critical juncture. He hoped that England and Russia would soon be able to restore order, and that he might be enabled to return to Persia to attend to his personal affairs. His Highness stated that his most ardent wish was that His Majesty's Government should bring about a better understanding between him and the Russian Government. He felt that the Russians looked upon him with quite unjustified suspicion and hostility. He had no desire to take any political part in Persia, and did not aim at acquiring the throne. He had considerable landed property in the neighbourhood of Isfahan, and would wish to live there on his estates in a private capacity. He was prepared to give identic written assurances to the British and Russian Governments that he would under no circumstances put himself forward as a candidate for the Persian throne, and he hoped that once the air had been cleared he would cease to be the object of hostility on the part of the Russian Agents in Persia as had been the case hitherto.

As to his property known as Saadabad, near Tehran, he did not consider it very important, and he was quite satisfied to know that the question would be amicably arranged between the two Legations at Tehran. He only wanted fair play in the matter, and he hoped that if His Majesty's Government could help him to dispel the suspicion entertained against him by the Russians the trifling matter of his garden would right itself automatically.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[13641]

No. 77.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 52.)

Sir,

Tehran, March 19, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Ahwaz reporting certain demands made by Serdar Mulkashim, Illeggi of the

Bakhtiari tribes, in connection with the payment of the February instalment due from the Oil Syndicate, and the reply returned to him.

The maintenance of Samsam-es-Sultaneh in the position of Ilkhani, of which I was assured by the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, enabled me to authorize Captain Lorimer, who had telegraphed for instructions, to allow the procedure of payment of the instalment by the Imperial Bank of Persia to take its normal course.

I have addressed a despatch to Captain Lorimer approving the terms of his reply to Sardar Muhtashen as reported in the inclosed despatch, which, I venture to suggest, might usefully be communicated to the Oil Syndicate.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 77.

Consul Lorimer to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 7.)
Sir,

Ahmed, February 18, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that I have recently received a batch of letters from Gholam Hussein Khan, Sardar Muhtashen, relating to matters connected with the affairs of the Oil Syndicate.

1. The demands which he makes proceed directly from the estrangement which has arisen between Samsam-es-Sultaneh and the rest of the Khans, the same cause which led to the principal of our difficulties in 1907.

2. Gholam Hussein Khan in his present letters claims:—

(1.) That the February oil instalment should be paid to him and Jafar Quli Khan (oldest son of Haji Ali Quli Khan).

(2.) That half of it is due to himself personally.

(3.) That it should be paid in Arabistan and not Ispahan; failing which he and Jafar Quli Khan inform me that they will withdraw the guards and repudiate responsibility for what may occur. He admits that Samsam has not been deposed, but states that he is in a state of rebellion against the Government, and that his responsibilities as regards the tribes have been made over to Jafar Quli Khan, by whom it is not made clear.

The above is, of course, only the essence of his letters which are as usual weighted with unfounded statements and intentional misrepresentations.

4. I have replied:—

(1.) That we can only pay the oil instalments in accordance with the expressed desires of the four signatories of the original Agreement.

(2.) That following out this rule we have since 1906 paid the money jointly to the Ilkhani and the Ilbeggi.

(3.) That we have nothing to do with the division of the money which is entirely a question among the Khans themselves.

(4.) That on receiving a proper written authority from the four signatories we shall pay the whole or any part of the money to any particular person specified.

(5.) That we are in no way bound in our agreement to pay the instalment in Arabistan or any specified place; perhaps he is confusing it with payment which the Khans are under obligation to make to Messrs. Lynch Brothers at Ahwaz, an obligation which they have always, except on one occasion, repudiated.

(6.) That we have acted in the only way that was legally possible for us in regard to the February instalment, and are in no way responsible for his inability to get possession of any portion of it due to him.

(7.) That the instalment being paid for the provision of guards and the practical recognition of their responsibility by the Khan we shall most assuredly stop payment from the moment that guards are withdrawn or responsibility repudiated, and in case that any injury, small or great, being subsequently sustained by the Syndicate satisfaction will be demanded from the whole of the Khans.

5. In conclusion I may add that the Khans' guards are as unsatisfactory as ever and are never, or rarely, available for escort work.

I have also learnt that Gholam Hussein Khan has been taking the so-called head of the guards to task for allowing the tribes to cultivate near the oil works, it being the

intention of the Khans to force the Syndicate to pay compensation for all land in the neighbourhood.

Such an attempt would be in direct contravention of the terms of their agreement under which the Syndicate can only be called upon to pay for cultivated land actually occupied.

This question has not, however, in the present case come as yet under discussion.

6. If the differences between the Khans continue we are likely to have trouble, but I have no suggestions to make as to our line of action beyond such as are implied in my answers to Gholam Hussein Khan of which I have just given an abstract.

I have, &c.
(Signed) D. L. LORIMER, Captain.

[13642]

No. 78.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 53.)
Sir,

Tehran, March 19, 1909.

In my telegram No. 407 of the 30th November, 1908, I stated my intention of presenting to the Persian Government a claim on behalf of a Bahraini as soon as I had obtained from the Persian Government the substitution of an amended communication for the objectionable note respecting Bahrain addressed to this Legation by Mushir-ed-Dowleh on the 21st April, 1908, and in my despatch No. 10 of the 22nd January. I reported that the desired substitution had been effected.

I ought now to inform you that on a reconsideration of the matter I have refrained from presenting the Bahraini claim as originally intended. The claim was in respect of the seizure and confiscation by the Customs authorities of the Persian Gulf of a Bahraini dhow for breach of the Customs Regulations, and on discussing the matter with M. Mornard, I found that there could be no doubt that the confiscation of the dhow, though a harsh punishment for the offence committed, was technically justified. M. Mornard, moreover, promised to consider whether he could not, as an act of grace, give orders for the return to the owner of the dhow of a portion of the price realized by the dhow, and orders have now been given for the return of 200 toman to the owner. Assuming that it is not desired by His Majesty's Government to raise the general question of the sovereignty of Bahrain at this moment, when it would be inopportune to take the steps which would be necessary to press it to an issue, I have, in view of the considerations that the case is far from strong and that a partial remission of the penalty has been ordered by M. Mornard, abstained from representing the case officially to the Persian Government.

The Persian Government can be in no doubt as to there being any question of the departure of His Majesty's Government from the attitude with regard to Bahrain as explained in Mr. Marling's note of the 30th March, 1908, but as soon as I learn that the terms of the amended note substituted for that of Mushir-ed-Dowleh of the 9th April, 1908, is acceptable to His Majesty's Government, I shall, when informing the Minister for Foreign Affairs that this is the case, make a further statement in the sense of the last paragraph of your despatch No. 17 of the 16th ultimo.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[13643]

No. 79.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 54.)
Sir,

Tehran, March 20, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of the note which I addressed to the Persian Government in February when it was rumored here that Amin-ed-Dowleh contemplated a general attack on the town of Tabreez. I also inclose copy of the note in which, in accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram No. 89 of the 5th instant, I repeated the warning to the Persian Government in regard to His

Majesty's Consulate-General and the lives and property of British subjects in the town, together with the reply which I have now received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 79.

Sir G. Barclay to Saad-ed-Dowleh.

M. le Ministre,

Tehran, February 21, 1909.

IT is rumoured in certain circles in Tehran that Am-ed-Dowleh is about to attack Tabreez.

I do not know what credit is to be attached to these rumours, but I feel it my duty to request your Excellency to cause most stringent orders to be given to all Commanders of the Shah's troops that in the event of any attack on the town the British Consulate-General must be most scrupulously respected, and to remind your Excellency that the Persian Government will be held responsible for any injury that may be suffered by British subjects and interests.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 79.

Sir G. Barclay to Saad-ed-Dowleh.

M. le Ministre,

Tehran, March 9, 1909.

I AM instructed by His Majesty's Government to state that they will hold the Persian Government responsible for any injury to His Majesty's Consulate-General at Tabreez due to the action of the Shah's troops.

I have, as your Excellency will remember, already had the honour to address the Persian Government as to the necessity for scrupulously respecting the Consulate-General, but as I have received no answer to this communication I venture to refer to the matter again.

I avail, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 3 in No. 79.

Saad ed-Dowleh to Sir G. Barclay.

Received March 19, 1909.]

IN reply to your Excellency's note of the 20th instant respecting the instructions received by you from the British Government in regard to Tabreez and the proceedings of the Persian troops, I have the honour to state that the matter has been submitted by me to His Majesty the Shah, and necessary orders have been telegraphed to the proper authorities.

I am also ordered to inform you at the same time that the Persian Government guarantees the security of the lives and property of the members of the British Consulate-General as long as the Consulate-General at Tabreez and the British subjects do not support the insurgents, do not associate with them, and do not appear among the insurgents who are in defiance with the troops.

I avail, &c.
(Signed) SAAD-ED-DOWLEH

[13644]

No. 80.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 55.)
Sir,

Tehran, March 22, 1909.

M. BIZOT has completed his financial Report, and although he has not yet submitted it to the Shah, he has been good enough to inform me very confidentially of his conclusions, which may be summarized as follows:—

The nearest approach to a Budget which he can obtain shows a deficit for this year of 36,000*l*. The real annual deficit must, however, be much larger owing to expenditure which does not figure in the Budget.

A series of annual deficits has produced a floating debt which is continually increasing.

Besides the Russian loan of 32,500,000 roubles and our own of 290,000*l*., there was last October debt of at the very least 1,850,000*l*., and this has since then considerably increased. This is exclusive of foreign claims, *e.g.* postal and road robberies (which must amount to a large sum). This debt consists partly of advances from the two banks, some of which were originally made to individuals, principally to Cabinet Ministers and Imperial Princes, but have been recognized by the present Government (and which the Assembly will doubtless dispute), and partly of unmet *havalahs* (orders for payment drawn on different branches of the revenue).

As remedial measures M. Bizot recommends—

1. That the Budget should be properly prepared;
2. That the European Treasurer-General should be appointed to enforce its application; and
3. The establishment of a "Cour des Comptes."

This Budget would inevitably show a deficit unless—

- (a.) The *malian*, which is in towns ridiculously low, were increased;
- (b.) The list of pensions were revised; and
- (c.) The advances from the two banks to the Government some 1,200,000*l*., which bear enormous interest, were converted.

Even thus, owing to the cost of necessary reforms, there would still be a deficit for some years.

A loan will be necessary for the conversion of the bank's advances, for settlement of other creditors' claims, and to meet the cost of reforms. Its amount cannot be determined until a programme of reforms has been prepared and the claims of these other creditors, principally holders of unmet *havalahs*, have been examined. M. Bizot has been shown a statement, according to which the outstanding *havalahs* previous to 1908 amounted to 540,000*l*. This sum must have increased since then, but there would doubtless be considerable reductions on the examination of the claims of the holders.

In conclusion, M. Bizot emphasizes the desirability of the prompt appointment of the European Treasurer-General.

The general situation is so uncertain that it would be premature to lay down any definite programme for putting Persia on its legs financially, but in view of the stage which the Anglo-Russian *pourparlers* in regard to the line to be taken by the two Powers, especially in regard to the question of financial assistance, have reached, and on the perhaps doubtful assumption that the situation will not get out of hand, but develop on peaceful lines, I ventured in my telegram No. 132 of the 16th instant to indicate, though without any attempt at precision, what, in my opinion, would be the most efficacious manner of helping Persia with money. My suggestions were based on the principle, which I believe to be indisputably sound, that, except for the purpose of securing Mohammed Ali on his throne, it would be quite useless until the day, probably still far distant, when a nucleus of honest Persians shall have made its way into the ranks of the Administration, to give this country money unless the handling of it is restricted to Departments strengthened by a European element with the backing of a popular Assembly. The only Department where the introduction of a European element is in sight is the financial. The Shah has given his consent to the appointment of a European Treasurer-General and Inspector, and whatever may be the attitude of the next Assembly towards foreign assistance in the other branches of the

Administration, it may fairly be hoped that if, by the time it meets, these two officers are on the spot, it will recognize an accomplished fact and support them in their efforts to reform the finances. I cannot elicit from M. Bizot any estimate of how much would be required for this urgently needed reform, but of course nothing like a sum of 400,000*l.* would be needed.

I should have liked to postpone any further advance until the introduction of a European element into the administration of the gendarmerie and police whose reform comes next in urgency.

I notice, however, from Sir A. Nicolson's telegram No. 152 that Russia is quite resolved to make an advance to the Shah's Government as soon as certain preliminaries for the reintroduction of Parliamentary government have been completed. Of the possible developments of the Anglo-Russian *pourparlers* it would, in my opinion, be almost the worst that the Russian Government should separate itself from us in this matter of financial assistance. If she alone gives money, presumably she alone will have a voice in its employment. Not only this, but it will confirm the general suspicions of a divergence of views between the two Governments, and thus greatly weaken the effect of our joint advice. Indeed, sooner than that Russia should act alone I think that it will be worth while, even at some apparent sacrifice of consistency, to meet Russia half way. My telegram Nos. 119 and 172 suggest a course, which, if indorsed by His Majesty's Government, might receive the Russian Government's assent. This course might, in circumstances other than those now present, lead to friction between the two Legations, but M. Subline has always worked so cordially and loyally with me that, even though there are other Russian influences at work in Tehran than those of the Government's Representative, I have strong hope that we should find it possible to agree as to the times at which the purse strings should be loosened or drawn.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[13645]

No. 81.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 54.)
Sir,

Tehran, March 23, 1909.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 31 of the 23rd ultimo, I have the honour to submit a Report on events at Resht during the past month.

As reported in my telegram No. 127 of the 1st March the Minister for Foreign Affairs communicated to me, in a note dated the 28th February, a telegram addressed by the Council of Ministers to the Ulema, Notables, and inhabitants of Gililan denouncing the Sepahdar, exhorting them to abstain from insurrection, and threatening innocent and guilty alike with loss of life and property in the event of a concentration of the Imperial forces on Resht to suppress the movement.

On the 2nd March the Acting Vice-Consul at Resht telegraphed that for the time being there was no fresh development, but that twenty or thirty Caucasians arrived by every steamer, and that the mail steamer due that day was expected to bring fifty Russian Cossacks as a Consulate guard. The guard did not, however, land until the 20th March. On the 22nd March I received a telegram from the Provincial Assembly of Gililan, copies of which had been sent to the other foreign Representatives in Tehran, protesting the constant efforts of the Nationalists to insure the safety of foreign subjects and against the dispatch of the Russian Cossacks sent to guard the Consulate, which, they stated, had caused great excitement and might lead to trouble.

In conclusion, I beg to transmit copy of a Memorandum by Mr. Churchill reporting on the situation and the control established by the Nationalists over the northern portion of the Resht-Tehran road, along which he recently passed on his return from Europe.

I may add that Panov, the Bulgarian ex-Konitaji and newspaper correspondent, who returned to Persia at the head of the Caucasians at Resht after having been deported by the Russian Legation, has now been arrested by the revolutionaries on the, I believe, well-grounded suspicion that he has previously been employed by the Russian Government as an *agent provocateur*; he has now left Resht for Mazanderau.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 81.

Memorandum by Mr. Churchill.

WHEN I passed through Resht a few days ago I called on Serdar Homayun and Serdar Motamid, from whom I received accounts of the events which occurred there on and after the 8th February last. I also called on Sepahdar, who had expressed a wish to see me, but a member of the Revolutionary Committee was present throughout the interview.

It was made quite clear to me, both from what I saw myself and from the accounts I received from various sources, that the entire movement at Resht was planned in the Caucasus and carried out by a band of determined Caucasians not exceeding fifty in number. These have been added to during the six weeks which have since elapsed, and I was told, now number roughly 350. In the meantime a considerable number of Persians who were in exile have come to Resht, including several who took refuge at His Majesty's Legation last June. Three brothers, the nephews of Serdar Mansur, known respectively as Muiz-es-Sultan, Amid-es-Sultan, and Kerim Khan, have throughout taken a very prominent part with the Caucasians.

The town of Resht I found in a normal condition as regards public security. The bazaars were open and trade was pursuing a normal course. Red flags were displayed at nearly every house door, and those not flying the revolutionary emblem either displayed a Russian or a Turkish flag, indicating that the inhabitants claimed the protection of those Powers. I also observed two British flags.

Sepahdar, in the course of conversation, declared that he was determined to support the Constitution, and that in the meantime he would maintain order in Resht so long as troops were not sent against him. If, however, troops were sent, he could not answer for the consequences, though he seemed confident of being able to deal with any force the Shah might be able to send. I deprecated such acts as the detention of Shoa-es-Sultaneh, and the Sepahdar informed me that he had so far opposed this step on the part of the Caucasians, that he had threatened to abandon Resht if they persisted in their course.

It was quite clear that the apparently fortuitous arrival of Sepahdar on the scene on the occasion of the murder of the Governor had been carefully prearranged by the Caucasians, but I am equally convinced that neither Serdar Homayun nor Serdar Motamid were taken into the confidence of the conspirators, though each, I believe, to be the general suspicion. It is inconceivable that these two timid persons should have gone to the card party at Mudirich on the fatal Monday (the 8th February) knowing that a band of Caucasians would forcibly enter the house with the determination to kill the Governor and one or two others supposed to be reactionaries. They would, if they had been in the plot, most certainly have found some excuse to avoid being under fire and liable to be hit by a stray bullet, or even shot by mistake, as the Caucasians did not even know any of the party by sight. Muiz-es-Sultan directed the party at Mudirich, and himself found the Governor who was attempting to hide, and held him by the coat while the Caucasians killed him.

The road to Tehran, for about 100 miles up to Yuzbashieli, I found to be under the control of Caucasians. I found no barricades on the road, but at several points trenches had been made and measures had been taken to defend the passage of the Mঞ্জil Bridge, as well as several other easily defended points on the road. I was stopped at four points by small bands of men and questioned as to my business, my destination, and the nature of my luggage. I, however, had no difficulty in satisfying them, though I was not in possession of the usual pass from the War Committee at Resht, which all travellers who are authorized to leave Resht are now given. I counted over sixty armed men on the road, and the advanced body near Yuzbashieli, which was returning in the direction of Resht, after having killed a Kurdish Khan sent there by the Shah, and one of his men on the night of the 12th March, was composed of thirty-four mounted men. They appeared to me to be all Caucasians, and I even noticed among them two fair men of an unmistakably European appearance. In fact, at one place where I was stopped, the leader of the band addressed me in German, and from his personal appearance might well have been a German.

On the steamer by which I crossed from Baku to Enzeli there were about thirty Caucasians, who shortly after we left Baku produced a number of arms. They received quite an ovation at Resht from their colleagues. It was told by the Sepahdar and others in Resht that these men were constantly coming in, and I estimate that there

were about 300 of them in Resht already. I noticed that they had Persian passports, and I gather that these are obtained from the Persian Consuls in the Caucasus by a process of intimidation.

(Signed) G. P. CHURCHILL.

Tehran, March 18, 1909.

[13646]

No. 82.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 57.)
Sir,

Tehran, March 23, 1909.

I VENTURE to submit, with reference to your despatch No. 19 of the 16th February, a brief report upon the forcible search for arms in Messrs. Ziegler's premises at Isfahan.

On the morning of the 1st February the ferrash bashi of Samsar-es-Sultaneh, accompanied by two Seyyids and several armed Bakhtiari, entered Messrs. Ziegler's premises, and while conducting a forcible search for arms and ammunition, opened three cases of goods, cutting their tin linings.

Samsar-es-Sultaneh at first asserted that the facts had been misrepresented to His Majesty's Consul-General, but when pressed by Mr. Grahame, agreed that an examination should be conducted by the Karguzar on the 6th February. At the appointed hour Mr. Grahame, Messrs. Ziegler's agent, and his witnesses appeared, but none of the defendants attended. Mr. Grahame accordingly claimed two apologies, firstly to Messrs. Ziegler for the incident of the 1st February, and secondly from Samsar-es-Sultaneh personally to himself for the non-appearance of the defendants at the Karguzari.

On the morning of the following day Samsar-es-Sultaneh called on His Majesty's Consul-General and expressed his regret, and on the 8th February a Bakhtiari Khan accompanied by Seyyid Mossih, the prime instigator of the incident, apologized to Messrs. Ziegler's agent, assuring him that there would be no repetition of such proceedings.

With the delivery of these apologies, which were ample and satisfactory, I considered the incident definitely closed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[13647]

No. 83.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 58.)
Sir,

Tehran, March 24, 1909.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 182 of the 22nd instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of the joint note which my Russian colleague and I have addressed to the Persian Government in regard to the recent proceedings of Rahim Khan in the neighbourhood of Julfa.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 83.

Sir G. Barclay and M. Sahline to Saad-eh-Dowleh.

M. le Ministre,

Tehran, March 22, 1909.

THE British and Russian Legations have the honour to address the Persian Government in the name of humanity in regard to the proceedings of Rahim Khan, leader of His Majesty's irregular troops.

The two Legations learn that these troops have pillaged and burnt all the villages in the neighbourhood of Julfa and that 1,000 persons, the majority women and children, have been forced to take refuge on an island in the Aves river, where they are in danger owing to the probable flooding of the river.

Rahim Khan's methods of making war are entirely to be regretted, and the two

Legations feel it their duty to point out to the Government of the Shah how desirable it is, not only in the interests of humanity, but also in the Shah's own interests, in order to avoid producing a deplorable impression throughout the civilized world, that the Shah himself should give precise and formal orders to Rahim Khan to abstain from acts which discredit the Government of His Imperial Majesty.

[13648]

No. 84.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 59.)
Sir,

Tehran, March 24, 1909.

ON the 25th ultimo an attack on Tabreez was commenced by the forces of Ain-ed-Dowleh and those of the Governor of Maragha. The bombardment, which continued during the 25th and 26th, was without effect on the defences of the town, and the Royalist forces were ultimately repulsed with heavy loss.

This attempt on the part of the Shah's troops to reduce Tabreez was no doubt the attack which, as reported in my despatch No. 38 of the 25th ultimo, it was so confidently hoped at Bagh-i-Shah would bring about the fall of the town. The failure to accomplish his purpose forced Ain-ed-Dowleh to retire to Basminch, and no further fighting occurred until the 5th instant, when the Maragha force began an assault from the direction of Kurumelik, which it had recently occupied. At the same time the Basminch artillery bombarded the Hissah quarter. The bombardment was without effect, and the artillery eventually retired from their positions. The Maragha force was also repulsed with severe loss. Marand was captured by Mukulis on the 5th or 6th, and Julfa by Karadaghli under Rahim Khan on the 15th, but it appears to have been subsequently recaptured by the Nationalists. The destruction of the villages in the neighbourhood of Julfa and the barbarous treatment of the inhabitants by Rahim Khan have, as reported in my telegram No. 182 of the 22nd, formed the subject of a joint representation to the Persian Government by my Russian colleague and myself.

There have also been slight disturbances at Urumia, in consequence of the Governor's unsuccessful reactionary enterprise. The Turks on the frontier have recommenced their aggressions, and a body of Young Turks have entered Salmas with arms and ammunition for the Nationalists, while some others are helping the Nationalists at Kivi against the Maku forces.

On the 3rd instant the telegraph-line of the Indo-European Telegraph Company was cut between Tabreez and Julfa by Rahim Khan. The telegraph employees of the Company were unable to go out of Tabreez and repair the wire, through fear of Rahim Khan's men, and, in spite of the orders which Ain-ed-Dowleh declared he had given, Rahim Khan refused to allow the Tabreez representative of the Company to execute repairs. The Russian Chargé d'Affaires had in the meanwhile made a strong protest to the Persian Government, and had put forward on behalf of the Company a claim of 5000 roubles during the period of interruption. His representations, which I supported, eventually resulted in direct orders being sent to Rahim Khan, and communication on the line was restored on the 19th.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

P.S.—I transmit a copy of a despatch from Mr. Consul-General Wratishaw, giving an account of the fighting on the 25th ultimo and 5th instant. The last paragraph briefly describes the devastation wrought by the Shah's brigades.

G. B.

Inclosure in No. 84.

Consul-General Wratishaw to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 13.)
Sir,

Tabreez, March 7, 1909.

OF the two assaults on Tabreez by the Maragha army under Saad Khan the latter was undertaken with larger forces and pressed with greater determination,

but even in the first, on the 25th February, unexpected courage was shown by the assailants, and though the defenders were never very hard pressed, the presence of Satar Khan in person and several hundred men was necessary before they were finally driven back. The attack was made from Saderud, and the fighting took place in the orchards before the Nationalist outpost at Khatib. One Royalist was taken prisoner, and ten corpses were picked up close to the Nationalist defences. From the traces of blood on the snow it was plain that a larger number of dead and wounded had been removed earlier in the day by their friends. The Nationalists lost three killed and five wounded.

On the 2nd March Samad Khan transferred his head-quarters from Saderud to Karandik, a large village to the east, and considerably nearer to Tabreez, and at daylight on the 5th instant a large mixed force of Chardolshi cavalry and Persian infantry, with one gun, advanced along the roads leading to the suburbs of Ahomai and Hukunabad. They effected an entrance into Hukunabad, but instead of pursuing their advantage the Chardolshis commenced pillaging the houses, and this allowed Nationalist reinforcements time to come up, and by 4 o'clock both attacks were repulsed and the Royalists in full flight. They were even unable to remove the greater part of their lost from Hukunabad, and five prisoners were taken, besides trophies in the shape of Samad Khan's drum and the donkey carrying his hunch. Twelve Royalist corpses were picked up and brought into the town, and their total loss in killed and wounded must have been very considerable.

The Nationalists lost five killed and ten or a dozen wounded. This assault excited great apprehension in Tabreez, as Hukunabad is virtually part of the town, and the Royalists had not previously come so close or shown such determination. A number of mollahs joined the Nationalist forces in the defence, and though it is not to be expected that the several gentlemen did much actual execution, their presence certainly encouraged the fighting men.

On this as on all other occasions Satar Khan showed distinguished personal courage, but he exposes himself far more than should a commander on whose life the whole Nationalist cause in Tabreez depends. In the abortive attempt to open the Julfa road on the 22nd February he was for a time in the greatest danger, being left by the mass of his men with only a handful of Armenians in a critical position, from which he extricated himself with much difficulty. He also proved his humanity on the 5th instant by interlarding at some personal risk to save prisoners from the hands of an infuriated mob.

The proceedings of the Basminch army are quite incomprehensible. On the 25th February they supported the attack on Khatib by a feeble bombardment of the Haidan quarter, which only resulted in two Nationalists being wounded. This bombardment was resumed next day with a similar lack of effect, and the barrage at which the three guns were firing all day was not once hit on either occasion. Some damage was done to the gunners by Nationalist rifle fire.

During the attack on Hukunabad on the 5th Haidan was again bombarded, but on this occasion the Nationalists attacked the position occupied by the Royalist artillery, and the guns were hurriedly withdrawn some time before Samad Khan's assault was repulsed. A determined assault on Haidan would have prevented Baghir Khan, who commands in that direction, from sending reinforcements as he did to Satar, and the latter's position might well have become critical.

The same day a small detachment of Royalist cavalry appeared before the outpost at Khatib, and the defenders withdrew to their inner position, taking their guns with them. The post was, however, recaptured the same day.

From the statements of prisoners it appears that the Royalist soldiers have all been instructed that the Tabreezis have become Bahis, and that it is therefore a religious duty to fight them.

Since the hub-European telegraph line was cut by the Karadaghlihs little is known of the proceedings of these brigands. It is, however, reported, I believe with truth, that they have occupied Marand and are threatening Julfa. They pay no attention to orders given them by Amin al-Dowleh and last week two travellers, a Greek and a Swiss, proceeding to Julfa with a safe-conduct from him were robbed of all their possessions.

The bread question in the town has not yet become acute, though the amount served out is barely sufficient for the daily needs of the population. On the 25th February a baker was executed for selling bread above the rate fixed by the Enjamien, after due warning, and on the next day a reactionary suffered a like fate for treason.

The general state of the country is indescribably bad. From Zanjan to Basminch the villages, who have been despoiled of their all by the Royalist troops, take to the

road and rob in their turn any one they can catch. The Karadaghlihs on the Julfa road have looted everything within reach.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. C. WRATISLAW.

[13649]

No. 85.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 60.)

Tehran, March 24, 1909.

Sir,

THE Nationalist movement has now spread to the ports of the Persian Gulf, Bushire and Bander Abbas have thrown off their allegiance to the Shah and passed without bloodshed under the control of the Nationalist party.

At the end of February the Resident at Bushire reported that Seyed Murteza Ahreud, one of the leading Mollahs in Bushire, was endeavouring to bring about the dispatch of a number of Tangistani tribesmen into Bushire for the purpose of creating a disturbance. Major Cox addressed the local Government urging them to take precautionary measures if there was any truth in the rumour. The Acting Russian Consul-General consulted Major Cox, and further representations were addressed to the Deputy Governor, who replied that he was taking the necessary steps to prevent disturbances.

Major Cox also reported that in the middle of February the Nationalists were threatening to enter Bander Abbas and take possession of the custom-house. For the moment, however, he said the movement was restrained by the fear of foreign intervention in the shape of foreign war-ships, and the visit to Bander Abbas on the 16th February of His Majesty's ship "Persens" had for a few days a calming effect. On the 17th March, however, it was reported to me that, as the result of the pressure from the Mujtaheds of Nejed and the Seyid of Laristan, the Nationalists at Bander Abbas had assumed control of the Government and the customs, the Karguzar being installed as Governor by them. In telegraphing this information the Resident at Bushire stated that he was asking the Senior Naval Officer to dispatch a war-ship to Bander Abbas for the protection of British subjects. Major Cox also stated that he presumed that His Majesty's Consul should recognize the *de facto* Governor, and that British importers clearing merchandise from the custom-house should pay duty to those in a position to enforce it. I replied that His Majesty's Consul should deal with the Karguzar without officially recognizing him as Governor; that he should tell him that the Southern Customs were pledged to his Majesty's Government; that I was informing the Bander Abbas receipts should be paid to the Consulate; that I was informing the Persian Government that I should consider import duties paid to the Nationalists by British merchants as duly remitted, and that I was claiming from the Nationalists the customs receipts on account of the overdue interest on our loan secured on the Southern Customs. Major Cox further reported that the Belgian Customs Director had been offered the choice of catering the Nationalists' service and paying the revenue to them, or leaving the Customs and that he had preferred the latter alternative. Further information was to the effect that order was being effectually maintained, but that danger lay in the fact that everybody in the town was armed, and that armed bands from the interior continued to arrive. On the 23rd March His Majesty's Consul at Bander Abbas reported an interview with the Karguzar, who had inquired whether His Majesty's Government wished that the whole of the customs duties should be handed over, and asked whether we should not be satisfied with the daily payment to the Consulate of half of the receipts. Captain Shakespear, in reporting this conversation, urged that it was desirable in the interests of tranquillity to leave the Nationalists a portion of the customs receipts for the payment of the men under arms, and I accordingly authorized him to use his discretion in the matter.

The rapid march of events at Bander Abbas appears to have brought affairs at Bushire to a head. On the 17th March the Resident reported that the populace there had hitherto hesitated to obey the dictates of the Nationalists, but that it seemed probable that the news from Bander Abbas would prompt them to follow suit. The Governor of the town was absent, and it was scarcely to be expected that the garrison, consisting of 200 Persian soldiers from Isfahan, would offer serious support to the Customs Department or the local authorities against the Nationalist party. Major Cox added that he had discussed the situation with his Russian colleague, and though for the moment there was no reason to apprehend deliberate molestation of foreigners, yet, in

view of the possibility of general lawlessness, and the fact that the revenues of the Bushire customs were pledged to us, it might be prudent to have a war-ship with easy call for the protection of our interests. I reported this in my telegram No. 166 of the 18th March, and received your reply telegram No. 160 of the 20th March, stating that the Admiralty had been asked to send a gun-boat to Bushire and to instruct it, as well as the gun-boat at Bandar Abbas, to protect all foreigners in case of disturbances.

On the 19th March I received a telegram from the Resident forwarding an urgent message from the Kargazur to the Minister for Foreign Affairs with a request that it might be communicated to his Excellency by His Majesty's Legation. In this message the Kargazur described the difficulties of his position and stated that the troops could not be relied on for checking the Nationalists, and that the danger of disturbance was hourly increasing. He suggested that either application should be made to His Majesty's Legation for assistance in keeping order, or that he should be authorized to make some temporary arrangement with the Nationalists.

On the 22nd March it was reported to me that Seyyed Murteza Ahmadi having introduced a number of Tangestani men, has peacefully taken over control of the Government on behalf of the Nationalists, that the principal local officials were resigning, and that, though the Customs has so far not been interfered with, the question of taking them over was under consideration. Captain Trevor, who was in charge in the absence of Major Cox at Mohammadi, added that he was informing the Seyed that the customs receipts were pledged to His Majesty's Government. I replied that I had no objection to the Nationalists taking over the Customs provided that a monthly instalment of 40,000 toman to cover the interest on our Government loan as well as the interest on the Imperial Bank of Persia's advances was regularly paid into the Imperial Bank of Persia (my telegram No. 185 of the 23rd March).

On the 23rd March Captain Trevor reported that Seyyed Murteza had written officially to the Consulates announcing the assumption of the Government by himself on behalf of the Nationalists, and stating that he was temporarily undertaking the duties of the local authorities and that he would arrange for the protection of the lives and property of foreigners. There had so far been no disorder, nor had the Customs been interfered with, but the Seyed stated that he was referring to Tabriz on the subject. In order to prevent the local business of the Residency coming to a standstill, Captain Trevor inquired whether he might treat officially with the *de facto* Governor; I replied that he might deal with him without according him express recognition.

Latest information is to the effect that on the 23rd March the Seyed took over the Customs, the Belgian officials withdrawing. Early the same day a meeting had been convened at the residence of the Mirpozi, the commander of the local Government forces, and was attended by Seyyed Murteza, on behalf of the Nationalist party, the Kargazur, the postmaster, and other heads of the local departments, and by some half a dozen respectable merchants. On being pressed as to whether he was for or against the Nationalists the Mirpozi tendered his resignation, the other Government officials following his example. The Seyed, accompanied by his followers, then proceeded to the Governor's house where the Royal Standard was lowered and the National flag was hoisted in its place and a salute of twenty-one guns fired. This bloodless revolution is stated to be due to the fact that all classes in Bushire, including the Government officials, are Nationalists at heart.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[13650]

No. 86.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 61.)

Sir,

Teheran, March 24, 1909.

A REFERENCE will be found in my despatch No. 19 of the 16th instant to the idea which originated with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Saad-ed Dowleh, to convoke a meeting of representative members of the different classes of the population of Tehran to discuss the situation and to express their views as to the desirability in principle of reverting to the constitutional régime.

Saad-ed Dowleh professed at the outset to hope that this would be a means of turning the flank of the Court party's obstinately reactionary policy. He appeared to hope that the composition of the members of this meeting would be such that a

frank exposition of their views would be possible, in which case he did not doubt of the result, especially as he contemplated inviting a large proportion of persons who have been faithful to the Nationalist cause throughout. Moreover, he proposed, with the Shah's authority, to open the proceedings himself with a speech which would by its liberal tone give courage to those who desired to advocate a return to the constitutional régime, which he professed to have so much at heart.

My Russian colleague, who was anxious to further this scheme, obtained on the 22nd instant from the Shah a list of the persons it was proposed to invite to the meeting. A mere glance at the document was enough to show the spirit in which the Court party are acting in the matter. The persons named are, with very few exceptions, reactionaries, and include Amir Bahadur, Sheikh Fazlullah, Naib-es-Sultaneh, and the Saad Azam, with about twenty reactionary clerics, who would effectively swamp the small liberal element chosen.

Mr. Churchill and his Russian colleague showed the list to Saad-ed Dowleh the same day, and they found him in a very despondent frame of mind. He looked upon the proposed meeting as a farce, and had no hope of an improvement in the situation, as he was, he said, convinced of the Shah's insincerity. The meeting, he said, if allowed to be held, could only widen the breach between the Shah and his people. The Nationalists had informed him that they would not attend, and under these circumstances he declared his intention of entirely dissociating himself from the undertaking, as it was only intended by the Court party as a means of strengthening their own hands.

I therefore consulted my Russian colleague as to the attitude we should adopt in view of this development, and we decided to make a joint communication to the Minister for Foreign Affairs through the two dragomans, who have this morning left with his Excellency an *aide-memoire* in which the two Legations express their opinion that the proposed composition of the meeting is not of a nature to meet the requirements of the situation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[13651]

No. 87.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 62.)
Sir,

Teheran, March 24, 1909.

THE revolutionary movement in the provinces, regarding which I reported in my despatches No. 14 of the 25th January and No. 38 of the 25th ultimo, appears now to be spreading towards the north-eastern districts of Persia.

On the 13th February His Majesty's Consul-General at Meshed reported that a strong reform movement was apparently being organized, but that the Governor-General, Rukn-ed-Dowleh, was keeping in touch with the reformers, and as these were timid and seemed to have no special objective, it was possible that the town might remain quiet. A week later Major Sykes reported that an abortive strike had taken place among the Meshed police, who had tried, but failed, to induce the soldiers to join them.

Up to the end of February it appeared as if the appointment of Rukn-ed-Dowleh as Governor-General of Khorassan would be renewed at Nainroz, a course recommended to the Persian Government by the two Legations. It was reported that though attempts were being made to persuade the people not to pay revenue, and there was a general feeling that a demonstration of some kind must be made to show sympathy with the reform party, yet the people as a whole seemed not to be dissatisfied with their actual Governor. Early in March, however, it was reported that Rukn-ed-Dowleh had been dismissed, and that the Shah had appointed in his place the Xayyir-ed-Dowleh, whose record is not a good one, and who is personally unpopular in Khorassan, on the strength of a present of some 2,000, which the latter had offered for the post. On the 11th March Rukn-ed-Dowleh left Meshed, and on the 7th March Major Sykes reported that disturbances in Meshed had commenced.

A bomb was exploded at the house belonging to a nephew of the new Governor-General. The revolutionaries, who were stated to be led by Russian subjects, seized the telegraph office, the shops in the city were closed, and the Palace of the Governor-General was guarded by guns. The Deputy-Governor was taken prisoner by the revolutionaries, and a new Assembly of the reform party was opened. His Majesty's

Consul-General reported that important developments were to be expected in view of the absence of all permanent responsible Government officials, including the late Karguzar, a person of good reputation and great local influence, but who had lately been recalled by the Persian Government.

Meanwhile, the disturbances had been spreading to Turbat-i-Haidari, and on the 16th March Major Sykes reported that the Acting-Governor had been attacked and killed by a revolutionary party headed by Baluchis. He further reported that the Meshed Assembly had been much encouraged by this success, and by further successes reported to have been gained by the revolutionaries in other parts of Persia.

I have received no further report from Meshed during the past week, but there seems to be no reason to suppose that the revolutionaries have any intention at present of returning to their allegiance to the Central Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY

[13652]

No. 88.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 63.)
Sir,

Tehran, March 25, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to report, with reference to my despatch No. 37 of the 24th ultimo, that no alteration in the situation at Isfahan itself has taken place, though Samsam-ol-Saltaneh has been actively engaged in endeavouring to win over to the Nationalist cause the hitherto wavering sympathies of the Sheikh of Mohammedrah and Sowlet-ed-Dowleh, chief of the Kasluais. An attempt to force the hand of the latter, which narrowly failed to be successful, was made by Samsam at the end of February by the dispatch of a bogus telegram to Assef-ed-Dowleh, dismissing him from the Governorship of Shiraz, and of a simultaneous telegram to Sowlet-ed-Dowleh upbraiding him for his inactivity and urging him "to fulfil his promises."

Sowlet-ed-Dowleh, believing the telegram to be genuine, prepared to leave Shiraz, but the absence of any orders in regard to the appointment of an Acting Governor raised some suspicion, and upon reference to Tehran the fraud was discovered.

The practical uses to which a complete control of telegraphic communications could be put, as illustrated in this incident, had no doubt rendered the Samsam more insistent in his demands in regard to the Telegraph Office of the Indo-European Department in Isfahan.

The present position is that Samsam has control of one line, and is claiming that no messages of a political nature shall be transmitted over the British wire from Tehran to Shiraz, and further that the receipts for local traffic shall be handed over to him on behalf of the Anjuman.

In view of the importance of not offending the Minister of Telegraphs until the termination of the present negotiations in connection with the Arabian lines and the extension of our telegraph concessions, I am endeavouring to temporize with Samsam-ol-Saltaneh who has been told that his demands were being considered and that in the meantime he had better abstain from cutting the wires, which would make a deplorable impression as interfering with international traffic and would not prevent telegraphic communication between Tehran and Shiraz, which would then be conducted by a roundabout route.

There are at present some 1,500 troops at Kum and one Bakhtiari Khan, Amir Kufakhan; Sardar Zafar and Sardar Ashtar having gone to Kashan, and the latter, it is said, with the Shah's permission, on to Isfahan. The three Khans are believed to be awaiting the arrival of Sardar Assad before taking a decision as to the course to be followed.

Sardar Assad has reached Mohammedrah, where he is reported to be endeavouring to persuade the Sheikh of Mohammedrah to join in the movement.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[13653]

No. 89.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 61.)
Sir,

Tehran, March 25, 1909.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 192 of to-day's date, I have the honour to report that, according to telegraphic information which I have just received, the towns of Shiraz and Hamadan have joined the Nationalist movement.

It appears that at a meeting held at Shiraz yesterday afternoon, and attended by the Begler Begi, Nasr-ed-Dowleh (the head of the Kawami party) and all other leading Persians, it was decided to proclaim the Constitution and inaugurate the local Assembly to-day.

At Hamadan, where the Constitution was proclaimed, the Acting Governor joined in the declaration, but he has been summoned by his father to Burujird. The Shah then appointed a new Governor, but the people replied to His Majesty that if the Governor entered Hamadan they would cut him in pieces. In reporting this information, His Majesty's Consul at Kermanshah states that the Nationalist movement in that part of the country is being engineered from Kerbela.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[13654]

No. 90.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 65.)
Sir,

Tehran, March 25, 1909.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 45 of the 4th instant respecting the question of Messrs. Lynch's shed at Shellieh, I have the honour to report that on the 8th instant I received a telegram from His Majesty's Consul at Ahwaz informing me that Sheikh Muraza had arrived at that place. In an interview with Captain Lorimer he agreed to the settlement of his dispute with Mo'in-at-Tujjar regarding the ownership of the land upon which Messrs. Lynch desire to erect their shed in a Shari Court at either Dizful or Nejez, should objection be taken to Shmshter.

I upon receipt of this information, I instructed Abbas Kuli Khan to call on Mo'in-at-Tujjar. The latter at first attempted to evade his previous declaration that he left it to the other party to choose between a Shari Court and a Committee of arbitrators, but eventually consented to have the case referred to a Shari Court at Nejez. He further promised to write immediately appointing as his agent in that place Agha Seyyid Ali, son of Agha Seyyid Javad Kilihdar.

Messrs. Lynch's agent here professes his satisfaction at this development of the question.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[13655]

No. 91.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 66.)
Sir,

Tehran, March 25, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the usual monthly summary for the past four weeks.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 91.

No. 3.—Monthly Summary.

Tehran.

THE Shah continues to reside in his armed camp at Bagh-i-Shah surrounded by his reactionary supporters, with the Sepahsalar (Amir Behadur) at their head. Violent

[1619]

1.

reactionary councils prevail, and the Shah, who was ten days ago reported to be much depressed, is now stated by those Europeans who see him daily to be cheerful, and to have received the news of the Nationalist successes at Turlat, Bunder Abbas, Bushire, Shiraz, and Hamadan with complete equanimity.

The abortive attempt made at the eleventh hour by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to convene a meeting of all classes of the population, which should have paved the way towards the re-establishment of a constitutional régime, has been reported upon in a separate despatch.

The bazars at Tehran remain closed, and the refugees are still at the Turkish Embassy. Those at Shah Abdul Azim have been increased to about 1,000 persons, and on the night of the 23rd instant a gang of roughs entered a house near the shrine and murdered the inhabitants, four in number, including Mirza Mustafa, the son of the late Majid Mirza Hassan Ashtiani, who took so prominent a part in the Régle disturbances. This act, which is attributed to orders emanating from Bagh-i-Shah, has caused much sensation, and the Shah's unpopularity has, if possible, increased.

The political situation has caused much stagnation in financial and commercial affairs. The Imperial Bank's operations have been greatly hampered by the difficulties and dangers of emitting currencies of coin to the provinces. Exchange which is offered at Tabreez, Resht, and Meshed cannot be bought, because money cannot be sent there for the purpose. The result is that high rates are maintained, to-day's rate being 55½ per pound.

Bureaux have been current that the Shah has been given 200,000. It was at first stated that the Russian Bank has given the money, then it was reported that a German group had made the advance. It is, however, interesting to note that no large sum could be transferred from Europe to Persia excepting through the Imperial or Russian Banks, and any such transfer would cause a fall in exchange.

Some time ago it came to the knowledge of the Legation that the Deutsche Orient Bank at Constantinople had placed the equivalent of 10,000,000 on fixed deposit for three months at 5 per cent, with the Russian Bank here. The full significance of this operation is not clear, though it may merely be a speculation in exchange in the hope of a fall.

Many persons, no doubt fearing general disorders, have sent their securities and cash to the Imperial Bank.

(Signed) G. P. CHURCHILL.

March 26, 1909.

The state of affairs at Tabreez, Resht, Meshed, Turlat-i-Haydari, Bushire, and Isfahan forms the subject of separate despatches.

Asterabad.

1. On the 3rd February the Governor, Amir Mukarram, barricaded the Palace and placed 120 soldiers in the old fort. Next day the Nationalists closed their shops and assembled in a mosque, and their leaders decided that the Governor must leave the town.

The Commander of the Hozar Jerrh regiment, being a Nationalist, was ordered by the Governor to proceed with his regiment to Kufshuk. On leaving the town he gave the Nationalists twenty rifles, and sent in 200 men from neighbouring villages to help them. Early in March some of the local officials, although apparently not Nationalists, telegraphed to the Shah requesting the dismissal of the Governor. On the 7th March the Prime Minister replied that the Governor had been recalled. The Nationalists, to show that the credit of getting the Governor dismissed belonged to them, and not to the local officials, closed the bazars and assembled in large numbers in a mosque.

Seistan.

1. The Russian Consul recently informed Major Kemmish that a Russian doctor, Dr. Otto, now at Turlat, would shortly come to Seistan.

Kerman.

1. The Governor, Salih Eklitar, has released the Naib and permitted the Nazim to return to Kerman. He also tendered his resignation, but the Persian Government are unable to find a successor owing to the disturbed state of the country. His Majesty's Consul anticipates trouble unless a strong Governor is appointed.

2. On the 14th March His Majesty's Consul telegraphed that the Governor of Bakt had been defeated by the Afsharis, who had revolted. The Governor had been brought to Kerman seriously wounded, and the Afsharis had captured most of his camp and baggage, one gun, and the revenue which he had collected.

Kermanshah.

1. Captain Haworth, telegraphing on the 24th February from Hamadan, reported that a small number of leading Nationalists at that place had taken refuge with the Turkish Consular Agent, and had sent telegrams to the Turkish Embassy at Tehran and to the Porte regarding the present state of affairs in Persia. The Nationalists believed that they could raise 2,000 horsemen, with the help of the Khadabandini tribes to assist them, but Captain Haworth thinks that this is an exaggeration, and that they are not likely to declare openly for the Constitution until they are certain of raising enough horsemen to withstand the regiments and local Chiefs who are on the side of the Shah; 2,000, was said to have been collected for the payment of the Nationalist forces. The Acting Governor informed Captain Haworth that he had repeatedly resigned, but the Shah only replied with orders to suppress all Constitutional movements. The Acting Governor said that if he carried out these orders the people would kill him, and if he disobeyed them the Shah would kill him. He asked if he could take refuge with the British Representative, to which Captain Haworth replied that we give sanctuary only when the life of a man is in danger.

2. Writing on the 20th February, His Majesty's Consul says that the telegram in the "Times" that the Kallur tribe was prepared to uphold the Constitution at Kermanshah is incorrect. The fight of the Kallurs, as previously reported, had nothing to do with the Nationalist movement, nor would Daoud Khan forward such a policy, except under necessity or to serve the time.

3. There was an earthquake shock at Kermanshah on the morning of the 23rd January at about 6 o'clock. It was also felt at Hamadan and Sulaimabad. Captain Haworth states that a European informs him that forty-seven villages were destroyed, and that, 35 miles from Burnjird, a mountain was split in two, causing a landslip. A gap of 500 yards was made in the mountain, and two villages were buried under the landslip. The loss of life was estimated at about 6,000 persons. The tract most affected was inhabited by the Silakhoris.

Yezd.

1. It appears that the party of 200 raiders, mentioned in last month's Summary as being Bakhtiaris, was in reality composed of inhabitants of Feraghin, a notorious robber village between Abadeh and Abargough, who had been joined by a number of Taftis. Samsan-oss-Sultaneh disclaimed any connection with them. The party, led by our Khosro Khan, approached to within a short distance of Yezd. This caused consternation in the town, and the Governor sent out a force, which retreated after a skirmish with the raiders. Khosro Khan announced that he had come to restore Constitutional government, but met with no response from the people of Yezd, who believed that he and the Taftis only wished to loot the town. Failing to get a telegram sent to Samsan-oss-Sultaneh, or to get support from the Yezdis, the party withdrew, and its subsequent movements are not known.

2. With reference to the ill-treatment of Parsas in the neighbourhood of Yezd, it appears that the culprits were Taftis, who raided a Parsae village and carried off three men, who were subsequently ransomed by their friends. His Majesty's Acting Vice-Consul made representations to the Governor, and by the end of February the latter had assembled a force of about 1,000 men to be sent against Taft. Meanwhile the Taftis, who appear to have influential friends in Yezd, were trying to patch up a truce, and no force has yet gone against them.

3. A number of robber bands still frequent the roads, and robberies are of frequent occurrence. The Kerman road is perhaps the least safe.

4. On the 20th February a telegram was received at Nain from Agla Norollah, of Isfahan, calling upon all those who were ready to take up arms in the righteous cause to come to Isfahan. Entezam-ul-Mulk, formerly Governor of Yezd, was also reported to be collecting troops at Anzabad. He has since joined the Bakhtiaris at Isfahan.

5. A person calling himself a German, who arrived recently from Shiraz, is reported to be selling magazine rifles and ammunition at Yezd at high prices. Mr. Blackman is endeavouring to get definite information on this subject.

Shiraz.

1. The centre of gravity of Fars politics is still in Laristan. The Kavanis seem to be pressed for money. On the 14th February the Kavanis agent in Tehran telegraphed that unless they could accomplish something it would be all up with them. On the 5th February a telegram arrived addressed to Sowlet-ed-Dowleh from the Anjuman-i-Saadet at Constantinople congratulating him on his patriotism and requesting him to telegraph an account of the state of affairs in Fars. Mr. Bill thinks that the future of Fars is entirely in the hands of Sowlet-ed-Dowleh, whenever he makes up his mind to commit himself, and the most probable result would seem to be the occupation of Shiraz by him when the Kasghis migrate in the spring. It is much to be hoped that the situation will change before that time, as it is not likely that the Chiefs of the Kasghis will be able to maintain the perfect control over their men that the Bakhtiaris have apparently displayed in Isfahan. Nasred-Dowleh, who returned unexpectedly in the middle of February from Laristan, told Mr. Bill that the Kavanis forces had defeated the Laris, but Mr. Bill believes that this was a fabrication, and that it is unlikely that the Kavanis will be able to make head against the Laris. Nasred-Dowleh insisted that the Lari Seyyed was playing for his own hand, and would pay no more attention to the orders of a Constitutional Government than to those of the Shah. He stated his own intention of transferring his whole establishment to Europe with the design of remaining there until the Persian horizon cleared. Meanwhile, the Bakhtiaris have telegraphed in the strongest terms to the Sowlet-ed-Dowleh reproaching him for his inaction after all that he had promised, and on the other hand, it seems certain that the Kavanis are trying with some success to come to an arrangement with Seussan-es-Sultaneh, in which case Sowlet-ed-Dowleh may find he has overestimated his market. The latest news is that the Kavanis returned to Shiraz on the 7th March leaving his troops at Fasa.

2. In Shiraz itself early in March there was a mild agitation in favour of the Constitution under Clerical leadership. It seems that the Governor-General, so far from suppressing the two meetings held, sent them messages of sympathy.

3. On the 21st February a serious assault was committed on two Parsees who were seriously stabbed by a drunken servant of the Governor-General's. Mr. Bill sent the Consulate a note with a private letter to the Governor protesting against the incident as seriously endangering the public peace. The offender was arrested, but a large crowd besieged the house of the Parsee employer of the wounded men and intimidated him to the point of proceeding in person to the police and giving his sanction to the immediate release of the offender.

4. On the 11th March a caravan accompanied by pilgrims was attacked near Yazdikhasht. One pilgrim was shot dead and four others were mortally wounded. Thirteen loaded mules were taken away. One of the cases looted contained thirty magazine rifles.

5. On the 20th March His Majesty's Consul telegraphed that Mr. Gentleman, agent of Messrs. Ziegler, had been stripped and robbed near Seyed by robbers, who were believed to be Lashanis. The Governor-General dispatched thirty men to try to capture the robbers. Mr. Bill also reported that 200 telegraph insulators had been broken during the week by ruffians near Zargoon, and that several robberies had occurred on the road south of Abadeh.

PERSIAN GULF.

Bushire.

1. The German Consul is reported to be collecting information as to the number of mules and camels available in the districts of Dashti and Dashtistan, the alleged reason for his action being the desire of the German house, Woneckhaus, to establish agencies in those districts.

2. It is reported that the Daryn Baggi has been reappointed Governor of the Gulf ports.

3. Gun running seems to be prevalent in the vicinity of the town of Bushire. The smugglers are said to offer the boatmen 5 krans for each rifle to be taken to Bushire from the neighbouring villages.

4. The Resident returned from Calcutta on the 25th February, and left for Moham-

Bahar Abbas.

The first Afghan caravan of the season, numbering 152 camels, arrived from Herat on the 11th January. Two others numbering 500 and 300 arrived on the 19th and 21st respectively. Twenty Afghans having purchased some camels at Bahar Abbas, left with them for Jask overland on the 19th.

Lingah.

1. In accordance with the instructions received by the Director of Customs through the proper channel he has taken charge of the papers of the French Consular Agency and removed the flagstaff from the house of Haji Abdul Rahiman, French Consular Agent. It is as yet not definitely known whether the French Consular Agency has been abolished for good or temporarily suspended on account of the unsatisfactory conduct of the Haji.

2. The German firm, Woneckhaus and Co., appear to have imported into Muscat 200 rifles in compliance with an order received from a Lari, the latter having agreed to make his own arrangements to bring the arms over to the Persian coast.

3. Seyyed Abdul Hussein Lari, having heard of the arrival in Lar of Aratoun, an Armenian, recently sent there by Woneckhaus and Co., asked him to leave otherwise he would be killed. Aratoun returned to Lingah on the 19th January and is reported to have been robbed of everything he had.

4. At the end of January about seventy inhabitants of Lar came to Lingah to escape the tyranny and lawlessness which prevail in Lar. Others are expected to follow their example.

Mohamuerah.

1. The land leased to Messrs. Woneckhaus on the river for 200l. a year is in their charge from the 24th January. It has been surrounded by a mud wall and two mud stores have been built in it.

2. Early in February it was rumoured from Ram Hormuz that the other Bakhtiaris Khans had offered to make peace with Seussan-es-Sultaneh and restore the previous arrangements recognizing him as Ilkhan, presumably on account of his recent success at Isfahan.

3. At the beginning of February Dizal and Shuster were said to be in disorder. Things are said to have quieted down since.

(Signed)

C. B. STOKES, Major,
Military Attache.

[13657]

No. 92.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Greg. (Received April 13.)

(No. 68. Secret.)
Sir,

Tehran, March 25, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to submit to you some notes by the Military Attaché to His Majesty's Legation on the foreign officers and non-commissioned officers now in the service of the Persian Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed)

G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 92.

Major Stokes to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 14. Secret.)
Sir,

Tehran, March 25, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to submit, for your information and that of the War Office, the following notes on the foreign officers and non-commissioned officers in the service of the Persian Government—

[1619]

M

The following are the Russian officers employed with the Persian Cossack Brigade:—

Commandant: Colonel Liakhoff.
Other officers: Captain Perilimoseff, Captain Blasoff, Captain Sapolski, Captain Gregorievitch-Baski, Captain Ushakoff (on leave).
There is also a Medical Officer.

There are eight Russian non-commissioned officers with the brigade. Quite apart from the Persian Cossack Brigade, there are in the personal service of His Majesty the Shah the following Russians:—

A Medical Officer: Dr. Zudowski.
An Aide-de-camp: Captain Khoubouff.
Two non-commissioned officers, of whom one was formerly in the brigade but is now in the Shah's personal service, while the other has been recently engaged to organize a Bodyguard of 100 men.

It is to be remarked that whereas the contract for the Russian officers of the Cossack Brigade provides for a Commandant, three other officers, and five non-commissioned officers, there are now on the strength of the brigade a Commandant, five other officers, and eight non-commissioned officers. Since June last reports have reached me more than once that a fresh contract, providing for an increased number of Russian officers and non-commissioned officers, had been signed, but so far inquiries have failed to prove the truth of these reports.

Colonel Kosteritz-Mannhorst, an Austrian officer, who has for some time been a Professor at the Military College at Tehran, is now stated to be employed as Instructor to the Shah's Bodyguard. Another Austrian officer, General Padovetz, who came with him, has left Persia and the Persian service.

General Maletta, an Italian officer, who left the Persian service some years ago with a pension, has now returned, and describes himself as in the Shah's service. He was many years ago in the Egyptian gendarmes, after which he became Infantry Instructor to the Persian army, a post he filled until he retired some eight or ten years ago.

A German ex-non-commissioned officer, Hase, is employed as a mechanician. He was formerly in charge of the machine-guns, but these have now been handed over to Colonel Liakhoff.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. B. STOKES, Major,
Military Attaché.

[13658]

No. 93.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 69.)
Sir,

Tehran, March 25, 1909.

THERE has lately been a good deal of alarmist talk in Tehran regarding the possibility of an outbreak in which European lives might be in danger, and the rôle of Colonel Liakhoff and his subordinates in such an event has formed the subject of conversation between some of the Foreign Ministers. Count Quidt, who had already had a somewhat acrimonious correspondence with Colonel Liakhoff in regard to the frequent withdrawal of his Cossack guard from the German Legation for purposes of drill, talked of asking for some sailors from the German "stationnaire" at Constantinople in case he found that he could not count on Colonel Liakhoff. The latter let it be known that his general instructions were (1) to protect the Shah's life, (2) to protect the barracks of the Cossack Brigade, and (3) to maintain order in the city and to protect the foreign Legations. This, however, did not satisfy some of the Ministers, and on the 11th March the Austrian, German, Italian and Turkish Representatives decided to sound their Russian colleague on the subject. They even talked of summoning a meeting of the Chiefs de Mission to elicit an official pronouncement from Colonel Liakhoff, and an undertaking that he would protect them in case of an outbreak.

The Russian Chargé d'Affaires placed the matter before his Government for instructions, but in the meantime Colonel Liakhoff called on the Austrian Minister, and, according to the latter's own account represented that he was placed in a very

awkward position, as he did not know by his instructions exactly what rôle to assume in case of an armed conflict between the Shah's troops and the Nationalists, who might at any time advance upon the capital from either Ispahan, or Resht, or both, and as to the protection of the Legations he was again in doubt.

The reply received from the Russian Government on or about the 21st March was to the effect that Colonel Liakhoff was in the service of the Shah, from whom alone he was to take orders. If the foreign Representatives desired special measures to be taken for their protection, the natural course would be for them to apply to the Persian Government. This M. Sabline has communicated to the Italian Minister. He has, however, informed His Majesty's Legation privately that more precise instructions were added as to Colonel Liakhoff's action in case of an outbreak. He and his subordinate Russian officers are to take no part in active hostilities, but the Colonel, under the Shah's orders, should direct the brigade from head-quarters, while only the Persian officers are to take active command of the men. The brigade should endeavour to maintain order and to protect foreign lives and property. The Colonel's main duty is to protect the life of the Shah.

As regards the danger of an outbreak in the town, I am somewhat reluctant to express an opinion. There is certainly a great deal of nervousness about amongst Persians and even in certain foreign quarters which has been considerably increased by the murder a day or two ago of four of the bastis at Shah Abdul Azim, which there is only too good reason for thinking was committed at least with the cognizance of the Shah. The Turkish Chargé d'Affaires visited my Russian colleague and me on learning of these murders, and told us that he had good reason to fear that the crimes, which he said had been committed by direct order of Mufakher-al-Mulk, Vice-Governor of Tehran, would prove the forerunners of similar crimes against his own bastis, and he talked of applying to Constantinople for a guard to be sent out to his Embassy.

I doubt the danger to the Turkish Embassy. Turkish intervention would not suit the Shah's book, but there is certainly a possibility of further murders with a view to swaying the Nationalists. I cannot even altogether exclude the possibility of an outrage on some foreigner in order to provoke intervention, and I have to-day ventured to suggest by telegraph that the surest means of averting such a proceeding would be that the two Legations should be authorized, in the event of further crimes like the recent murders, to make the communication proposed in your conversation with M. Podkowski, and recorded in your telegram to Sir A. Nicolson, No. 328, viz., that it should be impressed on the Shah that he has nothing to gain from intervention, and that it might probably result in his dethronement on account of his incapacity to govern. This should to some extent keep the Shah on his good behaviour.

I have already more than once mentioned the possibility of the troops getting out of hand; I saw no indication at present of such a development. Should it occur, it would probably mean a few hours' looting, but I do not foresee any special danger to foreigners, least of all to the Foreign Legations. There would be easier looting elsewhere.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[13659]

No. 94.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 70.)
Sir,

Tehran, March 25, 1909.

WITH reference to the penultimate paragraph of my despatch No. 29 of the 18th ultimo, in which I reported that Serdar Assad was said to be endeavouring to negotiate a loan in London with Messrs. Lynch on the security of the Alwaz-Ispahan road, I have the honour to forward herewith a copy of a despatch which has been addressed to me by His Majesty's Consul-General at Basrah, regarding the desire of Muntazim-ed-Dowleh, one of the Bakhtiari Chiefs, to sell his interest in the road to Messrs. Lynch.

I understand that Messrs. Lynch's Tehran agent has communicated this offer to his principals in London, and has received a reply to the effect that the question is receiving careful consideration.

You will notice that Captain Lorimer, in his despatch No. 33 of the 16th February,

which is forwarded by Major Cox, agrees with Messrs. Lynch's Ahwaz agent in thinking that it would be unwise to endeavour to come to terms with Muntazzim-ed-Dowleh, and though Messrs. Lynch are of course free to act as they please, I am inclined to endorse this view.

It also seems questionable whether the Khans, under the terms of their Concession from the Persian Government, have the right of alienating the road tolls, and, in the event of difficulties arising between Messrs. Lynch and the Khans, it would be difficult for His Majesty's Legation to support a right of the nature which it is proposed Messrs. Lynch should acquire.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY

Inclosure 1 in No. 94.

Consul-General Cox to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 21. Confidential.)

Sir, *Bushire, February 27, 1900.*
I HAVE the honour to forward for your Excellency's information, and such action as you may deem expedient to take, a copy of a letter which I have received from His Majesty's Consul, Ahwaz, regarding the desire of the Muntazzim-ed-Dowleh to sell his interest in the Ahwaz-Ispahan road to Messrs. Lynch Brothers.

I have, &c.
(For Consul-General Cox).
(Signed) A. P. TREVOR.

Inclosure 2 in No. 94.

Consul Lorimer to Consul-General Cox.

(No. 53. Confidential.)

Sir, *Ahwaz, February 16, 1900.*
I HAVE the honour to forward inclosed copies of a letter addressed by Messrs. Lynch Brothers' Ispahan agent to their Tehran agent, and recently communicated to me by Messrs. Lynch Brothers at Ahwaz.

2. The agent here does not know what, if any, action is being taken in regard to it, and agrees with me in thinking that it would be unwise to aim at coming to terms with the Muntazzim-ed-Dowleh in the matter referred to.

This opinion has been arrived at in view of the difficulty which has been experienced in maintaining satisfactory relations with the Bakhtiari Khans in business matters.

3. It is also questionable whether the Khans have the right under the Concession for the road, which they hold from the Persian Government, of in any way alienating the tolls which are collected on the road.

Paragraph 7 of that Concession runs as follows:—

"The administration and maintenance of the road and the levying of tolls will remain for the whole period of the Concession in the hands of the concessionnaires without any interference on the part of the others . . ."

I have, &c.
(Signed) D. L. R. LORIMER, Captain.

Inclosure 3 in No. 94.

Messrs. Lynch Brothers' Ispahan Agent to their Tehran Agent.

(Confidential.)

Dear Sirs,

December 2, 1900.

MUNTAZZIM-ED-DOWLEH, the eldest son of the late Isfandiari Khan, Sardar Asad, sent his servant to me explaining his desire of selling his and his brothers' shares of the Bakhtiari Road Concession, amounting to one-sixth of the whole. He is desirous of selling it to our firm at a reasonable price, but before he names the price he likes to

know whether the firm will undertake buying it. Will you therefore be kind enough to communicate this to London friends and see if they at all care to enter into such transaction. The following will show shares and shareholders of the Concession:—

Late Isfandiari Khan, Sardar Asad, one-sixth.
Late Muhammad Hussain, Sipahdar, one-sixth.
Present Ghulam Hussain, Shahab-us-Saltanah, and brothers, one-sixth.
Present Najaf Quli Khan, Saamsan-us-Saltanah, and Yusuf Khan, one-sixth.
Present H. Ali Quli Khan and H. Khassrau Khan, one-sixth.
Present Latif Ali Khan, Shuja-us-Sultan, and brothers, one-sixth.

Yours faithfully,
Per pro. Lynch Brothers,
(Signed) M. FAZLULLAH

[13660]

No. 95.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13)

(No. 71.)

Sir,

IN continuation of my two telegrams Nos. 193 and 197 of the 25th March and 10-day respectively, I have the honour to transmit copies of two notes which my Russian colleague and I have addressed to the Persian Government respecting the recent murders at Shah Abdul Azim.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 95.

Sir G. Barclay and M. Sahline to Saad-ed-Dowleh.

Votre Excellence,

Le 21 mars, 1900.

LES deux Légations d'Angleterre et de Russie ont appris avec regret que quelques-uns des bastis à Chah Abdul Azim ont été assassinés hier soir. Les détails malheureusement, mais on dit que les coupables sont dans l'emploi du Vice-Gouverneur de Mahéran.

Il est évident que pour éviter d'autres crimes de cette nature il est indispensable qu'une enquête soit tenue et que les coupables soient punis, et les deux Légations ont l'honneur de faire observer à votre Excellence que dans le cas où il serait avéré que ceux-ci ont agi sous les ordres du Vice-Gouverneur, il serait au plus haut degré désirable que Mufakher-ul-Mulk soit destitué sans retard. Cette mesure serait, votre Excellence le reconnaîtra, la meilleure pour éviter que les crimes d'hier soir n'augmentent des troubles plus étendus qui pourraient léser les intérêts des nationaux des deux Légations et qui pourraient exposer le Gouvernement du Chah à une lourde responsabilité que les Légations voudraient lui épargner.

Je profite, &c.

Inclosure 2 in No. 95.

Joint Note communicated to Saad-ed-Dowleh.

LES deux Légations, se référant à leur note collective du 24 courant, croient de leur devoir de faire savoir au Gouvernement persan que le bruit rendant responsable Mufakher-ul-Mulk des meurtres à Chah Abdul Azim est tellement général qu'ils croient de leur devoir, pour apaiser l'agitation actuelle dans la capitale, de demander le renvoi de ce fonctionnaire.

En faisant cette démarche les deux Légations sont convaincues qu'elles agissent dans les meilleurs intérêts du Chah et de son Gouvernement, qui seront tenus entièrement responsables par les Gouvernements britannique et russe pour ce qui pourra arriver

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N

à leurs nationaux par suite des troubles que les deux Légations craignent dans le cas où leurs demandes ne seraient pas exécutées.

Les deux Légations prient votre Excellence de soumettre ce qui précède à Sa Majesté.

Le 26 mars, 1909.

[13591]

No. 96.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

[Extends Sir A. Nicolson's telegram No. 184 of April 2.]

(No. 211.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, April 2, 1909.

M. ISVOLSKY asked me today when I expected to receive the reply of His Majesty's Government to the proposals which the Russian Government had submitted in respect to the situation in Persia. I told his Excellency that I might possibly receive them by a messenger who was arriving to-morrow morning, but in any case I would telegraph and inquire.

His Excellency then said that he was just proceeding to a Council to discuss Persian affairs, and that a very different point would have to be dealt with, and that was the security of the Resht-Tehran road. He had received anxious reports from the engineers at Kasvin, who were in fear of the Caucasian revolutionaries who dominated the situation in that part of Persia. He always discounted the reports from men exposed to certain risks, but he could not altogether neglect them. There was a fear that the Menzil bridge might be destroyed, and communication between Tehran and Resht interrupted. He was in rather a dilemma. It would be taking a great responsibility to adopt no measures for the protection of the only communication between Tehran and Resht; while any measures which were taken would be, he could not deny it, in the nature of intervention. He had an idea of sending a Vice-Consul to Kasvin with an escort, but this might irritate, and not otherwise, the revolutionaries—he was speaking of the Caucasians, as from the Persians he had nothing to apprehend. While if he dispatched an adequate force to establish pickets at certain points on the road, and to guard the Menzil* bridge and to protect officers of the road administration at Kasvin, this would undoubtedly be interpreted, and indeed was, intervention. The Minister of War and the Viceroy of the Caucasus were both against any movement of troops; but he had the responsibility of keeping the road to Tehran open. In any case, he would do nothing without informing His Majesty's Government, and he would let me know the results of this afternoon's Council. He asked me to give him my opinion. I said I perfectly appreciated the dilemma in which he found himself, and the question was really a very difficult one to decide. It was doubtless of importance not to leave Tehran *en l'air*; but, on the other hand, there were all the objections he had mentioned. I was sure that my Government would quite appreciate the difficulty. I asked if the Russian authorities could not take measures to prevent these terrorists from leaving the Caucasus for Enzeli, or even to prevent their disembarkation there. I heard that they were continually passing over openly in steamers. His Excellency said that he would mention this point at the Council.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[13595]

No. 97.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 217.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, April 5, 1909.

I CALLED on M. Isvolsky yesterday afternoon and communicated to him the substance of your telegram No. 155 of the 3rd instant, relative to the views of His Majesty's Government on the last proposals submitted by the Russian Government in regard to the joint communication to be made to the Shah. I pointed out to his

* Over the Kizil Uzen River half-way between Kasvin and Resht.

Excellency that His Majesty's Government had made great concessions in order to meet the wishes of the Russian Government, and that I earnestly hoped that now he would make no difficulty in consenting to the conditions which His Majesty's Government had put forward. Your telegram No. 328 had arrived the day subsequent to the communication by M. Isvolsky of his last proposals, but on its receipt I had given him verbally the substance. I, however, repeated it again to him yesterday, and embodied its principal points in the *aide-mémoire* which I sent to him after my interview, and of which I have the honour to transmit a copy.

I do not think that his Excellency will make any difficulty in accepting the proposals of His Majesty's Government, and he is anxious that instructions should be sent to the two Representatives at Tehran as speedily as possible. I will telegraph as soon as I receive his written reply.

I may mention that M. Isvolsky gave me as his private view that he doubted if the Russian Government would make any advance of money to the Persian Government, and if they did grant one they would limit it to as small a sum as possible and dole it out as late as possible.

I asked His Excellency whether the Council had come to any decision as to taking any measure to protect the Resht-Tehran road. He replied that no definite decision had been taken, and that the question was still being examined by the competent Ministries.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

Inclosure in No. 97.

Aide-mémoire communicated to M. Isvolsky.

HIS Majesty's Embassy had the honour to receive the *aide-mémoire*, dated the 14th (17th) March, of the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs relative to the procedure to be adopted by the Governments of Russia and Great Britain in regard to Persian affairs.

His Majesty's Embassy is now able to state that as regards point 1, His Majesty's Government are still desirous that Amir Bahadur Jung should be removed from all his offices both in the Cabinet and at the Palace. In the event of the Shah pressing very hard that that functionary should be retained at the Palace, His Majesty's Government would not, however, raise further objection to conceding that point. His Majesty's Government will not insist on the removal of Sheikh Fazl-ullah from Tehran.

With respect to points 3 and 4, His Majesty's Government are not disposed to undertake the responsibility of designating the members of the Cabinet or of the Council, and they consider that it would have been preferable to make the grant of a loan conditional on a change of Ministers for others who inspired confidence. But, in order to meet as far as possible the wishes of the Imperial Russian Government, His Majesty's Government would be ready to agree that the two Legations should submit privately to the Shah a list of suitable candidates both for the Cabinet and for the Council; it being clearly understood that if unsuitable candidates are selected by the Shah no money will be accorded.

As to point 5, His Majesty's Government have no objection to make to the revision of that point as proposed by the Imperial Russian Government.

As to point 7, His Majesty's Government leave it to the Imperial Russian Government to act in regard to their share of the advance under the conditions mentioned in the *aide-mémoire* of the 14th (17th) March as they may consider advisable. His Majesty's Government would be unable to make their share of the advance until the Assembly had accepted the whole loan.

His Majesty's Embassy earnestly trust that, in view of the concessions which His Majesty's Government have made towards meeting the views of the Imperial Russian Government, the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs will accept the proposals made in this *aide-mémoire*.

St. Petersburg, March 22 (April 1), 1909.

[13602]

No. 98.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received April 13.)(No. 224.)
Sir,

St. Petersburg, April 7, 1909.

IN accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram No. 464 of yesterday, I have the honour to report that I have requested M. Isvolsky to be good enough to cause instructions to be sent to M. Sabine to join with Sir G. Barclay in impressing on the Shah the necessity of treating the population of Tabreez with moderation in the event of the town being forced to capitulate.

His Excellency sent me this morning an *aide-mémoire* and some extracts from the Reports of the Acting Consul-General at Tabreez, of which I beg leave to inclose copies. As soon as I have received a reply to my request of this morning I will inform you by telegraph.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

Inclosure 1 in No. 98.

M. Isvolsky to Sir A. Nicolson.

LE Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, en présentant ses compliments expressés à son Excellence Sir Arthur Nicolson, a l'honneur de lui faire parvenir sous ce pli un extrait de deux Rapports du Général du Consulat-Général de Russie à Tauris, contenant des données fort intéressantes sur la situation actuelle des affaires, ainsi qu'un *aide-mémoire* au même sujet.

Saint-Petersbourg, le 24 mars (6 avril), 1909.

Inclosure 2 in No. 98.

Aide-mémoire by M. Isvolsky.

LES nouvelles venant de Tauris semblent indiquer que la population de cette ville, poussée à bout par les exactions des révolutionnaires, dont le régime est tout aussi insupportable que celui des Administrateurs gouvernementaux, et fatiguée des troubles qui n'ont que trop duré, ferait volontiers la paix avec le Shah, si elle ne craignait que les troupes et les partisans du Shah ne mettent la ville à sac aussitôt après l'avoir occupée. M. Miller suppose qu'une activité commune et systématisée des Représentants russe et anglais à Tauris contribuerait puissamment à une solution pacifique.

Le Gouvernement Impérial trouve désirable d'inviter les deux Légations à Téhéran de charger M. Miller et Mr. Wratshaw d'examiner conjointement la situation dans tous ses détails et de soumettre ensuite à leurs Gouvernements respectifs leurs considérations par rapport aux mesures au moyen desquelles la Russie et l'Angleterre pourraient contribuer à mettre fin à la lutte intestine et amener une solution pacifique de la situation extrêmement grave et dangereuse qui règne actuellement à Tauris.

L'Ambassadeur de Russie à Londres a été chargé de se mettre en rapport à ce sujet avec Sir Edward Grey et de le prier de mander Sir George Barclay d'instructions en ce sens; le cas échéant, des instructions identiques seront expédiées également à M. Sabine.

Saint-Petersbourg, le 24 mars (6 avril), 1909.

Inclosure 3 in No. 98.

Extract from Reports of Russian Acting Consul-General at Tabreez.

LA situation à Tauris se présente actuellement sous l'aspect suivant :—

La ville est cernée par les troupes du Prince Ein-oud-Dowleh, de Rahim Khan, et de Choudja-oud-Dowleh, dont les forces réunies atteignent le chiffre de 12,000 à 13,000 environ. Rahim Khan occupe le rayon situé entre Tauris et Djoulfa, sur la chaussée

russe. Les voyageurs qui prennent cette route se trouvent entièrement à la merci des cavaliers de Rahim, qui, entre autres, ont récemment arrêté deux goulams du Consulat-Général de Russie, ainsi que trois Européens (deux sujets autrichiens et un ressortissant suisse). Les représentations faites à ce sujet au Prince Ein-oud-Dowleh par le Consulat-Général n'eurent aucun résultat.

Les partisans du Shah gardent une attitude plutôt passive. Leurs mouvements sont indécis et désordonnés. Seul, Choudja-oud-Dowleh se décide à attaquer, le 20 février dernier, le faubourg Houshmadah, qui fut en effet occupé par ses troupes pendant quelques heures; néanmoins, elles ne réussirent pas à s'y maintenir et furent repoussées par les révolutionnaires renforcés d'un certain nombre d'arméniens géorgiens, arméniens, et tartares du Caucase, armés de bombes. L'insuccès de cette tentative doit être attribué exclusivement à l'arrivée du Prince Ein-oud-Dowleh, qui ne s'est pas décidé une seule fois, depuis son arrivée à Basmindji, à soutenir les attaques des troupes de Choudja-oud-Dowleh du côté opposé de la ville, ce qui a toujours permis aux défenseurs de la ville de concentrer toutes leurs forces contre les troupes de Choudja.

La ville même est défendue par un groupe de révolutionnaires dont le nombre ne surpasse pas 2,000. A part l'élément indigène, il se trouve dans leurs rangs soixante Tartares, dix-sept Géorgiens occupant spécialement de la fabrication de bombes, et quatorze Arméniens, tous originaires du Caucase. La population de Tauris est tenue en respect par ce groupe d'aventuriers, qui en réalité ne se soucient nullement des principes de la liberté constitutionnelle ("mashrouté") proclamés par eux et incompréhensibles pour la masse de la population. Cette dernière, terrorisée par les révolutionnaires, accablée d'impôts nouvellement introduits, et exposée à la famine, n'attend que le rétablissement de l'ordre et de la tranquillité. Néanmoins, elle ne se décide pas à livrer la ville aux partisans du Shah, prévoyant que ces derniers la mettront à sac.

L'Administration que les révolutionnaires avaient introduite est maintenant complètement désorganisée. Le pouvoir est divisé parmi les Endjounens, ou clous, suivants :—

L'Endjounen-i-Vyakhti, présidé par Séid Mohammed Taghi et Hadji Scheikh Ali Asker (sujet étranger), représente l'organe central qui s'occupe des relations avec les Consuls étrangers, ainsi que de la presse, et rédige des Proclamations qui sont journellement affichées sur les murs de la ville. Il ne jouit pourtant d'aucune autorité spéciale qui pourrait le placer à la tête des autres Endjounens.

L'Endjounen Kondret, ou Club des "Fidèles", est présidé par Baghir-Khan, un simple ouvrier rayon. Les "fidèles" sont engagés au service de ce dernier, moyennant une somme de 2 kran (36 copecks) par jour.

L'Endjounen-i-Hakikat, ou Club de la Vérité. Il est présidé par Sattar Khan, ex-ferrail (agent de police), puis palefrenier, et ensuite ouvrier rayon.

L'Endjounen-i-Monggholish Outaghi-Nizam, ou Chambre militaire, présidé par Baghir-Khan et Sattar-Khan.

M. Miller est d'avis que la situation actuelle à Tauris pourra prendre fin d'une façon pacifique si le Gouvernement du Shah se décide enfin à employer la force et si les Consuls étrangers dans cette ville font preuve d'une certaine énergie. Malheureusement, une pareille solution, qui pourrait être si facilement amenée, est remise de jour en jour. Ceci s'explique d'abord par le fait que la situation, telle qu'elle se présente en ce moment, offre de nombreux avantages matériels tant au Prince Ein-oud-Dowleh qu'aux chefs du mouvement révolutionnaire, ensuite par le terreur inspirée à la population paisible de Tauris par les forces du Shah, qui ne manqueront pas de piller la ville de fond en comble si elle leur est livrée, et enfin par l'absence d'une action commune et systématisée des Consuls russe et anglais à Tauris.

M. Miller croit qu'il est nécessaire que les chefs des troupes de Mohammed-Ali, garantissant la sécurité de la population paisible en cas de prise de la ville. Quant aux démarches éventuelles du Shah tendant à convoquer une Assemblée législative, elles ne suffiront pas, à l'avis de notre Consul, à satisfaire les révolutionnaires de Tauris, qui ne poursuivent que leurs intérêts personnels et ne pensent qu'à exploiter la population paisible, terrorisée, et passive.

[13610]

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 232.)

Sir,
I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of an *aide-mémoire* which I have received from the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs in reply to the last suggestions of His Majesty's Government respecting the programme of Persian reforms. The substance of this *aide-mémoire* was conveyed to you in my telegram No. 193 of to-day's date.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

Inclosure in No. 99.

Aide-mémoire communicated to Sir A. Nicolson.

LE Gouvernement Impérial accepte les changements que l'Ambassade britannique, dans son aide-mémoire du 22 mars (4 avril) courant, propose d'introduire dans le programme des conseils à donner à Sa Majesté le Schah par les Gouvernements russe et britannique. La teneur définitive de ce programme, justifié conformément aux désirs exprimés par le Cabinet de Londres, serait donc la suivante :—

1. Les Gouvernements de Russie et de la Grande-Bretagne exigent de suite du Schah la démission du Sadr-Azam ainsi que celle de Fâhir Badakour-Djeng, la démission de ce dernier se rapportant à toutes les fonctions qu'il exerce tant dans le Cabinet des Ministres qu'au Palais. Toutefois, si le Schah s'oppose d'une façon particulièrement opiniâtre à ce que ce fonctionnaire soit éloigné du Palais, les deux Gouvernements n'insisteront pas sur ce dernier point.

2. La Russie et l'Angleterre obtiendront du Schah le rétablissement du régime constitutionnel en Perse au moyen de l'introduction immédiate des réformes énumérées dans les §§ suivants.

3. Les deux Gouvernements exigent du Schah la constitution d'un Cabinet composé de personnes dignes de confiance et d'indépendance sans retard au Conseil de l'Empire de personnalités éclairées appartenant à divers partis, lequel Conseil serait chargé d'élaborer et de reconnaître une nouvelle loi électorale. Les Légations de Russie et d'Angleterre à Téhéran soumettront au Schah, d'une façon privée, une liste des candidats les plus appropriés à faire partie du Cabinet et du Conseil de l'Empire; il est bien entendu que si le choix du Schah tombe sur des personnes n'inspirant pas la confiance nécessaire aucune avance d'argent ne sera faite à la Perse.

4. Les deux Gouvernements exigent du Schah une amnistie générale pour tous ceux qui ont pris les armes contre lui et se sont rendus coupables de crimes politiques; il va de soi que cette mesure ne s'étendra pas à ceux des révolutionnaires qui ont commis en outre des crimes de droit commun. Quant aux individus convaincus de brigandage et à d'autres malfaiteurs qui auraient commis des crimes de droit commun en abusant du mouvement constitutionnel, le Gouvernement du Schah sera tenu de donner des garanties de ce qu'aucune peine ne leur sera infligée autrement que par jugement d'un Tribunal impartial, ainsi que cela a été fait en son temps par rapport aux personnes qui avaient pris part dans la légation d'Angleterre à Téhéran.

5. La Russie et l'Angleterre exigent en outre la fixation immédiate de la date des élections parlementaires, ainsi que de celle de la convocation du Medjliss. Ces dates doivent être portées sans retard à la connaissance du pays entier.

6. Le Gouvernement russe pourra, s'il le juge nécessaire, avancer au Gouvernement persan aussitôt que les mesures préparatoires énumérées aux §§ 1 à 5 du programme auront été prises par le Schah une somme de 2,500,000 fr., destinée à subvenir aux dépenses immédiates nécessitées par l'introduction des réformes. De son côté, le Gouvernement britannique, s'il le juge nécessaire, pourra faire au Gouvernement du Schah une avance du même montant aussitôt que l'Assemblée électorale adopte le projet d'un emprunt extérieur plus ou moins considérable. En présence d'une pareille décision du Medjliss, les deux Puissances accorderont à la Perse leur appui en vue de la conclusion de cet emprunt. L'appui pour la conclusion d'un emprunt extérieur

ne pourra être donné au Gouvernement persan qu'à la condition qu'une Commission spéciale composée des Directeurs des Banques Russe et Anglaise à Téhéran et de Délégués persans soit instituée, laquelle Commission—

(a.) Contrôlerait le déboursement des ressources de l'État et veillerait à ce que ces ressources soient affectées exclusivement aux besoins du pays;

(b.) Surveillerait l'ordre d'élaboration des devis des assignations annuelles pour toutes les branches de l'Administration, ainsi que le mode d'application de ces devis, en conformité avec le Budget qui serait dressé par le Ministère des Finances persan avec l'aide de la Commission; et

(c.) Assistait le Ministère des Finances du Schah dans la révision et la régularisation des lois sur le malat.

Le Gouvernement Impérial estime que la mise à exécution du programme exposé ci-dessus représente pour la Perse le seul moyen de sortir de la situation presque inextricable où elle se trouve actuellement et que, si le Schah n'accepte pas ce programme dans tous ses détails, la Russie et l'Angleterre n'auront plus qu'à discontinuer leurs conseils et à abandonner Mohamméd Ali à ses propres ressources, après quoi il n'aurait plus à compter sur aucun soutien de leur part. En conséquence, le Gouvernement russe trouve désirable qu'en soumettant le programme en question au Schah, les Représentants russe et britannique lui fassent une déclaration catégorique dans ce sens.

Aussitôt que l'Ambassade britannique aura informé le Ministère Impérial des Affaires Étrangères de ce que le Cabinet de Londres n'a pas d'objections au texte du programme contenu dans le présent aide-mémoire, ce programme sera immédiatement communiqué par télégraphe au Chargé d'Affaires de Russie à Téhéran afin qu'il fasse auprès du Schah, conjointement avec le Ministre anglais, la démarche prescrite.

Saint-Petersbourg, le 26 mars (8 avril), 1909.

[13872]

No. 100.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 314.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, April 19, 1909.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 192 of the 8th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of an *aide-mémoire* which I have received from the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs respecting the proposed dispatch of Turkish troops to Tehran.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

Inclosure in No. 100.

Aide-mémoire communicated to Sir A. Nicolson.

LE Gouvernement Impérial partage entièrement l'avis du Cabinet de Londres au sujet de la demande adressée à la Porte par le Chargé d'Affaires de Turquie à Téhéran, qui réclame l'envoi d'une escorte de 100 hommes pour protéger l'Ambassade ottomane dans cette ville, en cas d'un conflit entre les troupes du Schah et les personnes qui ont pris part dans la dite Ambassade. Le Gouvernement russe pense, tout comme le Gouvernement britannique, que l'envoi de troupes turques à Téhéran est inutile.

En conséquence, des instructions viennent d'être expédiées à M. Zinoviev, l'invitant à soutenir énergiquement toutes les démarches que Sir G. Louscher sera chargé de faire auprès de la Sublime Porte en vue d'empêcher l'envoi à Téhéran d'une escorte turque.

Saint-Petersbourg, le 27 mars
(9 avril), 1909.

[13734]

No. 101.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)(No. 159.)
Sir,*Paris, April 11, 1909.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 76 of the 11th February last, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a further communication which the Zil-es-Sultan has addressed to me respecting the demand of the Nationalist party at Ispahan that His Imperial Highness should advance part of the sum which they claim as being due for taxes.

His Imperial Highness is anxious that His Majesty's Consul at Ispahan should be instructed to urge that no advances on the taxes be demanded until it be made clear to whom such advances are to be paid. I shall be glad to learn what answer you desire that I should return to the Zil on the subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

Inclosure in No. 101.

Zil-es-Sultan to Sir F. Bertie.

89 bis, Promenade des Anglais, Nice,
le 6 avril, 1909.

Excellence,

J'ESPÈRE que vous n'avez pas oublié notre conversation du Grand Hôtel, où vous m'avez promis que le Gouvernement anglais ferait protéger mes biens et ma famille. Je suis obligé de vous demander encore conseil et aide au sujet de la perception des impôts. Déjà une fois, les Nationalistes d'Ispahan ont exigé et pris par la force une partie des impôts; ils veulent de nouveau prendre des avances, et je ne sais que faire. Je ne refuse pas de payer l'impôt, mais je veux savoir à qui je dois payer et ne pas être exposé à l'obligation de verser de deux côtés à la fois. C'est pourquoi je voudrais que le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères donnât des instructions au Consul britannique à Ispahan afin que mes intérêts ne soient pas lésés. Il pourrait obtenir que l'on ne me demandât pas d'avances sur mes impôts jusqu'à ce qu'il soit bien établi à qui on doit les payer.

Je serais très heureux d'avoir une réponse catégorique à ce sujet et voudrais que le Gouvernement anglais me tînt une ligne de conduite, puisque je m'en suis remis à lui pour sauvegarder mes intérêts.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signed) ZELLE SULTAN.

[13579]

No. 102.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 13.)(Confidential.)
Sir,*Admiralty, April 11, 1909.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram dated the 11th instant from the Commander-in-chief, East Indies, respecting the disturbances at Cashire.

I am, &c.
(Signed) C. I. THOMAS.

Inclosure in No. 102.

Rear-Admiral Sir G. Warrender to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) P.

Bombay, April 11, 1909.

THE following action, which has been approved by me, has been taken at the request of His Majesty's Minister at Tehran. Fifty men have been landed from "Fox" and are occupying the Consulate and neighbouring buildings, and other fifty have been landed to occupy the Customs, which command the bank. This allows foreign Consulates, &c., to be guarded by the residents.

[13938]

No. 103.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 196.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, April 13, 1909.

JOINT representations to the Shah: Your telegram No. 486 of the 12th instant. I have seen M. Ixolsky, who has spoken to his Excellency in the sense of your telegram No. 486. I have also suggested in a Memorandum the elimination from the communication to be made to the Shah of the passages in Article 6 beginning "The support for the conclusion of a foreign loan, &c.," and also the points marked (a), (b), and (c). In my Memorandum I further explained that, while the other points in the programme were urgent, the question of control, &c., was not, and that it was one which required careful consideration. I have impressed on M. Ixolsky that the communication should be made to the Shah with as little delay as possible, and I think his Excellency will agree to the elimination of the passages indicated. I told him that his Majesty's Government would accept the rest of the Memorandum, and would telegraph instructions to Sir G. Barclay without delay as soon as they were informed that the proposed modifications were accepted by the Russian Government.

13841

No. 104.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 255.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 13, 1909.

CUSTOMS receipts at Bushire.

I have received the following telegram, No. 328, of the 12th instant from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire:

"With reference to my telegram No. 296 of the 4th April.

"On the 8th April Seyyid Murteza forced the merchants, in whose names the receipts had been deposited, as already mentioned, to withdraw and pay over to him the balance. Thus the entire income since the 23rd March, amounting to some 20,000 toman, has been seized by the Seyyid and his followers.

"Fifty of the men landed yesterday were located at the customs wharf, which affords ample accommodation for them. It is also the most convenient place, owing to the state of the weather and to the fact that from there it will be easy to prevent the ingress of further bodies of ruffians expected from across the harbour.

"If, pending the final regulation of this question, the Seyyid attempts to seize more of the receipts, I presume that I may use the men who are already installed here to prevent this."

In reply, I have sent the following telegram, No. 92:—

"There is no objection to the proposal contained in the last paragraph of your telegram.

"Please tell Seyyid Murteza and other Nationalists that unless some arrangement satisfactorily securing our rights is made we shall be compelled to contemplate the possibility of seizing the customs, though we are most anxious to avoid doing so. I am trying to have a very strong hint sent to Seyyid Murteza about the proper quarter.

"The customs receipts had best be retained by the Belgian officials in the customs-house until we can come to some satisfactory arrangement. Ask the leaders of a responsible Nationalist party."

[13844]

No. 105.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 256.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 13, 1909.

SHEIKH of Mohammerrah.

I have told the Sheikh that the customs receipts of the Gulf ports are pledged to Great Britain. This will strengthen his hand in the event of the Nationalists pressing him for them.

[1649]

Acting on my statement, he has refused to remit the receipts to Samsam, who has pressed for them, to pay for his march on Tehran.

The reference is to my telegram No. 223 of the 3rd instant.

[13849]

No. 106.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 257.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 13, 1909.

SHIRKIL of Mohammerah and Daria Begi.

My telegram No. 253 of the 12th instant.

The Sheikh has been invited by the authorities at Tehran to provide the Daria Begi with 300 riflemen, and by the Nationalists to stop him.

To his request for my advice, I have merely replied according to the instructions contained in the last sentence of the second paragraph of your telegram No. 109 of the 25th ultimo, renewing the advice already given.

[13939]

No. 107.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 258.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 13, 1909.

TABREEZ negotiations.

The British and Russian Consuls have been instructed, in the sense of your telegram No. 249 of the 11th instant, to consult together and report, my Russian colleague having now received instructions to that effect.

[13940]

No. 108.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 259.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 13, 1909.

REFOURM of Persian finances.

A summary of the Financial Adviser's conclusions must have already reached you, and I shall not discuss with him the matters referred to in your telegram No. 486 of the 12th instant to Sir A. Nicolson, without your instructions. He looks to a European Treasurer-General and a "Cour des Comptes."

I entirely concur in your criticism contained in the above-mentioned telegram, and agree that the question of the Financial Commission should be postponed, so that it may not delay our representations. There would be small hope of the Shah yielding were Tabreez to fall before these can be made.

Providing the organization under the National Assembly of a proper system of financial control, with the assistance, I hope, of a European Treasurer-General, the Commission of Control might serve as a temporary expedient to regulate the expenditure of the Russian advance.

I would venture to point out in this connection that Mr. Wood, unlike M. Ostrogradsky, has no official position.

[13555]

No. 109.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 195.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 13, 1909.

PLEASE ascertain the views of the Russian Government on the Consul's proposals indicated in telegram No. 249 from Tehran of the 11th instant which has been repeated to you.

I see no objection to the proposals and shall therefore approve them and send instructions accordingly, provided the Russian Government do not object.

No. 110.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 144.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 13, 1909.

GUARD for oil works.

Reference is to your telegram No. 217 of the 1st instant.

The Government of India has sent Major Cox authorization to sanction the withdrawal of the oil guard, on the conditions which you have suggested.

If, after consultation with the local authorities, you think it desirable to convey a hint to the Chieftains and the Persian authorities that the removal of the guard is due to the present good relations between themselves and British subjects, but that any change in these relations would mean the return of the guard, you are authorized to do so. This course has been suggested by D'Arcy.

How will the fact of Mr. Reynolds being absent on leave increase the difficulties of the situation?

[14024]

No. 111.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 260.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 14, 1909.

I LEARN that our request for permission to bring in food for foreign subjects in Tabreez is about to be categorically refused.

My Turkish colleague writes to me privately urging me to press this matter, and professing great anxiety as to the plight of the Turkish Colony. He says the Shah will yield to our insistence, and immediate complications will be avoided, and he urges the absolute necessity of a prompt solution.

The Russian Chargé d'Affaires is telegraphing to his Government in the above sense.

To my Turkish colleague I have replied that the Persian Government have not as yet returned any answer to my request.

[14025]

No. 112.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 261.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 14, 1909.

FOOD for foreign subjects in Tabreez.

In continuation of my telegram No. 260 of to-day.

Unless the Shah consents to the introduction of food into Tabreez, I am led to infer from the manner and language of my Turkish colleague that he may recommend the Porte to take active measures.

Even if we insist in regard to the supply of food for foreign subjects, I doubt the Shah's consenting. He would doubtless reply that his troops will not prevent them from leaving the town.

[14026]

No. 113.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 262.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 14, 1909.

KERMAN situation.

I am drawing the attention of the Persian Government to the situation at Keruan, where all the roads, with the exception of that to Meshed, are closed. Nothing, however, can be done except to hasten the departure of the newly-appointed Governor.

His Majesty's Consul reports that all authority in the town is at an end, that bread is scarce, and that hungry crowds have looted the bakers' shops.

[14045]

No. 111.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey—(received April 14.)

(No. 263.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 14, 1909.

SITUATION at Bushire.

I have received the following telegram No. 343 of the 14th April from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire:—

"Seyyid Murteza still persists in keeping 200 to 300 riflemen with him; the town is panic-stricken, and matters are at a deadlock. A raid by these men is anticipated; the bazars consequently and even shops are still closed. Unless some relief come soon the inhabitants threaten to take 'bast' en masse at His Majesty's Consul-General.

"The whole community now realize that the Seyyid's mask of Nationalism is merely designed to cover his rapacious intentions. Three prominent Chiefs of Dashti and Tangistan have written to me signifying their intention to adhere to my wishes.

"The chief Nationalists and Royalists among the Persian population laid before me their views on the situation.

"They consider, without exception, that Seyyid must leave Bushire, and suggest his removal to Njef, where the Flema already have knowledge of his character. They are all equally convinced of the impossibility of restoring order if he is allowed to remain. Can you, in these circumstances, authorize me to turn him out, the Nationalists not being sufficiently strong to do so without my help? It is urgently required that action should be immediate.

"As there is some ground for thinking that Seyyid Murteza has been encouraged by the German Consul, I should prefer in the present instance not to consult with him; but I have no doubt that the French and Turkish Consuls will agree with me, and I am convinced of the entire concurrence of my Russian colleague."

In reply I have sent the following telegram No. 94 to Major Cox:—

"You have already been authorized to employ bluejackets for the expulsion of the Tangistanis if their presence were to constitute a real danger for the lives of foreigners. I cannot sanction their use as you suggest without the authorization of His Majesty's Government."

If you should intend to give this authorization to His Majesty's Consul, it would be well that he should secure from both Royalists and Nationalists a written request to depart Seyyid Murteza.

[14134]

No. 115.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 505.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 14, 1909.

FROM a communication made to me by the British Embassy here, it appears that the German Minister at Tehran has been discussing with his colleagues the desirability of guards being sent for the protection of the Legations of Germany, Austria, Turkey, and Italy.

In reply, the German Foreign Office have told their Representative at Tehran that "to approach the Persian Government with a view to obtaining guards for the Legations before that Government had officially declared themselves unable to fulfil their international duties would be contrary to the principles of international law."

I should like to know how the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs intends to reply if a similar communication has been made to him.

[13560]

No. 116.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 146.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 14, 1909.

THE action reported by you in your telegram No. 254 of the 12th April has my approval. The Persian Government have undertaken by Treaty "to respect and efficiently to protect" the subjects and citizens of foreign Powers.

You should, therefore, when the necessity arises, insist on their either allowing the foreigners in Tabreez to leave the town or allowing sufficient supplies of food to enter it.

[13559]

No. 117.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 147.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 14, 1909.

THE instructions sent to Bushire (see your telegram No. 253 of the 12th April) have the approval of His Majesty's Government. It is important that no action should be taken to facilitate, by means of the force of bluejackets which has been landed, the re-establishment of the authority of the Shah. Without of course interfering in any way with any arrangement for the payment to the Imperial Bank of 30,000 toman, would it not be possible for us, now that the Customs wharf is apparently in the hands of the bluejackets, to withhold the Customs receipts from Darya Begi until we receive assurances that a sum will be set aside out of those receipts for the refunding of the money which has been seized from British subjects by Ain-ed-Dowleh? The remainder would be at the disposal of the Shah.

[13841]

No. 117*.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 148.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, April 14, 1909.

YOUR telegram No. 255 of the 13th instant: Bushire affairs.
Instructions approved.

[13939]

No. 118.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 149.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, April 14, 1909.

YOUR telegram No. 258 [of the 13th instant: Tabreez].
I concur.

[14045]

No. 119.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 150.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 14, 1909.

THE expulsion of Seyyid from Bushire, suggested by His Majesty's Consul-General in his telegram repeated to me in your telegram No. 263 of the 14th April, and which it appears that the Nationalists have joined with the Royalists in requesting, would go beyond the object for which troops have been landed, i.e., the protection of the lives and property of British subjects and residents of other nationalities. Moreover, if we were to expel Seyyid, the decision as to who should be intrusted with the government of Bushire would rest with us. His expulsion

[1649]

Q

would, *ipso facto*, constitute us the government of the town, and it is difficult to see when this state of affairs would come to an end as there would be no other satisfactory authority which could take his place. There is, however, no reason why Seyyid should not be warned that if British subjects or foreigners are attacked, they will be protected against him by force if need be.

[13940]

No. 120.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 151.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 14, 1909.

I AM asking the French Government to lose no time in appointing an Inspector and a Treasurer-General. These two appointments are a necessary preliminary to the carrying into effect of any scheme such as that mentioned in your telegram No. 259 of the 13th April.

If the two Governments decide to make any loan or advance to the Shah, the proceeds might be placed to the joint account at the two banks of your Russian colleagues and yourself, and paid out to the Treasurer-General in instalments, after you had both been satisfied by the latter as to the objects to which it was intended to apply the money. It might possibly be arranged that the Financial Adviser should be associated with you though there might be some objection to this arrangement on the ground that he is an employé of the Persian Government.

Please communicate to me your views on the subject after you have consulted the Financial Adviser.

If you have any proposals to make with regard to reforms in the Gendarmerie and Police, I should be glad to receive them.

[14026]

No. 121.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 154.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 14, 1909.

SITUATION at Korman.

With reference to the information contained in your telegram No. 262 of the 14th April, could not His Majesty's Consul and the British subjects leave the town, or is this out of the question?

[13256]

No. 122.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 14, 1909.

WITH reference to your letter of the 25th ultimo and previous correspondence relative to the desire of the Sheikh of Mohammerrah for British financial assistance, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith a copy of a further telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran on the subject,* and to suggest that a solution of the question might be found by obtaining from the Sheikh, on behalf of a British subject or company, a Concession for the irrigation of the Karun basin in return for a sum of money to be advanced, if necessary, in the first place by His Majesty's Government, and subsequently repaid to them by the concessionnaire.

Viscount Morley is aware of the survey of the region in question, recently carried out by Sir W. Wilcocks, which will form the subject of a report shortly to be issued. There is every reason to suppose that this report will be favourable, and in such a case there should be no difficulty in finding British applicants for what cannot fail to be a most valuable Concession. The Sheikh, on his side, would view with satisfaction the creation of a material British interest in his dominions because, in his view, its existence would afford him the best assurance of British support.

Such a large material interest, added to those which Great Britain already possesses in this, the most fertile region in Persia, would, moreover, be of great

[13844]

No. 120*.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 152.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 14, 1909.

[MOHAMMERRAH.]

Action reported in your telegram No. 256 of yesterday's date is approved.

[13849]

No. 120^o.*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.*

(No. 153.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 11, 1909.

BUSHIRE.

I approve the action reported in your telegram No. 257 of yesterday's date.

advantage through subsequent extension to Mesopotamia, and would create a British interest on the Persian Gulf, and would compete successfully with any which Germany may acquire later through the Bagdad Railway.

I am further to point out that the present moment is a most favourable one for the realization of such a scheme, since, in the existing condition of affairs in Persia, there is no reason to fear any effective resistance on the part of the Persian Government to the granting of such a Concession by the Sheikh of Mohammerah.

I am accordingly to submit, for the consideration of Lord Morley, that a determined effort should be made without delay to secure this Concession for a sum, say, of 5,000*l.* or 6,000*l.*, to be repaid by the concessionnaire as soon as the work begins to be profitable, and I am to add that Sir E. Grey attaches great importance to the successful execution of this project both from the political and commercial points of view.

I am to invite a reply to this letter at the earliest possible convenience of Viscount Morley.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[13250]

No. 123.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April 14, 1909.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 25th ultimo and previous correspondence relative to the assurances of British protection solicited by the Sheikh of Mohammerah, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copies of two further telegrams from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran on the same subject.*

The former of these messages repeats a telegram from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire, in which he expresses the opinion that the Sheikh will require from him some definite reply, first as to whether the guarantees already given include protection against the violation of his rights by a possible constitutional Government in Persia, and, secondly, as to the extension of those guarantees to his immediate offspring.

The later telegram conveys Sir G. Barclay's observations on the first of these two points.

With regard to this first question, Sir E. Grey would suggest that the Sheikh should be informed that His Majesty's Government are prepared to give him the same support against any encroachment on his rights as already promised in 1902, whatever changes there may be in the government in Persia.

With regard to the question of the extension to the Sheikh's immediate offspring of the guarantees already given, the Sheikh might be reminded that these assurances have already been extended to his successors, and that, as these will presumably be his offspring, our assurances do, in fact, already apply to the latter. If this declaration fails to satisfy the Sheikh, Sir E. Grey sees no objection to a formal extension to "his heirs and successors" of the guarantees already given, since, should the Sheikh's immediate offspring fail to govern successfully and be expelled, His Majesty's Government would be no more bound to uphold them than they now are to uphold his successors. Sir E. Grey is, moreover, of opinion that an assurance of this nature would be likely so far to strengthen the Sheikh's position that his successors would be likely, if it were given, to be his lineal heirs.

I am to state that, if Viscount Morley concurs in the views above expressed, Sir E. Grey will address a telegram in that sense to Sir G. Barclay for the guidance of Major Cox.

I am to invite a reply to this letter at the earliest possible convenience of Viscount Morley.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

No. 124.

[14098]

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 15.)(Confidential.)
Sir,*Admiralty, April 14, 1909.*

1 AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to suggest, for the favourable consideration of the Secretary of State, that a small contingent of Indian or other troops might be sent in one of the troopships of the Royal Indian Marine from Bombay or Kurrachee to relieve the bluejackets landed at Bushire, as well as any at Bussorah, should it be necessary to land them at this place also, as indicated in recent telegrams sent to the Admiralty by the Foreign Office.

2. My Lords hope that Sir E. Grey may favourably entertain this proposal, as the state of unrest in the Persian Gulf appears likely to continue for some time, and the efficiency of His Majesty's ships suffers by the absence of the crews. Moreover, the men themselves are unprovided with the equipment necessary for military work on shore, and are consequently at a great disadvantage as regards their personal wants and capability for such work in the trying climate of the Persian Gulf.

3. I am to add that their Lordships have already detached two vessels from the Mediterranean Station, to provide for the extra work thrown on the East Indies squadron, and a third vessel, the first-class cruiser "Hawke," has just been ordered to convey Sir F. Wingate to Somaliland. In addition to these the Commander-in-chief of the East Indies squadron has asked for yet another vessel to be placed under his orders.

I am, &c.
(Signed) W. GRAHAM GREENE.

No. 125.

[14159]

*Mr. F. C. Strick to Foreign Office.—(Received April 15.)**Baltic House, Leadenhall Street, London,
April 14, 1909.*

Sir,

I LEARN from the "Geological Survey of India," vol. xxxiv, Part IV, that deposits of red oxide of iron exist on the Persian Gulf Island of Hahl, and I am accordingly taking steps to obtain samples from these deposits.

Meanwhile, I should be much obliged if you would kindly let me know whether the above island is under Persian rule, or whether it belongs to one of the Arabian Sheikhs.

Thanking you in anticipation,

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANK C. STRICK.

No. 126.

[14200]

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 209.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, April 15, 1909.

FOREIGN Legation guards for Tehran: Your telegram No. 505 of the 14th April. German Charge d'Affaires here made to Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs a communication similar to that made to you. M. Teliarkoff took the view that the communication indicated that Germany for the present would take no steps to provide guards for her Legation at Tehran, and accepted the communication with satisfaction. M. Isvolsky regards the communication as having been made à titre de renseignement, and considers that it does not call for any answer.

No. 127.

[14194]

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 264.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 15, 1909.

CONDITION of Shiraz-Ispahan road.

His Majesty's Consul-General at Ispahan has warned British subjects against travelling on the Shiraz-Ispahan road, and I am instructing His Majesty's Consul at Shiraz to issue a warning couched in similar terms.

The Kuldjeh tribes are out plundering and murdering in the Yeydikhast district, and the state of the whole road is deplorable.

No. 128.

[14195]

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 265.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 15, 1909.

TABREEZ negotiations.

In my telegram No. 249 I mentioned certain negotiations as in contemplation between the Nationalists at Tabreez and the Royalists.

These negotiations are being conducted from Basimeh—Anjed-Dowlah's camp—with Tehran.

To the Nationalists' demands for a Constitution the negotiators in Tehran replied that Tabreez must surrender unconditionally, and that the Shah would do his duty to his country. I learn this from a secret source. It is evident that the negotiations are, so far, very unpromising.

No. 129.

[14196]

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 266.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 15, 1909.

RUSSIAN troops for Astrabad.

The Russian Consul at Astrabad reports that he has applied for troops, as the town is surrounded by Turcomans and fighting is in progress, and he needs them to protect the Consulate and stop the fighting.

No. 130.

[12117]

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Gorst.

(No. 17. Very Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 15, 1909.

KARUN irrigation.

We are anxious to have the views of Sir W. Willecocks on this question, which is at present under consideration. Is he in Cairo, or if not, for how long will he be away? He might communicate through you, unless he is likely to be in London.

No. 131.

[14098]

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 156.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 15, 1909.

SITUATION at Bushire.

It is probable that the necessity for the special protection of Europeans at Bushire will be of long duration? If so, the Admiralty object to the prolonged employment of bluejackets on shore, and suggest that they should be relieved by the dispatch from India of a small contingent of troops, either Indian or others.

Please furnish me with your opinion on the subject.

[13969]

No. 132.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.(No. 122.)
Sir,*Foreign Office, April 15, 1909.*

THE Councillor of the Russian Embassy called at this Office on the 10th instant and informed Mr. Mallet that they had received a telegram from the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that he had informed your Excellency that the Russian Government were considering the desirability of sending troops to keep open the road between Euzeli and Tehran, but that no step would be taken to carry out this plan without a previous notification to His Majesty's Government.

M. Pokrowski thought that if this step were simultaneous with the joint representations to the Shah to grant a Constitution, it could not be said that the measure had been taken in support of His Majesty.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[14239]

No. 133.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 16.)

Sir,

India Office, April 15, 1909.

WITH reference to the letter of this Office of the 25th ultimo, as to the question of the grant of a loan by His Majesty's Government to the Sheikh of Mohammurah, I am directed by Viscount Morley to inclose, for the information of Secretary Sir E. Grey, copy of further telegraphic correspondence with the Government of India in the matter.

Lord Morley is still of the opinion expressed in the letter referred to that no charge should on this account be laid upon the revenues of India. He does not, therefore, think it necessary to express an opinion on the proposals in the first paragraph of Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 236 of the 7th instant, but he sees no objection in principle to the suggestion made in the second paragraph.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 133.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, March 29, 1909.

MOHAMMERAH.

Your telegram of the 19th March as to loan to Sheikh was communicated to Foreign Office for consideration before decision conveyed in telegram of the 25th instant to Sir G. Barclay, repeated to you, was arrived at by His Majesty's Government.

Inclosure 2 in No. 133.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P.

April 9, 1909.

LOAX to Sheikh of Mohammurah.

See your telegram of 29th ultimo, and telegrams Nos. 299 and 300 of the 5th instant from Resident, Persian Gulf, to Sir G. Barclay.

We are so firmly convinced of vital importance to Indian interests of maintaining our influence with Sheikh of Mohammurah that, while we fully recognize difficult position in which His Majesty's Government are placed, we venture once more strongly to support Resident in action in regard to loan which he proposes to take (see his telegram No. 300, concluding portion).

Mutatis mutandis, I desire to associate myself with views expressed in my predecessor's telegram of the 26th November, 1902, as we cannot overrate importance which attitude of Sheikh may assume in certain eventualities.

[14272]

No. 134.

Mr. Preece to Foreign Office.—(Received April 16.)

Dear Mr. Mallet,

1, St. James' Place, London, April 15, 1909.

WITH reference to your note of the 3rd instant regarding the pay of the Imperial Commissioner, I now send you on the reverse a copy of a letter from him to Mr. D'Arcy. Will you kindly get from Sir George Barclay a confirmation of this, and positive instructions as to whom the salary of 1,000*l.* from the 1st instant is to be paid, and oblige.

Yours faithfully,
(Signed) J. R. PREECE.

Inclosure in No. 134.

Sadigh-es-Sultaneh to Mr. D'Arcy.

Dear Sir,

Kensington, April 12, 1909.

AS I mentioned at our last meeting, I wired to his Highness the Persian Prime Minister, through the intermediary of his Excellency the Minister of Public Works and Mines, applying for an explanation with reference to the notice which you have received from the British Foreign Office. In reply I had a telegram from his Highness the Persian Prime Minister to the effect that there was a misunderstanding; no change has been made in the post of Commissionership. You are the Imperial Commissioner, and the fee of the Imperial Commissioner must be paid to yourself. Accordingly I have to request you to be kind enough to act on the authority of the above telegram.

Yours very truly,
(Signed) SADIGH-ES-SULTANEH.

[14309]

No. 135.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 16.)

(No. 202.)

St. Petersburg, April 16, 1909

(Telegraphic.) P.

JOINT action in Persia.

Suppression of the passages mentioned in my telegram No. 196 of the 13th instant is agreed to by the Russian Government.

It is, however, in their opinion, indispensable that the Shah should be informed that the approbation of an elective Assembly is not the only condition attaching to the conclusion of a loan, but that certain guarantees will also be required. They propose, therefore, that after the words "en présence d'une pareille décision du Medjlis" an addition to the following effect should be made:—

"Russia and Great Britain will grant to Persia their support in regard to conclusion of the loan under certain guarantees, which will form the object of a subsequent exchange of views between the two Powers and the Persian Government."

In order that the necessary instructions may be sent by telegraph to the Russian Representative at Tehran, M. Lvolsky begs that he may be favoured with a reply as soon as possible.

[14312]

No. 136.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 16.)

(No. 203.)

St. Petersburg, April 16, 1909.

(Telegraphic.) P.

JOINT telegram No. 195 of the 13th instant.

Proposed mediation at Tabreez. Proposals mentioned by His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez are accepted by Russian Government, who have instructed their Consular Representative at Tabreez to act in concert with Mr. Wrentslaw.

The view of the Russian Government is that the British and Russian Consular Representatives at Tabreez should unquestionably be left to deal exclusively with any measures for mediation, and that these Representatives should, if necessary, make the leaders of the Constitutional party understand that, in the event of their inviting the Consular Representatives of other Powers to join in the mediation, the two Powers will take no part in it.

The Russian Government believe, from the information which has reached them, that the Nationalist demands are that a Constitution and a full amnesty should be granted, and that permission should be given to those whose arms are their own personal property to retain them, while the arms belonging to the Persian Government would be surrendered; finally, a diplomatic guarantee is required that the old régime will not be re-established.

In the opinion of the Russian Government the advice to be tendered by the two Governments to the Shah in great measure meets the requirements of the Nationalists. With regard to the proposed diplomatic guarantee, the Russian Government suggest that perhaps it might be pointed out to the Nationalist leaders that the old régime would be definitely terminated by the introduction of the reforms which the two Governments are urging the Shah to adopt.

[14303]

No. 137.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 16.)

(No. 267.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 16, 1909.

FOREIGN subjects in Tabreez.

I have as yet received no reply as to the introduction of food into the town.

His Majesty's Consul-General reports that Russian subjects are unwilling to leave Tabreez, and thinks that British subjects would also refuse, and that their departure would in any case not be allowed by the Nationalists. He thinks that it would not be safe to urge the Shah in this sense, as he might provide facilities for their quitting the town and then decline any further responsibility. He also reports that British subjects can, with a little difficulty, last out for some time longer.

I concur in Mr. Wratishaw's view; and, beyond the action reported in my telegram No. 251 of the 12th instant, I do not for the moment contemplate any further move as regards a safe conduct.

The reference is to your telegram No. 146 of the 14th instant.

[14308]

No. 138.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 16.)

(No. 268.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 16, 1909.

ANGLO-RUSSIAN representations to the Shah.

What are the three points (a), (b), and (c) which it is proposed to eliminate from the text of the representations as contained in Sir A. Nicholson's telegram No. 486?

[14264]

No. 139.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 16.)

(No. 2.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 16, 1909.

BLUE JACKETS at Bushire: Your telegram No. 156 of the 15th instant.

Major Cox has already suggested to the Government of India that the extra troops now at Yash should be sent to Bushire in order to relieve the crew of His Majesty's ship "Fox." I am suggesting, however, that these troops should not be moved from Yash for the moment, for I should prefer that the bluejackets be retained if possible for the present. We will dispense with them as soon as possible, though I cannot foresee how long they may be needed.

The replacement of these men by Indian troops might cause a false impression.

No. 140.

[14321]

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 16.)

(No. 270.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 16, 1909.

PUBLICATION of representations to the Shah.

May we communicate the substance of our representations to the newspaper correspondents here? I think it would be calculated to make a useful impression on the Shah were we, after we had made them, to have them published.

[14316]

No. 141.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 16.)

(No. 271.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 16, 1909.

TABREEZ. Two Consuls' deliberations on the situation.

I have received the following telegram, No. 77, from His Majesty's Consul-General:—

"With reference to your telegram No. 36 of the 13th April, we are still waiting for the result of the negotiations at Bushire. Those of the Nationalist party who are in control of the town will not move from their original demands, which are understood to be—

"(a.) Restoration of the Constitution.

"(b.) Universal and complete amnesty.

"(c.) Removal of all—most particularly irregular—Government troops.

"(d.) Retention of all arms which are not Government property.

"(e.) Appointment of a Governor-General acceptable to Tabreez. (The three following names are mentioned in this connection: Samed-ed-Dowleh, Mukhlis-es-Sultaneh, and Humakuli Mirza.)

"(f.) These terms must be guaranteed by foreign Powers.

"The general population, on the other hand, desire nothing but to see an end to the present distressing situation. To accomplish this the two Governments might, if they thought fit, press upon the Shah to accept these conditions, or such modified forms of them as the Nationalists might be forced by straitened circumstances to accept

"The town is at present quiet, but lack of food is severely felt.

"Part 2.—A foreign guarantee of constitutional government in a modified form should bring about an earlier solution of the question. My Russian colleague and I, however, think that, should a capitulation be forced on the town, the following arrangements are urgent:—

"(a.) The tribesmen under Rahim and Sanad Khan should be removed to a distance of at least 20 miles, and under no circumstances allowed to enter the town.

"(b.) Any persons who may be excluded from the amnesty should, under the usual implied conditions, be allowed to take 'last' at the Consulate.

"(c.) The parties may arrange the surrender of arms and munitions between themselves.

"(d.) The bulk of Ain-ed-Dowleh's force should be instructed to maintain its present positions, while only the Persian Cossacks should be allowed to enter the town, with Ain-ed-Dowleh, to maintain order.

"(e.) Ain-ed-Dowleh should be instructed to see to the maintenance of order in the town, and to conform to our joint representations in everything connected with or arising from the capitulation.

"We do not think it advisable to offer any uncalculated help in the above sense, but, should the peace negotiations fail (as is not unlikely) and no help come from outside, the Nationalists will be forced to consider the prospect of a surrender on less favourable terms. Then they would presumably apply to us, and the moment, we think, would be a good one to put forward our proposals.

"Great caution will be necessary in the granting of guarantees, both sides being thoroughly unreliable.

[1419]

"Part 3.—The actual conditions of the moment have inspired these conclusions, but some unexpected success of the Nationalist arms in another part of Persia, internal strife, or treason may completely change the face of things and consequently the tenour of our decision."

(R.) As regards first part, two most essential points are sufficiently covered by our own [2] general representations. If latter succeed, points (c), (d), and (e) should be obtained. As regards (f), more cannot be given, and may not be necessary, than the knowledge that the Shah's concessions are due to our representations.

As regards second part, which should only become necessary if our representations fail, Consul should, if the case arises, endeavour to obtain terms indicated, and we should support them here.

It will be obviously desirable that the two Consuls should act independently of their colleagues, and they should discourage Nationalists from applying for help to other Consulates.

In view of imminence of our representations, and the fact that His Majesty's Consul-General thinks that Tabreez can last barring accidents at least three weeks, we have not made representations to the Shah indicated in my telegram No. 198.

(Sent to St. Petersburg.)

[14322]

No. 142.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 16.)

(No. 272.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 16, 1909.

FOREIGN subjects in Tabreez.

The Persian Government has instructed Ain-ed-Dowleh to facilitate the departure of foreign subjects and to ensure their safety, and suggest that they should now leave the town. As I expected they refuse to allow the introduction of food.

As already reported British and Russian subjects do not desire to leave Tabreez.

My Russian colleague and I are informing the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires, with a view to allaying his anxiety, that we hope to make our representations in a day or two.

I shall continue to act in harmony with my colleagues in this matter, although British subjects are less hard pressed than others.

[14323]

No. 143.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 16.)

(No. 273.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 16, 1909.

BUSHIRE customs receipts. With reference to your telegram No. 147 of the 14th instant.

Now that the attempts of Seyyid Murteza to seize the Bushire customs receipts have compelled us to guard against further misappropriations, our first object should be to ensure the safeguarding of all receipts issued at either the customs or the bank, without deciding to whom any surplus (and it is extremely unlikely that there should be any for some time to come) should be paid, until a proper agreement is reached as to the payment of 30,000 tomans a month with arrears, with whoever may be in authority in the town.

Practically all the money seized by Ain-ed-Dowleh from British subjects has been refunded.

A report reaches me from His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez to the effect that the local assembly has demanded 50,000 tomans from the customs, this being, as far as I know, the first demand preferred by the Nationalists on customs pledged to the service of the Russian Debt. The Belgian Director of Customs at Tabreez has taken "bait" in the Russian Consulate-General.

[14303]

No. 144.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 159.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 16, 1909.

TABREEZ.

The views set forth in your telegram No. 267 of yesterday's date have my approval.

[14308]

No. 145.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 160.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, April 16, 1909.

YOUR telegram No. 268 [of the 16th instant].

Proposed omission includes that portion of Article 6 of programme suggested in Russian Memorandum which is summarized in paragraph of Sir A. Nicolson's telegram No. 193 beginning "assistance" and ending "Maliat."

[14272]

No. 146.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 161.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 16, 1909.

OIL Syndicate.

Please refer to my despatch No. 47 and to your telegram No. 216 of the 1st instant.

A letter signed "Sadigh-es-Sultaneh," and written from Kensington, has been communicated to me by Mr. Preece. The writer of the letter asks the Syndicate to take note of the fact that the Persian Prime Minister has addressed a telegram to him informing him that he is Imperial Commissioner, and as such entitled to receive a salary of 1,000.

Please ascertain the facts of the case and let me have a telegraphic reply, as Preece asks whether you can confirm this, and give positive instructions as to the individual to whom the payment is to be made.

[14264]

No. 147.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 16, 1909.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to inform you that on the receipt of your Confidential letter of the 14th instant he addressed a telegram to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, apprising him of the suggestion that the bluejackets landed at Bushire from His Majesty's ship "Fox" should be relieved by a small contingent of Indian or other troops to be sent in one of the troopships of the Royal Indian Marine from Bombay or Karachi. Sir E. Grey also inquired whether the need for special protection for Europeans was likely to last long, and called for an expression of Sir G. Barclay's views on the proposal put forward.

A telegram has now been received from Sir G. Barclay, reporting that he would much prefer the bluejackets to remain at Bushire for the present, and that their replacement by Indian troops might give a false impression. He adds that he is unable to foresee how long the services of these men will be needed, but that they will be dispensed with at the earliest possible moment.

I am to state that Sir E. Grey concurs in the view expressed by Sir G. Barclay, and to express the hope that, in these circumstances, the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Admiralty will refrain, at any rate for the present, from pressing their proposal.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALET.

[13646]

No. 145.

Foreign Office to Messrs. Ph. Ziegler and Co.

Gentlemen,

Foreign Office, April 16, 1909.

WITH reference to my letter of the 15th February relative to the forcible search for arms made on your premises at Isfahan, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to inform you that he has now received from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran a report on the subject.

It appears from this report that on the morning of the 1st February the ferassh-bashi of Samsan-ess-Saltane, accompanied by two Seyyids and several armed Bakhtiari, entered your premises, and while conducting a forcible search for arms and ammunition opened three cases of goods, cutting their tin linings.

Samsan-ess-Saltane at first asserted that the facts had been misrepresented to His Majesty's Consul-General, but, when pressed by Mr. Grahame, agreed that an examination should be conducted by the Kargazari on the 6th February. At the appointed hour Mr. Grahame, your agent, and his witnesses appeared, but none of the defendants attended. Mr. Grahame accordingly claimed two apologies, first to your firm for the incident of the 1st February, and secondly from Samsan-ess-Saltane personally to himself for the non-appearance of the defendants at the Kargazari.

On the morning of the following day Samsan-ess-Saltane called on His Majesty's Consul-General and expressed his regret, and on the 8th February a Bakhtiari Khan accompanied by Seyyid Messih, the prime instigator of the incident, apologized to your agent, assuring him that there would be no repetition of such proceedings.

Sir G. Barclay states that the apologies tendered were ample and satisfactory, and that, in his opinion, the incident may be considered closed.

I am to inform you that Sir E. Grey concurs in this view.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MAILLET.

[13641]

No. 149.

Foreign Office to Mr. Preece.

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 16, 1909.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith, for the information of your Directors, copy of a despatch addressed to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran by His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Ahwaz,* reporting certain demands made by Sardar Muhtashem, Hbeggi of the Bakhtiari tribes, in connection with the payment of the February instalment due from your Syndicate, and the reply returned thereto.

In forwarding this report, Sir G. Barclay observes that the maintenance of Samsan-ess-Saltane in the position of Hkhami, of which he was assured by the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, enabled him to authorize Captain Lorimer, who had telegraphed for instructions, to allow the procedure of payment of the instalment by the Imperial Bank of Persia at Isfahan to take its normal course.

Sir G. Barclay adds that he has approved the terms of Captain Lorimer's reply to Sardar Muhtashem, and I am to inform you that Sir E. Grey has expressed concurrence in this approval.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MAILLET.

[14 82

No. 150.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 17.)

THE Under Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a letter to the Imperial Bank of Persia, dated the 6th instant, relative to the working of the Nasratbad branch during the year ended the 20th September, 1908.

India Office, April 16, 1909.

* Vice-Consul Lorimer to Sir G. Barclay, February 13, 1909.

Inclosure in No. 150.

India Office to Imperial Bank of Persia.

Sir,

India Office, April 6, 1909.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to inform you that this Office has been furnished with a copy of your letter to the Foreign Office of the 30th December, 1908.

In accordance with the arrangement accepted in Sir Lepel Griffin's letter to the Foreign Office, dated the 22nd May, 1903, a draft for the sum of 1,500*l.* is forwarded herewith, being the amount of the subsidy payable for the year ended the 20th September, 1908, on account of the Nasratbad branch of the Imperial Bank of Persia.

At the same time I am directed to invite reference to the final paragraph of my letter of the 5th February, 1908, and to remind you that the liability of the Secretary of State in Council is restricted, in accordance with the Agreement of 1903, to the payment in each year of 1,500*l.*, less the amount of any net profits for that year.

The question of continuing the subsidy is under consideration, in consultation with the Foreign Office.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

14380]

No. 151.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 17.)

Sir,

India Office, April 16, 1909.

IN reply to your letter dated the 14th instant, as to the obtaining from the Sheikh of Mohammurah of a Concession for the irrigation of the Karun basin, I am directed to say that Viscount Morley finds himself unable to approve this proposal unless it can be carried into effect without imposing a charge upon Indian revenues.

It would, however, be in accordance with the view expressed in the last paragraph of my letter of the 15th instant if facilities could be given to bring the Sheikh into direct communication with any suitable applicant for the Concession.

Lord Morley understands from your letter that Sir E. Grey does not anticipate any difficulty arising from the fact of an option for a Concession for works on the Karun River having already been granted by the Persian Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

[14379]

No. 152.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 17.)

Sir,

India Office, April 16, 1909.

IN reply to your letter dated the 14th instant, I am directed to say that Viscount Morley concurs in the views of Secretary Sir E. Grey as to the intimation that may be made to the Sheikh of Mohammurah regarding the support to be given him against any encroachments on his rights.

Lord Morley also agrees as to the formal extension, if necessary, to "his heirs and successors" of the guarantees already given to the Sheikh.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

14423]

No. 153.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 17.)

(No. 206.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

S. Petersburg, April 17, 1909.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs hears from Russian Charge d'Affaires at Tehran that the Persian Government refuse to permit introduction of food into Tabreez and

[1619]

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ask that Consuls should leave the place. Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks that the introduction of a large quantity of food for Consulates might expose latter to danger of attack from the famished population, and he asks whether it would not be practicable to obtain permission from the Shah that small quantities should from time to time be introduced for use of Consulates and foreign colony. If you think this proposal practical, he would suggest that instructions should be sent to British and Russian Representatives.

[14404]

No. 154.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 17.)

(No. 207.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

St. Petersburg, April 17, 1909.

RUSSIAN Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that, owing to events occurring at Asterabad and the danger of the town being pillaged, orders have been sent to Russian Commissioner at Goumbet-i-Kabours to proceed with his escort in all haste to Asterabad.

14459]

No. 155.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 17.)

(No. 274.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 17, 1909.

NATIONALISTS and Hornuz red oxide.

The Nationalists, wishing to prevent Moin-ut-Tijjar from paying his royalties to the Shah, have stopped mining operations, but I am inclined not to press the matter so long as they make no attempt to seize the oxide.

Can you inform me how long Mr. Weir can postpone his shipments without incurring loss? Without this knowledge I am unable to decide definitely on the best course to be followed.

Reference is to my telegram No. 229 of the 6th instant.

[14458]

No. 156.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 17.)

(No. 275.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 17, 1909.

TABREEZ negotiations.

I have received the following confidential telegram, No. 81, dated 16th instant, from His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez:—

"A leading member of the Local Assembly told me yesterday, on the occasion of a private visit, that foreign subjects would certainly not be allowed to leave the town, and that, in case capitulation should become necessary, the Nationalists would seek the mediation of the British and Russian Consulates-General. He thought, however, that there was a sufficient supply of food for another three weeks. He added that the Nationalists would be willing to accept whatever terms the British and Russian Governments might suggest to the Shah, there being no hope now but in intervention by the two Powers."

[14460]

No. 157.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 17.)

(No. 276.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 17, 1909.

KERMAN situation.

With reference to your telegram No. 154 of the 11th instant.

The state of Kerman, according to a report received from His Majesty's Consul, is no longer so bad, and British subjects are in no danger.

[14461]

No. 157*.

Sir E. Gorst to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 17.)

(No. 17.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Cairo, April 17, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to inform you, in reply to the inquiry contained in your telegram No. 17 of the 15th April as to Sir W. Willecocks's whereabouts, that his family have telegraphed to ask him about his future movements. Recent events at Constantinople and troubles on the Tigris have caused him to modify his plans, which were to leave Bagdad for Constantinople and Cairo on the 20th April. He is now on the Tigris.

[1619]

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No. 158.

[14309]

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 538.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 17, 1909.

PROPOSED loan.

See your despatch No. 232 of the 8th April and your telegram No. 202 of the 16th April.

A misunderstanding seems to have arisen as to the meaning of my telegram No. 238 of the 17th March. It must be understood that at this moment we cannot pledge ourselves to giving the Persian Government a large loan. In saying that the acceptance of the whole loan by the Assembly would be followed by our advance, I meant by "the whole loan," the loan of 400,000*l.*, and not a subsequent loan. We might, perhaps, facilitate a further loan by foreign capitalists if it were clearly shown to be necessary, but the two Governments would have to discuss this matter between them. You should express to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs my regret that such a misunderstanding should have arisen, and, as representations at Tehran are now urgently necessary, you should beg him to agree to the wording which I now suggest without further delay.

My suggestions are as follows:—

1. The words "le projet d'un emprunt extérieur plus ou moins considérable" should be omitted from paragraph 6 of the inclosure in your telegram No. 232, and the following words should be inserted in their place: "aussitôt que l'Assemblée électorale aura adopté cet emprunt."

2. The following sentence should be inserted after the above words instead of the sentence: "En présence . . . emprunt":—

"The only means of facilitating a larger loan to the Persian Government, if such should subsequently be found to be necessary, would be to do so under certain guarantees, these guarantees to be discussed by the Persian Government, on the one side, and the British and Russian Governments on the other, at some later date."

No. 159.

[14423]

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 163.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 17, 1909.

FOOD for foreigners at Tabreez.

I should be glad to have your views on the proposal contained in telegram No. 206 from St. Petersburg repeated to you.

No. 160.

[14379]

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 161.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 17, 1909.

WITH regard to the assurances to be given to the Sheikh of Mohammurah, you should inform him that whatever changes may take place in the Government of Persia the support already promised by His Majesty's Government in 1902 will be given to him against any encroachment on his rights.

You should further remind him that our assurances do in fact apply to his offspring as they have already been extended to his successors, who presumably will be his offspring. But there is no objection to formally extending the assurances already given so as to include "his heirs and successors" if he is not satisfied with the above guarantees.

[14496]

No. 161.

Sir A. Nicholson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 18.)

(No. 211.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, April 18, 1909.

PERSIA. Your telegram No. 538 [of the 17th instant: Anglo-Russian representations to the Shah].

Russian Government accept modifications which you propose, and will telegraph to-morrow necessary instructions to Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran so that programme may be delivered to the Shah without further delay.

[14572]

No. 162.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 18.)

(No. 277.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 18, 1909.

SITUATION of foreigners at Tabreez.

I have received the following telegram, No. 82, of the 17th April, from His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez:—

"I believe that public food supply is much smaller than I was at first given to understand. There seems, however, to be a fair quantity for the soldiers. The amounts are apparently unascertainable. The situation is very critical, and Members of the Assembly have hinted that Europeans would bear the brunt of the riot that is probably threatening.

"This afternoon my Russian colleague and I were invited to visit the Assembly. They declared that a serious riot was probable unless something to relieve the situation were immediately done, the food supply (except for soldiers) being very small. They begged us to convey a request to the two Legations to urge the Shah to accept the following proposals:—

"1. That a supply of 150 klavars of wheat for the poor, which they guarantee would not be used for combatants, should be sent in by the Basuinch road, which should be opened for this purpose.

"2. The opening of the road to be followed by a suspension of hostilities.

"3. That they should enter into communication with the Shah, and with other towns in Persia, with a view to arranging a general settlement through delegates chosen by them.

"The Assembly beg the two Legations to support them in these claims, and to impress on the Shah that the people of Azarbaijan are not fighting against him, but have taken up arms with the sole object of defending fundamental laws and the Constitution.

"The military leaders were to have been present on this occasion, but did not appear.

"My Russian colleague and I pointed out to them that the acceptance of their terms was very improbable, but promised to comply with their request.

"An identical communication was addressed by the local Assembly to Consuls this morning begging them to take measures for the welfare of natives and foreigners alike. This communication stated that until now food had been supplied to foreigners as well as to natives, but that henceforward it would be scarce."

I am replying to His Majesty's Consul-General instructing him to inform the Nationalists that any injury to foreigners at their hands may do irreparable damage to their cause.

May we make our general representations to-morrow?

As this seems to me a course which might possibly improve the very critical situation, I shall try to persuade my Russian colleague to telegraph for the same permission. It appears to me quite useless to attempt to press the terms suggested by the Assembly on the Shah.

[14492]

No. 163.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 18.)

(No. 278.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran April 18, 1909.

PERSIAN finances: Question of loan.

The proposed Commission of Control no more meets with the Financial Advisor's approval than with ours. He thinks that unless the exact reforms for which the loan or advance is to be employed are clearly stated (and I presume that the small loan contemplated by His Majesty's Government is destined for the introduction of reforms), the task assigned to the Commission would be almost impossible. The reforms for which it is to be applied can best be decided later, when any such abnormal form of control as that of the bank Managers, &c., will be no longer necessary, i.e., after the Assembly has met and given its approval, and when the Treasurer-General is in office.

Should the proposed Russian advance of 100,000l. now be made under the control of the bank Managers, the Shah will certainly try to use it for his troops, unless they are told that it must be employed for other purposes.

M. Bizot concurs in the general proposals contained in your telegram No. 151, and suggests that the two Representatives should be instructed to pay no instalment without his approval, as he thinks that it would be incompatible with his position for him to be associated more closely with them.

[14493]

No. 164.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 18.)

(No. 279.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 18, 1909.

ASTRABAD and Resht situations.

My Russian colleague informs me that a force of Shahsoreuds is marching on Resht. These troops are under the Shah's orders.

He also tells me that Astrabad seems to be at the mercy of the Turcomans, who are giving instructions from His Majesty.

[4494]

No. 165.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 18.)

(No. 280.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 18, 1909.

PROSPECT of Representations to the Shah.

His Majesty has been unfortunately strengthened in his attitude by the news of recent events at Constantinople.

The whole reactionary party, too, have drawn great encouragement from the critical situation at Tabreez, the successes of the Turcomans at Astrabad, and the prospect of an attack on Resht by the Shahsoreuds, referred to in my telegram No. 279 of to-day.

In these circumstances my Russian colleague, whom I have just seen, and I think it our duty to report that our chances of success are greatly diminished. M. Salimé, however, agrees with me that we should immediately make our general representations to the Shah in view of the precarious situation of Tabreez.

[14495]

No. 166.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 18.)

(No. 281.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 18, 1909.

FOOD for foreign subjects in Tabreez.

I am informed by the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires that he has presented a note to the Persian Government, in which he warns them that his Government will have to "seek strong and necessary measures," if permission to introduce food is refused.

[1649]

U

With reference to your telegram No. 163 of the 17th April my Russian colleague and I think that for the moment our general representations are the most pressing. We are not, however, sanguine as to their success.
We can, however, when making these, fall back on a demand for the gradual introduction by instalments of food for the foreigners in Tabreez.

[14598]

No. 167.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received April 19.)(No. 238)
Sir,

St. Petersburg, April 15, 1909.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 192 of the 8th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of an *aide-memoire* which I have received from the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs, respecting the escort dispatched to the Russian Consulate-General at Meshed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

Inclosure in No. 167.

Aide-memoire communicated to Sir A. Nicolson.

PAR un aide-memoire en date du 26 mars (8 avril) l'Ambassade britannique a bien voulu exprimer le desir que l'escorte du Consulat-General Imperial a Meshed soit chargée de protéger, en cas de danger, la vie et les biens des sujets britanniques qui se trouvent dans cette ville.

L'escorte en question, composée de soixante-quinze hommes avec deux mitrailleuses, va se mettre incessamment en route pour Meshed. Il va de soi que cette escorte recevra la protection, en cas de danger, non seulement aux sujets russes résidant à Meshed, mais encore à toute la colonne étrangère, ainsi que cela se fait habituellement dans toutes les villes de la Perse où se trouvent des Consuls russes.

Saint-Petersbourg, le 31 mars (13 avril), 1909.

[14719]

No. 168.

Messrs. Ziegler and Co. to Foreign Office. — (Received April 19.)

Sir,

Manchester, April 17, 1909.

WE have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your communication of yesterday, and beg to thank you for favouring us with the particulars of the events subsequent to the forcible search for arms made on our premises at Ischan.

Whilst expressing our warmest thanks to Mr. Graham for all he has done to safeguard our interests in this matter, we note with satisfaction that His Majesty's Minister at Tehran states that the apologies tendered by the Samiames-Saltane were ample, and that the incident is now to be considered closed.

We remain, &c.
(Signed) H. L. ZIEGLER AND CO.

[14754]

No. 169.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received April 19.)

(No. 241)

(Telegraphic.) P.

SITUATION at Tabreez.

Telegram No. 281 of the 18th instant from Tehran.

The Russian Government are considering the advisability of threatening the Shah that, unless certain quantities of food are admitted into Tabreez, they will themselves take steps to introduce the same, and will, if necessary, employ force to effect that object. This could be done, M. Isvolsky says, by dispatching an expedition from Julfa, and he

says that he will consult his colleagues in the Cabinet on the subject. He explains that foreigners in Tabreez cannot be allowed to die of starvation. It was the threats employed by the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran which first suggested to M. Isvolsky the idea of an expedition. I beg to be favoured with your views on the Russian project.

M. Isvolsky informed me that Caucasians from Resht were threatening Astara and the life of the Russian Consul there. As Astara is situated close to the Russian frontier, troops will probably be moved in for the protection of the Russian Consul.

The programme is being telegraphed this evening to M. Sabline. The necessity of obtaining the Imperial sanction has caused delay.

[14596]

No. 170.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received April 19.)

(No. 282.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

SITUATION at Tabreez.

Tehran, April 19, 1909.

I have received the following telegram No. 83 of the 18th instant from His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez.

"With reference to your telegram No. 41, bread was very scarce to-day, and will be scarcer still to-morrow. The chief source of danger for the moment lies in the immense number of starving poor who may at any time rush the houses where they think food is likely to be found. There is at present little danger from the Nationalists themselves."

[14748]

No. 171.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received April 19.)

(No. 283.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 19, 1909.

THREATENED attack on Consulate at Tabreez.

With reference to my telegram No. 205 of the 28th March, I have received the following telegram No. 84 of the 19th instant from His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez:—

"The women are clamouring for bread at a shrine where they are gathering.

"The question of negotiations is being discussed, although the military leaders, I hear, are opposed to the idea. 'Sikkat-ul-Isham, who was already in negotiation with the Shah from Basmineh, has invited the Assembly to send out delegates.

"Information has reached both my Russian colleague and myself that the Nationalists have some hope of securing Russian intervention, which is preferred to surrender to the Shah, by an attack on Russian and British Consulates and subjects. On the Russian Consul-General asking my opinion as to the advisability of summoning Russian troops, I answered that our Governments were aware of the situation, and would take what action they thought best.

"The population have entirely lost their heads, and any appeal to their feelings for the cause would be useless. I will consequently tell them, should an opportunity arise, that the life of a British Consul is not of great value to His Majesty's Government, and that they could hope for no very great result by killing one."

I am informing Mr. Wratishaw that we hope to make our representations to-morrow or on Wednesday. I am instructing him to let this be known to the Nationalists.

[14755]

No. 172.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received April 19.)

(No. 281.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 19, 1909.

CONTEMPLATED attack on Consulates at Tabreez.

I have received, with reference to my telegram No. 286 of the 19th inst., the

following telegram, No. 85, of the 19th instant, from His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez:—

"There is talk here of a last attempt to break the blockade to-night. 'Sattar Khan and Bagher Khan, fearing a popular rising against military authority, hope to create a diversion leading to foreign intervention, and I fear that, as a result of this, the Consulates may be attacked to-morrow."

"With reference to your telegram No. 42, 'I doubt whether the knowledge of advice having been given to the Shah would suffice to preserve order, but were the Nationalists to learn that an ultimatum had been presented to His Majesty they might be restrained.'"

[14756]

No. 173.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 19.)

(No. 285.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 19, 1909.

GENERAL representations to the Shah.

I have sent the following telegram, No. 43, to His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez:—

"With reference to your telegram No. 85, dated the 19th instant.

"We shall ask the Shah for an immediate reply to our representations. These, although not an ultimatum, contain, backed by a menace which we hope will prove effective, a demand for a general amnesty for political offenders and for those who have taken up arms, for an immediate and thorough remodelling of the Government under a Constitutional régime."

[14757]

No. 174.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 19.)

(No. 286.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 19, 1909.

DANGER to foreigners in Tabreez.

I have suggested to my Russian colleague that he should telegraph to the military authorities at Tiflis, urging them to hold troops in readiness to proceed to Tabreez. He, however, replied that the troops already at Julfa would be sufficient.

I have informed His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez that if instructions reach my Russian colleague and myself to-morrow we shall make our general representations to the Shah, but, in any case, we are seeking an audience to-morrow, when we shall warn His Majesty that, should any harm befall our Consulates or fellow subjects, we shall hold him personally responsible. We shall at the same time urge upon him the necessity of a cessation of hostilities and of the introduction of food into the town.

We shall make these representations because of the grave danger threatening our fellow subjects at Tabreez.

[14745]

No. 175.

British Subjects, Tabreez, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 19.)

(Telegraphic.) En clair.

Tabreez, April 19, 1909.

WE British subjects, Tabreez, feel compelled advise you we are imminent danger attack upon us owing desperate situation town. Impossible leave town. Consular guard utterly inadequate protect us either in Consulate or residences.—Signed on behalf British community, FAIRLEY, Imperial Bank; Browns, Indo-European, STEVENS, Senior Merchant.

[14495]

No. 176.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 551.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 19, 1909.

FOOD for foreigners in Tabreez.

With reference to your telegram No. 206 of the 17th instant.

Sir G. Barclay's views, as set forth in his telegram No. 281 of yesterday's date, have the concurrence of His Majesty's Government, and you may so inform the Russian Government, although there is not much chance of the Shah agreeing.

It might possibly be advisable that the British and Russian Governments should insist on their Consuls leaving Tabreez and taking with them any other foreign subjects who may wish to leave the town.

The Shah would have to be warned that any losses which they may suffer will have to be made good in full, and the Consuls and foreign subjects should also be informed of this.

Reply as soon as possible as to the views of the Russian Government on this subject. Tehran should also be informed at once.

[14748]

No. 177.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 561.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 19, 1909.

SITUATION at Tabreez.

In view of scarcity of provisions in Tabreez (see Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 283 of to-day), it seems advisable that a small force of Cossacks should be sent from Julfa with a view to either bringing Europeans in safety out of the town or protecting the British and Russian Consulates. Of these two alternatives the former would probably be the more practicable. You should ask the Russian Government whether it would be possible to send such force.

[14493]

No. 178.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 168.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 19, 1909.

ANGLO-RUSSIAN representations at Tehran.

The joint general representations may be proceeded with at once (see telegram from St. Petersburg, No. 211 of 18th April).

[14572]

No. 179.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 170.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 19, 1909.

THE instructions which you issued to His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez, as reported in your telegram No. 277 of the 18th instant, have my approval.

You should also instruct him to impress upon the leaders of the Nationalists, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, that in the event of the mob attacking foreign Consulates in the hope of obtaining food, they should furnish protection to the latter.

[14748]

No. 180.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 171.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 19, 1909.

I APPROVE the instructions given by you to His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez as reported in your telegram No. 283 of to-day.

[1619]

X

There does not seem to be much chance of Russian troops arriving in time to be of any use in rescuing foreigners in Tabreez, but of course we could have no objection to the Russian Government sending them if they wish to do so.

[14745]

No. 181.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Fairley.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 19, 1909.

WE are making every possible endeavour to insure your safety. Nothing practicable will be left undone to effect this.

[13734]

No. 182.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.(No. 168.)
Sir,*Foreign Office, April 19, 1909.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 150 of the 11th instant, inquiring what reply should be returned to the request of the Zil-es-Sultan that His Majesty's Consul-General at Isfahan may receive instructions to urge that no further advance on the taxes due by his Serene Highness should be demanded until it is made clear to whom such advances are to be paid.

Your Excellency should inform the Zil, in reply to his communication, that His Majesty's Government cannot undertake to instruct His Majesty's Consul-General to intervene in the matter.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[14846]

No. 183.

Mr. Preece to Foreign Office.—(Received April 20.)

Sir,

1, St. James' Place, London, April 19, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch with reference to the payment to the Bakhtiari Chiefs of the February instalment due to them.

The arrangements made by His Majesty's Minister in Tehran are perfectly satisfactory, and the Directors of the Oil Syndicate are much obliged for the trouble taken.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. R. PREECE.

[14913]

No. 184.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 20.)

(No. 215.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, April 20, 1909.

SITUATION at Tabreez.

Your telegram No. 561 of the 19th instant.

Russian Charge d'Affaires at Tehran was instructed yesterday to inform the Shah immediately that, unless urgent orders were sent to Tabreez to admit daily 150 kharvars of wheat, steps would be taken by the Russian Government themselves to cause the introduction of the supplies of food required. The Russian Consul at Tabreez was, moreover, instructed to let the population of Tabreez know that this communication had been made to the Shah.

In reply to my inquiry to-day as to whether a small Cossack force would not be sent by the Russian Government to bring away the Consuls and any other foreign subjects who might wish to leave the city, M. Isvolsky replied that it would be risky to send a small force, and that a considerable body of troops would be necessary. The number required would have to be decided by the authorities on the spot. By a forced march Cossacks might reach Tabreez from Julia in two days; three days would be

required in the case of other troops. Would it not be better, M. Isvolsky suggested, to postpone action for another twenty-four hours, until the results of M. Sabline's action at Tehran and of the Russian Consul's announcement at Tabreez were known? If an attack were made on the Consulates to-day, as threatened, then the troops could not arrive in time, and, on the other hand, it was possible that the Shah might act in accordance with the suggestion conveyed to him by M. Sabline. To this I replied that, according to the information which had reached me, there was not much hope of the Shah proving amenable. The safety of the Consuls was the main object to be kept in view. M. Isvolsky promised to consult with the Minister of War and to let me know their decision this afternoon.

[14915]

No. 185.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 20.)

(No. 216.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, April 20, 1909.

TABREEZ. My telegram No. 215 of to-day.

I have just been informed by M. Isvolsky that it has been decided to send a Russian force to Tabreez.

The orders to be given to the officer in command will be to facilitate the entry into the town of the necessary provisions; to protect Consulates and foreign subjects, and to assist those who wish to leave the town to do so.

The Caucasian authorities are to decide the number and composition of the force to be sent.

[14918]

No. 186.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 20.)

(No. 218.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, April 20, 1909.

SITUATION at Tabreez. Your telegram No. 563 of the 19th instant.

There is absolutely no desire on the part of the Russian Government to take any step which might favour either party in the struggle; but it seems to me inevitable that the arrival of a Russian force in Tabreez will allow provisions to flow into the town and will be practically equivalent to raising the siege. In his conversation with me to-day M. Isvolsky remarked that the passage of food for foreigners alone would be an impossibility, as an attempt to seize it would immediately be made by the furnished crowd, or else the latter would wreak their vengeance on the foreign colony and bloodshed would be the result. It seems to me that it would be the Nationalists who would profit by the arrival of the Russian force, but I doubt that the chief object to be kept in view is the safety of the Consuls, even at the risk of the measures which circumstances have rendered necessary proving of benefit to the popular movement at Tabreez.

[14796]

No. 187.

Sir G. Barchyn to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 20.)

(No. 287.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 20, 1909.

SITUATION of foreigners in Tabreez.

I have sent telegraphic instructions, *c. clair*, this morning to His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez to give out, if possible, that the result of the outrage on foreign subjects which is contemplated would be the most severe punishment of those responsible, and exclusion of any concerned from any amnesty which may be granted.

No. 188.

[14902]

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey. (Received April 20.)

(No. 288.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 20, 1909.

TABREEZ situation.

The Shah gave his promise, at the audience granted this morning (see my telegram No. 286 of 19th instant) to my Russian colleague and myself, to send telegraphic instructions to Aïm-el-Dowleh to permit the introduction of food into Tabreez until midday of 26th instant. During these days there will be a cessation of hostilities.

The introduction of food is of course conditional on the abstinence of the Nationalists from any attack on the Royalist forces.

We are informing the two Consuls-General at Tabreez that, if reconciliation is to result from any negotiations for peace, it is important that the demands of the Nationalist party should not exceed the scope of the general representations which we hope to make to-morrow, and we are instructing them to inform the Nationalists of the terms of the truce and to induce them not to break them. Armistice should afford a good opportunity for negotiations.

[14903]

No. 189.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey. (Received April 20.)

(No. 289.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 20, 1909.

SITUATION at Tabreez.

With reference to my telegram No. 287 of to-day, I have received the following telegram from His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez, No. 86:—

"This morning at dawn the Nationalists attacked Saïmad Khan's position. An American volunteer with the Nationalist force was killed. The result is uncertain, but most probably insignificant.

"I am much obliged for the information contained in your telegrams Nos. 42, 43, and 44. I have made it known, and the result, I believe, is satisfactory. I hope the danger may now blow over, but we can, however, if necessary, offer a good resistance.

"Sattar Khan yesterday laid the blame for the plot against the Consulates on Bagher Khan, and declared that he had no hand in it."

[14754]

No. 190.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 563.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 20, 1909.

WITH regard to the proposals for the assistance and protection of foreigners in Tabreez, mentioned in your telegram No. 214 of the 19th instant, any steps which the Russian Government may take for protecting foreigners from attack, or for providing them with food, will have our cordial approval. Prompt action is necessary. I need hardly say that His Majesty's Government understand that such steps will be taken solely for the protection of the lives of foreign residents in Tabreez, and that nothing will be done to favour either one side or the other.

[14321]

No. 191.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 565.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 20, 1909.

IF the Russian Government have no objection to the publication of the substance of the joint Anglo-Russian representations to the Shah (see telegram No. 270 of the 16th instant from Sir G. Barclay), I think that it would have an excellent effect. You should ascertain how they regard this proposal.

According to a private telegram from Sir G. Barclay, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires is reluctant to suggest this course himself to the Russian Government, though he appears to consider it advisable.

The preceding paragraph is confidential.

[14492]

No. 192.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 570.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 20, 1909.

PERSIAN financial reforms.

With reference to telegram No. 278 from Tehran of the 18th instant, which was repeated to you, you should make the following proposal to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs: That the advance, which is to begin with the 100,000*l.*, which is to be paid by the Russian Government on the receipt of satisfactory assurances from the Shah, should be placed to the account of the two Representatives jointly, who, when they have satisfied themselves that the money is to be devoted to proper purposes and have come to an agreement which has been approved by the Financial Adviser, shall pay over the money in instalments to the Persian Government. They would then be able to stop the payments if they found that the money is being used for different purposes from those which have been approved.

This system could be continued, if it is found to be satisfactory, in the case of a larger loan being granted at a later date.

[14200]

No. 193.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 571.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 20, 1909.

IN reply to your telegram No. 200 of the 15th instant, His Majesty's Government agree with the view of the Russian Government that no reply is necessary to the German communication on the subject of guards for foreign Legations at Tehran.

[14316]

No. 194.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 574.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 20, 1909.

HIS Majesty's Government have no objection to offer to the suggestions of the two Consuls (see telegram No. 271 of the 16th instant from Sir G. Barclay).

You should find out what is the view of the Russian Government on this question.

[14913]

No. 195.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 576.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 20, 1909.

I CONCUR in the proposal contained in your telegram No. 215 of the 20th April, that, until we have ascertained the result of the joint representations, it would, in view of the permission to send food into the town and of the granting of an armistice for six days, be better if the dispatch of Russian troops to Tabreez were delayed. This respite will in any case give the troops time to reach Tabreez if our representations fail.

[14194]

No. 196.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 173.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 20, 1909.

SHIRAZ-ISPAHAN read.

I approve the instructions sent to Shiraz as reported in your telegram No. 264 of the 15th instant.

[14323]

No. 197.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 176.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 20, 1909.

RUSSIAN and Tabreez Customs.

The action reported by you in your telegram No. 273 of the 16th instant has my approval.

[14902]

No. 198.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 184.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 20, 1909.

TABREEZ situation.

I approve the action reported in your telegram No. 288 of the 20th April.

See your telegram No. 271 of the 16th April.

I am communicating with the Russian Government, and the two Consuls should now be given authority to offer their mediation in the event of an opportunity presenting itself.

[13505]

No. 199.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 186.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 20, 1909.

JOINT SESSION for read from Kuli-Malik-Siah to Nusratbad. (See your telegrams Nos. 129 and 136 of the 3rd and 8th ultimo respectively).

A real scheme of so ambitious a character is to be discouraged for military as well as for economic reasons, and the Government of India oppose the granting of the concession to Kitalji. Detailed instructions will reach you by mail. It would be best to follow the course indicated by Sir A. Hardinge in his despatch to India dated the 19th December, 1902, and to urge the Persian authorities to undertake the road improvements which are most needed.

[14965]

No. 200.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 21.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 30th ultimo, relative to the Robat garrison.

India Office, April 20, 1909.

Inclosure in No. 200.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, March 30, 1909.

I APPROVE proposals in your telegram of the 17th March as to Robat garrison.

[14980]

No. 201.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 219.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, April 21, 1909.

SITUATION at Tabreez.

Telegram No. 288 of yesterday from Tehran.

In consequence of the six days' armistice granted by the Shah and the permission to bring supplies into Tabreez, the Russian force, M. Isvolsky tells me, has been ordered not to proceed across the frontier.

[15055]

No. 202.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 220.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, April 21, 1909.

JOINT representations at Tehran.

Your telegram No. 565 of yesterday.

The idea of publishing the text of the Persian programme is not welcomed by M. Isvolsky, who would prefer to give the public only such information as has already been published in London by Reuter's Agency.

M. Isvolsky points out that the programme contains some disagreeable messages to the Shah and certain references to persons which, in his opinion, it would be better not to publish. He adds that the programme would be analyzed and criticized by the Russian press, and that this would lead to polemics which he would like, if possible, to avoid.

[15056]

No. 203.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 221.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, April 21, 1909.

FINANCIAL assistance for Persia.

Your telegram No. 570 of yesterday.

At an interview which I had with M. Isvolsky to-day, I spoke of the proposal that the Russian share of the advance should be put to the joint account of the two Representatives, and promised to give his Excellency a Memorandum on the subject, in order that he might be in a position to discuss it with the Minister of Finance. M. Isvolsky thinks it not unlikely that M. Kokovtsov may remark that, if there is to be a joint account for the Russian advance, then the British Government should also contribute to making that advance.

M. Isvolsky said that he understood that the view of His Majesty's Government was that there are objections to making any advance until the Assembly have approved it. His Excellency pointed out, however, that, if His Majesty's Government were to take part in keeping the accounts and controlling the disbursement of the first advance, they would practically be sharing the responsibility for making it.

The above were merely preliminary remarks on the part of M. Isvolsky, who promised to let me have a reply when he had studied my Memorandum and talked the matter over with M. Kokovtsov.

[15057]

No. 204.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 21.)(No. 222.)
(Telegraphic.) P.*St. Petersburg, April 21, 1909.*

TABREEZ.

Until the Russian Government see what effect is produced at Tabreez by the armistice and what turn events are likely to take after it has expired, the Russian force will be held in readiness at Julfa.

During our conversation to-day, M. Ievolsky observed that the roads were still unsafe, and said something about a small Cossack force going to Tabreez to act as escort to those who might wish to leave the city. This idea met with no encouragement from me. I pointed out that, for the time being, danger no longer seemed imminent, and suggested that in any case we had better wait until the situation was a little clearer.

[15023]

No. 205.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 21.)(No. 290.)
(Telegraphic.)*Tehran, April 21, 1909.*

RUSSIAN troops for protection of foreigners in Tabreez.

With reference to your telegram No. 184 and to your telegram No. 576 to Sir A. Nicolson, both of the 20th instant.

Foreign subjects will be again in danger if our general representations and the action of the two Consuls-General should fail to lead to a peace. I trust, therefore, that Russian troops at Julfa may be ready to start at any moment.

The Shah's brigands, too, may not be under Ained-Dowleh's control, when an escort would be needed for food coming from Julfa.

[15034]

No. 206.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 21.)(No. 291.)
(Telegraphic.) P.*Tehran, April 21, 1909.*

MEDIATION between Shah and Nationalists at Tabreez.

I have sent the following telegram, No. 49, to His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabreez:—

"With reference to your telegram No. 77 of 15th April, I am instructed by the Secretary of State to authorize you, should an opportunity arise, to concert with your Russian colleague in offering your good offices for negotiations between the two parties.

"You may inform the Nationalists, should they show signs of seeking mediation elsewhere, that, in that case, you and the Russian Consul-General might abstain.

"If they require guarantees, it ought to be sufficient for you to inform them that the British and Russian Governments are pressing the Shah to adopt reforms which would definitely put an end to the former absolutist Government."

[14918]

No. 207.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 579.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 21, 1909.

SIT ATION at Tabreez

In reply to your telegram No. 218 of the 20th instant, if our advice is rejected by the Shah he will be entirely to blame for any incidental advantage which may accrue to the Nationalist cause from the Russian intervention for the rescue of foreigners at Tabreez, and I consider that such a result might be of the greatest use as a warning to His Majesty. If, on the other hand, he accepts our advice, no great difficulty should remain with regard to the arrangement of terms for the town.

[15035]

No. 208.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 292.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 21, 1909.

RUSSIAN Consulate-General at Bushire.

Major Cox has had entirely satisfactory relations with Kadlubowski and Miller, but he now hears that it is intended to appoint Orsenko to the Bushire consulate-general.

Whatever instructions Orsenko may receive as to his attitude, it would be very difficult for him to change it. In these circumstances, cannot anything be done to prevent the appointment rumoured?

[15036]

No. 209.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 293.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 21, 1909.

MR. KITABIJ'S projected road.

Mr. Kitabji, who left on Sunday, declares that on his return to London he will try to obtain the support of the Foreign Office for his scheme, which he has not pressed during his present visit here. I believe, however, that the road concession was only a pretext for his visit to Tehran, and that his real idea was generally to fish in troubled waters.

It would of course be hopeless at the present moment to expect the Persian Government to introduce any improvements in the matter of roads, so I do not propose to press the Persian Government, as suggested by the Indian Government, for the present (see your telegram No. 186).

[15049]

No. 210.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 294.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 21, 1909.

GENERAL representations to the Shah.

We are pressing for an audience to-morrow, as the Shah has postponed that accorded to-day on the ground of ill-health.

[15050]

No. 211.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 295.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 21, 1909.

ATTITUDE of Turkish Chargé d'Affaires.

I surmise, although proofs are lacking, that the German Minister is connected with the seemingly excessive anxiety displayed by Sadreddin Bey.

The latter has addressed me a letter, in which he tells me that Turkish consul-general asks for a guard, reporting the situation as still very grave. In case of murder or attack, he adds, that the troops stationed on the Turkish frontier will intervene immediately at any cost. He, further, professes scepticism as to the results of the six days' truce.

I have replied that we hope that some good may be effected by the armistice, and that His Majesty's consul-general reports that it has made a favourable impression in the town.

[14949]

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[15051]

No. 212.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 296.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

TABREEZ.

I have received the following telegram No. 87 of the 20th April from His Majesty's consul-general at Tabreez:

"We immediately communicated the arrangement mentioned in your telegram No. 46 to the Anjuman requesting them to inform Sattar Khan, who immediately ordered cessation of firing. They begged us to convey to the two legations the assurance of their profound gratitude.

My Russian colleague and I have written to Ain-ed-Dowleh, and after much trouble have induced the assembly, who are childishly procrastinating and suspicious, to take the same step. We have informed him that the assembly has accepted and promises to adhere to the armistice. A representative of the Russian consul-general and the British vice-consul, who took our letter to the camp, will remain there to arrange details and to supervise matters. We also begged Ain-ed-Dowleh to take steps at once to send in provisions. Could you bring pressure to bear on Ain-ed-Dowleh from Tehran, as, unless he sends us some of his own stores, I am afraid it will be two or three days before provisions are obtainable?

We hope to-morrow to see Sattar Khan and do what we can through him.

Bagher Khan has ceased to be a menace for us, his brother and principal supporter having been killed to-day."

[14757]

No. 213.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 190.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 21, 1909.

TABREEZ. I approve the action reported in your telegrams Nos. 286 and 287 of the 19th and 20th instant.

[15175]

No. 214.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 223.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, April 22, 1909.

RUSSIAN Consul at Tabreez has telegraphed to Minister for Foreign Affairs to the effect that no instructions as to the armistice had reached Ain-ed-Dowleh, though he had consented to open up the Basminch road with the object of letting in provisions. M. Isvolsky is put out at the apparent non-fulfilment of the Shah's promise and at His Majesty's action in asking for time to think over the representations which are being made to him by Sir G. Barclay and M. Sabline. His Excellency fears situation at Tabreez may again become acute, and he thinks that, in order to insure the safe introduction of provisions and the protection of foreigners in the event of situation suddenly becoming dangerous, it would be best that the Russian force at Julfa should be moved across the frontier. M. Isvolsky also thinks that this move may have the effect of hastening the Shah to agree to the representations of the two Governments. His Excellency is about to hold a consultation with the Chief of the General Staff and Ministers of War and Finance. I anticipate that orders to advance will be issued to the Russian force.

[15133]

No. 215.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 297.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 22, 1909.

TABREEZ.

We are demanding that the armistice shall be prolonged for an additional thirty-six hours, Ain-ed-Dowleh not having yet received any instructions by yesterday afternoon.

[15134]

No. 216.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 298.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 22, 1909.

TABREEZ.

I have authorised His Majesty's consul-general to concert with his Russian colleague in accompanying the delegates who were to be chosen yesterday, should they request him to do so.

The consuls think that Sattar Khan, whom they visited yesterday, will listen to reason.

[15135]

No. 217.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 299.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 22, 1909.

INTRODUCTION of food into Tabreez.

With reference to Sir A. Nicolson's telegram No. 214, and to my telegram No. 290 of the 21st April.

The two consuls-general at Tabreez have told Ain-ed-Dowleh that, in view of the irregular troops under Rahim Khan, being probably out of hand, and consequently likely to prevent the dispatch of provisions by the Julfa road, a large enough body of troops to ensure safe transit of stores in the face of any possible opposition will accompany food from Julfa unless other roads leading to Tabreez are opened.

I have demanded that instructions on this point be sent direct to Rahim Khan, and have approved the action of His Majesty's consul-general.

[15149]

No. 218.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 300.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 22, 1909.

GENERAL representations to the Shah.

His Majesty listened with close attention to the general representations which my Russian colleague and I made to him this morning.

The Shah appeared impressed, and though he entered into no discussion he expressed satisfaction at receiving our representations, and promised us an answer through the Minister for Foreign Affairs at the earliest possible date.

In reply to our pressing him for a fixed date, he could only assure us that an answer would be returned without delay.

We left an *aide-memoire* with His Majesty.

[15151]

No. 219.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 301.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 22, 1909.

TABREEZ.

With reference to my telegram No. 297 of to-day.

My Russian colleague and I, at the audience this morning, asked that the armistice

might be prolonged, and complained of the excessive delay on the part of His Majesty in sending instructions to his generals as to the passage of food for the town.

The Shah assured us that categorical instructions to this effect had now been sent.

As to the prolongation of the truce, His Majesty, in spite of pressure, refused and begged us, in view of the general representations which we were on the point of making, to postpone the matter.

When we know the result of negotiations at Tabreez and the effect of our own general representations we shall if necessary press His Majesty further.

[15172] No. 220.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 302.)

(Telegraphic.) P.
TABREEZ.

Tehran, April 22, 1909.

I have received the following telegram, No. 92, from His Majesty's consul-general at Tabreez:—

"We have just heard from the Nationalist governor that their important position at Kharth has been occupied by Saadad Khan's irregulars. This is very serious, as, in my opinion, the besieged have not much power of resistance left.

"The governor has asked us what is to be done, and we have replied that they should take their own measures to defend themselves."

[15173] No. 221.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 303.)

(Telegraphic.) P.
TABREEZ.

Tehran, April 22, 1909.

His Majesty's consul-general informs me in a telegram, No. 94, that as yet none of the promised supplies have been sent in. He adds that, in his opinion, the two consuls must see that provisions are obtained, and that the truce is strictly observed now that they have persuaded the Nationalists to cease hostilities on the strength of these two concessions. If they fail in their position will be very unpleasant. He and his Russian colleague agree that caravans from Julfa, which, however, could not arrive before a week, should start for Tabreez under the escort of Cossacks who might keep the road open.

[15174] No. 222.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 304.)

(Telegraphic.) P.
TABREEZ.

Tehran, April 22, 1909.

I have addressed the following telegram, No. 58, to His Majesty's consul-general at Tabreez:—

"My Russian colleague and I have lodged a vigorous protest against the action of Saadad Khan.

"This morning, the general representations being the object of our audience, we did not press as hard as we might have done for an extension of the truce, but if it becomes necessary we shall press to the utmost of our power.

"We could not let the limited period of the armistice interfere with any arrangements requiring a longer time, which you may make for the introduction of provisions, if you are unable to obtain them within the six days. What quantity of provisions would it be fair to ask for as a six days' supply?

"We can hardly expect Mirza Dowlah to reduce his own supplies; the best that we can hope for is that he will give you every assistance in obtaining food.

"I hope your Russian colleague will act as proposed in your telegram No. 94, if he has received authorisation."

[15035] No. 223.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 595.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 22, 1909.

If we were to ask the Russian Government not to appoint M. Ovsenko to the Russian Consulate at Bushire (see telegram No. 292 of the 21st instant from Tehran), the Russians in their turn might ask us to make changes in our own Consular service, which we might not be prepared to do; there would, however, be no harm in drawing the attention of the Russian Government to the very satisfactory nature of the relations which have existed lately between the Russian and British Consuls-General, and in asking them to impress upon M. Ovsenko (if the report of his appointment is correct) the desirability of maintaining friendly relations with his British colleague.

[15055] No. 224.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 600.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 22, 1909.

THE effect would not be so good if at least the substance of the Persian programme were not published, though it would not be necessary to publish the actual text (see your telegram No. 220 of the 21st instant). I had to reply to a question in Parliament to-day on the subject, but I mentioned no names and did not quote the text, confining myself merely to the substance of the representations.

[15050] No. 225.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 191.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 22, 1909.

SITUATION at Tabreez.

I approve the language held by you to the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires, as reported in your telegram No. 295 of the 21st instant.

[13637] No. 226.

Foreign Office to Persian Transport Company.

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 22, 1909.

WITH reference to my letter of the 3rd November last, relative to the property at Shudlith leased by Messrs. Lynch Brothers from Sheikh Morzeza, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to inform you that he has now received two further despatches on the subject from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

In the earlier of these despatches Sir G. Barclay reports that he has received from His Majesty's Consul at Ahwaz a clear statement, furnished by Messrs. Lynch's agent, of the case of Sheikh Morzeza and of that of the Muin-et-Tajjar, based on documents in the possession of the former and on certified copies of other documents communicated to His Majesty's Legation by the latter. The details of the two cases are undoubtedly known to your Directors, and it therefore appears to Sir E. Grey to be unnecessary to reproduce them in this letter.

In communicating these documents to Captain Loring, Mr. Parry showed anxiety that the case should be settled at Tehran and not locally, and such is understood to be the desire of Messrs. Lynch.

With regard to this point Sir G. Barclay observes that, although an examination of the Muin's claim shows his case to be very weak, it would be difficult for His Majesty's Legation at Tehran to take action in accordance with the desire expressed by Mr. Parry, since any representations with a view to compel the Muin to drop his claim would naturally be met with the reply that the Legation has no ground for interference in the case of a dispute between two Persian subjects, the settlement of which properly belongs to the Shari Courts. The action of the Legation in such a

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2 A

matter could only be unofficial, and would not, in Sir G. Barclay's opinion, achieve the desired result.

Sir G. Barclay states that some weeks before the date of writing (4th March) the Muin called on him in connection with this case and expressed his desire to arrive at a settlement. After some discussion it was agreed that the Muin should appoint an agent with full powers locally to represent his interests in the matter; that Sheikh Morteza should, if he returned from the Haj within a reasonable time, say two months, be urged by Captain Lorimer himself to bring his case before a competent Tribunal, or, should his absence be prolonged, likewise appoint an agent with full powers; and that Messrs. Lynch should be enjoined by Captain Lorimer to abstain from any participation in the proceedings. Finally, and after considerable hesitation, the Muin agreed that a representative of His Majesty's Consulate at Ahwaz should be invited to attend the proceedings on the express stipulation that he hold a watching brief only and had no voice in them.

The Muin expressed indifference as to the character of the Court before which the case would be heard, and left the choice of a Committee of Arbitrators or a Shari Court to the other party.

In his latest despatch, dated the 23th March, Sir G. Barclay reports that Sheikh Morteza returned to Ahwaz on the 8th March and has agreed to the settlement of the dispute in a Shari Court either at Dizful or Nijef, should objection be taken to Shushir.

When this information was conveyed to the Muin he at first attempted to evade his previous declaration that he left the mode of settlement of the case to the other party, but eventually consented to leave the case referred to the Shari Court at Nijef. He further promised to write immediately, appointing as his agent at that place Agha Seyyid Ali, son of Agha Seyyid Javad Kidkhder.

It is understood that Messrs. Lynch's agent at Tehran is satisfied with the arrangement made.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[15243]

No. 227.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 23.)

Sir,

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 5th April, 1909, asking for the views of the Secretary of State for India as to the desire of the Oil Syndicate to erect a telegraph and telephone line along the pipe line to be built to their refinery.

In reply, I am to say that Viscount Morley, while agreeing that there is no apparent necessity to approach the Persian Government in the matter, would suggest, for Sir E. Grey's consideration, that it might be advisable to refrain from expressing any definite opinion on the point in replying to the Syndicate, and to say merely that His Majesty's Government are doubtful whether it would be in their interests that His Majesty's Minister at Tehran should raise the matter at the present stage with the Persian Government; but that if the Syndicate decide to proceed with the work on their own responsibility, His Majesty's Government will be prepared, should the necessity arise, to use their good offices with the Persian Government in support of the Syndicate's contention. A reference is invited to the letter of your Department to Messrs. J. and J. Boyd and Miller dated the 24th February, 1905.

As regards the offer of the Syndicate to allow the use of their poles to the Indo-European Telegraph Department, Lord Morley agrees with the view expressed by Mr. Kirk, in the note of which a copy is inclosed, that the offer should be declined.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

* See last paragraph of Inclosure A.

Inclosure 1 in No. 227.

Note by the Director-in-chief, Indo-European Telegraph Department.

THE only part of the letter from the Concessions Syndicate that directly affects the Indo-European Telegraph Department is that in which the offer is made of allowing the use of their poles where they could be utilized by the Department. The working a telegraph wire on a telephone line interferes with the telephone working. Every telegraph message sent over the line could be read by the telephone offices. I do not think the offer need be considered.

April 7, 1909.

(Signed) H. A. KIRK.

Inclosure 2 in No. 227.

Captain Trevor to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Bushire, January 30, 1909.

WITH reference to correspondence ending with Foreign Department, dated the 21st December, 1908, regarding the Ahwaz-Borazjin telegraph line, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a letter which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Ahwaz on the subject.

2. I have informed Captain Lorimer unofficially that I am forwarding his letter to the Government of India, and that no doubt if they think there is anything in Mr. Reynolds' proposal they will take action. I also pointed out that Mr. Reynolds is in error in thinking that the Indo-European Telegraph Company have anything to do with the matter, and that if the Directors of the Concessions Syndicate wish to approach anyone in London on the subject, they had better address themselves to the India Office or to the Director-in-chief of the Indo-European Telegraph Department.

3. The constant failure of telegraphic communication with Ahwaz is a serious obstacle to British trade, and the nuisance becomes aggravated the more British interests increase there. I am asking His Majesty's Minister if he can see his way to press the requirements of the Syndicate on the Persian Government as suggested in paragraph 4 of Captain Lorimer's letter.

Inclosure 3 in No. 227.

Captain Lorimer to Major Cox.

(Confidential.)

Ahwaz, January 18, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to inclose a copy of a letter recently addressed by Mr. G. B. Reynolds, local Manager for the Concessions Syndicate (Limited), to his principals, on the subject of the means of telegraphic communication which will become necessary in connection with the construction and maintenance of a pipe line from the oil works to the coast.

2. I am not sure that I quite follow Mr. Reynolds' drift, but it would of course be quite impossible for the Indo-European Telegraph Department to enter into combination with the Syndicate in regard to the stretch of line between Ahwaz and Mohammerrah, unless they had previously brought to a successful conclusion their negotiations with the Persian Telegraph Department for taking over the management of the line between Mohammerrah, Ahwaz, and Borazjin.

3. With regard to the question of alignment, it is doubtful in any case whether the Indo-European Telegraph Department would be ready to accept that required by the Syndicate.

The "short distance" referred to at the Ahwaz end would be of no significance, but at Mohammerrah the line would be on the opposite side of the river from the town, and to carry the wire across the river, which would necessitate a wide span at a sufficient height to clear the river steamers' masts, would probably involve some trouble and expense.

It is, however, well that the Government should know what is being talked of. 4. The general question of telegraph communication is becoming more and more important, and the failure of the Persian line proportionately injurious.

The line between here and Mohammerrah has now been continuously out of work since November, while the line to Borasjun, which gives communication with the rest of Persia and Europe, has only been working on the 25th December and 3rd January since its return here on the 17th December.

As the operation of the Syndicate increases the necessity for direct means of communication with Europe and the inconvenience of its absence are steadily growing.

If circumstances are adapted to the employment of this form of argument, might it not be possible to press the requirements of the Syndicate on the Persian Government in such a way as to aid the Indo-European Telegraph Department in their negotiations with the Persian Telegraph Department?

5. The question of the Syndicate's local requirements should not be referred to in any discussion with the Persian Government. They seem fairly entitled to build a telegraph line in immediate connection with their work and their doing so will probably not be questioned. But were the matter to be forced on the notice of the Persian Government or any statement made which could be misconstrued into a request for permission to build such a line, the Persian Government would doubtless, following its best traditions, become obstructive, witness the removal of the rocks in the Karun at Kut Abdullah.

Inclosure 4 in No. 227.

Mr. Reynolds to the Concessions Syndicate, Glasgow.

Ahwaz, January 5, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to point out that telephonic and telegraphic communication along the line of the pipe from the field to the site of tanks and refinery will be needed, as also some reliable telegraphic connection with the Indo-European lines, and as this may take time to arrange I make no excuse for pressing it on your notice now.

2. Along the pipe line it would seem that we shall need a system of two wires: one for telephonic communication with the nearest telegraph station by means of a small instrument made for the purpose, and which can be connected with the telephone wire at any point desired by the line inspector, each of the several inspectors carrying such, and the second being a telegraph line, and both of these would be safely for the use of the Pipe Line Company working the pipe line and not for the use of the public. Assuming the tanks and refinery be at Abesha Island, it will follow that this telegraph line will connect, excepting a short distance at each end, the two existing telegraph stations of Ahwaz and Mohammerrah.

I have said, "excepting a short distance at each end," and in explanation would note that for our purposes it is essential that the telegraph line should follow the course of the pipe, and that will go some few miles south of the town of Mohammerrah and some few miles to the east of Ahwaz, where there is a gap in the hills.

3. Now, as I have often pointed out to you, the line this to Mohammerrah and this to Borasjun, both "worked" by the Persian Government, are only very occasionally liable to be interrupted, being supported on wooden poles, where they are supported at all, and the use of insulators being ignored, and it is this, coupled with the ignorance and apathy of the Persian Telegraph Administration, that is the cause of the present unsatisfactory state of affairs.

It has been noted, I believe, that Messrs. the Indo-European Company should work the Mohammerrah, Ahwaz, and Borasjun lines, in which case they would, I presume, put up iron poles, and in consideration of a line being necessary for the Pipe Line Company between Mohammerrah and Ahwaz, it would seem that the line they put up might with advantage follow the course of the pipe, and a moiety of the cost of the line between these points, so far as their poles were utilized by us for our lines, could be shared by us, saving much the cost to both.

4. If the Indo-European Company took over the line this to Mohammerrah, the possible connection with their system would seem to be—

- (a.) Mohammerrah to Fao.
- (b.) Ahwaz to Borasjun.
- (c.) Ahwaz to Isfahan.

As regards the first of these (a.) I note that the cost of messages to Europe by Fao, Borasjun, Isfahan, and Tehran would be heavier than at present when the Persian line Ahwaz, Borasjun, Isfahan, and Tehran to Europe is used on account of the cable, Fao to

Enshire. Again, if the public used the route to Europe from this via Mohammerrah, Fao, Bassorah, and Constantinople though cheaper than the routes via Tehran and that via Bombay, no code messages would be allowed to pass.

From the point of view, then, of the public, it would be better that the Indo-European reconstructed the line Ahwaz to Borasjun or made a new line, Ahwaz to Isfahan, following the route of the caravan road.

5. The object of this letter then is to get you to move in this matter, and if you would put yourselves in communication with Messrs. the Indo-European Directors you would hear their views.

Trusting that you will see your way to move in this matter, and that the suggestion of sharing a moiety of the cost of the Ahwaz Mohammerrah section may commend itself to you.

You will please look on the use of any poles for our line other than iron as absolutely unsuitable, as they will be robbed.

[15207]

No. 228.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 23.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 16th instant, relative to the proposed loan to the Sheikh of Mohammerrah.

India Office, April 22, 1900.

Inclosure in No. 228.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, April 16, 1900.

MOHAMMERRAH. Loan to Sheikh.

I have intimated, in communicating your telegram dated the 9th April to Foreign Office, that I adhere to the view that no charge should be laid upon Indian revenues on this account. I informed them at the same time that there appears to me no objection in principle to the suggestion made in telegram of the 7th instant from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran that general assurances might be given to the Sheikh that we should do what we could to facilitate his obtaining money in London if he should need it for any purpose to which we did not object.

[15250]

No. 229.

Mr. F. C. Strick to Foreign Office.—(Received April 23.)

*Britic House, Lendhall Street, London,
April 22, 1900.*

Sir,

I BEG to refer to my letter of last week, wherein I inquired whether you could inform me what country claimed the ownership of the Persian Gulf Island of Hahli. If not troubling you too much, I should be obliged if you could give me an early reply, as I am anxious to take steps as soon as possible to obtain samples from the oxide deposits said to exist there, before such work is rendered difficult, if not impossible, by the approaching hot season.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANK C. STRICK.

[15298]

No. 230.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 225.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

SITUATION at Tabreez.

My telegram No. 223 of yesterday.

I am informed by Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that the Russian detachment has been ordered to move on from Julla to Tabreez. According to a telegram received from the Russian Consul the situation at Tabreez is more threatening than ever; the Russian Government consider therefore that there should no longer be any hesitation on their part.

St. Petersburg, April 23, 1909.

[15315]

No. 231.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 226.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, April 23, 1909.

FILIER squadrons of Cossacks, three battalions of infantry, two batteries of artillery, and a company of sappers, all on a peace footing, will constitute the force which is to be sent to Tabreez.

Two thousand men, M. Isvolsky estimates, will be about the total number of the force. Detachments have to be left for the protection of the road, so that it would have been risky to dispatch a smaller number. Instructions have been given to the Commander not to undertake any administrative duties and not to interfere in the struggle between the opposing parties.

The force will be withdrawn when matters have settled down. It will be impossible for the force to carry with them sufficient food to supply the whole of Tabreez, but they will keep the road open so as to allow supplies to come in. Explanations of the necessity of the dispatch of troops, &c., will be given by the Russian Government to the Powers in the form of a Circular.

[15317]

No. 232.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 228.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, April 23, 1909.

RUSSIAN Consul at Bushire.

Your telegram No. 595 of yesterday, and Tehran telegram No. 292 of the 21st instant.

In conversation with M. Isvolsky to-day I mentioned that news had reached me to the effect that the post of Russian Consul at Bushire was to be given to M. Dyssenko. M. Isvolsky said that he knew nothing of such an appointment. To this I replied that it was only a report which had reached me, and that my sole object in mentioning it was to express a hope that instructions would be sent to him to maintain with His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire the same friendly relations as had existed in the time of his predecessor. To this M. Isvolsky replied that any Russian Consul who might be appointed to Bushire would, of course, receive strict instructions in the sense indicated.

[15234]

No. 233.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 304.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 23, 1909.

TABREEZ.

In continuation of my immediately preceding telegram.

In spite of the Shah's declaration that he has sent orders to the commander-in-chief and other generals, nothing has been done to facilitate the entry of food, nor has the truce been observed.

Whether this is due to the disobedience of the generals and to bad faith at Baghi Shah, I would urge that the authorities at Julla be instructed to supply a strong escort for provisions. My Russian colleague is also urging the dispatch of food under escort.

The food cannot now reach Tabreez before the six days' truce has expired, but we shall insist on its renewal, and a supply for six days ought to be introduced with or without the Shah's consent after the royalist generals' breach of the armistice.

[15287]

No. 234.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 306.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 23, 1909.

MOIN-UT-TUJJAR'S oxide.

I hear from His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire that Moin's employés have been at work on Farna and Little Farna and have mined some 100 tons of oxide on Sirri Island.

I have reminded the Persian Government of our caveat in this connection and have warned them that I cannot recognize Moin as concessionaire, at the same time requesting them to stop Moin's operations on Sirri.

I am pointing out again to Moin that, beyond the rights conferred on him by the firman of 1904, he has as yet given us no proof of any privileges as to mining oxide in the Persian Gulf. I am also informing him what our attitude is with regard to Sirri.

[15295]

No. 235.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 307.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 23, 1909.

THE administrator of customs has, I learn, been told by the Minister of War, Amir Bahadur Jang, that the Persian Government can no longer answer for the behaviour of troops in the capital unless they at once receive 200,000 roubles. This threat was apparently intended to reach M. Ostrogradsky, to whom it was conveyed. The Russian chargé d'affaires is reporting this telegraphically to his Government.

There is little likelihood of the threat being put into execution, but I should like to be authorized, with my Russian colleague, to make a communication to the Persian Government to the effect that disturbances might be followed by intervention, by which the Shah and those responsible would probably suffer. You will remember that you have already advocated such a representation in conversation with M. Poklewsky.

[15281]

No. 236.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 308.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 23, 1909.

TABREEZ.

Khatib was not actually captured yesterday, as reported in my telegram No. 302 of the 22nd April.

The royalist troops have now retired from this neighbourhood.

[15311]

No. 237.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 309.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 20, 1909.

TABREEZ.

It appears from His Majesty's consul-general's reports that the royalist troops have no intention of allowing supplies to enter Tabreez and that the advantage of the armistice is likely to be illusory.

The following is an extract from his telegram No. 96 of to-day :—

"In negotiations for the purchase of provisions, am I authorized to pledge the credit of His Majesty's Government? We cannot give the guarantees of safety, without which no merchant here will place an order. The Shah's troops are terrorising the whole country, and without their assistance it will be impossible to procure supplies. My position in the town is practically that of a prisoner, and my influence is at present very small. Fighting men still have some food, but many of the poor have little more than grass.

"I cannot expect any good result from the negotiations, as the Nationalists have been rendered very suspicious of us by the break-down of the truce, and I should think would be too much afraid of treachery to go out for this purpose."

I have replied that it is for the merchants to order provisions, and have invited him to concert with his Russian colleague and the representatives of the principal firms as to the best means of obtaining supplies from Julfa. Should the consignment of provisions be stolen *en route*, we will, of course, recover compensation for the merchants, who should have no hesitation in pledging their credit; but I do not doubt that, after receipt of telegrams which M. Sabline and I have sent to Petersburg and London to-day, a sufficient escort will be provided.

[15312]

No. 238.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 310.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

TABREEZ.

Tehran, April 23, 1909.

As Ain-ed-Dowleh has given the two consuls no facilities for the introduction of food into the town, they are withdrawing their delegates from Basminch. We are instructing them to inform him of their reason for this step.

[15313]

No. 239.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 311.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 23, 1909.

THIS afternoon, by appointment, my Russian colleague and I met the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was the bearer of a message from the Shah, at the Russian legation.

After making the usual request for guarantees for the Shah, and receiving as usual the reply that we could not go beyond the assurances given to His Majesty by the dragomans on the 22nd December last, Saad-ed-Dowleh asked that these might be given in writing. We replied that the *aide-memoire* left with him yesterday was the best written guarantee we could give. We further stated that we gathered from our information that those of the Shah's people now in revolt would spontaneously cease all opposition, were His Majesty to accept the advice of the two representatives and reign as a constitutional Sovereign; in any case, when satisfied upon this point, we would do our best to bring about a reconciliation.

We informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs that we would be willing to suggest privately to him persons who, in our opinion, would inspire confidence, and would be fitted for posts in the Cabinet and council.

To His Majesty's request for an advance exceeding 100,000*l.*, we answered that we were well aware of the need for a substantial loan.

Such a loan was indeed foreshadowed in the representations we had recently made, and when the assembly was sitting and a reformed financial administration in working order we would do our utmost to accelerate the granting of the financial assistance indicated.

[15133]

No. 240*.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 198.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, April 23, 1909.

YOL'R telegrams Nos. 207, 208, and 209 of the 22nd April [Tabreez].

I approve.

[1613]

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[15314]

No. 240.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 312.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 23, 1909.

TABREEZ.

I have received the following telegram, No. 98, from His Majesty's consul-general at Tabreez:—

“Russian consul-general tells me that it has been decided to send Russian troops to Tabreez.

“As the news of the dispatch of a Russian force must necessarily be known before their arrival here, we think it would be prudent to announce the facts ourselves to the Nationalists, in view of preventing any possible danger to Europeans that might ensue. We further beg to be allowed to give them the following assurances:—

“That the troops in question are coming to Tabreez to protect foreign subjects and Persians from the Shah's brigands and to secure the opening of the road.

“That the Shah's troops will not be allowed to enter the town; that no one, whatever his nationality (including Russians), will be molested for any part he may have played in recent events; and that the occupation will only last until peace has been made between the Shah and his people.

“We are informing the people that we have threatened Ain-ed-Dowleh with a forcible opening of the road, in order that they may understand beforehand what our attitude is.”

I have approved Mr. Wratishaw's action, and have, with my Russian colleague's concurrence, given the authorisation requested.

[13940]

No. 241.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 329.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 23, 1909.

AS general representations have now been made to the Shah jointly by the British and Russian Representatives, we trust that there will be no delay in the selection by the French Government of officials to fill the posts of Inspector of Finances and of Treasurer-General in Persia (see my telegrams Nos. 61 and 66 of the 28th January).

[15175]

No. 242.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 601.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 23, 1909.

YOL'R telegram No. 223 of today.

The only course which we can safely adopt now that it appears that we cannot depend on the royalist forces outside Tabreez to observe any conditions, whether this be due to bad faith on their part or whether it be that the Shah has not sent sufficiently explicit instructions, and now that the Shah has delayed giving us a satisfactory answer to our representations, is that recommended by M. Isvolsky in your above-mentioned telegram.

If the population of Tabreez are driven to desperation by the violation on the part of the Shah's troops of the conditions promised through our Representatives to the Tabreez Nationalists to our subjects and Consulates may become the objects of retaliation on their part. It is essential that this danger should be guarded against by the Russian Government. It appears, however, to be desirable that an authoritative statement should be issued here to the effect that any intervention which may be undertaken in any part of Persia by either of the two Powers is of an entirely

[1649]

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temporary character, and will not extend beyond objects of the nature of those now aimed at at Tabreez and which have rendered our action at Bushire necessary as well as Russian precautions in other localities. There will, I presume, be no objection on the part of M. Isvolsky to the issue of such a statement.

[15295]

No. 213.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson

(No. 607.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 23, 1909.

THE Russian Government have already (see your telegram No. 173 of the 27th ultimo) been asked once to give their consent to instructions to be sent to the two representatives as suggested by Sir G. Barclay in his telegram No. 307 of the 23rd April.

You should now inform them of the facts reported, and repeat the former request. One of the principal objections, as I understand, which the Russian Government raised to bringing the Shih to reason by threatening the withdrawal of the Russian officers from Tehran, was that mischief such as that which the Minister of War now threatens would be rendered impossible by their presence. The present moment seems to offer a very good opportunity for making it clear to the Shih that, if he wants money, he must accept the conditions laid down, and act on the advice already offered.

[13414]

No. 211.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 23, 1909.

WITH reference to your letter of the 12th ultimo, relative to the question of the protection of Bahrein subjects in Persian territory, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, deprecating the inclusion in the communication which he is about to address to the Persian Government, intimating to them the acceptance by His Majesty's Government of their unavowed role, of any statement in the sense of the last sentence of your letter, on the ground that such a declaration might raise the general question, which Sir G. Barclay is unwilling to do unless His Majesty's Government are prepared to press it to an issue.

In view of the considerations set forth in this telegram, Sir E. Grey is disposed, if Viscount Morley concurs, to leave the wording of the communication to Sir G. Barclay's discretion. His Majesty's Government must, however, continue to show by their acts that they do not intend to permit the Persian Government to assert their sovereignty over Bahrein subjects in their territory.

I am further to transmit copy of a despatch from Sir G. Barclay,† setting forth the reasons for which, after reconsideration, he considers it undesirable to present officially to the Persian Government the claim of the Bahrein subject which gave rise to the revival of the controversy, and I am to state that Sir E. Grey would propose, should Lord Morley see no objection, to approve Sir G. Barclay's attitude with regard to this matter also.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[14159]

No. 215.

Foreign Office to Mr. F. C. Strick.

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 23, 1909.

IN reply to your letter of the 14th instant, inquiring to whom the Island of Hahul belongs, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to inform you that its status presents some difficulty.

The island, which is uninhabited, appears to have no definite owner, and any

* No. 36.

† No. 78.

assertion of rights over it, beyond the usage of it by Arabs from Bahrein, the Trucial Coast, and El Katr, which is now customary, is considered undesirable for the present by His Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[15415]

No. 216.

Treasury to Foreign Office.—(Received April 24.)

Sir,

Treasury Chambers, April 23, 1909.

I HAVE laid before the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury Mr. Mallet's letter of the 26th ultimo, respecting a proposal by the Government of India to undertake certain works at Bassind, on Kishm Island, in the Persian Gulf, at an estimated cost of 3,903 rupees.

As Secretary Sir E. Grey is aware, it has for long been the practice of this Board to decline to make contributions towards the upkeep or repair of cemeteries abroad, and they regret, therefore, that they cannot agree to share such portion of the expense as is connected with repairing the tombstones in the cemetery at Bassind. The amount involved in this part of the work is not stated, but it probably is not considerable; and with this exception my Lords are prepared to accept as a charge to British funds a moiety of the expenditure now proposed.

I am, &c.
(Signed) G. H. MURRAY.

[15490]

No. 217.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 229.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, April 21, 1909.

PERSIA.

I read to M. Isvolsky the substance of your telegram No. 601 of the 23rd instant, with which His Excellency expressed complete agreement. He hopes that you will find nothing to object to in the telegram which he is circulating to all the capitals.

This afternoon M. Isvolsky told me that a telegram had been received from the Viceroy of the Caucasus stating that it would be impossible for the force to start till Wednesday next. I observed that this meant great delay, and said that I had hoped that by this time the force was already on its way. A telegram has been sent by M. Isvolsky to urge the Viceroy to take all possible steps to hasten the departure of the force. His Excellency said that he had made arrangements to see the Chief of the Staff this afternoon in order to discuss with him the possibility of hurrying on an advance guard at once. In reply to his inquiry as to whether I thought it would be safe to send on an advance guard, I told him that it was really impossible for me to offer an opinion on this point, but that the urgent matter was that there should be as little delay as possible in getting the force to Tabreez.

[15460]

No. 218.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 313.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 24, 1909.

BELGIAN Director of Customs at Bushire and "Persepolis."

The chief customs officer, acting under orders from Tehran, has diverted 1,200 tomans from the customs receipts, in order to buy coal for the "Persepolis," in spite of the arrangement concluded between His Majesty's consul-general and himself whereby these receipts were to be impounded pending a satisfactory settlement. It is well known that the "Persepolis" is to take on board the Daryn Beggi and what force he can collect, to be used against Bushire, at Bussorah.

The following is an extract from Major Cox's telegram No. 387 :—

"This action not only constitutes a flagrant breach of faith with me personally, but, if the money detained by our arrangement with the Nationalists in the Customs is to be used to actively assist the Darya Beggi to reach Bushire in the interests of the Shah, our good faith and neutral attitude will be entirely compromised. Another important consideration is that this vessel is armed and there is nothing to prevent the Darya Beggi should the Shah so instruct him, from intimidating the Sheikh of Mohammerrah into handing over to him the local customs receipts and providing men for Bushire. I submitted, therefore, that in these circumstances we would be justified in informing the Persian Government that we cannot thus actively participate in the departure of the 'Persepolis,' and in consideration of the methods employed we must object to her putting to sea."

His Majesty's consul-general has warned the officer-in-command that, until he obtains a reply from me, he will not be able to allow the vessel to sail. I have approved Major Cox's action and instructed him that the ship must be detained until the money abstracted has been refunded, and until such time has thereafter elapsed as may, in the opinion of the British Senior Naval Officer, be sufficient for coaling the "Persepolis," this operation having been already done by means of the money diverted.

I have informed the Persian Government of these instructions, and have explained that, in view of the arrangement as to the impounding of the customs receipts, it would be a violation of the neutrality, which the legation earnestly desires to observe, to allow the vessel to be coaled in this manner.

I have been careful, in my note, not to exclude the possibility of a further detention, as, had the Tangistanis still been in possession of the town, she could not certainly have left.

Please telegraph direct to His Majesty's consul-general if you think that this consideration will justify a permanent detention of the "Persepolis."

[15462]

No. 219.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 314.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 24, 1909.

TABREEZ.

I received last night the following telegram, No. 99, from His Majesty's consul-general at Tabreez :—

"Boyalist officers were strongly opposed to allowing provisions to enter the town, and proposed despatching a violently worded telegram in this sense to the Shah. This could not, however, be done as the telegraph line was not in working order. Amin-el-Dowleh personally seemed disposed to give his permission. He was later much disturbed by our threat of forcibly opening the road from Julfa. This seems to have even made an impression on the officers.

"I learn the above from a report by our delegates at Basminch."

[15472]

No. 250.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 315.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 24, 1909.

PERSIAN Government and new issue of oil shares.

The Persian Government learn that no attention has been given to their interests (which consist, I believe, in 20,000 shares in the Syndicate).

I have no detail, but would like to be able to reassure on this point the Minister of Foreign Affairs—who has written to me privately that the Persian Government "considers their rights prejudiced by the illegal action of the concessionaire, and will not ratify the statutes of the new Company which they cannot recognize.

[15471]

No. 251.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 316.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 24, 1909.

KARUN irrigation.

His Majesty's consul at Mohammerrah has forwarded to me by post Sir W. Willcocks' conclusions as to irrigation from Kerkha and Karun.

With reference to your telegram No. 17 to Cairo, shall I telegraph details of his views?

The scheme, he says, would be highly remunerative, and 250,000*l.* would probably cover the cost.

[15473]

No. 252.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 317.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 24, 1909.

TABREEZ.

I have received the following telegram, No. 100, from His Majesty's consul-general at Tabreez :—

"I learn confidentially that my Turkish colleague is stirring up the Nationalists and assuring them that the only safe course is for Turkish troops to participate in the occupation. I shall see him this afternoon with my Russian colleague.

"The Nationalists cannot keep the same opinion for two days, and seem utterly devoid of common sense. Mutual suspicion and terrorism are the order of the day, and no one dares express his real ideas or wishes.

"They are now organizing an agitation, professing that anything is preferable to foreign occupation, led on by the declaration of some fanatics that the armistice and opening of the road are mere pretexts for a permanent establishment of Russian control."

I have written to Sadreddin Bey stating that I can hardly believe that his consul-general can have been guilty of such highly reprehensible conduct.

My Russian colleague, at my request, is also bringing the matter to Sadreddin Bey's notice.

[15474]

No. 253.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 318.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 24, 1909.

BUSIRRE customs and "Persepolis."

With reference to my telegram No. 313, of to-day, I have received the following telegram, No. 389, from His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire :—

"A guard of riflemen stationed on board was in charge of the ship, while Seyyid Morteza was in authority."

[15481]

No. 254.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 319.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 24, 1909.

SHAH and Constitution.

His Majesty was present at a Council held this morning at the Palace, to discuss the question of the Constitution, and I hear, on the highest authority, that his attitude was distinctly favourable.

The Shah was strongly urged by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to follow the advice given to him by the Representatives of Great Britain and Russia. My informant

[1619]

thinks that Saad-ed-Dowleh will eventually gain his point, in spite of the very considerable opposition with which his suggestions were met to-day.

I have pointed out to his Excellency how much it is to be desired that His Majesty should act upon our recommendations promptly.

To-morrow a further meeting of the Council is to be convoked.

[15482]

No. 255.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 320.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 24, 1909.

TABREEZ.

I read to-day to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, a summary of the reports received from His Majesty's consul-general as to the obstructive attitude of the Royalist Generals on the question of the food supply for Tabreez.

He replied that Amir Yang had doubtless sent secret orders to subordinate officers, and that the difficulty had thus arisen. He told me, further, that the Shah was much hurt by the suspicion that he had not sent the promised instructions to his Generals, and declared that he had sent them.

[15483]

No. 256.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 321.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 24, 1909.

ATTITUDE of Turkish Consul-General at Tabreez.

I have received the following telegram, No. 101, from His Majesty's consul-general at Tabreez:

"Our colleagues, generally, are cordially co-operating with us.

"With reference to my telegram No. 100.

"This afternoon we called on the Turkish consul-general, who assured us of his support."

With reference to my telegram No. 317.

I have received a letter from the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires, stating that he has asked his consul-general for an explanation of the attitude he is said to have adopted, and has sent him strict instructions to take no action such as gave rise to the complaints of the two consuls-general.

[15287]

No. 257.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 201.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, April 24, 1909.

YOUR telegram No. 200 of the 23rd instaut. Oxide in the Persian Gulf.

I approve.

[15471]

No. 258.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 204.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 24, 1909.

PLEASE let me have by telegraph a summary of Willecks' views on the subject of irrigation from Karun (see your telegram No. 316 of to-day).

[15386]

No. 256*.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 68.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Paris, April 23, 1909.

YOUR telegram No. 329, Urgent, of to-day.

I informed the Political Director this evening that, in view of the joint general representations made to the Shah by England and Russia, His Majesty's Government hoped that the French Government would proceed at once with the selection of a Treasurer-General and an Inspector of Finances for Persia.

[15313]

No. 257*.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 202.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, April 24, 1909.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 300, 310, 311, and 312 of the 23rd April.

I approve.

[15460]

No. 259.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 205.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 24, 1909.

THE action reported by you in your telegram No. 313 of to-day has the approval of His Majesty's Government.

I am instructing His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire to refer to me for further instructions before he allows the "Persepolis" to leave.

[15471]

No. 260.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Gorst.

(No. 19.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 24, 1909.

SIR G. BARCLAY telegraphs that he has now received Willecks' views on the subject of irrigation from Karun (see your telegram No. 17 of the 17th instant).

[15460]

No. 261.

Sir Edward Grey to Major Cox.

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 24, 1909.

YOU should refer to me for further instructions before allowing the "Persepolis" to leave Bushire.

[15492]

No. 262.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 231.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, April 25, 1909.

(R.) YOUR telegram No. 607 of the 23rd instant: Danger of troubles at Tehran.

Russian Government have sent telegraphic instructions to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran to join with His Majesty's Minister in informing the Persian Government, if necessary, that if any disorders occur as intimated by the Minister of War, an intervention may take place which would probably lead to consequences disagreeable to the Persian Government and to those who would be responsible for the troubles. Russian Government add that the Chargé d'Affaires is also to state that the objects for which an advance will be made is to facilitate payment of arrears to the soldiers, and that therefore it depends on the Shah to obtain this assistance by hastening his reply to the advice which has been given by the two Representatives. (End of R.)

In the Memorandum which I addressed to the Russian Government I had mentioned that the consequences of an intervention would be disagreeable to the Shah, whereas in the Russian Memorandum it is the Persian Government who are threatened with disagreeable consequences.

I submit that it would have been better if the Russian Government had omitted the last paragraph of their instructions to M. Sabline, but it is hardly worth while trying to have the instructions modified, as they have already been dispatched.

[15484]

No. 263.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 322.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 25, 1909.

ARABISTAN irrigation.

With reference to my telegram No. 316 of the 24th April, I beg to make the following additions and emendations:—

In Sir W. Willcock's opinion the works on the Euphrates and Tigris should be carried out before commencing on the Karun on account of the damage which would otherwise result to the date groves on the Shat-el-Arab. He estimates the cost of the Karun works at 500,000.

Kerkla, which would cost some 250,000l., should, he thinks, first be utilized.

[15485]

No. 261.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 323.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 25, 1909.

ARABISTAN irrigation. With reference to your telegram No. 201 of the 24th April.

As regards irrigation from the Kerkla, 750,000 acres, comprising the whole tract lying between the Turkish frontier and the Karun from Hawizeh to the Shat-el-Arab, could be irrigated by restoring the dam at Nahr Hashem. Nizam-ess-Sultaneh claims Nahr Hashem itself, but Arabs under the Sheikh of Mohammedali inhabit the district adjacent. The initial cost of these works would be 250,000l. The tribesmen could dig the necessary creeks, and after the main work was completed efficient supervision could be exercised by one European and a few Indians.

A railway along the right bank of the Karun could then pay well, and would be likely to remove the more serious objections to interference with navigation of the lower part of the river.

A regulating weir at Ahwaz would be necessary for irrigation from the Karun, by which 1,000,000 acres east of that river could be affected, and, if necessary, another 500,000 could be fertilized from the Derahi, and a canal westwards from the Karun could supply any deficiency in the Kerkla. Probable cost of this would be about 500,000l. In eight years' time the date gardens on the Shat-el-Arab could be supplied with salt by the Turkish irrigation works, but until then they would suffer greatly from any interference with the waters of the Karun.

Sir W. Willcock considers these works of sufficient importance to justify the sacrifice of navigation on the Karun. On the upper half of the river the banks are very fertile, and on the lower could be made so.

[15486]

No. 263.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 324.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 25, 1909.

TABREEZ.

I have received the following telegram No. 102 from His Majesty's consul-general at Tabreez:

"In my opinion the majority of the population look favourably on the advent of the Russian troops.

"Some members of the local assembly went to the telegraph office last night hoping to come to terms with the Shah; they have returned there this morning."

It is Taki-Jadid who, with Bagher Khan, is at the bottom of the agitation against the arrival of Russian troops.

[15487]

No. 266.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 325.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, April 25, 1909.

[ANGLO-RUSSIAN representations.]

Two dragomans called by appointment on Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning.

His Excellency wished to discuss details of execution of programme. Dragomans replied first step was for Shah to signify acceptance. Afterwards legations would be

ready to discuss privately with the Minister for Foreign Affairs such composition of the Cabinet as would in their opinion inspire confidence.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Shah had kept no record of assurances given verbally (see my despatch No. 321). His Majesty desired to have some record, and his Excellency, who realized that we could not give them officially in writing, proposed that the Representatives, in answer to a private inquiry from him, might remind him in a private letter of what dragomans had said in December, giving text, and stating that they had the authority of the Representatives for these assurances. Minister for Foreign Affairs points out that if this request is refused the Shah will be suspicious.

May we promise compliance with this request to [Group undercipherable] upon the Shah's official acceptance of programme. It was only the sympathetic [?] encouragement of the two Representatives which was promised in certain contingencies. (Sent to St. Petersburg.)

[15488]

No. 267.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 326.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, April 25, 1909.

ST. PETERSBURGH telegram No. 229 [of the 24th instant].

In view of unfortunate delay in the dispatch of the force to Tabreez, my Russian colleague and I are pressing for six days' extension of armistice. (Repeated to St. Petersburg.)

[15489]

No. 268.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 327.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 25, 1909.

PROVISIONS for Tabreez.

I have sent the following telegram No. 67 to His Majesty's consul-general at Tabreez:—

"The Minister for Foreign Affairs has just written to me that the Shah, at the request of the Tabreez Ajman, has telegraphed instructions to all his generals to facilitate the free introduction of provisions into the town, with no restrictions as to quantity or time. At the same time a complete cessation of hostilities is ordered.

"He tells me further that the joy of the Nationalists at these concessions has given place to profound dissatisfaction on their learning that Russian troops had crossed the frontier. They have telegraphed in this sense to His Majesty.

"Please telegraph me your observations, particularly as to whether it would be safe, if still possible, to stop the Russian advance, in view of the present changed situation."

[15522]

No. 269.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 241.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, April 15, 1909.

THE Emperor, at my audience of yesterday, remarked that the state of Persia was deplorable. I agreed with the observation, and said that I trusted that within the next day or two the two Governments would be in a position to instruct the two Representatives at Tehran to give cogent advice to the Shah. We believed that an immediate declaration of a Constitution would go far to calming the country, and the a good effect. I hoped that matters had not gone too far, and that the people would believe in the intentions of the Shah to act up to his promises.

His Majesty observed, with a smile, that we had handed a force of bluejackets at [1619]

Bushire. I said that this step had been rendered absolutely necessary on account of the disorders in the town, and it was undertaken simply with the object of protecting the lives and properties of foreigners. The Emperor remarked that a similar condition of things existed in the north of Persia. As I saw what was in his mind, I said that my Government had always recognized the right of the Russian Government to take steps to protect the lives and properties of foreigners in the north of Persia; but I admitted that a certain section of British public opinion was always ready to criticize the action of foreign Governments in certain circumstances, which action they considered quite natural and defensible when Great Britain found herself placed in similar circumstances. I submitted that the views of His Majesty's Government and not those of other people were the important points to keep in consideration. As soon as order was re-established in Bushire the blue-jackets would be withdrawn.

His Majesty said he was a little anxious as to the Resht-Tehran road being kept open, as it was essential that Tehran should not be cut off from all communication with the outside world.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[15524]

No. 270.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey. (Received April 26.)

(No. 243.)
Sir,

St. Petersburg, April 16, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, with reference to my telegram No. 202 of to-day's date, copy of an *aide-memoire* which I have received from the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs, respecting the amendments proposed by His Majesty's Government in the programme of Persian reforms.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

Inclosure in No. 270.

Aide-memoire communicated to Sir A. Nicolson.

LE Gouvernement Impérial accepte la proposition du Cabinet de Londres, mentionnée dans l'aide-memoire de l'Ambassade britannique du 31 mars, annulée contrairement, de supprimer dans la communication à faire au Schah le paragraphe 6 ayant rapport à l'établissement d'une Commission de Contrôle, et commençant par les mots, "L'appui pour la conclusion," &c., ainsi que les alinéas (a), (b), et (c).

Le Gouvernement russe croit, toutefois, qu'il serait indispensable d'avertir dès à présent le Schah que l'appui des deux Gouvernements pour la conclusion d'un emprunt sera accordé non seulement à la condition de l'approbation préalable de cet emprunt par l'Assemblée élective, mais aussi sous certaines garanties dont la nature formera l'objet d'un échange de vues ultérieur entre les Cabinets de Saint-Petersbourg et de Londres et le Gouvernement persan.

En conséquence, le Gouvernement Impérial propose d'insérer dans le paragraphe 6, après les mots "En présence d'une pareille décision du Medjlis," la phrase suivante: "La Russie et la Grande-Bretagne accorderont à la Perse, sous certaines garanties qui formeront l'objet d'un échange de vues ultérieur entre les deux Puissances et le Gouvernement persan, leur appui en vue de la conclusion de cet emprunt."

Le Gouvernement Impérial se plaît à espérer que le Cabinet de Londres n'aura point d'objections à cette modification du paragraphe 6 du programme en question, et voudra bien lui faire savoir sa décision à ce sujet dans un délai aussi bref que possible, afin que des instructions dans ce sens puissent être envoyées par télégraphe au Chargé d'Affaires de Russie à Téhéran.

[15525]

No. 271.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey. (Received April 26.)

(No. 244.)
Sir,

St. Petersburg, April 16, 1909.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 203 of to-day's date, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of an *aide-memoire* which I have received from the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs respecting the proposed mediation between the Nationalist and Royalist parties at Tabreez.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

Inclosure in No. 271.

Aide-memoire communicated to Sir A. Nicolson.

LE Gouvernement Impérial n'a pas d'objections à ce que le Consul-Général britannique et le Gérant du Consulat-Général de Russie à Tauris, sans offrir formellement aux Nationalistes leur médiation en vue d'une solution pacifique de leur lutte contre le Schah, soumettent ces derniers quant aux conditions qu'ils jugeront acceptables. M. Miller a déjà reçu les instructions nécessaires de s'entendre avec son légation d'Angleterre par rapport aux mesures qui pourraient être prises à ces fins, et il serait extrêmement désirable que Mr. Wratishaw soit muni sans retard d'instructions analogues.

Il est hors de doute que toute action médiatrice devrait être concentrée exclusivement dans les mains des Représentants consulaires russe et britannique. L'intervention dans les affaires politiques de la Perse des Représentants d'autres Puissances a été systématiquement évitée de tout temps, et il est dans l'intérêt de la Russie et de l'Angleterre d'observer le même principe dans le cas actuel. Afin de prévenir l'immixtion d'autres Consuls dans les affaires de Tauris M. Miller et Mr. Wratishaw pourraient, en cas de besoin, faire comprendre aux chefs du parti constitutionnel que s'ils demandent la médiation d'autres Représentants consulaires ceux de la Russie et de la Grande-Bretagne s'abstiendraient de toute participation à l'action médiatrice.

D'après les renseignements que le Ministère vient de recevoir de Tauris, il y a lieu de croire que les Nationalistes de cette ville désirent surtout qu'une Constitution soit octroyée, qu'une amnistie plénière soit proclamée, et que les habitants puissent garder les armes qui sont leur propriété personnelle, tout en livrant au Gouvernement celles qui lui appartiennent; ils demandent, enfin, une garantie diplomatique contre le rétablissement de l'ancien régime.

Le Gouvernement Impérial estime que ces désirs sont en grande partie conformes aux conseils que les deux Gouvernements ont en vue de donner au Schah. Quant à la garantie diplomatique, il serait peut-être possible de faire savoir aux Nationalistes que les deux Gouvernements insistent auprès du Schah précisément sur l'introduction des réformes qui mettront définitivement fin au régime dont les Nationalistes réclament le rétablissement.

Saint-Petersbourg, le 2 (15) avril, 1909.

[15528]

No. 272.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey. (Received April 26.)

(No. 248.)
Sir,

St. Petersburg, April 19, 1909.

M. ISVOLSKY informed me last evening that he accepted the modifications in the programme of reforms to be presented to the Shah which you had communicated to me in my telegram No. 538 of the 17th instant, and that he would send to-day the necessary instructions to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran. The instructions will not be dispatched till this evening, as the final revise has to be previously submitted to the Emperor. I said that probably Sir G. Barclay would have received his instructions to-day, and that doubtless M. Salbine, even if his had not arrived, would not hesitate to act with his British colleague as the matter was urgent.

M. Isvolsky had received the same information from Tabreez as that which Mr. Wratislaw had communicated, and also the threat of the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires that unless Tabreez was provisioned his Government would take strong measures. M. Isvolsky said that he was debating whether it might not be well if the Russian Government were to threaten the Shah that, unless he permitted a certain quantity of food-stuffs to be introduced for the foreign colonies, such supplies would be sent to Tabreez from Jolfa, and their entry obtained, if necessary, by force. He would have to consult with his colleagues in the Cabinet, but the idea appeared to him to be perhaps of some use. He did not like, he added, to abstain from taking any measures for supplying the foreigners with the necessary means of subsistence.

He told me, further, that he had received information from Astara that the town was being threatened by Cossacks who had come from Resht, and who announced their intention of taking the life of the Russian Consul. As the place was close to the Russian frontier, troops would probably be sent to afford the necessary protection.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[15532]

No. 273.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 252.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, April 20, 1909.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 207 of the 17th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note which I have received from M. Isvolsky respecting the dispatch of Russian troops to Astrabad.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

Inclosure in No. 273.

M. Isvolsky to Sir A. Nicolson.

Mon cher Ambassadeur,

Saint-Petersbourg, le 3 (16) avril, 1909.

JE crois devoir vous faire savoir qu'ainsi que l'annoncent les dernières nouvelles d'Astrabad, cette ville est cernée par des bandes de Turcomans dont le nombre atteint 6,000, dit-on, et qui ont été mises en mouvement par les partisans du Schah contre les révolutionnaires. Un certain nombre de ces derniers, dont quelques étrangers, se sont livrés au Consul de Russie. La ville court le danger d'être mise au pillage; de nombreux habitants ont pris leur fuite au Consul.

Ces choses ont été expédiées à notre Commissaire à Gombet-i-Karbous de se rendre en toute hâte avec son escorte à Astrabad.

Votre sincèrement dévoué,
(Signé) ISVOLSKY.

[15533]

No. 274.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 253.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, April 20, 1909.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 206 of the 17th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note which I have received from M. Isvolsky respecting the proposed introduction of food into Tabreez.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

Inclosure in No. 274.

M. Isvolsky to Sir A. Nicolson.

Mon cher Ambassadeur,

Saint-Petersbourg, le avril, 1909.

LE Gérant du Consulat-Général de Russie à Tauris, de concert avec les autres Consuls dans cette ville, s'est adressé au Chargé d'Affaires de Russie à Téhéran en le priant d'obtenir du Gouvernement du Schah l'autorisation de laisser entrer à Tauris 80 kharsars de farine pour le Consulat de Russie et les sujets russes dans cette ville. M. Miller a ajouté que cette quantité de farine pourrait suffire pour deux mois, et que les autres Consuls adressaient une prière analogue à leurs Légations respectives.

En se référant à ce télégramme du Gérant du Consulat-Général, M. Sabline nous informe que le Gouvernement persan refuse l'autorisation demandée à toutes les Légations et insiste pour que les Consuls quittent Tauris. Le Chargé d'Affaires ajoute que son collègue de Turquie, très indigné de ce refus, menace les Légations de Russie et de la Grande-Bretagne de complications, si elles ne parviennent pas à obtenir l'admission de la farine pour les étrangers à Tauris.

Je crois, de mon côté, que l'arrivée d'une grande quantité de vivres aux Consulates de Tauris pourrait exposer ces derniers aux dangers d'une attaque de la part de la populace affamée. Mais on pourrait peut-être obtenir le consentement du Gouvernement du Schah à l'introduction dans la ville, à plusieurs reprises, de quantités moins considérables de farine pour les besoins des Consuls et de la colonie étrangère.

Je désirerais connaître votre avis à ce sujet et, si cette combinaison vous paraît pratique, des instructions en ce sens pourraient être envoyées à Mr. Barclay et à M. Sabline.

Votre sincèrement dévoué,
(Signé) ISVOLSKY.

[15535]

No. 275.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 255.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, April 20, 1909.

M. ISVOLSKY asked me to call upon him this morning, and informed me that the news which he had received from Tabreez was alarming, and that an attack on the two Consulates had been threatened for today. He had sent last night an urgent telegram to M. Sabline to lose no time in demanding from the Shah that immediate orders should be sent to allow 150 kharsars of wheat to be daily introduced into Tabreez for the use of the foreigners and of the peaceful population; and to inform His Majesty that, unless this request was at once granted, the Russian Government would themselves take measures to cause the necessary supplies to enter the town. He had also instructed the Russian Consul, by telegram, to make known to the population of Tabreez the steps which had been taken by the Russian Government, in the hope that it would have a calming effect on the populace. There was then the question of saving the Consuls and the other foreigners, and he asked what news I had. I gave M. Isvolsky the substance of the telegrams which I had received from Sir G. Barclay, and I told him also that I was authorized to inquire of him whether the Russian Government could not send a small force of Cossacks to assist in securing the safe withdrawal of the Consuls and the other foreigners who might wish to leave. His Excellency said that this question had been debated with the Minister of War on the previous evening, and it was considered that the dispatch of a "small force" might be a risky proceeding; and, moreover, he questioned whether it might not be better to wait to ascertain the results of the steps which were to be taken at Téhéran, and also the effect which the announcement of the Russian Consul might have on the population of Tabreez. I told His Excellency that the information in my possession seemed to indicate that it was exceedingly doubtful if the Shah would consent to the step which M. Sabline was to propose. If he refused the desperation of the people would be worse than ever, and previous time would have been lost. His Excellency said that if the attack on the Consulates were to take place today it was clear that the troops would arrive too late, as they could not reach Tabreez from Jolfa under two or three days. I said that this was true, but that perhaps the attack would not take place on the date fixed, and that if it were known that troops were on their way the plan would probably be abandoned. I understood that

[1649]

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the attack was to be made with a view of inviting an intervention; and if it were known that one was imminent the attack would have no object. There were the lives of our Consuls and of the other Europeans to be considered.

M. Isvolsky said he would speak again with the Minister of War, and asked me to call again upon him in the afternoon. I have just returned from seeing his Excellency, and he informed me that orders had been sent to dispatch a force to Tabreez. The number and composition of the force would be left to the authorities in the Caucasus to decide. The Officer Commanding would receive orders to protect the Consulates and foreigners, to facilitate the entry of food into the town, and to assist in the departure of any foreigner who might wish to leave. I should mention, as regards the entry of food, that M. Telmazykoff, who was present at my morning's interview, had observed that there was plenty of food waiting to enter, and if a road were opened supplies would flow in at once.

I venture to think that the Russian Government have taken a decision which was imperatively called for by the circumstances. None can regret the departure of a Russian force in any way intended to support the authority of the Shah, as it is sent to relieve a town besieged by his forces, and in which are Europeans exposed to most serious dangers. It would not have been possible to leave the Consuls and Europeans to their fate without an effort being made to save them, and, indeed, the presence of the Russian force will be entirely to the advantage of the Nationalists, and will, it is hoped, prove to the Shah that the patience of the two Governments is becoming exhausted. It is to be trusted that the force will not arrive too late.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[15538]

No. 276.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 258.)

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the translation of a communiqué, published in this morning's "Official Messenger," relative to the state of affairs in Tabreez, and to the instructions which have been issued to the Viceroy of the Caucasus to hold himself in readiness to dispatch a column of Russian troops to that town.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

Inclosure in No. 276.

Extract from the "Official Messenger" of April 21, 1909.

(Translation.)

ACCORDING to information received by the St. Petersburg Telegraphic Agency from the Director of the Consulate-General at Tabreez, the populace of that town, driven to desperation by starvation, with the "filas" at their head, intend to plunder, in their search for food, the Armenian quarters and the Russian and British Consulates situated therein. The heads of the movement calculate apparently that by this means, and, in an extreme case, by the murder of one of the Consuls, Russian intervention will be evoked, which will delay the surrender of Tabreez to the troops of the Shah and make it possible for the revolutionaries to conceal themselves.

In view of such a state of affairs the Russian Government instructed their Representative in Tehran to categorically demand of the Shah orders for the immediate admission into Tabreez of a sufficient quantity of provisions for the needs of the foreign Consulates, establishments, and subjects, and also of the peaceable population of the town. Furthermore, the Charge d'Affaires has been instructed to inform the Persian Government that failure to carry out this demand forthwith will compel Russia to take immediate decisive measures for the opening, by armed force of the road to Tabreez for the carriage of foodstuffs and provisions, and in the defence of Russian and foreign establishments and subjects in that town.

Twenty-four hours ago fresh and extremely alarming information as to the state of affairs in that town was received from the Director of the Consulate-General at Tabreez, amongst other, news of the decision arrived at by the starving populace and "filas" to attack the Russian and English Consulates in the immediate future. Similar informa-

tion has been received also by the British Government, who on their part have notified to the Imperial Government the desirability of dispatching a detachment to Tabreez to enable foreigners so wishing to leave the town.

In view of the foregoing and with the permission of the Emperor, the Viceroy of the Caucasus was instructed to dispatch immediately a column of sufficient strength for the defence of Russian and foreign institutions and subjects in the town, for guarantee of communications between Tabreez and Julla.

In view of information which has been received that tranquillity now prevails in Tabreez owing to orders of the Shah for the cessation of hostilities for six days and for the admission of provisions into the besieged town, the Viceroy of the Caucasus has been ordered to delay until receipt of further instructions the dispatch across the frontier of the column destined for Tabreez, but not to cease, however, taking preparatory measures in the event of further complications.

[15544]

No. 277.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 261.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, April 23, 1909.

M. ISVOLSKY told me yesterday that his news from Tabreez was not satisfactory. The Ained-Dowleh stated that he had received no orders to grant an armistice, though, after some discussion, he agreed to permit one road to be opened for the passage of provisions. He asserted that the telegraph line from Basmitch to Tehran had not been in working order, which probably accounted for the fact of his having received no instructions from Tehran as to according an armistice. M. Isvolsky was of opinion that little reliance could be placed on the word of the Ained-Dowleh, and that probably difficulties would arise as to the safe passage of provisions. Moreover, the Shah had informed the two Representatives that he would reflect over the proposals which had been made to him in regard to the promulgation of a Constitution, &c. The situation at Tabreez would probably become dangerous again at any moment, and he has about to consult with the Minister of Finance and of War and with the Chief of the General Staff as to whether, in the circumstances, it would not be prudent to order the Russian detachment to advance to Tabreez. This step would secure the free passage of provisions and might also exercise an influence over the Shah to expedite his giving a favourable reply to the representations of the two Governments.

Late last night I received a letter from M. Isvolsky, of which I have the honour to transmit a copy, stating that he finds that the telegraph line from Basmitch to Tehran has not been interrupted, and that the Russian Consul telegraphs that the situation is more threatening than ever.

In these circumstances the Russian Government consider that they can hesitate no longer; and orders have been sent to move on the detachment at Julla.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

Inclosure in No. 277.

M. Isvolsky to Sir A. Nicolson.

Mon cher Ambassadeur,

Saint-Petersbourg, le 9 (21) avril, 1909.

LES derniers télégrammes que je viens de recevoir de Tauris établissent d'une façon positive que le télégraphe entre Basmitch et Téhéran n'a pas cessé de fonctionner, et que malgré cela Eined-Dowleh n'a pas reçu d'ordres du Shah concernant un armistice et le rétablissement de la ville.

La position dans laquelle nos Consuls sont placés est extrêmement épineuse après que les promesses à la population n'ont pas été exécutées. M. Miller télégraphie que le danger est plus menaçant que jamais.

Dans ces conditions il n'y a plus d'hésitation possible, et nous avons décidé de mettre en mouvement sans retard le détachement préparé à Djulla.

Votre sincèrement dévoué,

(Signed) ISVOLSKY.

[15592]

No. 278.

M. Isvolsky to Count Benckendorff.—(Communicated by Count Benckendorff,
April 26, 1909.)

(Télégraphique.)

Saint-Petersbourg, le 10 (23) avril, 1909.

L'EXPRES les derniers Rapports du Consul-Général de Russie à Tabriz, la famine qui a régné en cette ville met en danger sérieux les Consuls et les ressortissants tant russes qu'étrangers.

Le Chargé d'Affaires de Russie à Téhéran a par conséquent été chargé de déclarer au Shah qu'à moins que des mesures ne soient prises immédiatement à l'effet de pourvoir les Consuls et les ressortissants étrangers ainsi que la population païenne de la ville des provisions nécessaires un détachement de troupes russes serait expédié de Djilfa, pour la sauvegarde des Consuls et ressortissants étrangers à Tabriz et l'importation dans la ville de provisions suffisantes.

Malgré la promesse du Shah de nommer le Prince Ein-ud-Dowleh, Commandant de ses troupes, de ordres nécessaires à cet effet, le dit Commandant persan n'a pas autorisé le ravitaillement de la ville, et la situation des Consuls et étrangers reste comme jusqu'ici critique.

Le Gouvernement Impérial s'est par conséquent vu obligé de recourir aux mesures dont le Shah a été prévenu, et le détachement russe quitte actuellement Djilfa en marche sur Tabriz.

Le but de l'expédition se trouve circonscrit par ce qui précède. Les troupes Impériales n'auront à rester sur territoire persan que tant qu'il sera nécessaire pour que la sécurité de la vie et des propriétés des Consuls russe et étrangers soient complètement garanties.

Veuillez porter ce qui précède à la connaissance du Gouvernement britannique.

[15752]

No. 279.

Mr. F. C. Strick to Foreign Office.—(Received April 26.)

*Baltic House, Leadenhall Street, London,
April 21, 1909.*

Sir,

I BEG to acknowledge receipt of your letter of yesterday, and thank you for the information contained therein in regard to the Persian Gulf Island of Halul.

I learn by the mail received to-day from my Bashiree agents, Messrs. A. and T. J. Mahdoun, that, with the permission of the British Resident, they are sending men on a prospecting expedition to the islands of Sirri, Fann, the Tams, Dohad, Sir Abu Nuair, and probably to others to search for and to obtain samples of any oxides which may be found on these islands.

I am now calling to Messrs. Mahdoun to instruct their men to call at Halul Island also.

With reference to the correspondence exchanged between us on the subject of Little Tams, and especially to your letter of the 13th January last, Messrs. Malcolm advise me by to-day's mail that it was reported that the Mohin-Tajjar's men were working oxide on either Tams or Little Tams, and that the mineral was reported to be of good quality.

If later on I receive any confirmation of this report, I shall have the honour of again addressing you on this subject.

I am, &c.
(Signed) FRANK C. STRICK

[15774]

No. 280.

Mr. Carter to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 26.)

American Embassy, London, April 25, 1909.

Sir,

I UNDER telegraphic instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that, in concert with Great Britain, an expedition is being sent to the neighbouring frontier to the relief of foreigners in Tabreez, and, if so,

whether any American citizens who may be in jeopardy may rely upon the protection of this expedition.

I may mention that our Legation at Tehran has informed the Secretary of State that the American Consul at Tabreez regards the situation as desperate should the joint representations made by Great Britain and Russia fail. He states that foreigners are not permitted to leave Tabreez, and that he is powerless to do anything to protect them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. R. CARTER.

[15661]

No. 281.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 328.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

TABREEZ.

Tehran, April 26, 1909.

With reference to my immediately preceding telegram, I have received the following telegram No. 103 of the 25th April.

"The local assembly have sent a deputation to us with a copy of a telegram sent by the Shah for transmission to Ain-ud-Dowleh and to each General personally. They are ordered in this to open all roads, to do everything in their power to facilitate entry of provisions, to keep their present positions, and entirely to suspend hostilities pending further orders. They have begged us that, until it is seen whether the Shah's orders will be obeyed, the Russian troops may not advance.

"As we cannot rely on either party we think it best that the Russian troops should not be stopped until they are within reach of Tabreez, but that we might be authorised to say that they will only enter the town under circumstances of exceptional necessity.

"In this way the safety of foreign subjects is most likely to be assured and a reconciliation made possible between the Shih and his people on the lines of your representations."

The two consuls are probably right in advocating the dispatch of Russian troops in the interests of foreigners' safety; moreover, the dispatch of Russian troops will undoubtedly incline the Shah to listen more favourably to our advice.

It would be well to press home on the Shah the lesson that Russian intervention is not necessarily in his favour as until now he has never realised this.

We will, should the two Governments concur, authorise our consuls-general to make the declaration suggested, and might at the same time address to the Persian Government a joint note in the same sense.

I think that it is desirable that in order to demonstrate the complete harmony of the two Governments I should associate myself with my Russian colleague in making this announcement.

[15662]

No. 282.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 329.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

TABREEZ.

Tehran, April 26, 1909.

I have received the following telegram No. 104 of the 25th April from His Majesty's consul-general at Tabreez.

"As the same situation could easily recur in a few days and for the reason put forward in my immediately preceding telegram, I venture to suggest that it would be unwise to stop the troops.

"The intense joy resulting from the Shah's concessions, which the Minister for Foreign Affairs mentions, is rather exaggerated; it will not in any case become evident until some result ensues, and this is still considered doubtful by the population. The people change their attitude hourly. I cannot follow their ideas or tell what their real wishes are."

[15700]

No. 283.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 330.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 26, 1909.

THE Tabreez Local Assembly and Taghi Ladeh, I am told, made an appeal yesterday to the Shah and his Ministers. They stated that Russian troops had already crossed the frontier, and urged that the best means of avoiding foreign occupation would be the restoration of a constitutional régime. The Shah's concessions were the result of this appeal. He immediately sent instructions as to the observance of the armistice, &c. The question of a constitution, however, was postponed for future consideration.

[15790]

No. 284.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 331.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 26, 1909.

JOINT communication to Shah regarding entry of troops.

With reference to my telegram No. 328 of the 26th April I should like to include a reference to Roshire, if you can see your way to make this proposal, in the joint communication regarding the Russian troops for Tabreez, although I have already brought the object of landing bluejackets at that port to the knowledge of the Persian Government.

By this means my association with my Russian colleague in making this communication would be justified, and, further, the identical character of the motives inspiring the action of the two Powers would be further emphasized.

[15661]

No. 285.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 206.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 26, 1909.

HIS Majesty's Consul-General may be authorized to make the proposed declaration in concert with the Russian Vice-Consul (see your telegrams Nos. 328 and 329 of the 26th instant) if the Russian Government have sent similar instructions to their *Chargé d'Affaires*.

You may join with Russian *Chargé d'Affaires* in addressing note in the same sense to the Persian Government.

[15455]

No. 286.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 207.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 26, 1909.

HORME'S Oxide.

I have referred your inquiry (see your telegram No. 274 of the 17th instant) to Ellinger, who says that he cannot give a definite reply because the demand for oxide, which it is impossible to foresee exactly, controls the rate at which Weir can ship it profitably. He does not understand why you make the inquiry.

The Main has not notified his firm of any interference with mining operations.

[15487]

No. 287.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 208.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 26, 1909.

YOU may repeat the assurances already given (see your despatch No. 324 of the 29th December, 1908) in compliance with the request of the Persian Minister for Foreign

Affairs, reported in your telegram No. 325 of the 25th instant, when the Shah has officially accepted the programme, if your Russian colleague has received similar instructions.

The text of the original assurances must be rigidly adhered to.

[15825]

No. 288.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 266.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, April 24, 1909.

THE intelligence which reached M. Isvolsky from Tabreez in regard to the increased tension of the situation there, and the evident duplicity either on the part of the Shah or of his Generals in respect to the armistice and the revictualling of the town, decided the Russian Government to lose no time in ordering the immediate advance of the column which had been held in readiness at Julfa. It was clear that grave risks would be incurred if further delay were permitted, and, unwilling as the Russian Government are to proceed to active measures, the position of affairs left them no alternative but to take steps for insuring the safety of the European colony at Tabreez. The column consists of three battalions of infantry, four sotnias of Cossacks, two batteries, and a company of sappers. The battalions are on a peace footing, so that M. Isvolsky estimates that the force will amount to about 2,000 men. The Russian Consul at Tabreez considered that a force of 200 Cossacks to guard a convoy of provisions might be sufficient, but the Russian authorities were of opinion, and I venture to think rightly, that the column should be of sufficient strength to be able to overcome any resistance if such were offered. Moreover, it will be necessary to leave posts at certain intervals to keep the road open, so that the number of men does not seem to be greater than reason would require. M. Isvolsky informed me that the column would take with them as much provisions as was possible, though, of course, it was impossible for it to collect and transport supplies sufficient to feed the whole population of Tabreez. Nevertheless, once that the road is opened up, probably supplies will flow in. The orders given to the Officer Commanding the column are to abstain from any interference in the differences between the two contending parties at Tabreez, and in no wise to assume any administrative duties. He is to give the necessary protection to the foreign Consulates and institutions, and to all foreigners residing in the town. When the situation has returned to a normal condition, and there is no longer any fear of danger to the foreign residents, the troops will be withdrawn.

An official communiqué has been published here explaining the reasons for the departure of a force, and a Circular telegram has been sent to the Powers to the same effect.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[15923]

No. 289.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 232.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, April 27, 1909.

PERSIA. Shah's request for guarantee.

The idea of making a private and unsigned communication to the Shah on this subject is not welcomed by M. Isvolsky, who would prefer that we should either give a guarantee openly or refuse it. If we were to put the guarantee given by the *dragomans* into writing the Shah might be satisfied.

M. Isvolsky asked whether HIS Majesty's Government would be disposed to give the Shah a guarantee on condition of his accepting the joint programme, and, if so, what form such guarantee would take. I promised to refer these inquiries to you.

[15924]

No. 290.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 233.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, April 27, 1909.

TABREEZ.

Sir G. Barclay's telegrams Nos. 328 and 329, and your telegram No. 206 to him, all of the 26th instant.

I am informed by Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that the Russian force will encamp outside Tabreez and will not enter the city. In order to provide guards for banks and for other institutions, and for any Consulate which may wish to have one, some small detachments will be sent into the town. M. Isvolsky hardly thinks it necessary to address a joint note to the Persian Government to inform them of this, but he sees no objection to the two Consuls letting it be known to whatever persons and in whatever way they may consider desirable.

[15791]

No. 291.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 332.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 27, 1909.

RUSSIAN troops for Meshed.

I have received the following telegram, No. 24/39c of the 26th April, from His Majesty's consul-general at Meshed:—

"Yesterday the Russian detachment arrived, and was received with military honours by the Persian general. The town is completely cowed, and the governor-general may now take up his functions. Detachment consisted of six Turcoman levies under four officers, thirty gunners with two Maxim's, and seventy-five Cossacks."

[15866]

No. 292.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 333.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 27, 1909.

TABREEZ.

With reference to my telegram No. 330 of yesterday, I learn from His Majesty's consul-general at Tabreez that 8 tons of flour were sent in yesterday from Basminch. There is still some wild talk about resisting Russian troops and massacring foreigners, but Mr. Wratlaw attaches little importance to this.

The Shah has urged the local assembly to admit Ain-ed-Dowleh, to defeat the project of a permanent Russian occupation which His Majesty assures them is contemplated. The two consuls-general hear that a good effect has been produced by their explanation of the motives and temporary character of the Russian action.

The Shah has granted an amnesty, and made a vague promise of a constitution consistent with Mussulman law, the Nationalist party using the approach of the Russian troops as a means of extorting concessions from him.

My Russian colleague and I have heard that the Shah proposes to publish a totally inadequate project, drafted, I believe, by M. Hartwig some months ago, in place of the required electoral law. We have consequently explained to His Majesty that such a step would not be consistent with an observance of our programme of advice, and would bring no improvement to the situation, and have again urged him to signify at once his acceptance of our advice.

[15876]

No. 293.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 334.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 27, 1909.

TABREEZ.

I have received the following telegram from His Majesty's consul-general, No. 107 of to-day's date:—

"A subscription has been opened here for the relief of the destitute.

"Saad Khan appears to be encouraging the inhabitants of surrounding villages to supply provisions, and has himself sent in a large quantity of corn this morning."

[15910]

No. 294.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 335.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 27, 1909.

WITHDRAWAL of Oil Syndicate's Indian guard.

With reference to last paragraph of your telegram No. 144 of the 13th April.

Inexperience or ill-timed interference on the part of Reynolds' *locum tenens* might give rise to difficulties.

[15919]

No. 295.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 336.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 27, 1909.

NATIONALISTS and Hormaz red oxide.

My reasons for making the enquiry replied to in your telegram No. 207 of the 26th April, were as follows:—

We might have to take strong action if the interests of the British firm were being prejudiced by the present cessation of mining operations, whereas, if Moim-at-Tajar was the only sufferer, I thought no action would be necessary. I believed that Weir was not suffering from the stoppage of work; for no ship is expected and there are already 3,000 tons of mined oxide waiting to be shipped, but I wished to be quite sure.

For the present, I shall assume that the stoppage of work does not injure Weir's interests, unless I am advised to the contrary.

[15844]

No. 296.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 337.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 27, 1909.

ATTITUDE of German consular agent at Tabreez.

My Russian colleague and I have brought to the notice of the German Minister a complaint emanating from the two consuls-general at Tabreez, according to which the German consular agent in that town is employing what influence he has in opposition to them.

We have asked Count Quadt to send the necessary instructions as to his attitude to this officer.

No. 297.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 629.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 27, 1909.

THE proposal made by Sir G. Barclay in his telegram No. 331 of the 26th instant has the approval of His Majesty's Government. Please ask the Russian Government to send instructions accordingly to their Representative at Tehran, if they have no objection to the course proposed.

[15884]

No. 298.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 210.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, April 27, 1909.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 333 and 337 [of 27th April: Tabreez].
I approve.

[15472]

No. 299.

Foreign Office to Mr. J. R. Preece.

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 27, 1909.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to inform you that he has received a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran stating that, according to information which has reached the Persian Government, their interests have been ignored in the issue of the shares of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited).

The Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs has written privately to Sir G. Barclay that the Persian Government consider their rights prejudiced by the illegal action of the concessionaire, and will not ratify the statutes of the new Company, which they cannot recognize.

Sir G. Barclay adds that he would like to be able to reassure the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, but that he has no details, and I am accordingly to request that you will be good enough to furnish Sir E. Grey with a statement of the facts of the case in order to enable him to furnish Sir G. Barclay with the information which he requires.

A perusal of the Company's prospectus, a copy of which is in Sir E. Grey's possession, throws no light on the matter.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[15941]

No. 300.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 28.)

(No. 267.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, April 25, 1909.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 231 of to-day's date, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of an *aide-memoire* which I have received from the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs respecting the warning to be conveyed to the Shah as to possible troubles in Tehran.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

*Inclosure in No. 300.**Aide-memoire communicated to Sir A. Nicolson.*

EN réponse à l'aide-memoire de l'ambassade britannique de ce jour, le Ministère Impérial des Affaires Étrangères a l'honneur d'informer qu'il partage entièrement le point de vue qui y est exposé. Aussi, des instructions viennent d'être données par

télégraphique au Chargé d'Affaires de Russie à Téhéran, lui laissant la faculté, dans le cas où lui et le Ministre d'Angleterre le jugent nécessaire, de faire savoir au Gouvernement persan que des désordres tels que les fait prévoir le Ministre Persan de la Guerre pourraient nécessiter une intervention et que cette dernière entraînerait très probablement des suites fâcheuses pour le Gouvernement persan et pour ceux qui seraient responsables des troubles.

M. Salikow est chargé d'ajouter qu'au des bute en vue desquels le Gouvernement russe serait disposé à faire au Trésor persan l'avance mentionnée au point 6 du programme des conseils amicaux données au Schah le 9 courant par les Représentants russe et anglais, était précisément de faciliter le paiement des arriérés de solde dus à la garnison de Téhéran. Il dépend donc du Schah d'obtenir ce secours en activant la réponse qu'il a promise de donner aux conseils susmentionnés.

Saint-Petersbourg, le 11 (24) avril, 1909.

[16046]

No. 301.

Mr. M. Ellinger to Foreign Office.—(Received April 28.)

Dear Mr. Norman,

28, Oxford Street, Manchester, April 27, 1909.

I THANK you for your note of yesterday, and wired you as per copy inclosed, as your letter does not distinctly state whether you told Sir G. Barclay on the 21st December, 1908, that the contract conferred the monopoly of the oxide on Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co. As I pointed out to you yesterday, this is a vital point, as, even if the Aladdin stops his mining operations, we hope His Majesty's Government will not allow the rights of Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co. to be violated by any shipment of oxide by the Nationalists from Hormuz.

Yours, &c.
(Signed) M. ELLINGER.

*Inclosure in No. 301.**Mr. M. Ellinger to Foreign Office.*

(Telegraphic.)

Manchester, April 27, 1909.

LETTER received. Question was whether you had told Minister at Tehran that Weir's had monopoly of oxide under contract.

[15969]

No. 302.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 28.)

(No. 318.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 28, 1909.

ATTITUDE of German consular agent at Tabreez.

I hear from the German Minister that he has instructed his consular agent to abstain from political agitation of any sort, and has asked him for an explanation of his attitude, which I reported in my telegram No. 337 of yesterday.

[16025]

No. 303.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 28.)

(No. 339.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 28, 1909.

PROPOSED joint note regarding Russian troops.

With reference to Sir A. Nicolson's telegram No. 233.

A false and regrettable impression will be made if the two legations make no official declaration in the sense proposed; I therefore trust that the Russian Government will consent. The declaration would explain the motives and the temporary character of the intervention of the two Powers, and would announce that, except in the case of absolute necessity, Russian troops would not enter Tabreez.

[16054]

No. 301.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 28.)

(No. 340.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 28, 1909.

RUSSIAN consul's request for a war-ship at Bushire.

Count Ghatk has informed his French colleague that the German consul is asking his Government to send a war-ship to Bushire, and that he hears that a French vessel will also be sent to that port. M. Lecomte is enquiring of his Government as to the truth of this statement, although he personally does not believe it.

As, perhaps, the presence of the flag-ship has given rise to the German consul's request, and he doubt causes a false impression, I am asking His Majesty's consul-general to persuade the Admiral, who is merely visiting Bushire to acquaint himself with his duties, to have there as soon as possible.

[16056]

No. 305.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 28.)

(No. 341.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 28, 1909.

RUSSIAN notification of dispatch of troops.

With reference to your telegram to St. Petersburg No. 620 of yesterday.

M. Sabine has just informed me that he has received instructions to notify the Persian Government of the dispatch of troops, and that he cannot postpone this until he may be authorised to admit my taking joint action with him. He has just learned that his Government were under the impression that he had already presented the notification.

In his note, which he has shown to me, he states that, unless it be necessary, the troops will not enter Talavez, explaining the motives and temporary character of the Russian Government's action.

With reference to the declaration proposed in my telegram No. 328 of the 26th April, I have authorised His Majesty's consul-general to act in concert with his Russian colleague in the sense desired.

[15293.]

No. 306.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 622.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 28, 1909.

WE have no objection to M. Isvolsky's proposal reported in your telegram No. 332 of yesterday relative to the assurances to the Shah, provided the idea commends itself to the two Representatives on the spot and the assurances do not go beyond the verbal guarantee given last December.

I would refer you to Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 325 of the 25th instant, and my reply No. 208 of the following day.

[16185]

No. 307.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 211.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 28, 1909.

REPEAT the following telegram to His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire:—

"The Anglo-Persian Oil Company which have lately been formed wish at once to establish a refinery on Abadan Island, for which a site must be acquired. They also wish to connect their refinery with their mills by means of a pipeline, which will necessitate the grant of a strip of land. They are entitled by the terms of their Concession to acquire waste land free of cost, and it appears that the land which they have selected for their refinery (which is estimated at not more than 1,000 acres) and most of that needed for the pipe line belongs to this category. They recognize, however, that they require the good-will and assistance of the Sheikh of Mohammerrah

to carry out their scheme, and therefore, if he will grant their application and give them a good title to the land or procure one on their behalf, they are willing to advance him 5,000l or 6,000l through the agency of His Majesty's Government.

"If the Company buy the land they will pay reasonable market value for it. If they lease it they will give 500l a year for as much land as they need as long as the Concession lasts or if it is extended. They would require 6 per cent. interest on their advance. His Majesty's Government have undertaken to do their best to see that the Sheikh pays interest and sinking fund (should one be provided for), but if the money is not forthcoming they will not undertake financial liability for payment.

"You should tell the Sheikh that if he concludes an arrangement on these terms with the Company and grants to a British Company a Concession giving them the exclusive right to undertake the irrigation of the Karun Valley, in accordance with the scheme worked out by Sir W. Willcocks, His Majesty's Government are willing to advance him 5,000l or 6,000l.

"Be careful to represent to the Sheikh that the loan comes from His Majesty's Government, and not from the Company."

[16185]

No. 308.

Anglo-Persian Oil Company to Foreign Office.—(Received April 29.)

Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London,
April 28, 1909.

Sir,

I HAVE just seen Sir Hugh Barnes, who has left me a copy of my proposed letter to you, showing the modifications which you have been good enough to suggest.

These include our putting forward a proposal to rent land on Abadan up to 10s. per acre per annum, a rate which is out of all proportion to the marketable value of such land, and partakes largely, if not almost entirely, of the nature of a subsidy payable for the Sheikh's good-will.

In these circumstances we would very much rather see the "rental" fixed at a round sum of say 500l. per annum to cover all lands required by us, estimated at not over 1,000 acres on Abadan, and a strip for a pipe-line on the mainland.

If you see no objection to this, may I suggest the excision from your proposed telegram to Sir G. Barclay of the words which I have therein underlined in red, and the substitution of the words which I have put in the margin in red?

But I leave it to you to do as you think best without further reference to me, and I consequently inclose my letter without making 500l. per annum a condition thereof. I also inclose the draft of your telegram to Sir G. Barclay.

I have to-day received the following cable from Mr. G. B. Reynolds, our representative in Persia, who is now in Mohammerrah:—

"Sheikh expects to leave Mohammerrah shortly. I must leave 4th May for Ahwaz. Quick work is therefore necessary."

I suggest, therefore, that it is very desirable that the Foreign Office should telegraph as early as possible to Sir G. Barclay.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. W. WALLACE,
Vice-Chairman.

[16185]

No. 309.

Anglo-Persian Oil Company to Foreign Office.—(Received April 29.)

Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London,
April 28, 1909.

Sir,

ANGLO-PERSIAN Oil Company (Limited).

I am desired by the Directors of this Company to address you on the following subject:—

The Anglo-Persian Oil Company, as you are aware, has been formed to work the 161 Concession obtained by Mr. W. K. d'Arcy in Persia, and we are now anxious to proceed with the development of this Concession as rapidly as possible.

[1619]

The matter of immediate importance is the acquisition, by purchase or lease, of a site for an oil refinery on the Island of Abadan, and of a strip of land for the pipeline which will connect this refinery with the wells. The land on Abadan, about 500 to 1,000 acres, selected by this Company's representative is said to be uncultivated, so is also most of the land that will be occupied by the pipeline, and by the terms of their concession this Company is entitled to obtain free of cost uncultivated land belonging to the State. But it is recognized that in the territories governed by the Sheikh of Mohammereh nothing can be satisfactorily settled without the Sheikh's good-will and co-operation, and this Company has every desire to deal with this Chief fairly and liberally on reasonable business principles. The difficulty is how to commence negotiations, and though the Foreign Office has been good enough to instruct His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General to assist in the matter, it has not so far been possible to make much progress.

We have heard that the Sheikh is urgently in want of a small loan, and that while it is considered desirable to assist him in the matter, there is some difficulty in finding all the money required. In these circumstances, if the proposal is agreeable to the Foreign Office, I am to suggest that this Company would contribute the sum of 3,000, to 5,000, through the Foreign Office towards the advance required on the understanding that it is made a condition of this loan that the Sheikh first considers and settles satisfactorily the Company's application for land and gives it, or procures for it a good title to all the land made over to it.

The Company is of course ready to pay the reasonable market value of the land, either by purchase or by rent on a lease co-extensive with the currency of the Oil Concession or the extension of it, if absolutely necessary, but as this rate seems to be very high for such land we name it as an extreme.

We presume that the Company's advance will bear a reasonable rate of interest, say 6 per cent., and we trust that the Government will instruct its Representative to take the same care to safeguard the loan as would be exercised in the case of the advance of Government funds. It is understood, however, that though the Government will do their best to insure that the interest and sinking fund (if one is formed) are duly paid by the Sheikh, they do not undertake financial liability for the payment if the money is not forthcoming.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. W. WALLACE.

[16226]

No. 310.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 56.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Berlin, April 29, 1909.

AN urgent appeal for the immediate dispatch of a warship, owing to the very alarming character of situation at Bushire, has just reached Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from the German Consul there. His Excellency informs me that, as they are desirous of avoiding taking any action liable to arouse susceptibilities of public opinion in England, they will not dispatch a ship to Bushire, although they have one which could go there. On the other hand, German public opinion might take it amiss were His Majesty's Government to be formally requested by the Imperial Government to protect German citizens. Consequently, having full confidence in both the ability and the desire of His Majesty's Government to deal with the present situation and to protect foreigners of all nationalities in Persia, the Imperial Government will take no action in response to the German Consul's appeal. Baron von Schoen expressed the hope that the procedure of the Imperial Government in the matter will be looked upon as showing a friendly desire on their part to avoid causing any embarrassment. His Excellency asked that this communication, which is to be withheld from the press here, might be regarded as being of a very confidential nature.

No. 311.

[16150]

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 342.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 29, 1909.

ISPAHAN.

I have received the following telegram, No. 61, from His Majesty's consul-general at Isbahan:—

"Samsan-es-Sultaneh has begun to move small bodies of troops outside the town. He is encouraged by telegrams urging him to move immediately from Persians in Paris and Constantinople and by the news contained in Reuter's telegrams. I learn, however, that an advance on Tehran is improbable owing to lack of funds, internal divisions, and differences with the priests. Yesterday I was informed by the Ikhand, the fighting was to be expected in the neighbourhood of Isbahan."

The Shah's troops have now set out for Isbahan from Kashan. I am consequently acting in the sense of your telegram No. 17 of the 10th January, and holding the Shah responsible for any danger to British lives in case of hostilities.

[16216]

No. 312.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 313.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 29, 1909.

BUSHIRE.

I have received the following telegram, No. 407, from His Majesty's consul-general:—

"His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad telegraphs that the Tigris is still impassable, and that the Darya Beggi may be delayed indefinitely.

"May we now, in view of recent changes in the situation in Northern Persia, be permitted to report Seyyid Murteza, whose presence is an impediment to any satisfactory solution and a constant source of anxiety?"

"If you approve this course it would be well that the co-operation of an ample force should obviate any possible misarrange. Consequently, it would be convenient to utilize the presence of the Admiral."

[16217]

No. 313.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 344.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 29, 1909.

BUSHIRE.

I have sent the following telegram, No. 109, to His Majesty's consul-general:—

"In reply to your telegram No. 407. No compulsion should be used against Seyyid Murteza unless his action is likely to cause immediate danger to foreign subjects. Russian troops have crossed the frontier and British sailors have been landed solely to protect the lives and property of British and Russian subjects and foreigners generally."

[16232]

No. 314.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 345.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 29, 1909.

REMOVAL of troops from Robat.

I have addressed the following telegram to the Government of India:—

"With reference to your telegram of the 27th April.

"The position of the Indo-European Telegraph Department will be very difficult

without troops at Bokar, as the nearest point to which the staff at Dehanch could then fall back in case of need would be Kernun.

"I therefore presume that the troops will be withdrawn only until the beginning of the next arms traffic season."

[16225]

No. 315.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 316.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 29, 1909.

SHAH and constitution.

We have learned that the Shah proposes to appoint as Grand Vizier his uncle Naib-es-Sultaneh, who is a most pronounced reactionary; that no Cabinet which includes Naib-es-Sultaneh will come within the requirements of our programme.

We have taken the occasion to inform the Shah that the two representatives will seek another audience in order to receive his reply to the advice tendered by the two Powers, unless an answer is forthcoming by the 2nd May.

[16217]

No. 316.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 214.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, April 29, 1909.

YOUR telegram No. 344 [of 29th April]: Bushin.

I approve.

[16225]

No. 317.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 215.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 29, 1909.

I APPROVE your action, as reported in your telegram No. 346 of to-day, relative to the appointment of a Grand Vizier in Persia.

[16267]

No. 318.

Note communicated by Count Benckendorff, April 29, 1909.

La situation incertaine à Tabreez a décidé le Gouvernement Impérial à ne pas arrêter la marche vers Tabreez du détachement russe. Toutefois, si d'ici son arrivée sur place les ordres du Schah concernant l'armistice et l'approvisionnement de la ville sont exécutés, et qu'il n'y ait pas d'autres motifs urgents pour l'entrée du détachement dans la ville, il a reçu l'ordre de s'arrêter en dehors, au pont d'Adichaisk. De ce point le Commandant doit expédier des pelotons à la garde du Consulat Impérial et des autres Consuls, à moins que ces derniers n'y objectent, et aussi en tant que nécessaire pour la garde de toutes les institutions russes et étrangères.

London, le 29 avril, 1909.

[15774]

No. 319.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Carter.

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 29, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 25th instant, inquiring as to the dispatch from the Russian frontier of a detachment of troops to Tabreez.

I have the honour to inform you in reply that the Russian Government have decided, with the concurrence of His Majesty's Government, on the immediate dispatch

of such a force with the special objects of introducing food into the town and of protecting the foreign Consulates and residents there. American citizens in Tabreez will, of course, receive from these troops the same measure of protection as other foreigners.

According to the most recent reports received from His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg, the Russian Government hoped that the force would be able to leave Julia on the 28th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[16275]

No. 320.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 30.)

Sir,

India Office, April 29, 1909.

I AM directed by Viscount Morley to inclose copy of a secret letter from the Government of India recommending an increase of the salute of five guns at present accorded to the Sheikhhs of Mohammurah, Koweit, and Bahrein. The proposal is to raise the salute of the two first-named Sheikhhs to twelve guns and that of the Sheikh of Bahrein to eleven guns, the salutes to be personal in all three cases to the present Chiefs. It is further proposed that the eldest sons of the Sheikhhs of Mohammurah and Koweit should receive a salute of five guns, and the eldest son of the Sheikh of Bahrein one of three guns, on the occasions when they visit one of His Majesty's ships as their fathers' Representatives.

Lord Morley is disposed to think that the recommendations of the Government of India should be approved, and would be glad to learn if Sir E. Grey concurs in this view. In that event, this Department would propose to make the necessary communication to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty on the subject.

Attention is called to paragraphs 6 and 7 of the letter of the Government of India.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 320.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Secret.)

My Lord,

Fort William, March 18, 1909.

WE have the honour to forward, for your Lordship's consideration, a copy of a letter from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf relative to a proposal to increase the salute of five guns which is at present accorded under the authority of Lord George Hamilton's despatch No. 66, dated the 12th July, 1901, to the Sheikhhs of Mohammurah, Koweit, and Bahrein.

2. The claims of these Chiefs to an increase of the salute which is at present assigned to them, have been fully discussed in the accompanying correspondence, and we need only express our entire concurrence with the opinion of the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf that, in consideration of the enhanced importance and prestige which these three Chiefs, especially the Sheikhhs of Mohammurah and Koweit, enjoy owing to recent political developments in the Persian Gulf, a salute of five guns is no longer adequate.

3. We have carefully considered the question of the precise number of guns to which the salute may in each case be raised, and we are disposed to agree with Major Cox that a salute of twelve guns may appropriately be accorded to the Sheikhhs of Mohammurah and Koweit and one of eleven guns to the Sheikh of Bahrein. The two former Chiefs will thus receive a salute slightly in excess of that which is accorded to the Political Officers accredited to them, but less than that to which his Excellency the Naval Commander-in-chief and the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf are linearly entitled, while Sheikh Ess, who is relatively of much less political importance than Sheikh Mularak, will receive a salute equal to that accorded to the Political Officer at Bahrein.

4. If these proposals are accepted, we would recommend, as suggested by Major Cox, that the eldest sons of the Sheikhhs of Mohammurah and Koweit should

[1619]

2 K

receive a salute of five guns, and the eldest son of the Sheikh of Bahrain one of three guns on the occasions when they visit one of His Majesty's ships as their fathers' Representatives.

5. We are of opinion that the increased salutes should in each case be personal to the present Chiefs, and that it should be explained to them that it is within the discretion of the Government of India to continue it, or not, to their successors.

6. As regards the Sheikh of Mohammurah, His Majesty's Government will no doubt desire to consult Sir George Barclay on the point raised in paragraph 4 of Major Fox's letter, dated the 3rd August, 1908, as to how far the proposal to increase his salute is affected by his position as a Persian subject. Our records do not show whether the Persian Government was consulted or not when the Sheikh's salute was originally fixed.

7. We trust that these recommendations will meet with the approval of His Majesty's Government, and we would suggest that, should our proposals be sanctioned, it should be left to the discretion of the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, in consultation, if necessary, with His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehran, to decide when it would be opportune to make the announcement to the Sheikhs concerned.

We have, &c.
(Signed)

KINTO,
KITCHENER,
H. FRILE RICHARDS,
C. H. SCOTT,
H. ADAMSON,
J. O. MILLER,
W. L. HARVEY,
G. F. WILSON.

Inclosure 2 in No. 320.

Major Cox to Government of India.

Bushire, August 8, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to refer to the correspondence ending with Foreign Department telegram dated the 19th April, 1908, on the subject of the salute to be accorded to the Sheikh of Kuwait, and incidentally of those assigned to the Sheikhs of Mohammurah and Bahrain.

2. The political developments of the past few years point to the desirability of increasing the scheduled salute of each of these Arab potentates, and I attach separate Reports from the three British Representatives concerned, in which each officer enters fully into the case of the Sheikh to whom he is accredited. Their Reports leave me little to add regarding the claims of the Sheikhs, and I need merely record my own ideas as to the number of guns which, in view of their representations, seem appropriate in each instance.

3. From our point of view it would seem advisable to place the Sheikhs of Kuwait and Mohammurah on the same footing, and I think that the choice lies between twelve guns and thirteen guns in their case. The grant of a salute of thirteen guns would place them on a level with the Resident in the Persian Gulf and with his Excellency the Naval Commander-in-chief, when Rear-Admiral, which rank he has generally held in the past. Sir George Warrander, as Commander, only receives eleven guns, but it is possible that his is a special case, and that the rank of the past has been permanently reduced.

As visitors of the same rank as their host, the Naval Commander-in-chief and the Resident would have to make the first call when visiting Kuwait. This position is of no consequence as far as the Resident is concerned, as both Sheikhs have reasonable grounds for hesitating to pay frequent visits on board ships, and the dispatch of business, for which purpose the Resident generally visits their ports, makes it more convenient for him to proceed on shore and get in touch with the Sheikh as soon as possible.

The case of the Naval Commander-in-chief, however, is different. He is only an occasional visitor, and during his tours in the Gulf it is politically advantageous to endow him with as much dignity and importance as possible, and for this reason it would be preferable that when either of the Sheikhs can be induced to venture on board the flag-ship he should pay the first call. Their excuse that if they board British ships it

makes it difficult for them to decline to take the risk of boarding Turkish or Persian ships has a foundation which we can understand, but I have little doubt that their reluctance to visit men-of-war is partly due to the paucity of guns which would be accorded to them. Twelve guns would be most convenient, as, while placing the Sheikhs on a slightly superior footing to that of the Agents accredited to them, it gives the Commander-in-chief and Resident precedence. Unless, therefore, the accord of an even-gun salute, as is prescribed for the Chief of Makulla, is considered objectionable by the Admiralty for service reasons, twelve guns would, in my opinion, be most appropriate. The Sheikhs might be informed that the distinction was personal.

4. It may be well to note here that technically the salute of the Sheikh of Mohammurah, as a Persian official, should be prescribed by the Persian Government, but I do not imagine that they were consulted when the salute was formerly fixed at five guns, and there seems no reason why we should do so now. They appear to have no definite regulations on the point.

5. The salute which our ships accord to the Darya Begi, Governor of Bushire, seventeen guns, is, properly speaking, too much for him, and should be considered personal to his Excellency and not to his appointment, which might be treated on a par with that of the Sheikh of Mohammurah. The practice of giving the Darya Begi seventeen guns arose in this wise: His Excellency having preceeded some years ago to call on one of His Majesty's ships in an Admiral's uniform, and being in charge of the "Persian navy" (that is, the "Persepolis"), and Governor of the Gulf Ports, was accorded a salute of seventeen guns. No great harm is done by our continuing the salute in his case, but his title, Darya Begi, or "Lord of the Sea," is not really a rank, but his personal title, and there is no reason why any successor of his should be accorded such an exalted salute.

6. As regards Bahrain, I am of opinion that an eleven-gun salute will be sufficient, the same as that of his Political Agent, and somewhat less than the Sheikhs of Kuwait and Mohammurah.

As Major Pridemay suggests, the intimation of the grant of the enhanced salute might be postponed until Sheikh Esa has done something specific to earn such a favour.

7. Finally, if enhanced salutes are granted to the ruling Sheikhs, I would recommend that, in the case of Kuwait and Mohammurah, when the eldest son visits one of His Majesty's ships, he be saluted with five guns, and in the case of Bahrain with three guns. I hardly think they or their people would understand an alternative salute, sometimes of three guns and sometimes of five on the lines suggested by Major Knox, and as regards the number five, it has been given by courtesy and with express explanation to that effect as the salute of the father, on occasions when the father, on account of sickness or from other causes, as at Kuwait, has sent his son to represent him.

In the event of the Sheikhs themselves being now permitted to receive twelve, twelve, and eleven guns respectively, their sons might, if Government see no objection, be accorded five and three.

Inclosure 3 in No. 320.

Consul McDouall to Major Cox.

Sir,

Mohammurah, June 6, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that since the Governor of Bushire, in or about 1882, carried off certain Gulf Chiefs who had called on board the "Persepolis," the Sheikhs of Mohammurah have made it a rule never to call on board the vessels of any Government, Persian or foreign. Should, however, the Sheikh of Mohammurah ever alter this rule, the salute provided in the table, of five guns, would be inadequate.

This number was apparently fixed many years ago, when the Sheikh of Mohammurah was only Sheikh of the Malayse tribes and Governor of their district, and the position of the present Sheikh, both personally and administratively, is very different.

Personally, the Sardar Arfa, Sheikh Khazal Khan holds the highest Persian military rank, that of Amir Niyazi ("Lord of 100,000"), under which he might be considered by the Admiralty instructions to be entitled to a salute of fifteen guns; but, as presumably the Governor-General of Arabistan is entitled to a larger number than the Sheikh, I would suggest thirteen as a suitable number. The present Governor-

General holds the same military rank as the Sheikh. At the same time it should be noted that the present Governor of Basrah receives seventeen guns as Admiral, but holds the military rank of Amir Toum ("Chief of 10,000") only.

The Sheikhs of Mohammurah receive their appointment as Governors of Mohammurah, Slatt-el-Arab, and Karim, and Sharaf Dar ("Warden of the Border") direct from Tehran, but for administrative purposes are under the Governor-General of Arabistan, who, however, cannot summon them to attend him, and, unless of Royal blood, is not of higher rank.

The present Sheikh, the Sardar Arfa, is Sheikh of the combined tribes of the Mahyasis and Chahis, and the districts of Mohammurah, Alwaz, and Danrak are under him, and also, but by the Governor-General's appointment, is in charge of the Hawjah and neighbouring districts. During the absence of the Governor-General he is nominally in charge of the province. He has under him Deputy-Governors at Alwaz and Mohammurah, and officials at Faldah, Mashur, and Hindijan, in addition to the Sheikhs of tribes.

His son Chasib Khan Nusrat-ul Mulk is now Deputy-Governor of Mohammurah, and there is, as far as I know, no reason why he should not call on board Government vessels.

I would suggest that the same salute be accorded him as the Deputy-Governor of Bander Abbas, viz. five guns, which his official position alone would justify.

A copy of this despatch is sent to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. McDOWALL,
His Britannic Majesty's Consul for Arabistan.

Inclosure 4 in No. 320.

Major Knox to Major Cox.

Koweit, July 8, 1908.

(Confidential.)

I HAVE the honour to refer the question of the salute of guns to be paid to Sheikh Mubarak, on the occasion of his paying official visits on board British men-of-war.

2. At present, the Sheikh of Koweit, like other Sheikhs of his standing in the Persian Gulf, is entitled to receive a salute of five guns. In the course of my experience at Koweit, the Sheikh has never visited a British man-of-war, and therefore the salute has never been fired.

3. On the occasion of the visit of his Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Station, in 1906, the Sheikh was suddenly called away by the serious illness of his son Fahad, who died shortly after, and the Sheikh himself was unable to visit his Excellency. Sheikh Jahir paid a visit to the flagship, and a salute of five guns was fired as he left the ship; but I was instructed by his Excellency to explain carefully to Sheikh Jahir that the salute was fired only because he was regarded as his father's deputy, and in the absence of his father, the ruling Chief. The explanation was given to Sheikh Jahir in the presence of his Excellency.

4. At the subsequent visit of his Excellency in 1907, it would appear that no salute was fired, though Sheikh Jahir visited the ship to welcome his Excellency. Sheikh Mubarak returned his Excellency's visit at the Agency.

5. When his Excellency visited Koweit in May of this year, Sheikh Mubarak paid the first visit at the Agency, which was returned privately the same evening. Again, Sheikh Mubarak paid the first official visit the following day, which was returned officially after the lapse of half an hour. Owing to the state of the tide, and the arrival of the flagship a day before expected, Sheikh Jahir was unable to pay the visit of welcome, but Sheikh Mubarak sent a formal letter of apology expressing his regret.

6. That the question of salutes is a matter to which the Ruler of Koweit attaches importance may be deduced, inferred from the correspondence that took place about the recent visit of R.F. "La Surprise." When the matter was referred to in your presence, Sheikh Mubarak said that he was unable to send his son to return the Commandant's visit because he was not yet reconciled with the usual salute.

7. There has evidently been in the past some difficulty regarding visits on board a man-of-war, and I am inclined to attribute it, at least partially, to the Sheikh's idea that the number of guns that he receives is not sufficient. The main difficulty would

appear to be that the Sheikh cannot tolerate the notion that it is possible for a personage more important than himself to reside permanently in Koweit.

8. The distinction, therefore, made between himself and the Political Agent is particularly invidious in his eyes, and there is no doubt that it would be noticed by the inhabitants of Koweit, more especially as the visits of him and the Political Agent would take place naturally about the same time.

9. It would be an unnecessary lowering of the dignity of the British Representative at Koweit to reduce his status, and would lead the Arab mind to the unfortunate conclusion that he no longer possessed the confidence of his Government.

10. The only course then appears to be to consider the claims of Sheikh Mubarak to the raising of his personal salute to the dignity of the Political Agent; I opine that his claims to this honour would be based on (a) his own importance and that of his principality, (b) the extent to which he supports and furthers British interests as far as lies in his power.

11. Both these points deserve careful consideration, and the difficulty is enhanced by the presence of arguments of considerable weight leading to opposite conclusions. With reference to the first, I think it will not be too much to state that one might search Arabia through to find a personage possessing a more real power than Sheikh Mubarak of Koweit at the present time. Thanks to British protection and to an equal extent to his own commanding personality and mastery of Oriental intrigue, he is practically the arbiter of the fortunes of Central Arabia, while his rich Fao estates and his strong friendship with Sheikh Khazal of Mohammurah make him an important personage on the Slatt-el-Arab. He has shown his absolute power over the Bedouin tribes of the vicinity by imprisoning in the course of the last two years the two most important chieftains, among them, Sheikh Faisal-ul-Dawish of the Untair and Muhammad-bin-Hitlalar, the present *de facto* Chief of the powerful Ajman tribe, who defeated the Turkish troops at Al Ahsa, and looted the inhabitants of that district. It is now a matter of common knowledge that the only method the Turks could find for taming this man was blackmail, and the still more shameful proceeding of buying back from him a captured gun and mules. It goes without saying that Sheikh Mubarak is undisputed master of his own town, and it must be added that the town and surroundings are well governed and orderly, and may be, without exaggeration, termed a pattern administration for all Gulf towns.

12. On the other hand, before Sheikh Mubarak's accession Koweit was nothing more than a clean little Bedouin town, with difficulty repelling desert Bedouin outrages on the very outskirts of the town itself. His successor, if incompetent, or what is perhaps more likely, two rivals fairly equally matched, fighting it out between themselves could easily and in a remarkably short time reduce it to its old level of unimportance.

13. Two things are especially likely to hit Sheikh Mubarak himself very hard, and at no distant future. One is the desperate state of the pearl market, which will impoverish the town considerably, and will probably embarrass the Ruler at least temporarily, for he has made very large advances to his principal merchants, who were in a very shaky condition already.

The second is the probable loss of the large income that Sheikh Mubarak derives from the customs duties on arms and ammunition.

14. In the late prosperous times, Sheikh Mubarak seems to have abandoned the simple, frugal fashion of living that was probably an inheritance of the past, and, from this point of view, it would seem that the friendship with the Ruler of Mohammurah has led to disastrous results.

Various distinctly oppressive measures have made him decidedly unpopular in his own town, and both rich and poor have felt the burden, especially when the town is languishing under the ruinous condition of its principal industry. While large portions of the town are falling into ruin, Sheikh Mubarak has built a large palace, and has purchased a motor-car and a steam-yacht, and is making extensive additions to the harem in well-built shops, for which he is apparently experiencing some difficulty in finding lessees. His recent order, a tempting to fill them by driving leggerly street hawkers out of the streets, seems a most unpalatable expedient.

15. The one satisfactory feature of the present situation is the prospect of a settled ruler under the undisputed rule of Abdul-Jin-Sand. This might, however, easily lead to such an increase of power in that Ruler as would materially shake the influence of the Koweit Ruler over the surrounding Bedouin tribes.

16. There still remains to the Ruler of Koweit his income from the Fao estates, but if the Turks realized that Sheikh Mubarak was embarrassed in other directions, they

would not fail, either by open confiscation or by the more insidious procedure of encouraging rival claimants, to encroach in the Law Courts, to add to his embarrassments.

17. To sum up, the importance of Sheikh Mubarak and his Principality would seem to justify the enhancement of his salute. At the same time Kuwait is a town of much-room growth which might easily in the hands of a weak Sheikh, or by the force of circumstances which even Sheikh Mubarak could not control, decline in importance to its former insignificance.

18. I now turn to consider point (b), the extent to which Sheikh Mubarak supports and furthers British interests as far as lies in his power. The files dealing with Kuwait show what a good friend Sheikh Mubarak has been to the English throughout his dealings with us. In all important matters, with the clear exception of the arms question and the Laffa revolt support he has given to us in quarantine, Sheikh Mubarak has shown himself ready to support the cause of law and order and the advancement of British trade. The marine survey, the gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, all British travellers, private or official, have received a warm welcome from him and every possible assistance. He has facilitated my acquaintance with the neighbouring Bedouin Chiefs and my travelling long distances into the interior of Arabia and the El Ahsa Coast, where I could not have moved 10 miles without his support. In the delicate question of the sale of Beluini property, where Arab fellow-feeling might have been expected to prompt him to oppose us, he assisted me loyally in every way. Indeed, it is no fault of Sheikh Mubarak's that British influence is not paramount in Haikland Rimal and a British Agent and garrison in charge of the buffer State of El Kasim keeping the peace between the rival claimants to the rule of Central Arabia.

19. On the other hand, and here I wish to write with all reserve lest petty annoyances should have warped my judgment, I cannot disguise from myself the hundred little ways in which Sheikh Mubarak seeks to impress upon me that I must play second fiddle in his town and that he is to control me, and through me, the British Government. As for my controlling him or advising him for his good, he would laugh at the notion. The policy is natural enough in a man who has had to face so serious opposition, now he murders his brothers and the disaster of Saif.

While I do not disguise from myself the advantage of having only one man to humour or persuade in this town, there are ever present to my mind two dangers. The first is lest Sheikh Mubarak should by some rash audacious venture, especially in the direction of Fao, entangle us seriously at an inopportune moment, and few moments indeed would be opportune. In a quarrel with the Turkish Government, in which we could not, with any sense of right, defend our protégé.

The second danger, to my mind, is internal. Sheikh Mubarak, by a violent act of bloodshed, came to power, and he sneered at a town that had undoubtedly been well governed in the past. The people were contented, lightly taxed, and enjoyed a large measure of independence. The Sheikh of old times was merely *primus inter pares*, and rich pearl merchants had their say in all matters of administration.

Many one of this former state of affairs still exist in the rough-and-ready Courts for the disposal of men and cattle cases, the way the pearling is managed and all rights governed by custom, and the general attitude of the people, who show a remarkable ability to manage their own affairs without undue interference from either King or priest.

The delusion, under the iron rule of Sheikh Mubarak, is rapidly breaking down, and the wheels turn rustily. The merchant Sheikhs are things of the past, and the few old scribes are left to sell their souls their own. This would not signify if the Sheikh himself were above reproach. But a good year or two in the pearl trade and the sudden increase of revenue from the importation of arms have revealed in him a hitherto unsuspected taste for bribery and extortionist display. The taxes are still low, but have increased of late of late years, and new extortionate demands have been levied on the people. Everything points to lean years to come, and it is problematical whether the Sheikh will have the strength of mind to economize. It is far more probable that he will increase his demands on the people and drive trade out of the town. At present the people, who complain continually, look to us for their deliverers. It will be an important moment for us when they arrive at a juster view of the situation and realize that it is our support chiefly that has enabled and will enable Sheikh Mubarak's despotism to flourish, and taught him that he need no longer rely on the affections of his people and their confidence in his strength, wealth, and justice.

20. It will, perhaps be objected that a most, if not the most, important consideration of this problem has been lost sight of in this Report; this is the diplomatic

advisability of keeping Sheikh Mubarak in good humour with a view to utilizing Kuwait and its Rulers as a formidable outwork of British influence in the Persian Gulf. The thought is ever present, but here so much depends on strings that are pulled in London, Constantinople, or Berlin, that I may be freely forgiven for leaving this care to immeasurably wiser heads than mine.

21. I have ventured to use the question of Sheikh Mubarak's salute as a text on which to hang, I fear, a lengthy dissertation on problems that have long been troubling me. After detailing the considerations that have guided me to a decision, I have the honour to recommend the salute of eleven guns to Sheikh Mubarak as a personal salute. I venture to consider the personal proviso indispensable, and think that it should be carefully explained to Sheikh Mubarak that we do not consider the ordinary dignity of the Sheikh of Kuwait entitles him to more than five—a salute of five guns to the heir-apparent, Sheikh Jafar, when he represents his father, and a salute of three guns when he visits on his own account.

Inclosure 5 in No. 320.

Major Prideaux to Major Cox.

Bahrain, July 11, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to submit, for consideration, the anomaly which exists in regard to the salutes which the Chief of Bahrain and the Political Agent receive from British Government vessels (such as are authorized to fire salutes) at the termination of official visits on board in this port.

2. The Political Agent, on the analogy of Indian appointments of the same status, is entitled, I believe, to a salute of eleven guns whenever he pays an official visit to an authority who can pay the compliment. He ought, therefore, on a few occasions annually to be given such a salute by the Chief of Bahrain, but whilst Sheikh Isa receives only five guns from British men-of-war and Indian marine ships, it seems inadvisable to expect him to concede this compliment gracefully, and I have never mooted the point on my own behalf, though I have found no difficulty in getting salutes paid to the Naval Commander-in-Chief and to the Political Resident when they have called upon him.

3. The present annual revenue of the Bahrain State may be estimated at 3 lakhs of rupees, though under a better administration it should be easily capable of expansion to 6 lakhs. I believe that a large number of Indian rulers, such as the Chiefs of Ajmer, Bani, and Chhatrapur, who receive salutes of eleven guns, possess smaller revenues than the Bahrain Chief, and though their dominions may be more extensive, their political importance at the present day is perhaps not so great. In the circumstances, therefore, I would like to see the status of the Bahrain Principality enhanced to a suitable degree as soon as the general circumstances of the Chief's relations with the Government of India are considered to be sufficiently satisfactory. It might, perhaps, be found desirable to give the Chief ordinarily a salute of eleven guns, with a personal salute in Sheikh Isa's case of twelve guns (cf. the case of the Sultan of Shahr and Mukalla), which would properly mark his position below that of the Political Resident, but above the Political Agent's. If the salute of the Political Resident could also be enhanced, I would even advocate giving the Chief of Bahrain thirteen guns.

4. With regard to the question of the opportuneness of such modification, I am inclined to recommend some procrastination, as I do not think there is any occasion for immediately granting Sheikh Isa fresh favours, after remitting two years of his nephew Sheikh Ali's punishment of exile, and in view of the fact that the people of Bahrain would perhaps only think that the honour was being conferred in expiation for previous harsh treatment.

5. The obstinacy and folly which the Chief has displayed in persisting in the formation of his own Customs Department, this year, by means of which he will probably obtain less than a lakh of revenue, is hardly likely to survive much longer, and I hope that within the next year or two, the force of circumstances will induce the Sheikh to accept our advice about the reformation of his administration in this respect. If in the interim Sheikh Isa sees that some of his compatriots are being honoured by the Government and raised to higher grade than his own on account ostensibly of their friendship and amenity displayed towards us, the requisite incentive might possibly be provided to initiate a perfectly satisfactory condition of affairs here.

6. At the present time, with the one exception of the customs question, I think I can confidently assert that the relations between myself and Sleikh Essa are as intimate and cordial as can be wished for, and there are no outstanding cases in dispute calling for a reference to the Government of India.

[16316]

No. 321.

Mr. J. R. Preece to Foreign Office.—(Received April 30.)

Sir,
I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 27th instant regarding the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

I am afraid that the Persian Foreign Minister in his private letter to Sir George Barclay has written under a misapprehension. In accordance with the Concession, before the Statutes of the Articles of Agreement or Association were completed they were shown to the Imperial Commissioner, and he with his lawyers, Messrs. Lamley and Lamley, effected certain alterations which were agreed to. At the last moment, the lawyers to the Imperial Commissioner suggested that their names as solicitors to the Imperial Commissioners should appear on the prospectus, but as these were already printed it was then too late to alter the paper. They, however, pointed out that this could be obviated and the same end obtained by its being inserted in the advertisements in the various newspapers; and this was done, their name appearing in every paper in which the Company was advertised in London and the country last Saturday.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. R. PREECE.

[16364]

No. 322.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 30.)

(No. 255.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, April 30, 1909.

JOINT guarantee for the Shah. Your telegram No. 622 of the 28th instant. I today told M. Tcharykow that there was no objection on the part of His Majesty's Government to the two Representatives giving the Shah a written guarantee if the two Representatives themselves saw no objection to such a course, and provided the assurances given were strictly limited to those which the dragomans gave verbally to His Majesty in December 1908.

M. Tcharykow said that he would inform M. Sabline of this by telegraph.

[16365]

No. 323.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 30.)

(No. 236.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, April 30, 1909.

RUSSIAN force for Tabreez.

I am informed by M. Tcharykoff that the Russian advance guard is now in the neighbourhood of the town, that Sattar Khan has shown himself well disposed towards them, and that they met with a good reception on the way. M. Tcharykoff added that a Russian Captain would be sent from Tehran to take over the command of the Persian Cossacks forming part of Amud-Dowleh's force. M. Tcharykoff explained that the Russian Government thought it would be well, now that hostilities between the two parties were at an end, that a Russian officer should be in command of the Cossacks, so that on the termination of negotiations with the Nationalists the Cossacks might be in a position to prevent the inhabitants of Tabreez being pillaged or maltreated by the Royalist troops.

No. 321.

[16351]

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 30.)

(No. 316 A.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 30, 1909.

TABREEZ.

With reference to my telegram No. 333 of the 27th instant, I have received the following telegram No. 103 of the 28th instant from His Majesty's consul-general:—

The Local Assembly yesterday asked the Shah to restore the old constitution, informing him that the proposed arrangement on the lines of religious law was not acceptable. Negotiations are continuing to-day at the telegraph office.

Many foreign subjects are still anxious, and the situation in the town remains unsatisfactory.

It is believed that Bagher Khan intends to go over to the Shah's party. Provisions are still very short, but they are gradually coming in.

[16353]

No. 325.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 30.)

(No. 317.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 30, 1909.

TABREEZ.

I have received the following telegram No. 100 of yesterday from His Majesty's consul-general:—

This morning Sattar Khan called to express his profound gratitude to Great Britain.

He is confident for the future, but too changeable to be entirely trustworthy.

Provisions are coming in regularly, and to-morrow the bakers' shops will be reopened.

On the whole the situation appears to be clearing up, though no answer as to the Constitution has as yet been given to the Anjuman.

(Confidential.)

The Russian general will be asked by my Russian colleague to send 300 men into the town. This number appears to me exaggerated, but I hardly think it worth while to make any objection. The men will be used to guard foreign houses and institutions.

[16357]

No. 326.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 30.)

(No. 318.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 30, 1909.

TABREEZ.

I have received the following telegram No. 110 from His Majesty's consul-general:—

The royalist armies are dispersing.

To-morrow the normal postal service will be resumed.

Yesterday evening 180 Russian soldiers reached the Agi bridge, and entered the town this morning without a hitch.

[16361]

No. 327.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 30.)

(No. 319.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, April 30, 1909.

GERMAN consular agent at Tabreez.

With reference to my telegram No. 338 of the 28th instant.

The German consular agent has replied to the request for an explanation declaring that interested members of the Local Assembly have been using his name, but that he has strictly abstained from all political agitation.

[16226]

No. 328.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 180.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 30, 1909.

THANK the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for his friendly attitude as reported in your telegram No. 56 of yesterday, and tell His Excellency that we appreciate it warmly. Tell him also that His Majesty's ships at Bushire have already received instructions to take any steps that may be necessary to protect foreign Consulates and subjects, and that we are now sending to His Majesty's Consul-General special instructions to ascertain from his German colleague what protection is required for German subjects and to take measures accordingly.

The situation at Bushire has greatly improved, and you may add an intimation to that effect.

[16226]

No. 329.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 218.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 30, 1909.

YOU should instruct His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire in the sense of my telegram No. 180 of today to Sir E. Goschen.

In present circumstances there is no need for the Admiral's stay to be cut short.

[15415]

No. 330.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 30, 1909.

WITH reference to my letter of the 24th ultimo, relative to the proposal of the Government of India that certain works should be undertaken at Bassidi at the joint expense of the British and Indian Exchequers, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a letter from the Treasury in reply to the communication which he caused to be addressed to that Department on the above date.

Viscount Morley will perceive that the Lords Commissioners are prepared to accept as a charge to British funds a moiety of the expenditure proposed, with the exception of the portion of it which is connected with the repair of the tombstones in the cemetery.

I am to inform you that Sir E. Grey concurs in the proposal of the Government of India, subject to the condition laid down by their Lordships.

I am, &c.

(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[15191]

No. 331.

Foreign Office to Mr. M. Ellinger.

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 30, 1909.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 22nd instant relative to the inquiry made by His Majesty's Minister at Tehran as to how long Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co. can, without loss, postpone further shipments of oxide from the Island of Ormuz.

I am to inform you that, as a result of the interview which you had at this Office on the 26th instant with Mr. Norman, Sir E. Grey addressed a telegram to Sir G. Barclay stating that, as the rapidity with which it would pay Messrs. Weir to ship the oxide depended on the demand for that article in the market, which could not be calculated beforehand, it was impossible to return a definite reply to his inquiry. Sir E. Grey added that you were wanted to understand his reason for asking the question.

* No. 246.

Sir E. Grey has now received a further telegram from Sir G. Barclay, in reply to his communication, stating that his inquiry was prompted by the fear that the reported stoppage of mining operations might be injurious to the interests of Messrs. Weir, in which case strong action might be needed. Sir G. Barclay adds that there are already 3,000 tons of oxide awaiting shipment, and that no ship is yet expected at Ormuz.

I am, &c.

(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[16475]

No. 332.

*Mr. J. R. Preece to Foreign Office.—(Received May 1.)**1, St. James' Place, Pall Mall, London,**April 29, 1909.*

Dear Mr. Mallet,

WITH reference to your note of the 3rd instant and mine of the 15th, regarding the salary of the Imperial Commissioner, will you get a reply from Sir George Barclay authorizing us to pay the Imperial Commissioner his salary from the 1st instant? He is somewhat anxious about it, and judging by the telegram which he has received from the *Sadr Azim*, referred to in the inclosure to my note, which I have seen, he is entitled to, but which we cannot pay until authorized to do so by you.

Please excuse the trouble I am giving.

Yours, &c.

(Signed) J. R. PREECE.

[16493]

No. 333.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 1.)

(No. 350.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, May 1, 1909.

SHAH has dismissed Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Latter has identified himself with the representations of the two Legations, and has taken a determined stand against reactionary influences opposed to us. His dismissal, Naib-res-Sultani's appointment, and other indications show that the Shah remains obstinate, and this flouting of the two Legations has compelled us to abandon our intention of avoiding details until the Shah has officially signified his acceptance of the programme.

Although it was agreed between the two Governments only to suggest privately the composition of the Cabinet, we have felt it our duty to protest strongly, and the two dragonsair informed the Shah last night that unless he forthwith dismissed Naib and reinstated Samed-Dowleh the two Representatives would inform their Governments that His Majesty had rejected their advice. The Shah declared that he accepted the programme, but he was very firm about exclusion of Samed-Dowleh, and I know he intends to make a determined stand against admission of Nasr-ul-Mulk.

The two Representatives feel that inclusion in the Cabinet of these two should be made the test of the Shah's sincerity, and that unless he agrees forthwith to accept them he should be told that the two Powers regard him as having rejected their advice. Nasr-ul-Mulk is indispensable for any reforming Cabinet, and, although much may be said against Samed-Dowleh, he has, for a Persian, rare courage, which is especially needed at this moment.

We have been very loth to depart from course laid down of private suggestion, but by making a firm stand at this stage we shall, if the Shah yields, have a better chance of an execution of programme. Partial execution would be positively mischievous.

Do the two Governments concur? Without authorisation we cannot take further action in above-mentioned sense, which amounts to more intervention than was intended.

I exclude as almost negligible chance of the negotiations with Tabreez resulting of themselves in a satisfactory Constitution, though of course this would be best solution.

(Sent to St. Petersburg.)

[16495]

No. 334.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 1.)

(No. 351.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 1, 1909.

STATUS of Russian officers in Tehran.

It would appear that the Russian officers of the Cossack Brigade are still under the orders of their own Government in spite of the contrary impression which I had received.

If a Russian captain is sent to take command of Persian Cossacks at Tabreez, I presume that he will be instructed to take no part personally in hostilities which may possibly break out afresh, the Shah not having as yet come definitely to terms with Tabreez.

[15910]

No. 335.

Foreign Office to Mr. W. K. D'Arcy.

(Private and Confidential.)

Dear Mr. D'Arcy,

Foreign Office, May 1, 1909.

SIR EDWARD GREY referred to Sir G. Barclay by telegraph the request contained in the last paragraph of your letter of the 6th ultimo for an explanation of the statement made by His Majesty's Consul at Alivaz, that difficulties may arise in future in connection with the presence of an Indian guard at the works of the Concessions Syndicate, especially when Mr. Reynolds proceeds on leave.

Sir G. Barclay has now reported that difficulties might arise owing to the inexplicable and undue interference of Mr. Reynolds' understudy.

I would refer you in this connection to my letter of the 27th ultimo, marked "private and confidential."

Yours very truly,
(Signed) C. HARDINGE.

[16498]

No. 336.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 237.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, May 2, 1909.

PERSIAN reforms. Telegram No. 350 of the 1st instant from Tehran.

The Russian Government, M. Telarykow informs me, are of opinion that it would be impossible for the reforms to be undertaken by any Cabinet which did not include Saad-ed-Dowleh and Nasr-ul-Mulk. M. Telarykow intends to ask the Emperor to sanction the dispatch of instructions to M. Saldine to state that if the inclusion in the Cabinet of these two individuals is refused by the Shah the two Governments will consider such refusal as equivalent to rejection of the advice which they have given to His Majesty.

[16496]

No. 337.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 352.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 2, 1909.

RUSSIAN troops for Urumia.

I have received the following telegram No. 112 of the 1st May from His Majesty's consul-general at Tabreez:

"I learn from my Russian colleague that the Russian force when passing through Maragha used the clerk of their Vice-Consulate at Urumia and three Russian Cossacks. They had been sent by the vice-consul at Urumia to telegraph from Jolfa for the extra consignment of three thirty Cossacks which they had been promised if necessary. They were seized by Sogut Nizam, and when released had been imprisoned in chains for six days.

"Russian consul-general tells me that his vice-consul at Urumia is apprehensive. I

[16364]

No. 335 A.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 219.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 1, 1909.

JOINT guarantee to Shah.

As soon as instructions have been received by Russian chargé d'affaires you may act in accordance with telegram No. 235 of the 30th April from St. Petersburg.

[15243]

No. 335 B.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 220.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 1, 1909.

OIL syndicate.

Lorimer's despatch, last paragraph, enclosed in your No. 43 of the 4th March. We have received an enquiry from the syndicate in connection with the proposed construction of telephone and telegraph lines along the pipe line, as to whether in our opinion they can legally carry out this proposal without consulting Persian Government (see article 2 of concession, last sentence). Unless you see objection, we would answer that if the syndicate on their own responsibility are prepared to proceed to work without consulting the Persian Government we will support their claim if necessary, but we think it would be better for the syndicate if this question were not raised with Persian Government.

With regard to the proposal made by Reynolds for instituting telegraphic communication between the oil syndicate's plant and a point on the Shatt-el-Arab, Barker has been instructed by Kirk to discourage the idea, as it is thought advisable here to keep the affairs of the oil syndicate distinct from those of the Indo-European Telegraph Department.

[1649]

2 M*

have had no news from this place for a month, but I gathered from my Russian colleague that the attitude of the Nationalists was merely offensive and that nothing particular had occurred; he had, however, requested of his legation that a force might be sent there.

"The Nationalists are in great force along the Turkish frontier and serious complications might result from this step, which I think would be only warranted by the gravest necessity."

M. Sabline tells me that four Russian Cossacks and two Persian Gholams left Urumia four weeks ago and have since disappeared; his consul's intention really is to send a small force to ascertain the fate of these men. He adds that the dispatch of such a detachment rests entirely with the St. Petersburg authorities.

I have informed him that the Russian troops have already found and released some men, probably a portion of the party in question, and have made him acquainted with the sense of the last paragraph of Mr. Wratislaw's telegram.

Could not the Russian Government be urged to defer dispatch of troops until careful enquiry has failed to disclose the whereabouts of the men stated to be missing.

[16769]

No. 338.

Mr. M. Ellinger to Foreign Office.—(Received May 3.)

Sir,

28, Oxford Street, Manchester, May 1, 1909.

I AM in receipt of yours of the 30th ultimo, and note that Sir G. Barclay's inquiry as to how long Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co. could without loss postpone their shipments of oxide from the Island of Hormuz was prompted by a fear that the reported stoppage of mining operations might be injurious to the interests of Messrs. Weir and Co., in which case strong action might be needed. We do not think that Sir G. Barclay underestimated the quantity awaiting shipment, and it is perfectly correct that no ship is at present expected at Hormuz.

It appears that when, on the 4th December, 1908, I informed you that the contract had been signed by the Mouin-ut-Tujjar and ourselves and Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co. for the sale of oxide to the latter for three years, I omitted to mention that the contract gave Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co. a monopoly of the sale of the oxide; and it is consequently of importance that Sir G. Barclay should be informed of this, as it would be very injurious to the interests of all concerned if oxide were allowed to be removed from the island for the purpose of shipment or sale by any other than the Mouin-ut-Tujjar or Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co.

I shall be obliged if you will notify Sir G. Barclay of this at once, as if the Nationalists are interfering with the mining at Hormuz this would appear at the moment to be the danger to which those interested are exposed.

I remain, &c.
(Signed) M. ELLINGER.

[16651]

No. 339

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 3.)

(No. 353.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 3, 1909.

GERMANS at Bushire.

I have instructed His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire in the sense of your telegram No. 218, and have informed him very confidentially of part of the contents of telegram No. 56 from Berlin.

I have now received from him the following telegrams, Nos. 418 and 419:—

No. 418 of the 1st May:

"Following to corroborate my previous reference:—

"Seyyid Murteza had been asked by four notables chosen by seventeen persons representing the whole community to render an account of the diverted customs receipts and to dismiss his Tufangchis. They received a formal reply to the effect that if I were

[1649]

2 N

to give a guarantee of the withdrawal within three days of British bluejackets to the Seyyid through the medium of the German consulate he would comply with their request."

No. 419 of the 1st May :

"We have good circumstantial evidence for believing that the German consulate has all along, with the sole object of raising obstacles for us, given support and incitement to Seyyid Murteza, to whom all our troubles here are due. Direct indications of this are reported in my previous telegram of to-day.

"On every occasion when the question of guards for foreigners has arisen I have consulted with my German colleague, and have entirely complied with his requests. In view of this, his application for a ship is instructive.

"The story that a German war-ship had arrived or was about to arrive at Muscat has for the last two or three days been constantly related by the Mirza of the German consulate."

I have brought this matter to the notice of the German Minister, and I have no doubt that he will give the necessary hint to the German consul, though I have had no answer yet.

[16497]

No. 310

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 3.)

(No. 351.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 3, 1909.

RUSSIAN troops for Urumia.

I have just learned from M. Sabline that his Government considers unnecessary the proposed dispatch of troops mentioned in my telegram No. 352 of to-day.

[16685]

No. 311.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 3.)

(No. 355.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 3, 1909.

ISPAHAN.

In reply to the note which I addressed to the Persian Government holding the Shah responsible for any danger to British lives through hostilities at Isfahan, the Shah has sent to inform me that his troops are returning to Kashan. This is doubtless due to the paralysis caused by Amir Bahadur Jang's dismissal.

[16777]

No. 312.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 3.)

(No. 356.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 3, 1909.

SAMSAM-ES-SULTANEEH and Sardari Gossad, who has presumably arrived at Isfahan, have telegraphed jointly to all the foreign legations expressing their gratitude for the measures taken to save Tabreez, but asking at the same time that the Powers should now interfere no further in their internal affairs. They add, after protestations of loyalty to the Shah, that they and all other nationalists are about to march on the capital to force on His Majesty the fulfilment of pledges made to his people.

[16686]

No. 313.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 3.)

(No. 357.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 3, 1909.

SHAH'S birthday congratulations.

If the Shah formally accepts our programme the King might wish to telegraph his

[16475]

No. 346*.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 221.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 3, 1909.

Oil syndicate Salary of Imperial commissioner.
 Syndicate wish to know result of your enquiries as to my telegram No. 161 of the 16th April last.

felicitations on the occasion of Mohamed Ali's birthday, which falls on Wednesday next in the case of acceptance, where shall I telegraph the King?

There are now indications which point to the Shah's officially accepting the programme, but until we insist on the execution of details matters will not come to a head.

[16687]

No. 344.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 3.)

(No. 358.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 3, 1909.

TABREEZ.
 The following are extracts from a telegram No. 113 of the 2nd May which I have received from his Majesty's consul-general:—

"There passed through Tabreez this morning a telegram addressed to the Czar by the Shah, in which the latter stated that he had changed his Ministers and granted a constitution in compliance with the Czar's wishes, and that he trusted that His Majesty would see that his rights as a Sovereign were respected.

"There are 269 Russian troops in the town, and the general informs me that he has nearly 4,000 men under his orders."

[16498]

No. 345.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 639.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 3, 1909.

WE share the opinion of the Russian Government respecting the composition of the new Persian Cabinet, and concur in the course which they propose to adopt as reported in your telegram No. 237 of yesterday.

Please inform them of this, and add that we are sending the necessary instructions to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

[16651]

No. 346.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 183.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 3, 1909.

INFORM German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the incident reported in telegram No. 418 from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran (see the latter's telegram No. 353 of to-day), and tell his Excellency that Major Cox has from the first consulted his German colleague as to the protection required by German subjects, and has complied with all his wishes in that respect. Mention also the proceedings of the Mirza of the German Consulate, reported by Major Cox in his telegram No. 419 to Sir G. Barclay, and state that the latter is in correspondence on the subject with the German Minister.

[16316]

No. 347.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 223.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 3, 1909.

WITH reference to the question raised in your telegram No. 315 of the 24th ultimo, I learn from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company that they showed the statutes of the Articles of Association or Agreement to the Imperial Commissioner before they were completed. The Commissioner made some alterations in the statutes on the advice of his lawyers, Messrs. Lumley and Lumley, which the Company accepted. Messrs. Lumley

suggested that their name, as lawyers to the Commissioner, should appear in the prospectus, but this proposal was made at the last moment, too late to be acted on. All the advertisements of the Company in the press contain, however, Messrs. Lumley's name.

[16498]

No. 348.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 225.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 3, 1909.

AS soon as the Russian Chargé d'Affaires receives his instructions to make joint representations as to the composition of the Persian Cabinet, you may act on the proposal contained in your telegram No. 350 of the 1st instant, which expresses the views of the Russian Government and our own. (See Sir A. Nicolson's telegram No. 237 of yesterday, and my telegram No. 639 to him of to-day.)

[16769]

No. 349.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 226.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 3, 1909.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 336 of the 27th ultimo, Mr. Ellinger is anxious that you should know that the monopoly of the sale of oxide from Hormuz belongs to Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co., in virtue of their contract with the Moin-ut-Tujjar, and therefore that, if anybody but Messrs. Weir or the Moin himself were to remove oxide from the island, British interests would be injured.

We have replied to Mr. Ellinger that you are perfectly aware that no oxide must be removed by other people, and that you would take action immediately to prevent it if any were necessary.

[16955]

No. 350.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 61.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 3, 1909.

THE Persian Minister called at this Office to-day, and read Sir C. Hardinge a telegram from the Shah to the effect that the British and Russian Ministers at Tehran had received a Petition from the Saad-ed-Dowleh to be maintained in his position as Minister for Foreign Affairs, from which post he had just been dismissed, and that he hoped that the two Ministers would not insist on his reinstatement. The Shah expressed his readiness to appoint anybody as Minister for Foreign Affairs whom I might approve.

Sir C. Hardinge told him that His Majesty's Government had not received news from Tehran to the above effect, but that I was much dissatisfied with the appointment of the Naib-es-Sultaneh as Grand Vizier, and that if the Shah wished to put an end to the present situation at once, and to forestall any further action on the part of the two Representatives at Tehran, he should at once appoint a Grand Vizier and a Minister for Foreign Affairs whom the two Ministers at Tehran could approve. Sir C. Hardinge added that His Majesty's Government must insist on the new Cabinet being composed of able and satisfactory persons, and that after what had occurred they could not regard as inspiring confidence any Cabinet which did not include the Saad-ed-Dowleh and the Nasr-ul-Mulk.

The Minister said he would reply to the Shah's telegram in this sense.

I am, &c.

(Signed) E. GREY.

[16947]

No. 353 A.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 4.)(No. 69.)
(Telegraphic.) P.
PERSIA.

Paris, May 4, 1909.

Under instructions from the Shah the Persian Minister came to see me this morning, and to request that I should inform you that His Majesty had dismissed Saad-ed-Dowleh, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who has been, the Shah states, the principal obstacle to the execution of His Majesty's good intentions as regards reforms.

The Minister went on to say that Saad-ed-Dowleh had become very unpopular, and had lost the confidence of the Shah. His Majesty anticipates that the ex-Minister, being a great intriguer, may attempt to enlist the support of the British and Russian Legations at Tehran in order to get back into power, and His Majesty would therefore be glad if the Legations could be warned not to give heed to Saad-ed-Dowleh's representations.

The Shah is inclined to nominate as his successor either Ala-es-Saltaneh (father of the present Minister in London and himself formerly Minister there) or some other person who has the sympathy of England and Russia and the confidence of His Majesty.

The Persian Minister is anxious to answer the Shah's telegram. He says that he knows Saad-ed-Dowleh to have frequently changed his views, but he himself takes no part either for or against him.

The Shah has made a like communication through the Persian Minister to the Russian Ambassador here. His Majesty has adopted this means of communication because the Persian Minister at St. Petersburg is a cousin of Saad-ed-Dowleh.

[16931]

No. 353 B.

Consul-General Cox to Sir G. Barclay.—(Received May 4.)(No. 428 to Tehran.)
(Telegraphic.) P.

Bashire, May 1, 1909.

It is necessary that "Persepolis" should go to Shant-el-Arab in order to take in supplies of fresh water and I see no objection to this being done. A promise has been given that she will return at once and not to bring any outsider back with her. Moreover, the leaders here have received a telegram from the Ghom of Nejed saying that they can support the appointment of Daria Begi after the assurances which he has given them.

[1619]

2 (1)*

[16876]

No. 351.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 4.)(No. 359.)
(Telegraphic.) P.
OIL Syndicate.

Tehran, May 4, 1909.

I concur in the reply proposed in your telegram No. 220 as to the Syndicate's right of laying a wire along the pipe-line.

[16912]

No. 352.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 4.)(No. 360.)
(Telegraphic.) P.
OIL Syndicate.

Tehran, May 4, 1909.

I am pressing the Persian Government for an answer to your telegram No. 221, but such disorganisation prevails that reply is likely to be delayed.

[16949]

No. 353.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 4.)(No. 361.)
(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 4, 1909.

SHAH and constitution.

The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has officially informed my Russian colleague and myself that the Shah has accepted the advice tendered to him by us on 22nd April.

In view of this official acceptance we shall to-morrow give His Majesty the assurances authorised in writing.

The Shah desires that a meeting should be held between the two representatives and his delegates, whose explanations of certain points of detail, for which His Majesty wishes, may be given.

[16955]

No. 354.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**(No. 339.)
(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 4, 1909.

IN a telegram communicated by the Persian Minister yesterday, the Shah urges that we should not press the reappointment of Saad-ed-Dowleh.

The Minister was informed that His Majesty should not delay the appointment of a Grand Vizier and Minister for Foreign Affairs deserving the approval of the British and Russian Representatives at Tehran, and that in view of recent events, no Cabinet which did not include Saad-ed-Dowleh and Nasr-el-Mulk could be regarded here as inspiring confidence.

[16931]

No. 355.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.(No. 228.)
(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 4, 1909.

IN view of the telegram of His Majesty's Consul-General at Bashire to you No. 428 of to-day, the "Persepolis" may be allowed to leave if you see no objection, subject to the reimbursement of the sums which have been diverted from the Customs, and if the Darya Begi is not accompanied by a fighting force he may be allowed to land. It is impossible to allow foreigners to run risks from a collision between any Tangistanis who might return to Bashire and the Darya Begi's men.

[1619]

* Also to Sir G. Barclay, No. 227.

2 (1)

[12115]

No. 356.

Foreign Office to Persian Transport Company.

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 4, 1909.

WITH reference to my letter of the 29th October, 1908, relative to the repairs to the Godar Bridge on the Ahwaz-Ispahan road, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith a Memorandum on the subject prepared in this Office.

I am to inform you that Sir E. Grey is in general agreement with the opinions expressed in this paper, and I am to suggest that the most suitable course for your Company to pursue in order to reach a solution of the present difficulty would be to approach the Bakhtiari Khans direct with a view to obtain their consent to a reference of the question to some suitable Arbitrator to be agreed on by the parties and approved by His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I am, &c.
(Signed) W. LANGLEY.

Inclosure in No. 356.

Memorandum on the Incidence of the Responsibility for defraying the Cost of the Repairs to the Godar Bridge on the Ahwaz-Ispahan Road.

THE Persian Transport Company have not communicated to the Foreign Office the full text of the Report of Mr. Howard Humphreys, the engineer whom they consulted with reference to the repairs to be carried out on the Godar Bridge, but the "outline" of his opinion, indlosed in their letter of the 19th October last, does not appear to meet the facts of the case as now ascertained.

These facts show that the defects which have made their appearance in the bridge are due to an obvious unsuitability in its original design which necessitates certain structural alterations; and that, in so far as the bridge has been misused by unequal loading, this constitutes no more than a contributory aggravation of its primary unsuitable condition.

The question then presents itself as to who is responsible for this unsuitability of design, and who is chargeable with the expense of rectifying or attempting to rectify it.

The bridge was erected by Messrs. Lynch Brothers for the Khans under a species of contract, and the responsibility for suitability of design rested on the former, as being the only persons concerned in a position to judge of such matters. The responsibilities incurred by Messrs. Lynch Brothers in regard to the construction of the road have since been taken over by the Persian Transport Company.

It is true on the other hand that, though the bridge was in the first instance built by Messrs. Lynch Brothers at their own expense, up to the present only a portion of its cost has been recovered by them from the Khans, and that the latter do not appear, either at the time when the bridge was completed, or subsequently, to have taken any objection to its design.

The question is further complicated by the change of attitude of the Persian Transport Company with regard to the extent and cost of the repairs required. These were at first represented as slight, and the consent of the Khans was obtained to their execution at a certain cost. It was not till later that the serious nature of the repairs required became known to the Foreign Office, and it is difficult to understand why the Company, who must have been aware of it for some time, did not disclose it earlier. Their omission to do so had the effect of placing His Majesty's Representatives on the spot in an embarrassing position with regard to the Khans and of weakening, in proportion, their power of taking effective action on the Company's behalf.

In view of the effect of the Company's proceedings in causing His Majesty's Government to commit themselves to the Khans and of the attitude assumed by the latter, it is impossible for His Majesty's Government to press on the Khans the necessity of their agreeing to bear the cost of the repair of the bridge, whether on the extended scale now proposed, or on the lower one previously suggested. It is even doubtful, in the circumstances, whether His Majesty's Government would be justified in accepting from the Khans the 1,000 toman which they expressed their willingness to provide in autumn, were the Company now to express a desire to avail themselves

of that offer, at any rate unless it were shown that this money was to be expended on repairs, as apart from structural alterations. The only alternative appears to be to suggest to the Persian Transport Company that they should themselves take such steps as may seem fit to them in order to arrive at an understanding in the matter with the Khans. In the event of the negotiations being carried on directly between the Khans and the Company, if the Khans raised no difficulty on the score of responsibility for the design of the bridge, there would be no moral obligation on His Majesty's Government to invite them to do so, or to interfere with any arrangement which, as free agents, they might see fit to enter into with the Company.

If the Company desire a continuance of the support of His Majesty's Government through His Majesty's Consul at Ahwaz in this matter, they should submit to the approval of the Foreign Office any proposals which they may decide to make to the Khans.

(Initialled) H. N.

Foreign Office, May 4, 1909.

[17086]

No. 357.

Mr. M. Ellinger to Foreign Office.—(Received May 5.)

Dear Mr. Norman,

28, Oxford Street, Manchester, May 4, 1909.

I THANK you for your letter of yesterday, and note that Sir G. Barclay is fully alive to the necessity of preventing any shipment of oxide from Hormuz by the Nationalists, and that he does not propose to take any action to insist upon the resumption of mining operations so long as their resumption threatens no loss to Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co. This assurance sets at rest the fear I had that the Nationalists might attempt to realize some of the oxide lying on Hormuz.

I will at once let you know if we hear of any occurrence of a nature to make steps at Tehran desirable.

I remain, &c.
(Signed) M. ELLINGER.

[17053]

No. 358.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 5.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 3rd May, 1909, relative to Anglo-Russian representations to the Shah of Persia.

India Office, May 5, 1909.

Inclosure in No. 358.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.
AFFAIRS in Persia.

India Office, May 3, 1909.

British and Russian Ministers presented joint Memorandum to Shah on the 22nd ultimo, in which my financial assistance was made conditional on dismissal of Grand Vizier and Amir Baluch Jang and an undertaking on part of Shah to re-establish constitutional régime after following reforms have been introduced:—

(a.) Cabinet composed of persons worthy of confidence to be formed and suitable persons belonging to different parties to be at once added to Council of Enquiry; both Legations to submit privately to Shah list of candidates for Cabinet and Council.

(b.) New electoral law to be elaborated and promulgated by the Council; no time to be lost in making public the date of elections and of convocation of Assembly.

(c.) General amnesty, subject to limitations already agreed upon, to be granted by the Shah.

See telegram of the 18th March from His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

Memorandum contemplates, as regards form of financial assistance to be given, that 100,000, should be advanced to Persian Government by Russian Government, if they think it necessary, as soon as Shah has taken above measures, and that similar advance should be made to Persian Government by British Government, when they think it necessary, when elected Assembly has accepted principle of loan. Should it be found necessary subsequently to facilitate a larger loan to Persia, Memorandum indicates that certain guarantees will be required before this can be effected. There will be a subsequent exchange of views between the two Governments and the Persian Government on the subject of these guarantees.

In submitting this programme a categorical statement was to be made by the two Representatives to the effect that if programme in all its details is not accepted by Shah, the two Governments will leave him to his own devices and cease advising him, and that their support can no longer be counted upon by His Majesty. His Majesty's Minister at Tehran reports that, in acknowledging the communication, Shah asked that more than 100,000, might be advanced to him. Representatives pointed out that hope of more was held out by their communication, and that both Governments would do their best to negotiate loan, the need for which was recognized, when financial administration was reformed and Assembly was working.

Proposal has been made to Russian Government that the advance, beginning with the 100,000, to be paid by Russia on receipt of satisfactory assurances from Shah, should be placed to the joint account of the two Representatives, and that the latter should disburse it to the Persian Government in instalments after an agreement has been come to between them and approved by Financial Adviser. No reply has been received from Russian Government, but view is indicated by them that we should participate in first advance if they accept our proposal.

[17101]

No. 359.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 239.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

TURKEY and Persia.

St. Petersburg, May 5, 1909.

Telegram No. 353 of the 5th May from Tehran.

M. Telarykoff, who is in charge at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, informs me that, according to Confidential information which has reached him from Erzeroum, a Turkish force of about 360 men has been ordered to march in order to protect "the Consulate." He has no indication as to what Consulate is intended, but he presumes that the reference is to the Turkish Consulate at Urmia. M. Telarykoff thinks that the intention of the Turks is to occupy that place, and he expresses a hope that if the Russian Government find it necessary to make representations on the subject to the Ottoman Government, His Majesty's Government will be ready to instruct their Ambassador at Constantinople to support these representations.

[17088]

No. 360.

Sir E. Gaschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 58.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

BUSHIRE.

Berlin, May 5, 1909.

I have carried out the instructions contained in your telegram No. 183 of the 3rd instant. Baron von Schoen was much put out by any communication. His excellency stated that he was sure that British Consul-General had done and was doing everything, he could for the protection of German subjects. He said that the Imperial Government had sent instructions to their Agents to refrain from interfering in any way, as they were specially anxious that no embarrassment should be caused by the action of their Representatives. In view of this he did not understand reference to German Consulate made by Seyyid Murza, and must ascribe it to latter's desire to cause mischief. He would send telegraphic instructions, he added, to German Representative at Tehran to give German Consul at Bushire warning to be careful that in future no suspicion of political agitation could be attributed to him or his staff.

[17011]

No. 361.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 362.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

ATTITUDE of German acting consul at Bushire.

Tehran, May 5, 1909.

I have addressed the following telegram, No. 362, to His Majesty's consul-general:—

"Can you let me have any definite information which I could use to establish that the Mirza's action was as reported, or to prove the Seyyid's request for a guarantee from the German consulate, or any facts which may tend to show that an understanding exists between the Seyyid and the German consuls?"

The German acting consul categorically denies the interference by himself or his staff in local politics. He understands that a guarantee for the re-embarkation of blue-jackets was required by the Seyyid, not from the German consulate particularly, but from that of any foreign Power.

[17028]

No. 362.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 353.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

RUMoured Turkish occupation of Persian territory.

Tehran, May 5, 1909.

I have received the following telegram, No. 116, from His Majesty's consul-general at Tabreez:—

"The royalist troops are continually circulating reports that Urumia, Soujboulak, has been occupied by a Turkish force. I have no confirmation.

"Rahim Khan, with a great quantity of loot, has left the vicinity of Tabreez."

I am informed by my Turkish colleague that a guard has been sent for the consulate at Soujboulak as for other posts near the frontier. He has no information of the alleged occupation.

[17040]

No. 363.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 364.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

BUSHIRE.

Tehran, May 5, 1909.

I concur in your views as regards the departure of Persepolis and landing of Darya Beggi, and am instructing consul in the sense of your telegram No. 288.

[17095]

No. 364.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 366.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

SHAH and constitution.

Tehran, May 5, 1909.

A rescript has been issued by the Shah promising the restoration of a constitutional régime. The electoral law will shortly be published, and elections are fixed for the 19th July.

The constitution is described as subject to the limitations of Mahomedan law and in accordance with the requirements of the country.

[17096]

No. 365.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 367.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 5, 1909.

KAZVIN has been taken with little bloodshed by 200 revolutionaries from Resht. The town is now quiet.

[17097]

No. 366.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 368.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 5, 1909.

SHAH and constitution.

My Russian colleague and I have taken act of the Shah's official acceptance of the advice tendered by us. We are now urging the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to hasten on the proposed meeting at which we are to give explanations as to the formation of the Cabinet and other points of detail for which His Majesty has asked us.

We shall not for the present give His Majesty the assurances, as proposed in my telegram No. 361 of yesterday, since we have learned that Naib-es-Sultanch is still officiating as Prime Minister.

[17167]

No. 367.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 230.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 5, 1909.

OXIDE.

We have been informed by Strick that the Nationalists have taken possession of a large quantity of oxide, amounting to 20,000 tons, which are awaiting shipment. Strick wishes to buy this oxide from the Nationalists, and he has asked us what attitude we should adopt if he did so, and if he sent a ship for it.

In reply, we informed him that we should be obliged to protect the interests of Weir, as established by his contract with the Moins.

He will probably let the matter drop, in view of this answer; but what steps do you consider we should take in the event of any tampering with the oxide on the part of the Nationalists?

[16769]

No. 368.

Foreign Office to Mr. M. Ellinger.

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 5, 1909.

IN reply to your letter of the 1st instant, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to inform you that a telegram has been sent to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran stating that you are desirous that he should be informed that, by their contract with the Moins-at-Tijjar, Messrs. Weir have acquired a monopoly of the sale of oxide extracted from Hormuz Island, so that British interests would be injured if oxide were removed from the island by any party other than Messrs. Weir or the Moins.

I am, &c.

(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[17154]

No. 369.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 6.)

Sir,

India Office, May 5, 1909.

IN reply to your letter dated the 23rd ultimo as to the protection of Bahrein subjects in Persian territory, I am directed to say that, in the circumstances described,

Viscount Morley concurs in the proposal of Secretary Sir E. Grey to leave to the discretion of His Majesty's Minister at Tehran the wording of the proposed communication to the Persian Government, though His Majesty's Government will continue to show by their acts that they cannot permit the Persian Government to exercise sovereignty over Bahreinese in Persian territory.

Lord Morley also concurs in the proposal to approve Sir G. Barclay's attitude in abstaining from representing officially to the Persian Government the case of the owner of the Bahrein dhow, which was confiscated for breach of the Customs Regulations.

I am, &c.

(Signed) A. GODLEY.

[17238]

No. 370.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 6.)

(No. 369.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 6, 1909.

REVOLUTIONARIES advance from Resht.

My Russian colleague is instructing his consul at Resht to urge the Sipahdar, in the interests of a speedy reconciliation between the Shah and his people, to hold up the advance along the Resht-Tehran road.

The Shah has ordered 100 Cossacks to proceed against the revolutionaries, who are now believed to have left Kazvin.

M. Sabline, who now looks on the Russian officers as no longer under the Legation's control, does not know whether one of these accompanies the troops. From other sources, however, I learn that they are under the command of Captain Lapolski.

Reference is to my telegram No. 351 of the 1st May.

[16185]

No. 371.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 60.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 6, 1909.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 211 of the 28th ultimo, relative to the conditions of the proposed advance to the Sheikh of Muhammerrah, I have to inform you that the Anglo-Persian Oil Company lately submitted to Sir C. Hardinge the draft of a letter which they proposed to address to this Department on the subject of their desire to acquire a site for an oil refinery on Abadan Island and a strip of land for a pipe line to connect the refinery with the wells, in return for which they expressed their willingness to advance a sum of 5,000l. or 6,000l. to the Sheikh.

Certain trifling alterations were introduced into this draft, and it was returned to the Company, who, in their turn, made two further changes in it before sending off the letter, on the receipt of which I addressed to you my telegram above referred to.

I transmit to you herewith copy of the Company's letter, together with copy of a letter from Mr. Wallace,† the Vice-Chairman, giving the reasons for the introduction of the final modifications spoken of above.

You will observe that I have thought it best that the advance of 5,000l. or 6,000l. should be represented to the Sheikh as coming from His Majesty's Government, and not from the Company, and that I have added to the conditions on which the Company are willing to make the important one of the grant to a British Company of a Concession for the exclusive right to carry out a scheme of irrigation from the Karun on the lines proposed by Sir J. Willcocks and on terms to be settled later by mutual consent.

I am, &c.

(Signed) E. GREY.

[15752]

No. 372.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, May 6, 1909.*
 WITH reference to the letter of the 13th January from this Office relative to Concessions for mining red oxide on islands in the Persian Gulf, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, copy of a letter from Mr. Frank C. Strick,² stating that the agents of his Company are dispatching a prospecting expedition in connection with this industry.

With reference to the last paragraph of the letter, I am to state that, if confirmation is received from Mr. Strick of the report that the employes of the Moin-ut-Tijjar are working oxide on one of the Tauba, Sir E. Grey will cause a further letter to be addressed to you on the subject.

I am, &c.
 (Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[16876]

No. 373.

Foreign Office to Mr. J. R. Preece.

Sir, *Foreign Office, May 6, 1909.*
 I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 22nd ultimo respecting the right of the Oil Syndicate to construct a telegraph and telephone along the pipe line which they are about to construct from their oil wells in Arabistan.

I am to inform you that His Majesty's Government are doubtful whether it would be to the interest of the Syndicate to raise this question with the Persian Government at the present moment, but that if they desire to proceed with the work on their own responsibility His Majesty's Government will, if necessary, use their good offices in support of the Syndicate's contention that Article 2 of their Concession entitles them to build a telegraph and telephone line along the pipe line for use only in the ordinary course of their business.

I am to add that Sir E. Grey is obliged to the Syndicate for their offer to allow the use of their poles by the Indo-European Department for the service of the Bona-Joon-Ahwaz-Mohammudi and Shuster line, but he does not consider that any such arrangement would be practicable.

I am, &c.
 (Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[17296]

No. 374.

The Anglo-Persian Oil Company to Foreign Office.—(Received May 7.)

*Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London,
 May 6, 1909.*

Sir,
 ON the third of last month you were good enough to write to Mr. J. R. Preece on the subject of the future payments of salary due to the Imperial Commissioner by this Company.

I have now received a letter from Sadigh-es-Saltaneh, who was, as you know, appointed Imperial Commissioner, dated the 3rd of this month, in which he says that he has received a telegram from "his Highness the Persian Prime Minister, to the effect that there was a misunderstanding; no change has been made in the post of commissioner-ship; you are the Imperial Commissioner, and the fee of Imperial Commissioner must be paid to yourself." In these circumstances Sadigh-es-Saltaneh requested me to resume paying him his salary.

In view of your letter of the 3rd instant, I am, of course, unable to do this until I hear further from you. May I ask you to be so good as to ascertain whether the

* No. 279.

instructions contained in your letter of the 3rd April are to stand, or whether I may resume the payments to Sadigh-es-Saltaneh in terms of the telegram which he advises having received from the Persian Prime Minister.

I have, &c.
 (Signed) C. W. WALLACE, *Vice-Chairman.*

[17243]

No. 375.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 7.)

(No. 370.)
 (Telegraphic.) P. *Tehran, May 7, 1909.*

GUARDING of the Resht road.

I understand from my Russian colleague that his Government is being urged by the Tehran-Resht Road Company to dispatch a Russian force to protect their property. M. Sabline adds that one of the company's employes on the Kazvin-Hamadan road was recently ill-treated by the Shah's troops. The company, it appears, are now losing 8,000 toman a-month.

I have told my Russian colleague that as far as my information goes the road is safe and the traffic on it in no danger. He appears to agree, but fears that unless it is guarded it may be blocked or damaged later on.

It would not surprise me were he to recommend the precautionary measure of dispatching road guards.

[17327]

No. 376.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 7.)

(No. 371.)
 (Telegraphic.) P. *Tehran, May 7, 1909.*

NATIONALISTS and Hormuz oxide. Your telegram No. 230 of the 5th May.

His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire thinks that the arrival of the Daryn Beggi will bring about a satisfactory solution of the question.

The Nationalists have expressed their willingness to refrain from all interference if we will hold in trust, until the granting of a constitution, all payments for red oxide. This arrangement I have authorised Major Cox to accept.

On the 2nd May Sheikh's agent at Bushire was instructed to ask His Majesty's consul-general to assist him in the purchase of oxide from the Nationalists. Major Cox, with my approval, refused. The agent accepted his advice and has rejected the Nationalists' overtures.

[17349]

No. 377.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 7.)

(No. 372.)
 (Telegraphic.) P. *Tehran, May 7, 1909.*

SHAH and constitution.

The application of the Russian Road Company for a guard, and the action of my Russian colleague, reported in my telegram No. 369 of the 6th May, suggest the question what should be the attitude to be adopted by the two representatives should the Nationalists fail to be satisfied by the Shah's execution of our programme. This contingency calls for early consideration by the two Governments on account of the Nationalist move on Tehran, which is possibly imminent.

We shall endeavour at the meeting proposed by the Shah, as explained in a previous telegram, which is fixed for this afternoon, to persuade His Majesty to announce by proclamation that he is immediately putting into execution those points of our programme which are susceptible of prompt accomplishment, and that everything possible will be done to hasten on the others.

I am not very sure, however, that the Nationalists will be satisfied with this.

[1619]

2 Q

Samsam, whose forces are about 4,000 strong, has replied to the Shah's decree of the 5th May that he can only accept the former constitution. He has again announced his intention of marching on to Tehran. Resht Nationalists are credited with the intention of dethroning the Shah.

[17371]

No. 378.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 7.)

(No. 185.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Constantinople, May 7, 1909.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 293 respecting the reported movements of Turkish troops in Persia, the Minister for Foreign Affairs denies that the positions named have been occupied by Turkish forces. He insinuated that, in the event of the Russians threatening to occupy Tabreez permanently, the Ottoman Government might be obliged to send troops into Persia with a view to accelerating the Russian evacuation.

[17243]

No. 379.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 654.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 7, 1909.

IF, as seems probable from Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 370 of the 7th instant, the Russian Government are desirous of sending troops to guard the Resht-Tehran road, you should point out that a threat to take such action would probably suffice to produce the effect desired, and express the hope that, as the actual dispatch of troops would create the impression of intervention, the Russian Government will not go beyond a threat.

[17238]

No. 380.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 232.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 7, 1909.

IS it quite certain that the Russian officer reported to be opposing the revolutionaries who are threatening Tehran from Resht is no longer on the active list of the Russian army, and can you obtain definite information as to whether the revolutionaries in question are chiefly Russian Caucasians or Persian Constitutionnlists?

[17373]

No. 381.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 8.)

(No. 373.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 7, 1909.

SHAH and constitution.

This afternoon the meeting indicated in my telegram No. 372 of to-day took place. We gave the desired explanations of points of detail, and insisted that Nasr-ul-Mulk and Saad-ed-Dowleh should be in the Cabinet. A list of persons suitable for Cabinet and council was at the same time privately communicated.

There is a considerable modification of the Shah's attitude indicated by the removal from office of Naib es Sultaneh, Amir Jang, and the Grand Vizier, and particularly by the selection of suitable delegates for to-day's meeting, though, of course, I cannot as yet pronounce definitely as to the impression we have made so far on the Shah.

The population of Tabreez has been favourably impressed by the Shah's decree, and Nationalists there have telegraphed to Samsam to suspend his offensive movement.

There is great alarm at the Palace, due to the advance of revolutionaries from Resht. There are wild rumours afloat that hundreds of these men have marched from

[17524]

No. 383*.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 8.)

(C. o. 242.)

(Telegraphic.) P

PERSIA.

St. Petersburg, May 8, 1909.

Sir G. Borelay's telegram No. 370 of the 7th May and your telegram to me, No. 651, of same date.

I have seen M. Telarykoff, who tells me that a Cabinet Council will be held this evening, and that he intends to propose at their meeting that a force of four companies should be held in readiness at Baku, and that notification should be made at Resht and all along the road between that place and Tehran that if traffic on the road is interrupted these troops will be dispatched.

M. Telarykoff told me also that orders to return to Tehran had been sent by the Shah to the Persian Cossacks serving with Ain-ul-Dowleh's force. These Cossacks, he said, were under a Russian captain, who, on the cessation of hostilities at Tabreez, had been sent to take charge of them with a view to keeping them in hand and preventing pillage in Tabreez. In reply to my enquiry as to whether this Russian officer would accompany the Persian Cossacks on their march to the capital, M. Telarykoff replied in the affirmative, adding that the officer in question was in the Shah's service and not in that of the Emperor of Russia. He said that in the event of the Resht people meeting the Cossacks on their road to Tehran and attempting to stop their advance, the latter would have to make their way through by force. To this I replied that it would be well to avoid action on the part of any Russian officer which might have the appearance of being directed against the fedais, even if the officer in question were no longer on the active list of the Russian army. M. Telarykoff replied that the officer's action would not be of that nature, but would only consist in bringing his men to Tehran in accordance with the orders issued to him. In answer to a further enquiry on my part, M. Telarykoff said that no Russian officer had accompanied the force of Cossacks sent from Tehran to guard the bridge on the road between Kazvin and the capital.

[1619]

2 Q*

Kazvin. A secretary of the Russian Legation, who has been sent there, reports that reinforcements constantly arrive, but so far only a few have come beyond Kazvin.

The German Minister here displays great anxiety for the future, though for the time being the town is quiet.

[17527]

No. 382.

Sir G. Borelay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 8.)

(No. 371.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 8, 1909.

ATTITUDE of German consulate at Bushire.

I learn, with reference to my telegram No. 362 of the 5th May, from His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire, that German acting consul denies, as far as he is concerned, that he gave Seyyid Murteza any ground for mentioning the German consulate in connection with the required guarantee.

Major Cox recommends that, in view of the tranquillity likely to result from the Darya Beggi's arrival, we should temporarily accept this *démarche*, although Herr Wisnass's explanation is by no means convincing. Meanwhile His Majesty's consul-general is sending by post to you and Tehran a summary of evidence which he is sure will establish that the German consulate has from the first been using these troubles as a means of intrigue against us. This, he is inclined to think, is merely a part of a wider policy.

It is possible, seeing that the German acting consul has only been in office for two weeks, that he has personally taken no part in these manoeuvres. It is, however, significant, with regard to telegram No. 56 from Berlin, that on the 1st May he informed Major Cox that he had some time before reported that German subjects were receiving sufficient protection, and that thanks to the presence of British bluejackets the town was quiet. He did not know that his appeal for a war-ship had been reported to us from Berlin.

I shall avoid further discussion of this matter with my German colleague until I know what action you take at Berlin.

[17519]

No. 383

Sir G. Borelay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 8.)

(No. 375.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 8, 1909.

RUSSIAN officers of Persian Cossacks.

Beyond the information contained in my telegrams Nos. 201, 213, and 369, I can learn nothing here as to the status of the Russian officers.

I am informed by my Russian colleague that the Russian officer in command of Cossacks on the Kazvin road is returning to-day.

In answer to your telegram No. 232 of the 7th May, I am afraid I can give no definite opinion as to the strength and composition of the Resht force in the neighbourhood of Kazvin. Russian information is to the effect that the advanced posts of this force are at Kerench, the first stage on the road from Kazvin to Tehran, and the dominant element of the force is a body of 200 Caucasians.

[17963]

No. 381.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Borelay.

(No. 65.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 8, 1909.

THE Persian Minister called to-day and read to Sir C. Hardinge a telegram from the Shah to the effect that you had yesterday, with the Russian *Chargé d'Affaires*, insisted on the appointment of Saad-ul-Dowleh as Minister for Foreign Affairs. He had already telegraphed to the Nasr-ul-Mulk to return to become Grand Vizier and Minister of Finance, but he begged that we would not insist on the appointment of Saad-ul-Dowleh as Minister for Foreign Affairs. He added that the latter had a quick temper, and was never able to get on with the other members of the Cabinets in which he had served.

Sir C. Hardinge told the Minister that I had not insisted on the Saad-ed-Dowleh being made Minister for Foreign Affairs, but simply on his being included with the Nasr-ul-Mulk in the new Cabinet, and, from your telegram No. 373 of the 7th instant, of which he read to him the first two lines, you had made the same demand. Sir C. Hardinge added that I regarded these two appointments as a *sine qua non*, and advised him to express to the Shah my conviction that only a prompt acceptance of our programme could avert a forward movement of the Nationalists on Tehran, which would expose the Shah's person to considerable danger.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[17529]

No. 385.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 9.)

(No. 377.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 9, 1909.

SHAH and Constitution.

The ex-Minister for Foreign Affairs has just been reinstated. He has read to me a draft proclamation which he hopes to induce the Shah to issue to-morrow. I have suggested the insertion of some slight changes, with which it ought, if carried out, to give satisfaction to the Nationalists. The measures announced in it are in full accordance with the requirements of our programme, and my Russian colleague and I have given the assurances authorized to His Majesty.

Saad-ed-Dowleh, who has been ordered to form a Cabinet, has chosen members according to our desire.

[17548]

No. 386.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 10.)

(No. 72.)

Sir,

Tehran, April 3, 1909.

SOME months ago a case containing 50,000 Imperial Bank of Persia two-toman notes and 10,000 one-toman notes were stolen from the post on their way from London to Tehran between Shiraz and Isfahan. These notes were not yet furnished with the Government seal of the High Commissioner and were therefore valueless, but I regret to report that some of them have recently been presented to the Isfahan branch with the High Commissioner's seal forged.

I feel it my duty to bring this matter to your notice as it may have very serious results for the Bank. There is indeed no great likelihood of the Bank's being taken in by the forged notes, but their refusal to honour them must injure their credit and might lead to a run on the Isfahan branch.

Lists of the stolen notes have been published but it is doubtful how far this will prevent their circulation in the Bazaars.

At the time of the robbery I held the Persian Government responsible for the consequences, but should it ever come to pressing this point I am in some doubt as to how far we could properly go, for the Persian Government is only very indirectly responsible for the injury to the Bank's credit which is the most probable serious consequence of the robbery. It was as much with a view to stimulating the Persian Government to strenuous efforts to recover the stolen notes as for any other reason that I held them responsible, and with the same object I am now, while informing them that some of the notes are in circulation, reminding them of their responsibility.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[17549]

No. 387.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 10.)

(No. 73. Confidential.)

Sir,

Tehran, April 3, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to report that M. de Rosthorn, the Austrian Minister, left Tehran yesterday on six months' leave.

[17116]

No. 384°.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Louth.

(No. 302.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 8, 1909.

IN response to a request from His Majesty's consul at Hodeida, His Majesty's ship "Barham" has been ordered to proceed thither from Aden.

[1649]

2 Q†

Before his departure he was received in audience by the Shah, when he took the occasion to lecture His Majesty on the dangers of the course he was following. M. de Rosthorn has been good enough to let me take a copy of the address which he read to the Shah. I inclose it herewith. While it was being read His Majesty showed signs of annoyance and finally appeared to allow his attention to wander. He evidently did not relish the lecture at all and replied in a few curt words.

M. de Rosthorn tells me, however, that at a farewell luncheon party given to his honour by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Saad-ed-Dowleh made a speech in which he conveyed to him an expression of the Shah's thanks for having spoken to him so frankly.

I avail, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 387.

Address read to the Shah of Persia by M. de Rosthorn on taking leave.

Sire,

J'AI l'honneur de me présenter devant votre Majesté pour prendre congé.

Après un séjour de trois ans en Perse mon Gouvernement vient de m'accorder un congé de six mois, après lequel je compte rester dans mon pays, dont j'ai été séparé depuis un quart de siècle.

Durant mon séjour dans cette capitale je me suis toujours souvenu que l'Envoyé d'un Souverain ami de votre Majesté et de vos illustres aïeux doit se considérer non pas comme un simple agent pour liquider les affaires, mais comme un ami du pays à qui incombe la tâche de se pénétrer des idées et des sentiments de la nation, de suivre et d'encourager ses efforts dans la voie du progrès, et de resserrer les liens de sympathie qui ont existé depuis des générations entre la Perse et l'Autriche-Hongrie.

Cette tâche je erois l'avoir accomplie avec conscience et assiduité. Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, ici présent, saura témoigner à votre Majesté que, dans mes relations avec le Gouvernement Impérial, je me suis constamment efforcé d'éliminer toute cause de malentendu et d'aplanir toute difficulté surgissante. Mes collaborateurs, le Chargé d'Affaires, que j'aurai l'honneur de présenter à votre Majesté, et le Secrétaire persan de la Légation, sont mes témoins que les principes qui ont réglé toutes mes relations et ma conduite journalière étaient la loyauté envers votre Majesté et le désir de pouvoir en quelque sorte contribuer à rétablir l'harmonie entre le Gouvernement et le peuple. Maintes fois, par l'intermédiaire du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, j'ai eu devoir avertir votre Majesté des dangers que le régime actuel lui prépare; et maintes fois, dans mes entretiens avec les représentants des Nationalistes, je leur ai recommandé la modération et le rapprochement avec leur Souverain. Lorsque le peuple est venu se réfugier en masse à l'Ambassade ottomane et aux Légations j'ai renvoyé tout le monde en l'assurant que votre Majesté avait promis d'accorder la Constitution à la nation et que la parole du Souverain valait mieux que tous les Traités. La réponse du Gouvernement était l'arrestation de quelques gens inoffensifs qui n'avaient rien fait que présenter des requêtes au doyen et aux Ministres, et l'un d'eux, bien que reconnu innocent par le Tribunal chargé de l'enquête, se trouve encore privé de sa liberté et sous la protection du drapeau national de mon pays. Mon Gouvernement et moi-même nous ne sommes pas du tout inclinés à donner asile à des sujets persans contre leurs autorités, mais l'humanité même exige que les Représentants des pays civilisés usent de ce droit tant qu'il n'y a pas de justice en Perse et que des Moufakher-ul-Mulk exercent les fonctions de Gouverneur de la ville. Je ne veux pas croire que votre Majesté soit responsable de tous les actes arbitraires et cruels qui sont commis en son nom, mais il est de mon devoir d'attirer sa très haute attention sur la catastrophe que l'abus de leur pouvoir de certains fonctionnaires d'un rang très élevé et très proche du trône lui préparent.

Quand je pense à l'époque où je suis arrivé en Perse, plein de curiosité de connaître ce peuple, parent du nôtre et porteur d'une ancienne civilisation, qui venait de faire les premiers pas vers la modernisation de ce vénérable pays; quand je pense que, alors, à côté de beaucoup d'ignorance et trop d'orgueil, on rencontrait sur toutes les figures l'espérance d'un meilleur avenir et que, dans quelques jours, je traverserai ce même

pays en souffrance et en révolte d'un bout à l'autre, je ne puis pas réprimer un certain découragement moi-même. Cependant, j'ai confiance que la Perse se guérira de cette crise et continuera sa marche vers une destinée heureuse.

En prenant congé de votre Majesté je lui souhaite la santé et le bonheur, à elle et à la Famille Royale.

[15647]

No. 388.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, — (Received April 26.)

(No. 71.)

Sir,

Tehran, April 8, 1909.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 55 of the 22nd ultimo, I have the honour to transmit copy of the Financial Adviser's Report, which he has now submitted to the Shah.

You will notice that, in M. Bizot's opinion, the need for a loan is indisputable, though he is unable to announce as to the amount required. In my telegram No. 152 I gave it as 2,500,000*l.* at the lowest estimate, independently of the small advances which would be needed for the reorganization of the Departments which most urgently call for reform, and I should mention that in this estimate I had M. Bizot's concurrence. Besides the Government's debt to the two banks, amounting in round figures to some 1,200,000*l.*, which, bearing exorbitant interest, cries loudly for conversion, there are other creditors' claims which, according to a statement given to M. Bizot, already at the end of 1907 amounted to 2,751,638 tomans (550,000*l.*). These must greatly have increased during the year just ended. There are also the claims for postal and road subsidies, &c., filed by the foreign Legations, of which it would be rash to attempt an estimate, but which must represent a very considerable sum.

Assuming that the sum indicated above is approximately sufficient to convert the advances of the two banks, and to settle the claims of other creditors and those presented to the Persian Government by the foreign Legations, Persia's total indebtedness may be estimated at something like 6,000,000*l.*, i.e. :—

	£
Russian Government's loans	3,200,000
Russ and Indian Government's loans, with arrears of interest,	300,000
Unpaid tax pay-off floating debt, &c.	2,500,000
	<hr/>
	6,000,000

To pay interest on this at 5 or 6 per cent, the Customs receipts would amply suffice, leaving a very substantial sum at the disposal of the Persian Government, very nearly as large a sum, indeed, as that now left over after paying the interest on the loans and advances as at present secured on the proceeds of the Customs. The conversion of the 1,200,000*l.* owed to the Imperial Bank of Persia and to the Russian Bank, so as to reduce the interest from 12 to 6 per cent, would effect a saving of 72,000*l.* a year, or nearly enough to pay 6 per cent. on the sum needed to clear off the rest of the floating debt.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 388.

Requ'd by M. Bizot on the Financial Situation in Persia.

POUR donner de la situation financière de la Perse un tableau aussi exact que possible, je voudrais exposer quels sont les rouages de l'Administration et montrer comment cette Administration, bien connue, a perdu peu à peu les qualités d'ordre et de méthode qui faisaient sa force.

Les quelques chiffres que j'ai pu recueillir à grand-peine rendront plus claires ces considérations générales.

A la fin j'indiquerai les réformes propres au relèvement des finances du pays.

Le fonctionnement des services de recettes et de dépenses doit être étudié :—

1. Dans les provinces.
2. Au Gouvernement central.

1. Administration provinciale.

L'Administration provinciale comprend, à sa tête, un Gouverneur-Général muni en fait de tous les pouvoirs, ayant des attributions de justice, finances, police, et, dans chaque subdivision de la province, des Gouverneurs choisis par lui. Les écritures et les comptes sont tenus par les *Moudafs*.

Dans quelques provinces importantes le Ministre des Finances envoie un de ses agents (*Dilem*) spécialement chargé de veiller au recouvrement de l'impôt.

Les Gouverneurs ont sous leurs ordres, pour faire exécuter leurs décisions, des Commissaires appelés *Mahmouds* ou *Mobachars*.

Le Ministre des Finances adresse au commencement de l'année à chaque Gouverneur-Général un budget, ou *kétab*, sur lequel sont inscrites les recettes et les dépenses de la province. Si les recettes sont supérieures aux dépenses, l'excédent reste à la disposition du Gouverneur central. Si, par contre, les recettes sont insuffisantes pour acquitter les dépenses imputées sur la province, le Ministre des Finances devra pourvoir la différence au moyen d'un envoi de fonds.

Les revenus des provinces sont : (1) le *Maliat*, proprement dit, ou *Asl*. Le *Maliat* frappe les revenus de la terre et des troupeaux ; il est également perçu sur les boutiques ; et le *Fare* ou *Tafavot-annal* (augmentation de recettes).

Le *Tafavot-annal* est un supplément d'impôt prélevé, à l'origine, par les Gouverneurs pour frais d'administration. Les Gouverneurs imputent aussi sur les fonds du *Tafavot-annal* des pensions accordées par eux aux personnes de leur entourage.

Le *Tafavot-annal* est perçu sous forme de cotisations additionnelles au principal du *Maliat*. Il a été souvent modifié et augmenté par les Gouverneurs ; il est très différent suivant les provinces, et dépasse parfois le montant du *Maliat-Asl*.

Le *Tafavot-annal* est aujourd'hui, comme le *Maliat*, à peu près fixe. L'excédent des recettes sur les dépenses du *Tafavot-annal* doit être versé à Téhéran avec le surplus du *Maliat*.

La partie du *kétab* où sont inscrites les dépenses apparaît comme une longue liste de traitements, pensions ou indemnités, rangés d'après la classe sociale des bénéficiaires.

Les dépenses sont ainsi réparties :—

(I.) Dépenses non militaires :

(A.) Appointements—

- (a.) Des Princes.
- (b.) Des héritiers des Princes.
- (c.) Autres que ceux des Princes.
- (d.) Des gens de bien.

(B.) Pensions—

- (a.) Du clergé, des *seyeds*.
- (b.) Autres.

(C.) Éclairage des lieux saints.

(II.) Dépenses militaires :

Appointements des officiers hors cadres, solde des officiers, solde des hommes.

Les appointements et pensions ont sans doute été accordés autrefois à des personnes qui exerçaient des fonctions publiques ; les traitements actuels autres que ceux de l'armée sont, pour la plupart, des sortes de rentes concédées au prix de cadeaux ou par faveur, sans aucune raison d'intérêt général. Ce sont des dépenses improductives.

Quand le Gouverneur-Général a reçu le budget de sa province, il répartit l'impôt *Asl* et *Fare* entre les Gouverneurs, et donne à chacun d'eux l'ordre de le percevoir sur les villages de son ressort.

Dans chaque village, le chef du village — ou *Khatkhonda* — représentant du propriétaire du village, est chargé de recueillir le *Maliat*. Si le *Khatkhonda* ne paie pas, le Gouverneur envoie un *Mahmoud* dans le village.

Le Mahmoud—type des anciens garnisaires—exige des redevables, en outre du Malat et du Tafavot-annal, une nouvelle redevance—Ghologh—comme indemnité de ses frais de déplacement.

Dans les provinces où il y a un Pichear, le Pichear répartit les listes d'impôt entre les Gouverneurs et fait les diligences nécessaires pour obtenir des Gouverneurs le versement de leur part contributive, mais il ne perçoit pas directement l'impôt.

Il n'y a pas, en général, dans les provinces, de caisses publiques. Les Gouverneurs déposent les fonds qui leur sont envoyés chez leur banquier—Saraf. Les Sarafs lui versent un intérêt.

D'ailleurs, le produit des impôts reste, en grande partie, chez les collecteurs pour servir sur place au paiement des dépenses.

A cet effet, le Gouverneur-Général, après examen des mandats, remet aux créanciers de l'Etat un Havaleh, ou bon à payer, soit sur un Khalkhouda ou Mahmoud, soit sur un Saraf.

Beaucoup de hauts personnages ont reçu, à titre de pension ou de traitement, la jouissance de certains revenus du domaine impérial ou une délégation les autorisant à percevoir, pour leur compte, le Malat de leurs terres ou d'autres villages. Ces privilèges anciens—Tioul—avaient été supprimés par le Parlement. Quelques-uns subsistent. Dans ce cas, le Gouverneur n'a à intervenir ni pour la recette ni pour les dépenses qui se règlent par compensation.

L'Administration provinciale, en apparence bien ordonnée, se prête à d'innombrables abus.

Dans quelques provinces, les Gouverneurs, le Pichear et certains employés ont des appointements prélevés sur les fonds du Tafavot-annal, mais, le plus souvent, les fonctionnaires n'ont pour traitement, s'ils en ont un, que leur pension indépendante de leur emploi ou certaines redevances établies par l'usage comme celle de quatre chais par toman que touchent les comptables, Mostofis, sur les mandats soumis à leur contrôle avant paiement.

Le Gouverneur-Général et les Gouverneurs ont dû, pour obtenir leur poste, faire des cadeaux : les Mahmouds achètent leur charge. Il faut que les profits de leur emploi les dédommagent des sacrifices qu'ils ont faits.

Ce n'est pas en général dans la perception de l'impôt que se commettent les exactions. Les habitants des villages savent ce qu'ils doivent payer ; ils se refusent à verser davantage.

Les Gouverneurs sont tout-puissants. C'est par des menaces, des accusations mensongères ou d'ignobles étalonnages qu'ils se procurent des ressources.

Les Mahmouds qui reçoivent l'impôt font aussi exécuter les décisions de justice ; ils trouvent dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions le moyen de réaliser des bénéfices sérieux.

A la fin de l'année, les Gouverneurs doivent rendre leurs comptes au Ministre des Finances. Un Ministre spécial, "Ministre des restes", a pour mission d'exiger le versement des sommes en excédent dont ils sont reconnus débiteurs.

Les Gouverneurs refusent de répondre aux injonctions des Ministres. S'ils se décident à déposer leurs comptes, ils s'efforcent de démontrer qu'ils n'ont pu percevoir le Malat ou de grossir le chiffre de leurs dépenses ; quand on veut faire de leur gestion une vérification trop approfondie, ils savent endormir la vigilance des Agents de Contrôle.

2. Administration centrale.

Le Ministre des Finances, Chef de l'Administration, est entouré de comptables ou Mostofis chargés de l'enregistrement des pièces, de la tenue des écritures, de la confection des budgets, de la vérification des comptes, et du visa des mandats, kals ou larats, émis à Téhéran.

Le Ministre du Trésor paie les dépenses.

L'Administration centrale a un budget propre désigné sous le nom de Recab du Téhéran.

Les recettes du Recab sont :

1. Les excédents du Malat et du Tafavot-annal des provinces.

2. Les recettes dont l'encaissement n'est pas confié aux Gouverneurs.

Recettes de la douane, recettes du télégraphe, redevances et prix de concessions, produit de passeports, revenus de l'Hôtel des Monnaies, &c.

Les dépenses inscrites au Recab sont :

1. Les excédents de dépenses des provinces

2. Les frais de la Cour.

3. Les intérêts des emprunts.

4. Les traitements des fonctionnaires européens.

5. Les appointements et pensions, les dépenses de l'armée, de la brigade des Cosques payables à Téhéran.

Sous le règne de Nasr-ed Din Schah le budget était dressé avec le plus grand soin. Les Gouverneurs payaient régulièrement le Malat.

Les Mostofis formaient une corporation puissante ; leur contrôle était efficace.

Le Ministre du Trésor avait la liste des recettes et des dépenses ; il refusait de payer toute dépense non prévue au budget.

L'autorité de certains Ministres des Finances était si forte, dit-on, qu'elle ne fléchissait même pas devant les ordres du Grand Vizir. Les Mostofis, eux-mêmes, savaient résister au Ministre des Finances.

Pour maintenir l'équilibre entre les recettes et les dépenses, Nasr-ed-Din Schah avait, à deux reprises, réduit le chiffre des traitements. Le budget se soldait presque chaque année par un excédent de recette.

Peu à peu on a abandonné toutes ces règles, qui mettaient un obstacle au désordre et au gaspillage des finances. Il n'en reste plus que des écritures sommaires, intelligibles pour les seuls initiés et de vaines formalités beaucoup mieux faites pour enregistrer les abus que pour les empêcher.

1. On adresse toujours chaque année les listes de recettes et de dépenses du Recab de Téhéran. Dix Mostofis, au moins, se partagent cette tâche, mais on ne réunit plus ces listes éparses. Il semble qu'on appréhende le résultat final que ferait apparaître le rapprochement des chiffres de recettes et des dépenses.

Il est juste de faire remarquer que la préparation du budget est difficile.

En Perse, les attributions des Ministres sont mal définies ; les services publics sont à peine organisés ; on ne peut donc prévoir, au moment de la confection du budget, les sommes nécessaires à leur fonctionnement.

On inscrit au budget les pensions et les traitements dont le chiffre est à peu près invariable ; les dépenses supplémentaires pour lesquelles on n'a ouvert aucun crédit modifient chaque année complètement les évaluations primitives.

2. Les Mostofis continuent à viser tous les mandats. Aucune pièce ne peut figurer à l'appui d'un compte si elle n'est revêtue de cinq cachets : (1) le cachet du Mostofi du service intéressé ; (2) quatre cachets de contrôle.

Pour être efficace, le contrôle des Mostofis doit précéder le paiement de mandats. C'est en général ce qui a lieu ; mais certains Ministres des Finances ont pris l'habitude de donner des ordres de paiement sur la douane notamment sans soumettre les mandats à l'examen préalable des Mostofis. Les ordres de paiement dont concernent le plus souvent des dépenses extraordinaires, qui ne sont pas inscrites sur le Recab et qui devraient être rejetées.

A la fin de l'année, avant de rendre ses comptes, le Ministre présente aux Mostofis ses mandats acquittés pour qu'ils apposent les cinq cachets réglementaires désormais sans utilité.

3. Le Ministre du Trésor ne devrait payer que des dépenses prévues et autorisées ; il devrait donc avoir, pour les dépenses ordinaires, les listes au Recab, et, pour les dépenses extraordinaires, une copie des décisions spéciales les approuvant. Comme on ne lui remet aucun de ces documents, il paie tous les mandats revêtus des signatures et cachets d'usage.

Quand M. Naus, Ministre des Douanes, a voulu organiser le service de la Trésorerie ou Caisse Impériale (1904-1907), il n'a jamais pu obtenir une copie du Recab de Téhéran. Les agents de la Caisse acceptaient comme régularité tous les mandats signés par le Ministre des Finances sans savoir si la dépense figurait au budget.

On pourrait objecter que cette année tous les mandats présentés au Ministre du Trésor pour être payés étant tous la forme de larats, ou ordres personnels du Schah, portent avec eux la preuve de l'autorisation de la dépense. Néanmoins, le budget ne peut être ni intenté ni exécuté que si les larats sont émis dans les limites des prévisions de recettes et de dépenses ; le Ministre du Trésor doit donc connaître ces prévisions, car son rôle est de rappeler et de faire respecter, d'accord avec le Ministre des Finances, cette règle essentielle.

Un bref exposé des fonctions du Ministre du Trésor fera connaître les autres

défauts de l'organisation actuelle. (Les mêmes critiques s'appliquent, du reste, au mode de paiement des dépenses, dans les provinces, par les Gouverneurs.)

Le Ministre du Trésor est chargé de payer les mandats du Reçah. Il reçoit un relevé de toutes les recettes du Reçah sur lesquelles il pourra imputer les dépenses. Certains revenus du Reçah la donne, les passeports, la poste—ont des affectations spéciales, et ne sont pas mis à sa disposition.

Le Ministre du Trésor n'a pas de Caisse; on ne lui verse généralement aucune des recettes dont il doit faire emploi.

Lorsqu'il doit payer un mandat, il remet au bénéficiaire, en échange de son titre qu'il conserve comme pièce justificative, un ordre de paiement, ou havale, sur un des agents de recettes, Gouverneur de province, Ministre de Télégraphie, Ministre de la Monnaie . . .

La comptabilité du Ministre du Trésor est très simple.

Dans un premier registre il inscrit tous les mandats acquittés pour lesquels il a délivré des havales. Dans un autre registre il classe les recettes par catégories et note en regard les havales imputés sur ces recettes. Il connaît ainsi le montant des havales soulevés et le restant disponible de chaque espèce de revenus. Si, par exemple, le Gouverneur de la province de Fars doit verser à Téhéran 250,000 tomanis, et si on a tiré sur lui des havales pour 200,000 tomanis, le Ministre du Trésor sait que le reliquat de la province est de 50,000 tomanis.

Le double principe de la comptabilité publique, c'est que toutes les relevances dues sont considérées comme disponibles, même avant d'être encaissées; tout mandat, dans les écritures du Trésor, est soustrait lorsque le havale a été donné.

Il appartient aux créanciers de faire les démarches nécessaires pour obtenir leur paiement. Ce n'est pas chose facile. Les Gouverneurs auxquels ils présentent leur titre objectent qu'ils n'ont pu percevoir l'impôt, que leurs ressources ont été absorbées par d'autres dépenses. Beaucoup de mandats restent impayés. Les porteurs de havales finissent parfois par les céder pour une somme infime avec une perte de 60 ou de 70 pour cent. Comme le payeur fera figurer les havales dans sa comptabilité pour leur valeur nominale, la différence de 10 ou de 70 pour cent constitue pour lui un bénéfice.

La délivrance d'un titre de pension, d'un mandat, la remise d'un havale sont des formalités coûteuses. Quand un pensionnaire de l'Etat est muni de toutes ses pièces parfaitement en règle, il n'est pas certain d'être payé. Il a un billet à ordre qu'il ne peut pas toujours encaisser et qu'il est même heureux de négocier au hasard pour quelques kranis.

On peut imaginer les combinaisons auxquelles donnent lieu des opérations aussi insensées dans un pays troublé et sans ressources où le souci de la régularité s'efface devant l'espoir de réaliser un gain.

Le Ministre du Trésor ne se contente pas toujours de remettre des havales; il paie parfois aussi directement les appointements avec des fonds dont il fait l'avance. S'il opère une retenue sur les mandats et s'il les inscrit dans sa comptabilité pour leur valeur nominale, il peut réaliser, quand il sera remboursé de ses avances, un gain très appréciable.

Au lieu de retenir le Gouvernement dans la voie des dépenses, le Ministre du Trésor lui procure au contraire un gain apparent, et lui retire le plus grand profit.

1. Ses revenus de l'Etat étaient antérieurement régulièrement encaissés, il n'en est plus devenu aujourd'hui. Les Gouverneurs, sans l'avis en, trouvent mille façons d'ajourner le versement des recettes de leur province, qui reviennent au budget de Téhéran.

D'après les comptes de la Caisse Impériale, les Gouverneurs doivent encore sur les relevances totales (Kérah et Reçah) qu'ils avaient à verser à l'Administration de la Trésorerie :—

	Tomanis.
Pour Hamet (1906-7)	580,455
Pour Youssuf (1906-7)	610,791
Les relevances et le reste	
En Fars	2,104,614
En Youssouf	1,289,783

Ils doivent donc encore plus d'un quart de ces relevances.

Examen des Comptes de l'Etat.

A l'appui de ces considérations d'ordre général, j'aurais voulu donner des indications précises tirées des comptes de l'Etat; mais il y a dans ces comptes tant d'obscurités et

de confusions qu'on ne doit même pas attribuer aux chiffres une valeur absolue et définitive.

D'après un premier résumé qui m'avait été donné des évaluations budgétaires du seul Reçah de Téhéran, on prévoyait pour l'année 1326 (1908-9) un déficit de 552,189 tomanis; on ajoutait :—

" Dans le cas où les recettes indiquées ne parviendraient pas au Gouvernement telles qu'elles sont inscrites sur la liste, et dans le cas où se produiraient certaines dépenses imprévues pour l'Empire, ce chiffre sera augmenté du total de ces dépenses, et, au moins, perçu sur les recettes."

Le Budget général de la Perse, dressé plus tard sur ma demande, comprenant les recettes et les dépenses des provinces groupées avec celles de Téhéran, fait apparaître une situation un peu différente :—

1. Recettes.—	
Recettes en espèces en nature	7,850,834 tomanis.
Blé et orge	316,317 khalvars.
Riz	6,219 "
Paille	148,825 "
Fourrage	Pour mémoire.
2. Dépenses.—	
Dépenses en monnaie en nature	8,167,258 tomanis.
Blé et orge	173,201 khalvars.
Riz	3,717 "
Paille	72,673 "
Fourrage	Pour mémoire.
Le déficit en argent est donc de	636,704 tomanis
Il est atténué par l'excédent du Malat payé en nature—	
Blé et orge	173,201 khalvars.
Riz	3,717 "
Paille	72,673 "

Si on donne au blé et à l'orge une valeur moyenne de 25 kranis le khalvar, au riz celle de 4 tomanis et à la paille celle de 1 kran, l'excédent du Malat en nature représente—

	Tomanis.
Pour le blé et l'orge	133,201
Pour le riz	15,856
Pour la paille	7,615
Total	156,700
A retrancher de	636,701
Montant du déficit	179,911

Le déficit prévu au budget de l'année 1326 ne serait donc que de 179,944 tomanis.

Le déficit n'est pas un fait exceptionnel.

Depuis longtemps les Ministres n'ont jamais pu faire face aux dépenses—dépenses inscrites sur les budgets, dépenses supplémentaires—avec les seules recettes budgétaires. Ils ont eu recours à divers procédés d'emprunts :—

1. Les revenus à venir ont été escomptés.

La redevance annuelle de 46,000 fr. payable par les héritiers Lyansoff comme prix de location des pêcheries a été versée le 13 avril, 1906, et d'avance pour les années 1907, 1908, 1909, et le 1^{er} décembre, 1906, pour l'année 1910.

Un nouvel accord du même genre a été fait en 1908.

Par Convention en date du 14 juin, 1906, la Compagnie du Télégraphe Indo-Européen a fait au Gouvernement persan une avance de 40,000, à valoir sur les relevances de la Compagnie à partir de l'année 1912.

Les relevances annuelles de 5,600, sont d'ailleurs retenues jusqu'en 1912 par la Compagnie pour se rembourser d'avances antérieures ou des sommes qui lui sont dues pour le prix de ses télégrammes transmis et non payés.

2. Les Ministres s'adressent aux banques et font des Emprunts à courte échéance ou en compte-courant.

Le 28 mars, 1901, on emprunte à la Banque Impériale de Perse 1,000,000 tomanis à 12 pour cent, remboursables en trois ans.

2. Le 2 (15) mai, 1904, on emprunte à la Banque d'Escompte 1,200,000 tomanis à

9 pour cent, remboursables en cinq ans. Les intérêts et annuités non payés sont capitalisés et passibles d'un intérêt de 12 pour cent.

Le 7 (20) juin nouvel emprunt de 500,000 toman à 12 pour cent, remboursable en quatre ans, à la Banque d'Escompte.

On ne peut d'ailleurs ignorer, quand on fait des emprunts remboursables à si brève échéance, que la situation financière ne permettra pas de payer les annuités, ni même les intérêts.

L'avance de 1,000,000 toman du 28 mars, 1901, figurait dans les comptes de la Banque Impériale au 30 novembre, 1900, *sic*! pour 1,254,342 toman; celle de 1,200,000 toman du 2 (15) mai, 1904, à la Banque d'Escompte, montait au 1^{er} janvier, 1905, à 1,757,892 toman, et celle de 500,000 toman du 7 (20) juin, 1905, à 715,344 toman.

3. Les Ministres empruntent en leur nom ou font des avances au Gouvernement de leurs propres deniers. Ils font ensuite reconnaître ces prêts comme dette de l'État.

Le 20 mai, 1908, le Ministre des Télégraphes emprunte 50,000 toman à 15 pour cent pour le compte des Télégraphes à la Banque Impériale.

Le 20 mai, 1908, le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères emprunte à la Banque Impériale 17,000 toman, remboursables dans six mois à 15 pour cent, garantis sur le produit des passeports pour payer les arriérés des employés. (Ces deux dettes ne sont pas encore reconnues comme dettes publiques.)

Le Ministre de l'Instruction Publique s'est fait rembourser en 1908, une somme de 9,000 toman, qu'il avait avancée dans ses services.

Le Ministre du Trésor réclame actuellement le remboursement des avances faites par lui pour le paiement des mandats en 1908.

Le Gouvernement doit à l'un des Ministres de la Cour une forte somme pour prix d'achat de décorations et insignes non remboursés.

Les avances ne sont pas d'ailleurs toujours librement offertes, et beaucoup de grands personnages sollicitent un poste dans l'espoir de récupérer les sommes dont le versement leur a été imposé.

Les ressources extraordinaires provenant d'avances ou d'emprunts ne suffisent pas pour payer toutes les dépenses. Beaucoup de mandats restent impayés.

Le Ministre des Finances n'a reçu au mois d'octobre 1908, une "liste des traitements arriérés des troupes, des Envoyés Extraordinaires, des Consuls, des Ministres, des personnalités pendant les années Ilan-Il, Youm-Il, Ghom-Il (1905, 1906, 1907), des sommes dues aux Suédois, aux Italiens de la Cour, au banquier Toumaniantz, au Cheusé pour le prix des armes fournies à la Perse."

Cette liste monte à 2,751,638 toman (50,000 toman ont été remboursés depuis au banquier Toumaniantz).

(Je n'ai pu vérifier l'exactitude de ce chiffre.)

Il faudrait ajouter à la somme de 2,751,638 toman—

1. Les mandats restant à payer de l'exercice 1908-9; le relevé n'en a pas été fait.

2. Les mandats imputés sur la douane, qui n'ont pu être réglés pour défaut de fonds, car 2,000 toman (quelques-uns de ces mandats figurent peut-être déjà sur la liste précédente).

3. Les indemnités demandées pour vols postaux, 143,638 toman.

Beaucoup de récépissés ont disparu, la dette de 143,638 toman pourrait être réduite.

Les seules dettes certaines sur la dette de la Perse sont—avec celles de la douane et de la poste—celles des deux banques Russe et Anglaise.

La dette de la Perse à la Banque d'Escompte comprend—

1. Les emprunts à pour cent de 1900 et 1902, remboursables en soixante-quinze annuités, 37,000,000 roubles (montant en francs à évaluer).

2. Aut s'agit de reconnaître comme dettes de l'État, au 31 décembre, 1908, 3,230,000 toman.

3. Dettes non reconnues—pour mémoire.

La dette à la Banque Impériale comprend

1. L'emprunt à pour cent de 1903-4, remboursable en vingt annuités, 290,000 (montant en francs à évaluer).

2. Autres dettes au 20 septembre, 1908, suivant état fourni par la Banque, 2,920,000 toman.

Les emprunts à court terme et les avances dans les deux banques portent intérêt à 9, 10, 12 et 15 pour cent. Les intérêts arriérés sont capitalisés tous les six mois; le taux des emprunts à 0-12 pour cent est donc en réalité de 9-20 et 12-36 pour cent quand les intérêts ne sont pas payés à l'échéance.

Résultats des Opérations de la Caisse Impériale pour l'Exercice 1905-6.

L'Administration des Douanes vient de terminer les comptes de la Caisse Impériale pour l'année Ilan-Il, 1905-6.

Elle en a fait un résumé qui montre clairement les difficultés financières de la Perse et l'impossibilité, en l'état actuel, de réaliser l'équilibre du budget.

Les appointements doivent encore sur le Malat d'Ilan-Il, 580,455 toman.

Les Gouverneurs doivent encore sur les provinces montant à 77,000 toman.

La Caisse Impériale n'a jamais en la liste des autorisations de dépenses du budget de Téhéran; elle ne peut donc indiquer les restes à payer sur le Recbu.

Pour acquitter les dépenses, la Caisse a dû chercher des ressources en dehors des recettes normales de l'année.

Le Trésor Impérial a fourni 322,263 t. 2-25 kr. On a emprunté :

	T.	kr.
Pour payer la brigade de Cosques
A la Banque Impériale
On a prélevé—	265,551	5-10
Sur les fonds de l'Ilan-Il (1904-5)
Sur les fonds de Youm-Il (1906-7)
	252,411	2-75
	1,402,324	3-75
Total	1,965,169	5-05

Les comptes de la Trésorerie ne centralisent pas toutes les opérations budgétaires de l'année Ilan-Il.

La Douane avait à cette époque un budget spécial. On ne peut donc dire que le déficit ait été en Ilan-Il de 1,965,169 t. 5-05 kr.

La confusion des comptes, des exercices, ne permettrait pas de tirer des chiffres précédents une telle conclusion. On en peut seulement déduire une preuve évidente de la mauvaise administration des finances persanes.

Conclusions.

Les premières réformes à entreprendre pour rétablir l'ordre dans les finances sont les suivantes :—

1. Il faut dresser un budget unique pour toute la Perse faisant apparaître clairement toutes les recettes et toutes les dépenses du pays rangées méthodiquement par Ministère et par nature de services. On devra rattacher au budget (toutes les recettes qu'effectuent les agents pour leur propre compte et comme rémunération de leurs services—droits perçus au moment de l'établissement d'un barat ou d'un kabs, taxe sur les affaires contentieuses, recettes du Tafavot-avand laissées à la disposition des Gouverneurs.

On insérera au budget toutes les dépenses d'administration et les traitements des fonctionnaires.

La multiplicité des budgets—budgets provinciaux, budget de Téhéran—la classification des dépenses d'après les revenus affectés à leur paiement, dépenses imputées sur les fonds du Malat, sur la Douane, sur les Passes, sur les revenus des Postes ou des Télégraphes obscurcissent les comptes, facilitent les doubles paiements.

Les revenus de la Perse sont actuellement insuffisants pour faire face aux dépenses. L'organisation des services publics, le paiement des fonctionnaires, occasionneront des dépenses nouvelles.

On devra donc chercher à augmenter les revenus de l'État et à réduire les dépenses dont l'utilité est contestable.

L'augmentation du Malat est possible dans certaines provinces. L'impôt payé par les villes est minime. Le Malat de Téhéran est de 57,481. Sur cette somme, 22,000 toman sont payés par les fabricants de briques.

La dernière revision du Mahlat date de plus de trente ans; on a formé depuis longtemps le projet de procéder à de nouvelles évaluations destinées à supprimer les inégalités dans l'assiette de cet impôt.

Le Parlement avait décidé de réduire les traitements anciens et les pensions. Son Excellence Nour-el-Molk, Ministre des Finances, avait fait établir par les Mostolids des relevés des traitements inscrits au profit d'une même personne dans plusieurs budgets. On a donc tous les éléments d'un travail reconnu nécessaire.

Les intérêts élevés des emprunts à court terme et des avances sont une lourde charge pour le budget; mais on ne peut songer à rembourser les avances faites par les banques sans contracter un emprunt dont les conditions pourraient être moins onéreuses.

2. Toutes les augmentations d'impôt et toutes les économies qu'on pourrait réaliser ne donneront pas encore aux Administrations nouvelles assez de ressources pour fonctionner avec régularité et pour lutter contre des errements invétérés.

Si on veut mener à bien cette œuvre de relèvement, il faudra recourir à des fonds d'emprunt dont l'emploi sera justifié par l'utilité de la dépense.

3. On devra organiser au Ministère des Finances et dans les provinces un corps d'agents régulièrement payés, chargés sous les ordres d'un Trésorier Général, responsables de l'exécution du budget, de la perception du Mahlat, de la centralisation de toutes les recettes et du paiement des dépenses.

Les projets les mieux conçus, les règles budgétaires les plus strictes sont inutiles sans agents pour les appliquer.

Je pense même que seul un Européen très au courant de la comptabilité budgétaire aurait assez de savoir et d'autorité pour rétablir l'ordre et soustraire les services financiers à l'inertie prédominante des Gouvernements.

Les difficultés de cette tâche seront grandes; elles ne sont pas insurmontables. Il y a dans les provinces et à Téhéran des agents expérimentés auxquels il ne manque qu'un chef pour les guider et coordonner leurs travaux.

4. On a déjà mis à l'étude autrefois le projet de création d'une Cour des Comptes.

Cette institution pourra seule empêcher les irrégularités qui se commettent aujourd'hui au moment de la remise et de la vérification des comptes.

Si la nécessité d'un emprunt n'est pas contestable, on n'en peut dès maintenant fixer le chiffre.

Les fonds de cet emprunt devront recevoir une triple affectation :

1. Remboursement des dettes à courte échéance ou exigibles dans les banques.
2. Règlement des mandats émis mais non payés, et autres dettes.
3. Paiement des dépenses d'organisation des divers services publics.

La dette flottante dans les deux banques russe et anglaise est connue. Mais des difficultés très graves se présenteront quand on voudra procéder au remboursement des mandats et autres dettes.

Il faudra d'abord en établir une liste complète et sincère; puis discuter les bases du remboursement, car on ne peut admettre que des mandats dont le valeur actuellement estimée à 30 ou 40 pour cent de leur montant nominal soient intégralement payés.

La détermination des sommes nécessaires à l'exécution d'un programme de réformes suppose que ce programme ait été préalablement arrêté dans chaque Ministère.

Ce sera un travail long et compliqué, parce que, si dans les Ministères des Finances, de la Guerre, ou des Affaires Étrangères on trouvera des éléments d'organisation, certains services, tels que l'Instruction, les Travaux Publics, la Justice, devront être entièrement créés.

Le fonctionnement régulier de tout service public est étroitement lié à celui de l'Administration financière, qui procure les ressources et acquitte les dépenses. Il est donc indispensable de procéder dès maintenant à la réorganisation du Ministère des Finances et d'obtenir, au plus tôt, l'envoi d'un fonctionnaire européen qui soit mis à la tête de cette Administration.

L'Inspecteur des Finances en mission,
Conseiller Financier du Gouvernement Impérial Persan,
(Signé) A. BIZOT.

Téhéran, le 15 mars, 1909.

[17550]

No. 389.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 10.)

(No. 75.)

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Seistan to the Government of India, in regard to the Seistan-Bandan section of the Seistan Meshed telegraph line.

I have shown this despatch to Mr. Barker.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 389.

Consul Kennion to Sir G. Barclay.

Sir,

Seistan, March 11, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your information, copy of my letter No. 37 c, dated 11th March, 1909, to the Secretary to the Government of India, in the Foreign Department, with inclosure.

I have, &c.
(Signed) R. L. KENNION, Major, Indian Army,
His Britannic Majesty's Consul for
Seistan and Kaim.

Inclosure 2 in No. 389.

Consul Kennion to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Seistan, March 11, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a Report made by Mr. E. A. McManis, Sub-Assistant Superintendent of Telegraphs, on the condition of the Seistan-Bandan section of the Seistan-Meshed telegraph line.

2. With reference to the concluding paragraph of the Report, I am informed that a fresh supply of sulphate of copper has since been received from Meshed.

3. I hope to be able to get the condition of the remainder of the Seistan and Kaim sections reported on very shortly.

4. Copies of this letter with inclosures are being sent to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran and His Majesty's Consul-General, Meshed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) R. L. KENNION, Major, Indian Army,
His Britannic Majesty's Consul for
Seistan and Kaim.

Inclosure 3 in No. 389.

Report on the Condition of the Telegraph Line from Nasratnabad to Bandhan
(February 15 to 26, 1909).

AS the physical features of the country through which the line passes are very different, I have divided the line into two sections, viz., (1) Nasratnabad-Lab-i-Baring (2) Lab-i-Baring-Bandan.

2. Section 1. (a.) *Alignment*.—For the first 4 miles from the city the line crosses the "put," thence to Afzabad, a distance of 2 miles, over undulating country. From Afzabad to Mil-i-Baring across the "muizar."

The alignment from the city to Afzabad is faulty, as during the winter season that portion running across the undulating country is maintained with great difficulty, if at all. At the time of my inspection there were three posts leading over so much that their tops were barely a foot above the water, and but for the support given by

the wire itself, would undoubtedly have fallen. I brought this to the notice of the Ghilman Bashi at Bandan, but he informed me that owing to the depth of water nothing could be done at present. Two important points seem to have been overlooked in the construction of this section, viz., facility for inspection and repairs, and erecting posts in firm, solid ground. When ground liable to inundation cannot be avoided, special measures to ensure liability should have been adopted.

If the construction of the line from Kohat is sanctioned, it would be advisable to divert the line from Afghanistan to the city slightly south to meet this line, and thence onward to the city on the same supports.

The alignment across the "unizer" would appear the best that could be taken. If special measures, such as liberal cross-staying, bushing, planting the supports in lands of stones, &c., be adopted—as this part of the country is liable to inundation—there is every reason to hope that the line will remain stable.

(b.) *Posts*.—Except for a couple of miles from the city, the posts on this section are in a bad condition, for besides the majority being below the standard dimensions (the diameter at the base being barely $\frac{1}{2}$ inches), and their bases ant-eaten, there are no less than 50 no higher than 8 feet. In a country like Persia, where the camel abounds, the lowest roadway should not be less than 12 feet. In this connection I would draw attention to the following: the Ghilman Bashi informed me that recently an interruption occurred by a camel getting entangled in the line wire, and in trying to extricate itself pulled down two or three supports.

(c.) *Wire*.—The common fault is "tying down." This is due to two causes: firstly, when the wire was first erected the correct working strain was not given, as looking at it now it is much too tight; and, secondly, owing to the number of short posts, the tops do not follow even curves, that is, they suddenly rise and fall, this causes the wire to be tied down to the insulator on the low posts instead of the insulator supporting the wire. As undue strain is thus thrown on the insulators, they must crack or break, and, consequently, the insulation of the line, on which so much depends, is considerably reduced.

(d.) *Insulators*.—Several cracked and broken. This fault I noticed frequently occurred at severe angles and where the wire was tied down (please see the preceding paragraph).

3. *Section 2.* (a.) *Alignment*.—From the Mil-i-Baring the line crosses the "dasht" to Bandan. This alignment is good.

(b.) *Posts*. There are as many as sixty short posts on this section. Other conditions are much the same as those described in 2 (b).

(c.) *Wire*.—In the same condition as 2 (c).

(d.) *Insulators*.—In the same condition as 2 (d).

4. *General*.—The Ghilman Bashi at Bandan informed me that no thorough repairs were undertaken this winter. He did certain petty repairs on the section Seistan-Sideh with the help of the Ghilmans, but no funds were allotted, the expenditure incurred being met by contributions from the Ghilmans themselves! No Russian Inspector or Sub-Inspector accompanied the party.

No poles have been changed since the line was originally constructed; those ant-eaten at the base were simply cut down and re-erected, hence the large number of short supports. I have already drawn attention in paragraph 2 (b) to the deficiency in roadway, and, until steps are taken to replace these short posts, frequent interruptions may be expected.

No insulators are available to replace those broken.

I experienced great difficulty in working Seistan from Bandan; this was due to a very weak battery and no sulphate of copper available to charge the cells. The Ghilman Bashi informed me that the little he had had been sent to Seistan, and that the cry all along the line was for more sulphate of copper. My personal experience of Seistan is the same. From the present state of the line and batteries I can form but one opinion, and that is, there will be a sudden cessation of work very shortly. To prevent this, immediate steps should be taken to put the line and the batteries into working order.

(Signed)

E. A. McMANUS,

Sub-Assistant Superintendent.

[17551]

No. 390.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 10.)

(No. 76. Confidential.)

Sir,

Tehran, April 14, 1909.

IN my telegram No. 129 of the 3rd ultimo I reported that Mr. Edward Kitajhi was in Tehran seeking a Concession for the construction of a road from Kuh-i-Malik Shah to Nasatabad.

Mr. Kitajhi called yesterday at the Legation to tell me that he had not been pressing the matter, nor did he intend to do so during his present visit to Tehran. He told me, however, that on his return to London next month he hoped to interest the Foreign Office in his scheme, which, I gathered, embraced not only the construction of the proposed road, but also the establishment of a steam-traction service on it. I do not know whether Mr. Kitajhi is really in earnest about this Concession, the value of which is problematical. Indeed, I have reason to believe that the object of his visit to Tehran was quite other than that explained to me.

He is accompanied by a Mr. Richard, who is a jewel expert in the employ of Cartier, the great Paris jeweller, and the two have purchased jewellery from Naim-ess-Sultaneh to the value of 10,000*l*. It came to my knowledge a day or two ago that the Shah was attempting, on the part of the Shah, to dispose also of Crown jewels of great value, but I am happy to say that after a conversation which Mr. Churchill had with Mr. Kitajhi by my instructions, the latter was so much impressed by the resentment which he and his friends would be likely to incur with the Nationalist party if they bought Crown property, that they broke off negotiations with the Naim-ess-Sultaneh, which they assured me they had only proceeded with in the belief that the jewels really belonged to him.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[17552]

No. 391.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 10.)

(No. 77.)

Sir,

Tehran, April 16, 1909.

I NOTICE from the "Times" of the 1st instant, which has just reached me, that on the previous day Mr. Rees asked a question in the House whether you had any official information to the effect that the Shah's Government had received a loan through the German Bank in Tehran.

There is, of course, no German Bank in Tehran, and though there have been rumours from time to time that the Shah had received financial assistance from one of the great banks in Germany, I believe them to be totally unfounded. Not only does Count Quett deny that there has been anything of the kind, but it is obvious that any foreign loan would have sent down exchange, which, on the contrary, stands now at the unusually high rate of 56 kran to the pound. Such rumours are probably spread by the Shah's reactionary counselors in the hope of discouraging the Nationalists. They generally relate to alleged loans from the Imperial or the Russian Bank, and are intended to serve the additional purpose of engendering mistrust between the two Legations. It is true that the Shah has procured a certain amount of money during the last few weeks, and he has managed to pay three or four months' arrears to his troops. 20,000*l* were paid by Nizam-ess-Sultaneh on the understanding that he was to be appointed Minister of Finance, an understanding which, I should mention, has not been fulfilled; Karamedd-Dawleh still retains that portfolio, and Nizam-ess-Sultaneh has been forced to content himself with the Governorship of Kerman. Nayer-ed-Dawleh, the newly-appointed Governor of Mashed, is also said to have paid 30,000 kran for his post. Besides this the Shah has also received a considerable sum from a Russian subject for the mortgage of the fines on the export of lambskins. The only point in question has secured the mortgage for five years for a payment of 20,000*l*, which represents no more than one year's revenue from these fines. Only a part of this, however, has gone to Baghi-Shah, for my Russian colleague informs me that his Legation has contrived to secure a substantial portion for the settlement of *ceza* claims. Negotiations for the sale of the Crown jewels were in contemplation, but I

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am happy to say that the parties with whom the deal was to have been effected have realized that if they proceeded with the negotiations they would arouse the bitter resentment of the Nationalists. They assure me that as soon as they realized that the jewels were not the property of a private individual they abandoned their project, and they are leaving Tehran this week.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[17553]

No. 392

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 10.)

(No. 78.)

Sir,

Tehran, April 16, 1909.

SINCE my despatch No. 63 of the 25th ultimo there has been little change in the situation in Isfahan.

Sensam is daily awaiting the arrival of Sardar Assad, who is reported to be accompanied by some 2,000 Bakhtiari, and a move on Tehran is, it is said, projected for the 21st April. The Chiefs are now said to be united, and it appears very unlikely that any stand will be made by the Shah's troops at Kashan, who number some 1,500 men, including 300 Bakhtiari, who will probably join their fellow clansmen at the first opportunity. The few supporting troops at Kum are in a semi-mutinous state, and some days ago a number of them took part at the Indo-European Telegraph Department's office as a protest against the non-receipt of their pay, which they stated was two years in arrears. In these circumstances it is scarcely to be expected that the troops covering the road to Tehran will make any effective resistance should the Bakhtiari advance take place.

Meanwhile, an Isfahan order appears to be effectively maintained, though Sensam seems to be somewhat disconcerted with the attitude of the mullahs, headed by Agha Nejafi and to be far from successful in raising money by voluntary means for the payment of his men. An attempt was recently made by the Sadr Azam, through a certain Sahamias Saltaneh, to patch up matters between the Shah and the Bakhtiari, and a compromise was proposed by which the Governorship of Isfahan was to be conferred on Sensam, who, however, indignantly refused to listen to this clumsy effort at reconciliation.

Mr. Consul General Grahame has, so far, been successful in inducing Sensam to respect the lines of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, which the Chief had complained were being used against him. He appears to have been mollified by the promise I instigated Mr. Grahame to make, to the effect that after the 1st April the receipts for local traffic should be made over to him. By virtue of this arrangement a certain small sum (12,274 kranes) was handed over to Sensam at the beginning of April on account of the local traffic during the previous month, and the Department's wires are now working without interruption.

The Isfahan situation is in a state of deplorable insecurity. Some four weeks ago a Mr. Gerdemann, agent of Messrs. Ziegler, was robbed at Yazdkihiast, four stages north of Shiraz, by men belonging to the Lashan tribe. A Mr. Linton, of the Church Missionary Society, and the post between Dehdad and Sived have also been robbed, while two ghilman of the Indo-European Telegraph Department on the same stage have been held up by Arab tribesmen who beat and stripped them. On the 8th April His Majesty's Consul General at Isfahan was informed by Sensam that the tribesmen were on the war path, and that no British subjects should travel on any roads in the Isfahan district for some days to come.

Sensam added that he was ordering his people to take precautions against possible raiders.

Mr. Grahame has accordingly warned British subjects against travelling in the Isfahan neighbourhood until further notice. I have also directed His Majesty's Acting Consul at Shiraz to issue a similar notice, and a further warning has been also circulated among the British subjects in Tehran.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[17554]

No. 393.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 10.)

(No. 79.)

Sir,

Tehran, April 17, 1909.

WITH reference to Mr. Marlins's telegram No. 162 of the 27th June, 1908, reporting the appointment of M. Passek to be Russian Consul-General at Tehran, I have the honour to state that M. Passek has now left, and, from the language held by various Russian officials, I understand that he is not likely to return. During his stay here M. Passek did not enter upon the functions of his post, the new system of a separate Consulate-General not having as yet been put into force.

It is rumoured, but with how much truth I am unable to tell, that M. Pokhitonoff, lately Russian Consul-General at Tabreez, may succeed him.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[17555]

No. 394.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 10.)

(No. 80.)

Sir,

Tehran, April 19, 1909.

HOSTILITIES of minor importance only have occurred at Tabreez during the past few weeks. On the 24th ultimo a sortie was attempted against the Royalist army, and the Nationalists succeeded in capturing one position, but nothing further was achieved, as the bulk of their forces remained in their trenches; his loss is stated to have been thirty-four killed and wounded. An ineffectual bombardment of the town took place on the 5th instant, and a few shells were fired on the 14th instant, and some slight skirmishing took place the same day, but no definite engagement has taken place.

The disturbances at Urmia mentioned in my despatch No. 59 of the 24th ultimo were not of a serious character. They appear to have originated in an ill-advised attempt of the Governor to intimidate the Nationalists, who were subsequently reinforced by supporters from the surrounding districts and by some bands of Kurds, and induced the Governor to come to terms. A subsequent rising took place at the end of March, and the Governor, who is also President of the Frontier Commission, was deported to Sahnas, the Nationalists taking possession of the archives of the Commission. Mr. Wratishaw suspects the Turks of being implicated in the latter affair.

At the end of February a body of thirty-one Young Turks arrived in Sahnas. They are said to have been provided with letters of recommendation from the Committee of Union and Progress at Salonica, to have furnished the Nationalists with a number of Mauser rifles, and to have assisted in organizing an expedition to relieve Tabreez. This force, numbering, according to their own account, some 3,000 men—a figure which is probably greatly exaggerated—were reported on the 6th instant to have advanced to within some 10 miles of the city, but, beyond causing a certain amount of alarm in the local Assembly, it seems to have effected little. It would appear that neither the relievers nor the besieged have much real inclination for fighting or power to assume the offensive.

Meanwhile supplies in Tabreez had begun to run short, and famine was beginning to make itself felt, especially among the non-combatants. In view of the prevailing distress, it was felt to be expected that a disposition to open negotiations should manifest itself among certain sections of the population, and that the Shah should endeavor to reduce the town by the well-known method of spreading dissension among the besieged. Certain delegates were sent to the Royalist camp at Pasarsin, not, as I understand, officially representing the Nationalist party, but with their consent. I may here mention that the German Consular Agent offered his services as intermediary, but his assistance was declined by the local Assembly, who stated that no outside interference was desired. My telegrams of these last days will have kept His Majesty's Government informed regarding these negotiations and the general situation in Tabreez. The proposals of the local Assembly, which the Russian and British Consuls-General were requested to press upon the Shah through their respective Legations, and which were to the effect that supplies should be permitted to enter the town, and that delegates should be chosen to treat with the Shah and other towns with a view to a

general settlement, were such as His Majesty could scarcely be expected to listen to at a moment when events pointed towards the surrender of the Nationalist centre which had through so many months held out against him. The Turkish Chargé d'Affaires had two days previously pointed out the desperate condition of his nationals in the beleaguered city, and had addressed a menacing note to the Foreign Minister, Mr. Wratshaw, in telegraphing yesterday to me the conditions for an armistice laid down by the local Assembly, informed me that the amount of grain available for public consumption was less than he had been given to understand, and stated that there was a probability of riots taking place which might endanger the lives of the foreigners. To-day Mr. Wratshaw has informed me that the possibility of an attack on the foreigners had become very real, and it might possibly even be countenanced by the military leaders of the Nationalists.

In view of this very serious news, I to-day consulted with the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, with whom I have been in constant communication regarding the situation, and we have decided to seek a joint audience of the Shah to-morrow and to press upon His Majesty the urgent necessity of protecting the lives of the foreigners at Tabreez, which appear now to be in imminent danger.

I have just learned that the Shah will receive us to-morrow, and I shall have the honour to report the result of this audience in a separate despatch.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[17556]

No. 395.

(No. 81.)
Sir,

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 10.)

Tehran, April 20, 1909.

I DO not think it is necessary to trouble you with an account of the numerous conversations I have had with my Russian colleague on the subject of the critical turn affairs in Tabreez have lately taken, as my telegram and those of Mr. Consul-General Wratshaw will have kept you fully informed of the course of events.

As reported in my telegram No. 288 we decided late last night, in view of the urgency of the case, to ask for a joint audience of the Shah for the following day in order to urge upon His Majesty the necessity of granting a truce and of allowing the introduction of food in order to avoid the threatened attack on our Consulates and fellow subjects at Tabreez.

The audience took place this morning between 11 and 12. I began by making the usual inquiries as to His Majesty's health and immediately proceeded to read the statement, of which I have the honour to inclose a copy, a translation of which Mr. Churchill, who was present as well as M. Baranowsky, read to the Shah.

His Majesty said that he would give a reply, after carefully considering the matter, through the Minister for Foreign Affairs, but he desired to say that he had four days ago ordered his troops before Tabreez to desist from all hostilities pending the negotiations which were in progress, but that last night hostilities were opened by the rebels, and were still in progress.

Speaking on behalf of myself and of my Russian colleague, I informed the Shah that we were not concerned with the rights and wrongs of the struggle at Tabreez. The matter was too urgent to admit of discussion. We were face to face with a situation which presented the gravest perils for our respective Consuls and fellow-subjects there. I strongly urged His Majesty to give orders that an armistice should be declared and that supplies should be allowed to enter the town in order to avert the danger which threatened.

The Shah seemed to have some doubt as to the existence of provisions in the neighbourhood. I had reported that the rebels were attacking his forces, and asked whether his Generals were aware of such attacks with their armies folded.

I said that His Majesty declared that an armistice would be observed by him for a given time. I said of supplies were, during such truce, allowed into the town, my Russian colleague and I would instruct our Consuls to use all their influence to prevent the Nationalists from attacking.

The Shah said that Delegates had been sent to Basimchik from Tabreez to discuss terms of peace, and that the people of Tabreez were ready to submit but that, for the time being, the rebels under arms, as distinct from the peaceful population with whom

he had no quarrel, had made a determined attack on his forces. Was he at this juncture to allow provisions into the town?

I again impressed on the Shah the grave danger to which our Consuls and fellow subjects were exposed; a situation which demanded immediate action. Every minute was of importance if a catastrophe was to be avoided. M. Sabline joined in this earnest appeal.

The Shah replied that he had for nine months been endeavouring to get the mastery of the Tabreez rebels, and for this purpose he had besieged the town and stopped the entry of supplies. They were now in sore straits. Was he at this juncture to allow supplies in and thus undo all the work which had been done by his forces?

I said, in reply, that His Majesty was only asked by us to declare a temporary cessation of hostilities and to allow a limited quantity of provisions to enter the town which would at any rate avert the imminent danger to our Consuls and nationals.

The Shah replied that he did not know why the Foreign Consuls and subjects did not leave the town, to which M. Sabline and I answered that such a course was, under the circumstances, quite out of the question. My Russian colleague added:—

"Our Consuls cannot leave their fellow subjects in Tabreez—the interests at stake are too great; and the numerous Russian subjects in the town cannot go out—they have their families and property to think of. If we thought your Majesty could protect them we would ask you to do so; but you cannot. We must therefore insist that your Majesty will comply with our representations. Mr. Miller, who is known to your Majesty, has telegraphed to me that there is imminent danger of an attack, and I fear it may occur at any moment. Therefore I cannot sufficiently impress upon your Majesty the importance of immediate action. I would even add that the country is at stake."

The Shah appeared to be much impressed by this appeal, and after some further discussion agreed to send a telegram to Aïm-ed-Dowleh to hold his hand for six days (*i.e.*, until midday on Monday, the 26th April), during which time provisions approximately required for that period will be allowed to enter the city on condition that no attack is made in the interval on the Royalist forces.

M. Sabline and I undertook on our side to instruct the Consuls-General at Tabreez to communicate these terms to the Nationalists, and to use all their influence to prevent the resumption by them of hostilities.

We informed the Shah during the course of the audience, which lasted three-quarters of an hour, and at which the Minister for Foreign Affairs was present, that we proposed to wait upon him again the following day, in order to make representations of a more general character in accordance with the formal instructions of our two Governments.

On returning to the Legation I received a message from the Shah, through the Minister for Foreign Affairs, communicating the following telegram which he had just received from Aïm-ed-Dowleh:—

"The rebels only want to gain time, as they expect a relieving force from Urumia and Salmas which will attack Sirdar Nosret. There is absolutely no doubt that two guns have reached Salmas from Urumia."

The Shah desired it to be understood that, should this force attack his troops, the armistice would be considered at an end. I replied that I agreed on this point, and my Russian colleague subsequently gave a similar reply.

We have sent identical instructions to the British and Russian Consuls-General at Tabreez in the above sense, and it seems that for the time being the danger has been averted.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 395.

Note read (in translation) to Shah of Persia.

THE situation of our fellow subjects at Tabreez is serious in the extreme. It seems that the food in the town is so scarce that the people are desperate, and there is reason to apprehend that an attack on the British and Russian Consuls-General is in contemplation in order to secure provisions.

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In these circumstances, the Representatives of Great Britain and Russia are compelled to point out to your Majesty that the two Governments will hold him personally responsible for any harm which may come to their fellow-subjects and to the Consulates-General in Tabreez.

We have sought an audience to-day in order to indicate to your Majesty the only way of preventing the deplorable outrage threatened, and in view of the impossibility in which your Majesty's Government finds itself of protecting our subjects at Tabreez we are compelled to insist on the immediate necessity of pacifying the population of the town by granting a truce and by promptly taking the necessary measures for the introduction of food for the starving populace.

[17558]

No. 396.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 10.)

(No. 83.)
Sir,

Tehran, April 21, 1909.

AS reported in my telegram No. 202 of the 28th ultimo, Ain-ed-Dowleh seized and detained at Basimneh two sums of money, amounting respectively to 4,000 and 3,000 tomanis, which are being forwarded by post to Tabreez by Messrs. Stevens and Messrs. Ziegler.

I am glad to be able to report that the two firms have now received practically the whole of the money detained, including a further sum of 5,000 tomanis belonging to Messrs. Stevens, which was on its way from Tehran when I received news of the seizure of the first two amounts, though the money, upon being released by Ain-ed-Dowleh, and forwarded to Tabreez, was, upon its arrival there, impounded by the local Assembly, who only surrendered it upon the urgent representations of His Majesty's Consul-General.

I enclose copy of the note which I addressed to the Persian Government on the subject and of their reply, in which is given Ain-ed-Dowleh's explanation of the incident. From the information I have received from Mr. Wratlaw, I have no doubt that the story told by his Highness is no more than an after thought when he found that the Central Government was being pressed to take action, and I consequently replied declining to accept his Highness's protestations of good faith. A copy of this note is also inclosed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 396.

Sir G. Barclay to Saad-ed-Dowleh.

Your Excellency,

Tehran, March 27, 1909.

I REGRET to have to bring to the notice of the Shah's Government two further robberies committed by the Shah's General in command of the troops at Basimneh.

Sums respectively of 3,000 tomanis and 4,000 tomanis addressed to the British firms, Messrs. Stevens and Messrs. Ziegler have been seized in the post by Ain-ed-Dowleh, and I request your Excellency to move the proper Department of the Persian Government to refund this money promptly to the firms which have been so shamefully robbed.

Interest and cost of transfer will, of course, be charged to the Persian Government.

I should add that there is a further sum of 5,000 tomanis on its way to Messrs. Stevens in Tabreez, and in view of the shameless manner in which Ain-ed-Dowleh has acted, I request your Excellency to submit to the Shah the desirability of His Majesty's sending direct commands to Ain-ed-Dowleh to abstain from any further robberies.

I avail, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 396.

Saad-ed-Dowleh to Sir G. Barclay.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

Tehran, April 6, 1909.

WITH reference to your Excellency's note of the 27th ultimo respecting the money belonging to Messrs. Stevens and Messrs. Ziegler, I have to state that, as you have already been informed by my note of the 28th ultimo, strong and immediate orders were telegraphed by His Majesty to Ain-ed-Dowleh who has sent the following answer:—

"I have had the honour to receive Your Majesty's Rescript respecting the money belonging to the firms of Stevens and Ziegler. I have not consulted those two sums of money, but since the date of their arrival they are lying in the Basimneh Post Office.

"Owing to the disturbed state of the town, the postal Gadam does not dare to take the money to the town. The owners should come to Basimneh Post Office and get the money. With regard to the other sums the same course must be followed."

Since Ain-ed-Dowleh has taken these measures for the protection of the interests of the British subjects against the insurgents, it is a matter of great regret that the facts should have been misrepresented to you. It will no doubt be clear to your Excellency's enlightened mind to what extent it would be unpleasant to the Persian authorities, who always wish to protect the rights and increase the security of the British subjects, that the measure taken by them for the protection of the property of the subjects of a friendly Power should be interpreted as a robbery, and that it would necessitate an apology for the accusation brought against a well respected Prince. I have therefore no doubt that you will take such steps for the reparation that you may deem suitable and thus remove the unpleasant impression left on His Majesty on this account.

I avail, &c.
(Signed) SAAD-ED-DOWLEH.

Inclosure 3 in No. 396.

Sir G. Barclay to Saad-ed-Dowleh.

Your Excellency,

Tehran, April 8, 1909.

I HAVE received your note of the 6th April, in which you are good enough to inform me of Ain-ed-Dowleh's explanations regarding the money of Messrs. Stevens and Ziegler.

With regard to these explanations, I would point out that if his action was taken in the interests of the consignees, his proper course was to inform them. Ain-ed-Dowleh did not do so, and in view of the details which have now reached me from His Majesty's Consul-General, and especially having regard to Ain-ed-Dowleh's previous record, I regret that I am unable to credit that Prince's explanations.

While expressing my satisfaction that Ain-ed-Dowleh has now thought fit to restore the money in question, and thanking your Excellency for the effective action you have taken in the matter,

I avail, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[17560]

No. 397.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 10.)

(No. 85.)
Sir,

Tehran, April 22, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the monthly summary of events in Persia for the last four weeks.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 397.

No. 4.—*Monthly Summary.**Tehran.*

THE political situation at Tehran during the past four weeks has been unchanged. Saïed-Dowleh, First President of the late Majlis, took refuge at His Majesty's Legation on the 27th March with some of his relatives, on the plea that his life was in danger. They stated that they desired to leave for Europe, and the Shah gave them permission to do so. They have all now left the Legation, and some of them have actually left Tehran, but Saïed-Dowleh still remains in his house.

A few days later a prominent preacher, called Etamad-ul-Zakerin, took refuge at the Legation, having escaped, with a bullet wound in the arm, from Shah Abdul Azim on the night of the 23rd March, when several persons were murdered as reported at the time. He is still at the Legation.

M. de Rosthorn, the Austro-Hungarian Minister, left for Europe on the 3rd instant.

M. Baronowsky, the Russian Dragoman, returned from leave during the course of the month and had a private audience of the Shah which lasted over two hours, at which His Majesty declared his intention of re-establishing the Constitutional régime. M. Baronowsky having just married, His Majesty gave him a valuable diamond ring as a wedding present.

His Majesty's Minister and M. Sablino had audiences of the Shah on the 20th and 22nd April as reported fully in separate despatches.

Mme. de Hartwig will leave Tehran on the 24th April, having remained in Tehran five months after the departure of her husband.

(Signed) G. P. CHURCHILL

April 22, 1909.

Tabreez.

The situation forms the subject of a separate despatch.

Resht.

The town has remained quiet and order has been preserved. It is stated that a force of Nationalists under Sipahbar is about to start for Tehran. Traffic on the Tehran road has remained uninterrupted.

Astrabad.

It appears that the Jafarbai Turcomans telegraphed to the Shah some time ago that they were on his side, and would disperse the Nationalists if he sent them a Commander. The Nationalists sent one Haji Bahdin Khan to collect the Turcoman Chiefs and ask them to take the oath of fidelity to the Nationalist cause. The Turcomans murdered him and plundered his property, carrying off 5,000 cattle. His body was subsequently recovered, and buried by the Nationalists with great pomp.

On the 27th March some twenty Nationalists under one Panoff, who was formerly correspondent of a Russian newspaper at Tehran, arrived at Bender Gez and seized the telegraph office and customs house. A Russian subject who had committed murder was arrested by them and handed over to the Russian Agent for trial. On the 25th March some 5,000 people with red flags went out to bring the Nationalist into the town of Astrabad, which they entered shouting "Long live the Constitution" and "Down with Mohammed Ali." On the 1st April about twenty Nationalists arrested the Karguzar, who was suspected of having recommended the Russian Consul to the Jafarbai Turcomans, to induce them to assist the local Assembly. The Karguzar was afterwards released through the intervention of the Russian Consul. The latest news is that the town is surrounded by Turcomans, who are acting on the Shah's behalf. Fighting is proceeding, and the Russian Consul has applied for troops to be sent in to Astrabad.

Meshed.

The disturbances opened on the 7th April with the throwing of a bomb into the house of the new Governor-General's nephew, who was temporarily in command of the troops. The anti-Government party, led by some twenty Russian subjects, then seized the telegraph office, but did not interfere with the European signalmen. Guns were placed in position to protect the ark, and all soldiers were withdrawn from the city, where some of them had been disarmed. On the 8th intense excitement prevailed, and it was decided to attack the ark, but no attack was made. The local Assembly was reconstituted, and telegrams announcing the fact were sent all over Persia. On the 9th the Deputy Governor was imprisoned by the local Assembly, but was released two days later on taking the oath of fidelity to that body. Fifteen Caucasians and a Russian man and woman arrived to reinforce the Nationalists. During the next week much money was collected, and this divided the Assembly into several parties and made united action impossible. Both Consulates received letters from the local Assembly, with a request that their subjects should be warned not to join in the fray. It was also seriously intended to ask both Consulates to withdraw from the city, in order to give the Assembly a free hand, the fact being that their proximity to the ark and arsenal, and the certainty that they would resent fighting in their vicinity, made for peace. His Majesty's Consul-General states that his Russian colleague has looked on, and made no serious effort to restrain his subjects, without whose active aid the movement would never have started. A feud having broken out between some Turks, who were Russian subjects, and the people of Meshed, the Persian authorities asked Prince Dabija to either restrain his subjects, or if he could not do that, to state in writing that he would not hold the Persian Government responsible if they were killed. Prince Dabija replied verbally only that he would not claim compensation if they were killed. To his own subjects he has promised that as soon as one Russian subject is killed he will bring in Russian troops. The peaceful Russians wrote to him to the effect that they understood that he wanted some of them to be killed in order to have a good excuse for bringing in troops, but that they had no desire to be his sacrifice. It seems that the death of an Armenian, a Russian subject, gave him the excuse he desired, as early in April he informed two Persians that a seditious Cossack was on its way to Meshed.

The new Governor-General still remains at Nishapur on his way to Meshed.

Turbat-i-Hajdari.

1. Early in March Abdol-Dowleh was dismissed from the Governorship of Turbat. On the night of the 14th March Yawar Asadillat, at the head of 200 well-armed Baluchis entered Turbat and took possession of the town, installing himself in the house of the Governor. He killed the Deputy-Governor, an old enemy of his. The town remained quiet and Salar Khan, who assumed the management of affairs from the Yawar, published the following circular:—"We are Constitutionalists and desire only the peace and well-being of all. Foreigners and others are informed that life and property will be respected. All are warned that nobody should leave their houses after sunset." A censorship was established over the post and telegraph offices, but there was no interference with British or Russian correspondence. The people appeared quite satisfied with the turn events had taken.

2. Six Russian Cossacks arrived on the 9th March and five on the 17th March from Keran en route to Russia. On the 11th March six arrived from Meshed en route to Bender Abbas and five others on the 19th March from Karez, destination unknown.

Seistan.

1. Things remain quiet in Seistan and Kabi. The chief priests received telegrams early in March from Meshed telling them to suspend payment of revenue, but everyone seemed to be awaiting the turn of events.

2. M. Bravine expects to leave Seistan in May or June. He states that a Russian doctor will replace him as Consul pending the appointment of a permanent man.

3. Mr. Hinson, the new manager of the local branch of the Imperial Bank of Persia, arrived on the 4th March.

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Kerman.

1. On the 7th April His Majesty's Consul telegraphed that the roads to Kerman, the Meshed road excepted, were in the hands of robbers, the posts of five weeks were held up and the prices of provisions had risen greatly. The Meshed road being still open, Russian trade would profit by the fact. On the 13th he telegraphed that hungry crowds were rushing the bakers' shops, bread was scarce and there was no authority in the town. On the 14th he reported that Haji Naib had been appointed Kalantar of the town and had taken strong action with the result that the state of the town was better. The danger was that Russian trade would establish a strong hold on the local market owing to the southern routes being closed.

2. In the middle of April a party consisting of Colonel von der Flaas, the Russian Military Attaché in Seistan, another Russian, two Cossacks, and three Brahmins arrived at Kerman from Bam. It appears that the party has been making a survey, and that the Colonel, who left Seistan without permission from the Russian Consul there, has been recalled.

Yezd.

1. The German traveller, Dr. Pugh, is still at Yezd. He gives out that he is selling aniline dyer and makes light of the difficulties over the Customs prohibition thereon. So far he has no samples only. He states that the report that he was trading in arms was due to his servant, who had bought a Mauser rifle at Shiraz, wishing to sell it at Yezd.

2. Simson-es-Sultaneh, Bakhtiari, has telegraphed to Nain that he has heard that the town is in a disorderly state and advising the people to be quiet, otherwise he will have to send horsemen to restore order. The telegram ended with an inquiry as to when it would be convenient for horsemen to come to collect the first instalment of next year's revenue. No answer was given to this telegram.

3. By the end of March most of the Parsi villagers had returned to their villages, but no attempt had been made to restore to them their property, on the contrary, it was stated that small parties of Mahomedans were still blackmailing them secretly.

4. The general state of the country round Yezd shows no improvement. The postal service is dislocated and no road is free from robbers. The Nain road, which had been comparatively safe for some time has relapsed into insecurity. Europeans in Yezd have at last been provided with guards, but it is doubtful if the latter will remain long unless they get their pay more regularly than was the case with previous detachments.

Kermanshah.

1. A serious disturbance took place on the 27th March. On the 25th, a Jew convert to Christianity, by trade a stocking seller, beat his apprentice, a young Seyyid. The boy returned home, ate his dinner and slept well, but next morning, after fainting several times, he died. The hospital assistant attached to His Majesty's Consulate attended the boy, and told the boy's brother that, in his opinion, there was no connection between the boy's death and the beating he had received. Two Persian doctors also attended the boy. The boy's brother made no complaint, but the stocking seller was arrested and certain Seyyids, who are well-known bad characters, forbade the burial of the body, which they required to carry round in order to inflame the people against the Jews. A message to His Majesty's Consul that the Jewish quarter would probably be looted unfortunately failed to reach him. The next day one of the Seyyids went to the Governor and, under threat of exciting a riot, demanded the instant execution of the Jew-Christian. The Seyyids also compelled several of the chief priests to support their demand. The Governor, fearing a religious riot and hoping to end the matter, ordered the instant execution of the Jew, without further inquiry. The unfortunate and innocent man having been executed the looting of the Jewish quarter was at once begun. The Governor, though warned, took no steps to prevent the looting in which his soldiers took part. On receiving messages from Captain Haworth and the Russian Consul, however, he displayed some vigour, and prevented the Alliance Institute School being harmed. The most important part of the quarter had, however, been stripped of everything, even doors and windows being removed. A Jewish British subject had his house entirely stripped, but Captain Haworth's escort were in time to rescue him and his family, who were brought to the Consulate. There were no Jews killed outright,

but many died of their wounds. The Governor's weakness and want of force were the cause of the disturbance. His regiment and the artillery were alike conspicuous in the looting. The guard at our hospital, when remonstrated with for taking part, replied that it was by the Governor's order. Captain Haworth telegraphed to His Majesty's Minister asking that the Governor might be dismissed. Subsequent to the raid the chief priest spoke very strongly against it, and disclaimed all responsibility for it, and the Governor entrusted to them the task of recovering the looted property and restoring it to the Jews. A good deal of property has been restored. Captain Haworth reports that he has been much astonished by the practical sympathy shown by the Mahomedans in sending food and covering to the Jews. He adds that many Jews owe their lives to Mahomedans who, in some cases, actually stood armed in front of their Jewish friends until they could take them to their own homes. It is openly admitted that the Jew-Christian was innocent and that his apprentice died a natural death. The Governor, Zahir-ul-Mulk, himself admits that the executed man was innocent, and says he executed him to prevent a riot.

On the 7th April it was rumoured that an attack was to be made on the Jews, this time on their lives, and not on their property. A large number of the more important Jews in Kermanshah are Babis, and a picture of the Bab, found among the stolen goods, appears to have excited some of the big gamesters in the bazaar. All the Jews who were Turkish subjects took refuge in the Turkish Consulate and the leading Persian Jews in our Consulate. Captain Haworth and the Turkish Consul obtained from the Governor a written guarantee for the safety of the Jewish quarter, which was strongly garrisoned that night by soldiers and riflemen. While Captain Haworth was arranging for the removal of the refugees to the house of the head Representative of the Persian Foreign Office, the Mahomedan chief priest sent word that he would look after them. As they were willing, Captain Haworth sent them to him, and he had them escorted safely to their homes.

2. Early in April the Mahomedan chief priest was suspected of wishing to proclaim the adherence of Kermanshah to the Nationalist cause, but up to date this has not been done.

3. At Hamadan the Nationalist movement collapsed on the arrival of a new Deputy Governor with troops, but the movement is likely to recommence.

4. On the 1st April a man was blown from a gun for killing an artilleryman. It is stated that the man's brother was the real assailant. In any case, after the gun was fired it was found that the man was injured, whereupon some followers of the Chief Priest rushed in and released him. He had called upon Hazrat-i-Abbas, and the whole town was illuminated the same evening in honour of the miracle performed by the saint. The executioner was so struck with remorse that he repented his sins, and renounced his profession, and has joined the staff of the Chief Priest, while a near relative of the Jew who was recently executed, who is employed by Lotz, the German chemist, was also so overcome that he became a Mahomedan. He has been very nervous ever since the looting of the Jews. The indignity state that the executioner was bribed by the Chief Priest to fire the criminal's rifle, that he could get away from the muzzle of the gun, and the fact that he is buried under one arm would appear somewhat to discount the miracle; thus the repentance of the executioner and his renouncing his profession becomes intelligible. Both he and the criminal are with the Chief Priest.

5. Dood Khan, the Kallur Chief, has patched up a friendship with Sher Khan, late Chief of the Sinjabis, and has agreed to reinstate him. It appears that Habibullah Khan, who is at present Governor of Kasr-i-Shir, will have to vacate that position and the Chiefship of his tribe. Dood Khan, it will be seen, presently appoints or dismisses the Governor of Kasr without reference to what the supreme Government may desire, and also dictates who shall be Chief of the Sinjabis.

6. With reference to the kind treatment of Jews by Mahomedans, it should be mentioned that the Chief Priests at Kerbela, in response to a request made to them, telegraphed to the priests at Kermanshah urging them to respect the lives and property of the Jews.

Shiraz.

1. The constitutional agitation continued during the first half of March, and the Governor-General continued his policy of mysterious inactivity. On the 17th March Nasreddin Dowleh, the Kapanu's brother, called on His Majesty's Consul and discussed the situation freely. He said he had no wish to commit himself to either the

Royalist or the Nationalist causes, and that it was therefore necessary to sit on the fence as long as possible in the hope of foreign intervention. Mr. Bill says that, in spite of all discouragement, all classes are firmly convinced, and express that conviction continually, that there is no possible means of restoring order except by foreign help. On the 18th March the Kawan visited Mr. Bill and also discussed the situation frankly. He laid stress on his belief that the only remedy left for Persia was British intervention. Mr. Bill thinks that this idea, which is clearly in the air, will probably be effaced at least temporarily by the Nationalist successes at Bushire and Bunder Abbas and the progress of the Nationalist movement at Shiraz, but if this in its turn fails to restore the desired order, a strong movement in favour of intervention may be expected. On the 24th a very important meeting was held which was attended by Nasir-ed-Dowleh, Ata-ed-Dowleh, and the Governor-General's Vizier, and by numerous representatives of all classes. The first proceeding was a speech by Amini-Hade in praise of union and Constitution. The whole assembly acclaimed the Constitution. A long discussion followed, in the course of which it was decided to inaugurate the constitutional Government of Fars the following day, to send messengers to Sheikh Zakariyeh and Seyyid Abul-Hussein to induce them to remain quiet, and also to Nasir-ed-Dowleh to enlist his support. Telegrams announcing the re-institution of the Constitution in Shiraz were also to be sent to all parts of Persia. The first result of this meeting was the visit to the Consulate on the following morning of Moine-ul-Islam, one of the more civilized members of the popular party. Having requested Mr. Bill to make notes of what he said, he made the following statement: "The movement had been going on for some time, but had been delayed by the necessity of obtaining unanimity by negotiation with the Kawanis, &c. All parties were now agreed on the subject of the movement, which was the attainment of the national rights as provided in the Constitution to which the Shah had sworn. The leaders were all "democratic reformers" (these words, in English, and precise meaning to Moine-ul-Islam probably very doubtful); but all others, including the Governor-General, had now come in. At the meeting held on the 24th it was agreed that fifty persons should be chosen, including all members of the former Grand Assembly, to meet in the building which was formerly made over to the use of the Grand Assembly, on the afternoon of the 26th. It was to be opened by the Governor-General, in conjunction with Mirza Hashim. The object of all parties was to cultivate the good-will of foreign Powers, especially the two neighbouring Powers, and of these especially Great Britain, as a Parliamentary country. The last phrase was evidently very carefully composed. After delivering himself of the above inappreciable sentiments Moine-ul-Islam became much more confidential. He explained that the reformers had only succeeded in bringing round the Kawanis and other persons of rank by arranging for Sheikh Zakariyeh's expedition in concert with the Lari Seyyid; and that while clerical co-operation was essential at the outset, they hoped soon to be able to dispense with it and govern in a civilized way." He added that they proposed to form a Committee as follows: for revenue, public order, justice, and police. It was not clear as to the functions of the last.

Unfortunately this programme has not made much progress. The fifty members duly met as proposed, but not under the presidency of the Governor-General. On the 24th the latter telegraphed to the Grand Vizier in apologetic terms, to the effect that a meeting of all the principal persons of Shiraz had decided to establish a local Assembly, and he was helpless. To this no direct reply seems to have been sent, but on the 26th a telegram arrived from the Grand Vizier to the Governor-General, Kawan-ul-Mulk, Nazir of Mulk, and others of the nobility, assuring them that all would be well, and that troops were about to start for Isfahan. The Assembly met as arranged in a Government building on the 24th, 27th, 28th, and 30th, under the presidency of the Governor-General's Vizier. They seem to have talked a great deal, and to have come to the following decisions:—

(a.) Rules of procedure. Assembly to meet for three hours three times a week. No member to bring in any followers; language of debate to be simple, without titles or flowery forms of address.

(b.) Telegrams to be sent to Talence, Isfahan, Najaf, and Constantinople.

(c.) Messengers to be sent to Seyyid Abul-Hussein, Sheikh Zakariyeh, and Nasir-ed-Dowleh. The object of the two former was to be to cause the Sheikh to return to Lar, now that the National cause had triumphed; and of the latter to persuade the Sultan to charge himself with the maintenance of order on the road to Bushire, by Kazerun or Fuzulabad, as he might prefer, and to invite him to come and confer with his friends in Shiraz.

(d.) Nasir-ed-Dowleh to be entrusted with the Isfahan road, and to be maintained in charge of the Khamsa tribes.

(e.) Pending an arrangement with Nasir-ed-Dowleh the Bushire road to be patrolled as far as Kazerun by fifty men, having their headquarters at Kluahue Zium.

(f.) Ata-ed-Dowleh to take the usual precautions against a rise in prices by punishing any one exporting food-stuffs.

The Committees, though much discussed, have not yet been elected.

Asaf-ed-Dowleh visited the Assembly, and made a long speech to the effect that he had been with them in heart all along. At this same meeting appeared a deputation from an organization of malcontents, headed by the son of the Russian chief merchant (a Russian subject), who complained that as no regular elections had been held the proceedings were void. A somewhat lively dialogue ensued between the Russian and Asaf-ed-Dowleh. When asked how these matters concerned a foreign subject, he claimed to be a Persian, but when asked to put this declaration in writing he refused point blank.

Altogether the most important events were those which took place outside the Council chamber. It appears that in spite of apparent unanimity the Shirazis are as hopelessly divided as ever; and there seems to be a real danger that the ultimate result of these divisions may be that Sheikh Zakariyeh, who has been invited by the extreme Constitutionalists, may come to Shiraz unopposed merely because, though all hate and fear him, they cannot bring themselves to trust one another sufficiently to unite in resisting him by force. The accounts received of his proceedings exhibit him as a mere savage. He destroyed the Jewish quarter at Darab (this is confirmed by the reports of refugees who have arrived thence), he is said to have burnt two Babis alive at Shiraz and to have caused the Sheikh-ul-Islam of that place to be led round the bazars with a bit in his mouth for refusing to acknowledge the Seyyid (the Karguzar is the source of this report, but it is not confirmed). As a consequence the Jews are panic-stricken and all classes are alarmed; prices have also risen considerably, and sugar especially to the almost prohibitive price of 9 kranas a maund. On the 29th the Postmaster visited the Consulate and, after making the usual inquiry as to the prospects of intervention, asked whether, in the event of Sheikh Zakariyeh's coming to Shiraz, His Majesty's Consul would accept the deposit of a box containing 3,000*l.* in stamps. He was told that his request would be referred to His Majesty's Legation if the Sheikh's arrival became at all imminent. There can be very little question that if the Sheikh does come, and the Nasir-ed-Dowleh does not, the situation for all classes, including even foreigners, will become very serious. The last news is that Nasir-ed-Dowleh is to be sent out with a force, ostensibly to preserve order, and if necessary to enforce the instructions of the Assembly to the Sheikh to return home; but there is no directing mind in Shiraz, and it is quite possible that to-morrow's arrangements may be quite different. To understand the situation it is necessary to remember that the Laris are exceedingly backward and, from all accounts, care no more for the Assembly than for the Autocracy; what they are out for is the blood of the Kawan brothers; and though the latter have temporarily cut the ground from under their feet, no one seriously believes that they will be content with what they must believe to be a transparent subterfuge. The best thing for Shiraz now would seem to be the arrival of Nasir-ed-Dowleh to keep the peace, however rough. He seems, however, determined to keep aloof, well knowing that neither side can afford to quarrel with him.

Writing on the 3rd April Mr. Bill described the situation as very bad. The Shah's authority was dead, at any rate temporarily, and there was no faith in the Assembly. His visitors all asked him what was to be the end, and several asked point blank how long the British Government was going to stand the present condition of its trade and claims. Shiraz being in many ways a commercial adjunct of Bombay, Shirazi merchants are thoroughly conversant with English methods, and many have visited India. They naturally contrast their present financial position and prospects with those they would enjoy under the British flag. The same is true of the landowners.

2. The condition of the roads is very bad indeed. Posts are frequently robbed on both the Isfahan and Bushire roads. On the 28th March a postal waggon in which Mr. Linton, of the Church Missionary Society, was travelling was robbed near Dehbid. This robbery is important, as the Governor had sent a strong telegram through His Majesty's Consulate to Dehbid, directing that a strong guard should be supplied, and there were present on the road no less than three parties sent out to inquire into

Mr. Gentleman's robbery, so that the bankruptcy of the local authority may fairly be said to be demonstrated. The whole road almost up to Isfahan itself seems to be at the mercy of bands of robber tribesmen who either attack passing caravans or plunder the villages near the road. In one case a caravan of pilgrims was attacked, but the pilgrims, being numerous and armed, were able to beat off the attack with a loss to the attackers of two men killed.

PERSIAN GULF.

Bushire.

1. The general situation here forms the subject of a separate despatch.
2. Mr. Pearson, of the Carnegie Institution, Washington, arrived on the 14th March, and was given the necessary facilities by the Residency for carrying out his magnetic observations.

Bunder Abbas.

1. The new British Consulate buildings have now been completed. Major Cox inspected them during his visit in February.

Lingah.

1. Mr. Brown, of the German firm Robert Wronckhaus, left on the 28th February for Baybay, and it is said that he has gone to Germany in compliance with telegraphic instructions from his principals.
2. Mr. Pearson, of the Carnegie Institution, Washington, arrived on the 2nd March. At his request he was allowed to use a garden belonging to the Residency Agent for taking observations, and has marked the place with a pillar for future use.
3. Letters, &c., received by Persian post at Lingah on the 5th March from Lar did not bear the usual postage stamps. It appears that Seyyid Hussain, Lar, had taken away from the postmaster at Lar the Government postal seal and substituted one bearing the words "Nationalist Post-office Laristan," and directed him not to use the usual postage stamps, but to affix the new seal and recover the postage due in cash and pay it to him. He also asked the postmaster at Lingah not to charge anything to the addressees of letters for stamps. This, however, the postmaster refused to do, and demanded double postage from the addressees, but was eventually persuaded to accept the usual (single) rate of postage.

Mohammerah.

1. Affairs at Dizful and Shuster are reported to be worse, and the road between the two towns is interrupted by robbers.
2. Sindar Assad, Bakhtiari, who recently arrived from Europe, left Mohammerah for Isfahan on the 25th March.

(Signed) C. B. STOKES, Major,
Military Attache.

[17561]

No. 398

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 10.)

(No. 86.)
Sir,

Tehran, April 22, 1909.

SINCE writing my despatch No. 50 of the 24th ultimo I have during the present month forwarded to you the various telegraphic reports which have reached me from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire in regard to the development of the situation at that place consequent on the action of certain Nationalists and more especially that of Seyyed Morteza Ahmadi in taking over the conduct of the local Government.

The attitude of Seyyed Morteza has, indeed, been the determining feature of the movement. It is evident that without his initiative and the considerable force of ridemen of which he has been able to dispose it would not have been possible for the Nationalist party so easily to overthrow the Shah's authority, but, though the Seyyed at the beginning professed his allegiance to the Nationalist cause with much vehemence,

it has become increasingly clear that he has throughout been actuated rather by a desire for personal gain than by any more disinterested motives. The force which he introduced into the town is composed of tribesmen of the immediate hinterland of which the Seyyed is also a native, and the troubles which have taken place under the Seyyed's régime have been entirely due to their lawlessness. The looting of a portion of the bazaar on the 7th inst. by these men and the serious danger of further excesses necessitated the landing of a force from His Majesty's ship "Fox," which had recently been ordered to Bushire. Besides having a most salutary effect upon the Seyyed's ridemen, the landing of the force has gone far to allay the growing nervousness of the foreign Consuls and thus has forestalled an appeal by them to their Governments for protection.

Public order has been fairly well maintained, but the continued presence of the ridemen, whom the Seyyed refuses to remove, keeps the population in a constant state of alarm. The Nationalists are now unanimous in repudiating the Seyyed, but they are unable to expel him from the town, as they wish to do, without assistance. With regard to the question of the customs revenue, the Seyyed, after agreeing to the arrangement by which, after subtraction of a certain sum for current Nationalist expenses, the balance should be held in trust by three "trustworthy" Persian merchants, succeeded in undermining the honesty of these three persons and appropriated all the money on deposit. In all he has had from the customs 20,000 toman.

The present position is that, pending the conclusion of an entirely satisfactory arrangement with the responsible Nationalist leaders, the receipts are to be retained on the customs premises in the possession of the Belgian officials, and I have authorized Major Cox to use the presence of the bluejackets at the custom-house in order to prevent the Seyyed from making any further seizure.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[17562]

No. 399.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 10.)

(No. 87.)
Sir,

Tehran, April 22, 1909.

MY Russian colleague and I, accompanied by our dragomans, were received in audience by the Shah this morning, when I read to His Majesty the statement of which I have the honour to inclose a copy herewith.

His Majesty, who listened with attention to the translation which Mr. Churchill read to him—even asking for a passage which he failed at first to grasp to be read over again—replied in the following terms:—

"It is evident that Great Britain and Russia, as friendly and neighbouring Powers, are keenly interested in the prosperity of Persia. I have therefore received the representations which have now been made to me with much satisfaction, and I shall, after consultation, communicate my reply through my Minister for Foreign Affairs."

I asked when we might expect to receive His Majesty's reply, to which the Shah replied that it would be given very soon.

We then withdrew.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 399.

Note read (in translation) to Shah of Persia.

IT is now nearly four months since the Representatives of His Britannic Majesty and of His Imperial Majesty the Czar last advised your Majesty jointly to fulfil the pledges so repeatedly given to your people and to the two Representatives to re-establish constitutional government in Persia.

Unfortunately for your Majesty and for your unhappy country—unfortunately, too, for the interests of Great Britain and Russia—your Majesty has persisted in violating those pledges, and in following the advice of evil counsellors rather than the wise counsels of the two neighbouring and friendly Powers, with the result that the situation has gone from bad to worse, and that it is now difficult to point to any part of the country, except the capital, where the Central Government has any authority. Not only are the principal towns in revolt against the present reactionary system, but the general condition of anarchy has spread so as to be well-nigh irreparable—a state of things not only disastrous for your Majesty and your subjects, but also fraught with great injury to the nationals of the two neighbouring Powers.

Had your Majesty followed the friendly advice of the two neighbouring Powers four months ago the state of Persia would have been very different from the deplorable condition of affairs existing to-day, which has become a byword amongst the civilized nations of the world. Had your Majesty fulfilled your pledges four months ago, a reconciliation between your Majesty and your Majesty's people would have ensued immediately, and there is no reason to doubt that in a short space of time the united efforts of your Majesty and of a Constitutional Government would have brought about a notable improvement in the general condition of the country. Your Majesty's persistent failure to fulfil your pledges has produced a situation where the restoration of order will be a task of extreme difficulty. Nevertheless, the two Representatives feel that there is no reason to despair provided that your Majesty loses no time in abandoning the present deplorable methods of government, which, since the destruction of the Medjlis last autumn, your Majesty has been following under the advice of men who have proved themselves the enemies of their country. But if your Majesty delays further the fulfilment of your pledges, then, indeed, there will be no hope of your Majesty's succeeding in arresting the growing anarchy.

It is in this conviction that the two friendly and neighbouring Powers, whose sole desire is to see Persia emerge from the present deplorable crisis an independent, well-governed, and prosperous nation, after careful consideration of the situation in all its bearings, have instructed their Representatives to seek a joint audience of your Majesty, and to make to your Majesty the following recommendations. In making the communication which follows, the two Representatives are instructed by their two Governments to declare categorically to your Majesty that, if your Majesty does not accept in all its details the programme now recommended by the two Powers, the two Powers will desist from giving advice, and will leave your Majesty to your own resources, and your Majesty will no longer be able to count on any support from them or their agents.

Point 1. Mushir-es-Sultanch and Amir Bahadur Jang to be removed from their offices. Amir Bahadur Jang to be removed not only from the Cabinet, but also from any other office in the Palace.

Point 2. After the introduction of the following reforms, the Shah to re-establish a Constitutional régime.

Point 3. The appointment of a Cabinet composed of persons worthy of confidence, and the addition, without delay, to the Council of the Empire of enlightened persons belonging to different parties. The Council to elaborate and promulgate a new Electoral Law. If the Shah chooses people for the Cabinet or Council not inspiring confidence, no money advances will be made to Persia.

Point 4. The immediate Proclamation of a General Amnesty to cover all those who have taken up arms against the Shah and who have committed political offences, but to exclude those who have committed offences against the common law. As regards these latter and those who have committed acts of brigandage, guarantees to be given by the Persian Government that they shall have an impartial trial.

Point 5. A date to be immediately fixed for the elections and for the convocation of the Assembly. These dates to be made known without delay to the whole country.

Point 6. As soon as the measures enumerated in paragraphs 1 to 5 have been taken by the Shah, the Russian Government may, if it thinks necessary, make an advance to the Persia Government for the urgent expenses necessitated by the introduction of reforms, on condition that the British Government will, if it considers it necessary, make a similar advance to the Persian Government, as soon as the elected Assembly has adopted this advance. It is afterwards found necessary to facilitate a larger loan to Persia this could only be effected under certain guarantees, which will form the object of a subsequent exchange of views between the two Governments and the Persian Government.

Animated by the sincere desire to assist Persia in the crisis of extreme gravity through which she is now passing, the Cabinets of London and St. Petersburg have agreed on this programme of friendly advice to be given to the Shah, and the two Governments believe that the execution of the programme in question, is the only means for Persia of escaping from her present almost inextricable situation.

[17674]

No. 400.

Consul Stevens to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 10.)

(No. 8.)
Sir,

Batoum, April 25, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to report that two compound battalions of the 1st Caucasian Rifle Brigade, one galling gun company, and a battery of artillery-entrained yesterday at Tiflis in three echelons for Julla on the Persian frontier, from whence the troops have orders to proceed, by forced marches, to Tabreez.

Before leaving Tiflis the detachments referred to were inspected by General Shatilov, 2nd in command of the Army of the Caucasus, and attended a *Te Deum* service during which the men were sprinkled with Holy water.

After the Church service, General Shatilov, who paraded the force, wished the men God speed and congratulated them on their good fortune in being selected to take part in an expedition outside the limits of the Empire. The words spoken by the General evoked three cheers from the troops for His Imperial Majesty, for the Russian army, and for the General. This concluded the proceedings, the three detachments being then marched to the railway station. It is reported the expeditionary force is to be joined by two or three sotnias of Cossacks at Russian Julla.

I have, &c.
(Signed) P. STEVENS.

[17569]

No. 401.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 10.)

[Extends Sir A. Nicolson's telegram No. 235 of April 30.]

(No. 277.)
Sir,

St. Petersburg, May 1, 1909.

I CALLED on M. Teliarsky yesterday afternoon and explained to him what had passed between M. Isvolsky and myself in regard to giving a guarantee to the Shah for his personal safety. I left with M. Teliarsky a Memorandum of which I have the honour to inclose a copy. M. Teliarsky said that he would telegraph to M. Sahliue in the sense of the Memorandum, and he considered that if the guarantee of the nature indicated were given to the Shah it would remove the last objection of His Majesty to accepting the advice proffered to him by the two Governments. I said that I trusted that this might be the case, though the desire of the Shah to appoint the Nizhes-Sultanch as Grand Vizier was not of very good augury. M. Teliarsky replied that he thought that a great step had been made by the Shah having relieved the Grand Vizier and Amir Bahadur Jang of their offices.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

Inclosure in No. 401.

Aide-mémoire.

THE question of giving a guarantee to the Shah in the event of his acceding to the programme of reforms proposed by the Governments of Russia and Great Britain has formed the subject of conversations between his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the British Ambassador. His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs was of opinion that if a guarantee were to be given it should be in writing and signed by the two Representatives at Tiflis; but he was desirous of ascertaining the views of the British Government on the subject.

His Majesty's Embassy have the honour to state that the British Government

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have no objection to giving a guarantee in writing as suggested, provided that the Representatives at Tehran see no disadvantage in such a course and provided that the assurances are strictly limited to those given verbally last December by the dragomans of the two Legations.

The assurances were as follows:—

"So long as His Majesty fulfils sincerely the rôle of Constitutional Sovereign, he will have the support and sympathy of the two Representatives of Russia and Great Britain, and the two Representatives will, in case of necessity and should he seek it, afford him protection for his person. The two Representatives are, however, persuaded that the best guarantees against the danger foreseen by His Majesty would be the re-establishment of the Constitutional régime and his sincere co-operation for its good working."

St. Petersburg, April 17 (30), 1909.

[17570]

No. 402.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 10.)

[Extends Sir A. Nicolson's telegram No. 236 of April 30.]

(No. 278.)
Sir,

St. Petersburg, May 1, 1909.

M. TCHARYKOFF informed me yesterday that the advance guard of the Russian forces had arrived in the vicinity of Tabreez, and had met with no difficulties on the way. The advance guard had covered 136 verstas (about 85 miles) in two days, which he thought was a very creditable performance. Sattar Khan had shown a good disposition towards the force, which had brought with them about 5000 worth of flour, which would be distributed gratis among the poorer population, or at very moderate prices among the better-to-do.

M. Tcharykoff added that, now that the hostilities had ceased between the two contending parties, the Russian Government had instructed their Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran to arrange that a Russian officer should be dispatched to take command of the Persian Cossacks who were with Mir-ed-Dowleh. When the terms to be concluded between the town and the Shah's forces had been arranged, it would be well that some trustworthy force should enter Tabreez to prevent any pillaging on the part of the troops, and the only men who could be relied upon for the purpose were the Cossacks. It was necessary that they should have one of the Russian officers over them when employed in maintaining order.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[17575]

No. 403.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 10.)

(No. 283.)
Sir,

St. Petersburg, May 3, 1909.

SIR G. BARCLAY was good enough to repeat to me his telegram No. 350 regarding the dismissal of the Saad-ed-Dowleh, and the opinion of himself and of M. Sabline that it would be well if they were to inform the Shah that the two Powers considered that he had rejected their advice. I thought that it would be of interest to you to know the views of the Russian Government on the subject, and I therefore addressed a private letter to M. Tcharykoff giving the substance of Sir G. Barclay's telegram, and asking what was his opinion. I have the honour to transmit copy of the reply which he has sent to me.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

Inclosure in No. 403.

M. Tcharykoff to Sir A. Nicolson.

Dear Sir Arthur,

St. Petersburg, April 19 (May 2), 1909.

I HAVE received from Sabline a telegram in the same sense as you from Barclay. We are of opinion that a Cabinet without the Saad-ed-Dowleh and Nasr-ul-Mulk will be unable to undertake the reforms which our Governments advise. Having to-morrow an audience, I intend asking His Majesty the Emperor to allow me to telegraph to Sabline that unless the Shah agrees to accept the two above-named personages, he should be told that the two Powers will consider that he has rejected their advice.

I have no objection to your informing Sir E. Grey of the contents of this letter.

Yours, &c.
(Signed) M. TCHARYKOFF.

[17579]

No. 404.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 10.)

(No. 287.)
Sir,

St. Petersburg, May 5, 1909.

I TOLD M. Tcharykoff this afternoon that Mr. Wratislaw had telegraphed that reports from the Royalist camp near Tabreez spoke of the occupation of Urumia and Soulboulak by the Turkish forces, but that the information which Sir G. Barclay had derived from the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran seemed, according to the statements of the latter, to indicate that the Turks were merely sending some guards to protect their Consulates.

M. Tcharykoff said that he had just received information from a confidential but trustworthy source at Erzeroum, to the effect that 120 men from each of the three battalions in that place had been ordered to proceed to protect "the Consulate." No information had been given as to which Consulate reference was made, but he presumed that Urumia was meant. He was uneasy in regard to a possible Turkish occupation of Urumia, and he trusted that His Majesty's Government would support the Russian Government in case the latter might think it necessary to make any representations at Constantinople on the subject.

He also was of opinion that the two Governments should offer their mediation in respect to the delimitation of the Three-Persian frontier. I said that I presumed that he did not wish that the suggestion should be made at once. He replied that it would be well that the Commission should make one more endeavour to arrive at a settlement, and that if failure were to ensue, which was more than probable, the two Powers might then offer their services.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[17756]

No. 405.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 10.)

(No. 378.)
(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 10, 1909.

SHAH and constitution.

The Shah has to-day issued a rescript ordering that, "in pursuance of the fundamental law (constitution) without any alteration," a number of learned constitutionists, trusted by the Government and people, be added to the council and immediately draft an electoral law. The elections will be commenced immediately after the promulgation of this law, which will be made without delay. The National Assembly will be opened in the same place as formerly when two-thirds of the deputies are ready to take their seats.

The Shah has adopted our suggestions, and the Cabinet, we think, is as satisfactory as circumstances permit. Saad-ed-Dowleh will hold the position of Prime Minister until the return of Nasr-ul-Mulk.

A general amnesty for political offences, with licence for exiles to return, has been proclaimed in a separate decree.

Our consuls at the various centres of revolt are being instructed to point out to the Nationalists that it is now their duty to do everything in their power to secure a reconciliation between the Popular party and the Shah.

[15056]

No. 406.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 661.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 10, 1909.

ADVANCE to the Persian Government.

Have you any information beyond that contained in your telegram No. 221 of the 21st ultimo? In order that the two Powers should appear to act together in the question of the advance, if their advice is accepted by the Shah, it is important that some arrangement should be arrived at on the subject.

[17154]

No. 407.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 235.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 10, 1909.

PROTECTION of Bahrainis.

IN reply to your telegram No. 240 of the 8th ultimo, the communication to the Persian Government can be worded as you think best, but His Majesty's Government cannot allow the Persian Government to exercise sovereignty over the inhabitants of Bahrain, and they will continue to act in accordance with this principle.

[17349]

No. 408.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 236.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 10, 1909.

ANGLO-RUSSIAN representations to the Shah.

Reference is to your telegram No. 372 of the 7th instant.

If the Nationalists are not now satisfied with the tardy surrender of the Shah we cannot be responsible in any way.

In such a case your attitude should be one of strict neutrality, and any action which might be interpreted as intervention should be avoided.

The instructions sent on the 25th December, 1907, to Mr. Marling may be taken as holding good, in the event of the Shah taking refuge at the Legation.

[17527]

No. 409.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 237.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 10, 1909.

ACTION of German Consul at Bushire.

Reference is to your telegram No. 374 of the 8th instant.

No further action will be taken by His Majesty's Government at Berlin for the present in view of lack of any definite proof of the German Consul's interference, and of his denial of the action attributed to him.

[17752]

No. 405°.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 10.)

(No. 244.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, May 10, 1909.

PERSIA.

My telegram No. 212 of the 8th May.

I am informed by M. Tcharykow that the Russian Government have decided that a certain number of Cossacks shall be kept in readiness at Baku, so that they may, if necessary, be despatched to protect the Resht-Tehran road. M. Tcharykow adds, however, that he hopes that it will not be necessary to despatch this detachment now that negotiations with the Shah have taken a satisfactory turn.

17760]

No. 411*.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received May 11.)

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Admiralty, May 10, 1909.

WITH reference to Admiralty letter of the 14th April and to subsequent correspondence, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of a telegram from the commander-in-chief on the East Indies station respecting the relief of the crew of His Majesty's ship "Fox," at present landed at Bushire for the protection of the lives and property of Europeans.

My Lords consider that, for the reasons given by the commander-in-chief, the situation does not appear to require the presence of a naval force on shore, and desire me to express the hope that it may be found possible to make other arrangements for the provision of such guards as may now be necessary at Bushire, in order that the crew of the "Fox" who have been ashore for a month, may return to their ship as soon as possible.

I am, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

 Inclosure in No. 411*.
Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.)

Bombay, May 7, 1909.

REFERRING to my telegram No. 48, though it was at first essential that some of the crew of the "Fox" should be landed, and though Bushire must still be protected by means of an effective guard on shore, yet that such guard should continue to be composed of men from His Majesty's navy is not proper; it militates against our powers of dealing with contingencies elsewhere in the Gulf, as it means the withdrawal of an important portion of our effective force.

I wish to point out that there is at dusk an additional native guard which is now not needed there, and I am strongly of opinion that this guard should replace the party landed from the "Fox." Objections are raised by the Minister at Tehran to replacing our bluejackets by soldiers, but as Tabreez is now in the occupation of the Russians it seems to me that the previous situation is thus altered.

[17781]

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 11.)

(No. 291.)

St. Petersburg, May 7, 1909.

Sir,
I HAVE the honour to report that the "Novoe Vremya" had a leading article in to-day's edition on the attempts, as it styles it, of a certain section of the English press to frighten the public with fears of Russia's interested motives in sending her troops into Persia. "Russia," says the article, "in thus sending her troops does not in the slightest degree interfere in the internal affairs of Persia. She takes sides with neither of the contending parties. The Russian troops are protecting only the lives and property of Russians and foreigners at Tabreez, and they will remain there until the restoration of order and until it is possible to carry on business freely. We desire only to suppress the anarchy which threatens that portion of our territory which is contiguous with Persia and also our subjects in that country. The question of the final establishment of this or that form of government in Persia is not our business, and concerns only the Persians themselves."

The article goes on to say that the section of the English press in question is trying to make use of the Persian incident to damage the Anglo-Russian understanding.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[17786]

No. 411.

Sir A. Herbert to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 11.)

(No. 31.)

Christiana, May 4, 1909.

Sir,
THE Russian Chargé d'Affaires, who is of Armenian descent, speaking to me about a week ago about affairs in Persia dropped a hint that the Russian occupation of Tabreez might prove of longer duration than had been anticipated, and might even extend to the permanent occupation of the Province of Azerbaijan.

As I considered that this was merely the expression of a personal opinion, I did not pay much attention to the remark, but, in the telegram sections received by bag to-day, a telegram from Tabreez, dated the 24th ultimo, repeated under Sir G. Barclay's No. 317, says: "Fanatics among Nationalists believe proposed opening of road is a pretext for a permanent Russian occupation," and therefore the opinion of a certain section of the population of Tabreez would seem to have found an echo here.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR HERBERT.

[17897]

No. 412.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 11.)

(No. 373.)

Tehran, May 11, 1909.

(Telegraphic.) P.

SHAH and nationalists.

I presume that the instructions contained in your telegram No. 236 do not preclude such action as that indicated in my telegram No. 378, last paragraph.

Now that we have given the assurances to the Shah, it appears to me that some such steps are incumbent on the two representatives.

I consider it my duty to use what moral suasion I can in the interests of reconciliation until the nationalists have definitely made known their refusal of the Shah's concessions.

(Very Confidential.)

When I dispatched my telegram No. 372 I feared that my Russian colleague might feel warranted, in the event of the Shah's complete acceptance of our programme, in using to the nationalists the threat of active intervention by Russia should they not be content with what the Shah had granted.

If he were furnished with instructions similar to those you have now sent me, this danger would be avoided.

[17835]

No. 413.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 11.)

(No. 380.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 11, 1909.

SITUATION at Bushire.

Yesterday the Darya Beggi met with a cordial reception on his arrival.

(Confidential.)

I should prefer that in any case the bluejackets may not yet be withdrawn, as their departure might well be made to synchronise with that of Russian troops from the north of Persia, and their presence at Bushire is certain to have a quieting effect on both Shah and nationalists.

[17865]

No. 414

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 11.)

(No. 381.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 11, 1909.

TABREEZ situation.

I have received the following telegram, No. 118 of yesterday, from His Majesty's consul general at Tabreez:

"A Russian sentry on guard on the roof of a house near the Russian consulate-general was severely wounded in the arm. Shots were fired from a neighbouring house, but it is not known by whom.

"The Russian general is much incensed by this outrage, but I hope the more moderate attitude of Russian consul-general will prevent him from taking the stringent measures of which he talks.

"The Shah's proclamation has caused great delight among the nationalists here, but the question of guarantees is not lost sight of."

[17910]

No. 415.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 238.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 11, 1909.

NEW Persian Ministry.

Private information has reached me of the refusal of Nasr-ol-Mulk to return for the present to Tehran from Paris. He bases his refusal on the ground of his son's illness, but the real reason is his unfortunate lack of courage; he fears for his personal safety if he returned, for he does not believe in the Shah's sincerity.

[17970]

No. 416.

Messrs. Ellinger and Co. to Foreign Office.—(Received May 12.)

Sir,

28, Oxford Street, Manchester, May 11, 1909.

WITH reference to the Ormuz Concession of the Mounttajar, we regret to inform you that this gentleman now informs us, under date the 24th ultimo, that his mining operations of the oxide on the island were stopped by carabineers who had been placed on the island, and that consequently he cannot be held responsible for any failure on his part to carry out the terms of his contract. Since we last wrote you we have entered into negotiations for the sale of a large parcel, and if this results in business we shall probably require to ship from Ormuz in July. We cannot at present state the quantity that we shall ship, as this will depend upon the position of the freight market; but we may mention that the last cargo we brought home by the steamer "Anchorable" was over 6,000 tons, and it is highly desirable that the Mounttajar should now be allowed to continue his mining operations unobstructed, so that he can mine a sufficient quantity of oxide to provide a full cargo for a steamer should it be needed. We shall therefore be much obliged if you will now ask the British Minister

[17932]

No. 417.

Id. Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 12.)

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Admiralty, May 11, 1909.

WITH reference to my minute dated the 30th ult., I am commanded by my Lords Comrades to send the Admiralty to insist for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, expressed in my minute dated 12th ult., that the commander-in-chief, East Indies.

I am, &c.
C. F. THOMAS.

Enclosure to No. 417.

Commander-in-chief, East Indies, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.)

SENIOR naval officer in the Gulf telegraphed as follows:—

Bombay, May 11, 1909.

"I hear from political resident at Bushire that, as the local mulbah has threatened by one who consents to pay customs, there is a probability of foreigners suffering harm; also I have since learned that there are more dissensions amongst the chiefs in the neighbourhood, and that at sea their dhows are attacking each other."

In reply I have sent him orders to take steps to stop the local chiefs from disturbing the peace of the sea, and to counsel with the political resident as to the expediency of the chiefs being informed that such interference by any one will not be permitted by us. I have also told him to furnish a report as regards the action of the mulbah, and also to state whether he requires assistance.

It is submitted that, if possible, approval be given to my request in telegram No. 67, also reviving that, in the circumstances, the matter is urgent.

[1619]

3 B4

at Tehran to take the necessary steps to have the carabinciers removed from the island, so that the Mouintujjar may be allowed to continue the working of the mines undisturbed. We refer you to our separate letter upon this subject, and remain, Sir, faithfully yours,

(Signed) ELLINGER AND Co.

P.S.—We should be glad to hear from you on the subject with the least possible delay.

E. AND Co.

[17971]

No. 417.

Messrs. Ellinger and Co. to Foreign Office.—(Received May 12.)

Sir,

28. Oxford Street, Manchester, May 11, 1909.

WITH reference to our separate letter of date, we think it may interest you to have knowledge of some of the remarks which the Mouintujjar makes in his letters to hand this mail regarding the present position in Tehran and Ormuz.

He acknowledges our letter of the 6th April, in which we advised him that His Majesty's Government will protect the oxide, and that His Majesty's Minister at Tehran will take any steps that may be necessary. He regrets, however, that he is advised from Bunder Abbas that the British Consul there has not taken sufficient measures, and, further, that although he asked the Legation three days earlier if they had received news from Bunder Abbas, he was only told that a telegram had been received from Bunder Abbas, and that the contents had been communicated to London, whence a reply was awaited. He states that he has not been informed of the contents of the telegram in question, but he thinks that the Consul has asked what attitude he should take up, and how he should act. He supposes that the British Minister will have probably asked instructions from you, because he understands that in pursuance of a Convention which exists between His Majesty's Government and that of Russia, His Majesty's Government does not desire to interfere in Persia. He states that had he not been assured at the commencement of the necessary protection, he would perhaps himself have taken other measures to safeguard his rights; whilst relying upon our previous assurances, he had instructed his people not to take any action, and that the Consul would do whatever might be necessary. He writes that he would have telegraphed us that the carabinciers had been placed on the island, and that they were preventing his men from working in the mines and mining the oxide, but he thought we would have been informed of this fact by your good self, and that the Convention mentioned formed an insuperable obstacle to any steps we might desire to take. He himself seems to think that it is a good opportunity for His Majesty's Government to intervene for the protection of the oxide at Ormuz, and that this would have good results in future. He goes on to say that he will await the result of the steps taken by the Legation and the Consul at Bunder Abbas, and that if he is disappointed he will then take other steps, and will also know that these contracts serve no other purpose than to tie his hands.

He is very disappointed that, in spite of the assurance given to him by the Minister at Tehran and by us at different times, if he made a contract with an English firm the oxide would be effectually protected, these hindrances have been allowed to continue at Ormuz without any steps having been taken by the Consul to put an end to them.

With reference to the above, we beg to point out that you did inform us that the mining operations were being interfered with, but we did not ask you at the time to take any steps to stop this interference, relying upon your assurances that this would be done when it became necessary.

It appears to us that the time has now come when His Majesty's Government should take the necessary steps to see that the business can be carried on unmolested, in view of the fact that the Mouin has now notified us that he is restrained by the presence of the carabinciers on the island from continuing his mining operations, and cannot for this reason carry out his contract, and that consequently we may within the next few months find ourselves face to face with the fact that Messrs. Andrew Weir & Co. wish to ship from Ormuz a full cargo, which cannot be supplied.

We are, &c.

(Signed) ELLINGER AND Co.

[17913]

No. 418.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 12.)

(No. 382.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 11, 1909.

AFFIDUDE o' Sipalidar.

With reference to the last paragraph of my telegram No. 369 of the 6th May, to my telegrams Nos. 372 of the 7th May and 379 of the 10th May. Please see also my private telegram of to-day to Sir Charles Hardinge.

My Russian colleague writes me that he has brought to bear all his influence on Sipalidar in vain, and thinks it possible that he will now march on Tehran from his present quarters at Kazvin, as he professes dissatisfaction with the Shah's concessions.

I have no direct information as to the Sipalidar's attitude, but if my Russian colleague is right, a joint reconnoissance from the two legations would seem to afford the best chance of bringing about a reconciliation.

[17988]

No. 419.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 12.)

(No. 383.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 12, 1909.

NASR-UL-MULK.

For the moment we must await developments here. It is to be hoped that if the present crisis ends in reconciliation Nasr-ul-Mulk will pluck up courage and return at his own accord. If he does not do so, he might be induced to return by a guarantee for his personal safety from the two legations.

Pending his return, Said-ed-Dowleh will act as Prime Minister.

Reference is to your telegram No. 238.

[18003]

No. 420.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 12.)

(No. 384.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 12, 1909.

NATIONALIST advance from Resht.

First paragraph of my telegram No. 379 of the 11th May. The matter is pressing.

[18024]

No. 421.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 12.)

(No. 385.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 12, 1909.

NATIONALISTS and Shi'a's concessions.

My Russian colleague informs me that he has made a second communication to Sipalidar through a secretary of his legation now at Kazvin, pointing out that the Shah has granted all the demands of the Nationalists, and insisting on his checking the revolutionaries' advance. He has added a warning to the effect that a good means of bringing him to reason lay in his extensive debts to the Russian bank.

In Tehran dissatisfaction with the Shah's concessions is growing. This is, perhaps, more due to a general feeling of mistrust of the Shah than to certain points in the decree, which have provoked criticism.

I have no news of effect in the provinces of the Shah's surrender, excepting from Teheran and Kazvin.

[18021]

No. 422.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 12.)

(No. 249.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, May 12, 1909.

FINANCIAL assistance for Persian Government.

Your telegram No. 661, of the 10th May, Russian Government, though willing to consult with the British Legation, and to keep it informed as to the mode of disbursement of the Russian share of the advance, do not wish that share to be placed to the joint account of the two Legations. I said that His Majesty's Government, when the time came for the British share of the advance to be made, would have no objection to their quota being put to a joint account, and I explained that our object was to impress on the Persian Government that complete union existed between the Russian and British Governments. I trusted, therefore, that the Russian Government would find it possible to place their share to the joint account of the two Legations. To this M. Tchernykhoff replied that the view of the Minister of Finance was that it was impossible to place to a joint account money that had been advanced by Russia only.

The above is the substance of what passed verbally today between me and M. Tchernykhoff, who then handed me a Memorandum, in which no mention is made of a joint account.

The following is the substance of the Memorandum:—

(R.) "The Russian Government have always considered it necessary that the mode of disbursement of advance to be made by two Governments should be controlled. Russian Government had therefore proposed in its Memorandum of 28th March the institution of a special Commission of Control. In view of satisfactory turn which the work of reform is taking in Persia, Russian Government consider it of urgency that the said Commission should be established. At the same time, whilst awaiting the conclusion of the discussions with British Government as regards Commission, and taking into consideration the wishes expressed in the British Memorandum of 21st April, Russian Government consider it opportune that half of first proposed advance, i.e., 50,000*l.*, should be furnished by England.

"In the event of British Government not feeling disposed to make the advance simultaneously with advance of the other half by Russia, Russian Legation will have to occupy itself with the manner in which Russian advance should be employed. Russian Chargé d'Affaires will receive instructions to keep British Legation fully informed of all measures which he will take in the matter." (End of R.)

It was in the British Memorandum of 21st April that the proposal was put forward that the Russian share of the advance should be paid to the joint account of the two Legations.

To my inquiry as to how the Commission of Control would be composed, M. Tchernykhoff replied that it would consist of the Financial Adviser and the Directors of the Russian and English Banks.

I expressed myself as very doubtful whether His Majesty's Government would at the present moment be willing to advance a sum of 50,000*l.*, and said that I felt pretty sure that their resolve to make no advance without the sanction of the Assembly, still held good.

M. Tchernykhoff said that M. Sadoun proposed to allot 100,000 toman to the payment of the arrears due to the Tehran troops, a further sum of 100,000 toman to the payment of the troops with Amin-ed-Dowleh, which would be disbursed after payment, and a sum of 50,000 toman to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. These sums together, M. Tchernykhoff said, would make a total of 50,000*l.*. If an additional sum of 50,000*l.* were contributed by His Majesty's Government, it could be devoted to other purposes which were just as urgent, and part of it could be used to assist in carrying out the Eleventh Law.

It is evident that the Russian Government intend to limit their first advance to 50,000*l.*, and have no intention of giving 100,000*l.*, the sum mentioned originally.

[18022]

No. 423.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 12.)

(No. 250.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

TABREEZ.

St. Petersburg, May 12, 1909.

I was told to-day by M. Tcharykoff that the Russian General at Tabreez has demanded the surrender to him within forty-eight hours of the persons who shot a Russian sentry (his arm had to be amputated), and fired into the Russian Consulate. In the opinion of the Russian authorities, it was probable that the shots were fired, not by Persian nationalists, but by Russian revolutionaries. It is the intention of the Russian General to deprive all Russian revolutionaries of their arms, and to deport them across the frontier into Russia.

The assaults, whose surrender was demanded would, M. Tcharykoff said, be brought to trial and executed. I pointed out that no one had been killed, and asked if these men would really be executed. To this M. Tcharykoff replied that it was a very serious matter to fire on a sentry, and that the men would be tried by court-martial.

There is no Persian authority at Tabreez at present with whom to deal, and instructions have accordingly been sent to M. Sabine to urge the Persian Government to send a Governor there without delay. M. Tcharykoff expressed a hope that instructions to support this request might be sent to Sir G. Barclay.

[17897]

No. 121.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 239.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 12, 1909.

EFFORTS to rescue Shah and his people.

In reply to your telegram No. 379 of the 11th instant, there is no doubt that at the present stage action indicated in the last paragraph of your telegram No. 378 of 10th instant is not precluded by my instructions.

[17835]

No. 425.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 210.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 12, 1909.

BLUEJACKETS at Bushire.

Please refer to your telegram No. 350 of the 11th instant.

We have informed the Admiralty that it is desirable that the bluejackets should be retained at Bushire a week longer, and have asked them to give orders in this sense. If at the end of that time there is still need of an extra guard, Indian troops at dusk (see your telegram No. 269 of the 16th ultimo) might take the place of the bluejackets, and we might then, if such a course appears advisable, take into consideration the question of making the withdrawal of this guard simultaneous with the departure of the Russians from Tabreez.

[17835]

No. 126.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 12, 1909.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 10th instant, expressing a hope that the crew of His Majesty's ship "Fox," which has been landed at Bushire, may be permitted to return to their ship as soon as possible.

I am to express Sir E. Grey's hope that the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty

will see their way to permitting the retention of the bluejackets on land for a week longer, at the expiry of which period other arrangements will be made for the protection of European life and property, should such protection be still required.

I am, &c.

(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[18119]

No. 427.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 13.)**Sir. India Office, May 12, 1909.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 30th January last, as to the financial arrangements involved in the proposed transfer of the Tehran Meshed and the Klat-Nasratbad telegraph lines.

In reply, I am to say that Viscount Morley appreciates the difficulty felt by Secretary Sir E. Grey in approaching the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury at the present stage, when the result of the negotiations is not certain, and when no definite estimate of the expenditure involved can be formed. At the same time, Lord Morley sees no reason why, in the case of any increase of charge consequent on the transfer, the principle of equal division between the two Exchequers which has prevailed since the Welby Commission should be departed from, and he would be unwilling to sanction any expenditure from Indian revenues on the administration of the lines after the transfer, except on this condition.

I am, therefore, to express the hope that Sir E. Grey will see fit to submit the matter to the Lords Commissioners with a view to the recognition of the principle of division laid down in my letter of the 6th January last. It seems possible that if the matter is not submitted to the Treasury till after the negotiations for the transfer are concluded, the Lords Commissioners may take exception on the ground that they were not consulted at an earlier stage.

With regard to the reference made in your letter to the decision of the Lords Commissioners in 1891, I am to point out that it is not proposed that any expenditures which the Lords Commissioners refused to share then should now be shared by them, and, further, that the decision in question was due to a difference of opinion prevailing at that time regarding the incidence of expenditure in Persia generally, a matter which is now governed by the Report of the Royal Commission.

I am, &c.

(Signed) A. GODLEY.

[18121]

No. 428.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 13.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of telegrams on the subject of financial assistance to the Persian Government.

India Office, May 13, 1909.

Inclosure 1 in No. 428.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P.

March 9, 1909.

WE are not aware of present position of question of advance to Persia, but we trust that an opportunity of stating our views will be afforded us if it is denied that out of a loan or advance should be charged to Indian revenues.

Vicount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, May 11, 1906.

LOAN to Persian Government. See your telegram of the 9th March.

You will see from my telegram dated the 3rd May that, subject to conditions imposed being fulfilled by Shah and to safeguards on proper expenditure of funds, His Majesty's Government are pledged to contribute half of advance to be made jointly by British and Russian Governments to enable the Shah to meet urgent claims which it is necessary for him to discharge in order that his position on establishment of new régime may be secured. In accordance with Agreement with Russian Government, described in my telegram of the 3rd October, 1905, which throughout subsequent phases of negotiations with Russia has been treated as holding good in principle, total amount of joint advance is not to exceed 400,000*l*. Conditions which made the Agreement necessary apply at the present time with equal force, and I recognize that, in the circumstances, financial responsibility for half, viz., 100,000*l*, of British share of joint advance must be accepted by India. (See letter dated the 29th July, 1907, to Foreign Office, which was forwarded with Secretary's letter of the 9th August, 1907.)

India is, however, free from any engagement so far as any further financial assistance to Persia is concerned; and it has been made clear to the Foreign Office that, apart from objections to financial and other entanglements in Persia, on grounds of general Imperial policy I am unable to admit that the nature of Indian interests in Persia is such as to justify Indian funds being expended on schemes for the establishment in that country of reformed government. It is essential that India should be kept entirely free from responsibility from international complications, danger of which, no less than financial risk, is involved in these schemes.

18124

No. 429.

Sir G. Barchin to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 13.)

(No. 286.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 13, 1906.

TABRIZ situation.

I have received the following telegram No. 119 of the 12th May from His Majesty's consul general at Tabreez:

"Ahmed-Bekel's forces have practically dispersed. He was to set out today with the Persian Cossacks for Tehran."

18141

No. 430.

Sir G. Barchin to Sir Edward Grey.—Received May 13.

(No. 388.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 13, 1906.

WITHDRAWAL of bluejackets from Bushire.

With reference to your telegram No. 210 of the 12th May.

The bluejackets might be removed from Bushire in a day or two without danger to British subjects, as the situation there is now satisfactory. You may, however, think it desirable to keep some force in this port in view of the presence of Russian troops in the north.

Major Fox sees no objection to placing these men, whom the admiral is anxious to re-embark, by Indian infantry from Bush.

Although troops may not be needed for their original purpose of giving protection to foreigners, may I authorise this arrangement?

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barchin.

17913

(No. 241.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 13, 1906.

ADVANCE of Resht Nationalists.

The proposal in your telegram No. 382 of the 11th instant has the sanction of His Majesty's Government, and you may make a joint remonstrance with your Russian colleague to the Sipahdar. You should at the same time point out to him that the Nationalists ought certainly to be satisfied with the Shah's Decrees, and urge him to accept them, and add that, in the event of the Shah trying to evade the fulfilment of his pledges and not putting into execution his promises of reforms, the two Representatives will give His Majesty neither support nor sympathy.

This final sentence accords with the assurances which the two Representatives gave to the Shah, and you should obtain the assent of your Russian colleague to it.

18022

No. 432.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barchin.

(No. 242.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 13, 1906.

APPOINTMENT of Governor for Talavez.

With reference to the last paragraph of the telegram from St. Peter-burgh No. 250 of yesterday's date, you may, if you see no objection, support your Russian colleague in pressing the Persian Government to send a Governor without delay, but the individual selected should be acceptable to the Nationalist party.

18021

No. 433.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Nicolson.

(No. 674.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 13, 1906.

ADVANCE to Persian Government.

With reference to your telegram No. 219 of yesterday, His Majesty's Government have not changed their opinion that they cannot give any portion of the British share of the advance to be made jointly by the two Governments to the Persian Government until the loan has been sanctioned by the Assembly.

I am not entirely convinced that the introduction of reforms and the renewal of the Constitution are as yet established firmly enough to justify considerable payments being made to the Shah's troops, who may be employed at any moment by His Majesty against the Nationalists. But the responsibility for making such payments must rest entirely on the Russian Government, and His Majesty's Government rely on the latter to adopt such precautions as will effectively prevent the revival of a reactionary disposition in the Shah owing to any advance of money made by them.

The assurance that the Russian *Chargé d'Affaires* at Tehran will keep His Majesty's Minister at that capital fully informed of all measures in connection with the Russian advance has given me much satisfaction.

18216

No. 434.

Mr. M. Ellinger to Foreign Office.—(Received May 11.)

Sir,

28, Oxford Street, Manchester, May 13, 1906.

I THANK you for Mr. Mallot's letter of yesterday, and note that you have received a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, stating that the Nationalists have agreed to refrain from all interference if all payments for the Drunz oxide are held in trust by the British officials in Persia pending the grant of a Constitution, and that His Majesty's Consul at Bender Abbas has been authorized to accept this arrangement.

I presume that this arrangement has only reference to the moneys which are

payable by the Mountinjar in return for the Concession which he holds from the Persian Government, and that it does not in any way refer to the purchase-price of the oxide payable by Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co. under their contract with the Mouin, and ourselves, as all such moneys are under the contract to be paid by Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co. to my firm, and not to the Mouin. I shall be glad if you will kindly let me have a line making this point clear at your earliest convenience.

Yours faithfully,
(Signed) M. ELLINGER.

[18242]

No. 435.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 11.)

(No. 389.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 11, 1909.

THE Sheikh has borrowed, through his agent, 1,000*l.* from Warrklans, and there are rumours current in Alwaz, which, however, are denied at Mohammerah, of a wider connivance between the Sheikh and this merchant. Major Cox, on his forthcoming visit to Mohammerah, will remonstrate with Sheikh Khazal on this subject.

I have instructed His Majesty's consul-general at Basline to inform him, if he thinks it desirable, that the first charge on the contemplated loan from His Majesty's Government must be the repayment of the 1,000*l.* in question.

[18244]

No. 436.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 11.)

(No. 390.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 14, 1909.

TABREEZ situation

With reference to my telegram No. 378 of the 10th May, I have received the following telegram from His Majesty's consul-general at Tabreez:

"We called on the Assembly after writing as instructed. They are sending delegates to-morrow into Western Azerbaijan to quiet that district, and have to-day telegraphed thanking the Shah for his concessions. They profess anxiety for a complete reconciliation."

[18245]

No. 437.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 11.)

(No. 391.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 11, 1909.

ACTION of Russian general in Tabreez.

I have received the following telegram from His Majesty's consul-general at Tabreez:

"The number of Russian soldiers in the town has been increased. Great perturbation has been caused by the Russian general's demand for immediate disarmament and an indemnity of 10,000 toman in consequence of the incident reported in my telegram No. 118.

It will be difficult for the population to find so large a sum. Disarmament is progressing as quickly as possible, but Russian troops are hastening it by force."

Reference is to my telegram No. 381 of the 11th May.

No. 438.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 11.)

(No. 392.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

SHAH and Nationalists.

Tehran, May 14, 1909.

Almost all the basia have now left the Turkish Embassy, and to-day reconciliation seems more probable.

The Shah appears docile, and, so far, the new Cabinet is dealing reasonably with the situation. The committee which has just been formed for the elaboration of the electoral law is, on the whole, satisfactory.

Friendly negotiations as to the appointment of a governor for Tabreez are proceeding between the townspeople and the Cabinet. Consequently my Russian colleague and I think it better to take no steps in this matter for the moment.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs finds that Siyahlad's attitude is now less uncompromising. No further representations to him are at present needed.

As regards the Russian advance, M. Sahlane is confident that he can ensure the money being used to pay off and disarm unnecessary troops and settle the arrears due to the officers, thus removing some of the elements of disorder, and not for the encouragement of the reactionary party.

[19248]

No. 439.

Sir A. Nicholson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 11.)

(No. 251. Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, May 14, 1909.

SHAH and Emperor of Russia.

Acting on the Emperor's orders M. Tsharykow read to me to-day confidentially certain telegrams which had passed personally between the Emperor and the Shah. This telegraphic correspondence began with a telegram from the Shah, dated the 2nd May, in which His Majesty stated that he intended to proclaim a Constitution and take other measures of reform, and that later on he would send to the Emperor, through M. Sahlane, a private and personal message. For some days the Emperor waited for this promised message, and, as it did not arrive, dispatched on the 11th May a telegram to the Shah, in which he expressed pleasure at the Shah's action in introducing reforms, and hoped that the prosperity and tranquillity of Persia would be secured thereby. On the following day, the 12th May, the promised private message was dispatched by the Shah. It amounted to a request to the Emperor to take him and his family under his protection. On the following day the Emperor sent an answer to this message, in which he repeated his expressions of satisfaction at the wise step taken by the Shah in preparing to introduce the various reforms, and assured the Shah that he could rely on his warm sympathy and benevolent feelings. The use of the word "protection" was avoided by the Emperor.

In reading this correspondence to me M. Tsharykow said that the Emperor wished to know everything that had passed between the Shah and himself. I said that I was sure that His Majesty's Government would appreciate the Emperor's action, and I expressed thanks for the gracious confidence which His Majesty had reposed in me.

[18249]

No. 440.

Sir A. Nicholson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 11.)

(No. 252.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, May 14, 1909.

TURKEY and Persia.

I saw M. Tsharykow to-day, and his Excellency informed me that trustworthy confirmation of a confidential nature had reached him to the effect that the only British troops in Urumia were a Cavalry guard of thirty men, and that the Turkish authorities had recalled two companies which had been dispatched to Persia from Van.

[18250]

No. 411.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 11.)

(No. 253.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

FINANCIAL assistance for Persia.

Your telegram No. 67 of the 15th May.

I saw M. Teliarkow today, and told his Excellency that His Majesty's Government were not disposed to make to the Persian Government any pecuniary advance unless such advance were previously sanctioned by the Assembly. I also intimated to M. Teliarkow that it would be well if the Russian Government were to be careful, in making their advance to the Shah, not to sanction any payments which the Shah might utilize for the suppression of the Nationalist cause. To this M. Teliarkow replied that Sir G. Barclay would be kept fully informed by M. Sabine, who would certainly listen to any advice which might be given him by His Majesty's Minister. M. Teliarkow thought that it would be desirable in the interests of order and to prevent the troops in Tehran from running riot and pillaging, that some of the arrears due to them should be paid off. Ahmed-Dowleh's troops would be paid off on their disbandment. M. Teliarkow again repeated his assurance that, in view of the firm determination of the Russian Government to act in complete unison with His Majesty's Government, M. Sabine would be guided by Sir G. Barclay's advice.

St. Petersburg, May 14, 1909.

18254

No. 412.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 14.)

(No. 256.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

TABREEZ.

St. Petersburg, May 11, 1909.

I was told today by M. Teliarkow that the Nationalists at Tabreez were laying down their arms, and that at the same time they were depriving the Russian revolutionaries of their weapons. There was a great improvement, his Excellency said, in the situation at Tabreez. M. Teliarkow went on to suggest that the two Representatives at Tehran might perhaps propose privately the appointment of Ahmed-Dowleh, who was now at Berlin, as Governor of Tabreez, unless indeed they had their eye on some better man.

Since the above interview Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 381, in which he reports the Russian demand for an indemnity, has reached me. This demand was never mentioned to me by M. Teliarkow, who indeed had never led me to understand that any demand for his armaments had been made. M. Teliarkow had told me that the disarmament of the Russian revolutionaries would be demanded by the Russian General at Tabreez, but that the latter of course had no concern with the affairs of the Nationalists. I am bringing the matter to M. Teliarkow's notice in a private letter.

[18253]

No. 413.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—Received May 11.

(No. 255.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

NEJAT-METTEHIDS and similar in Persia.

St. Petersburg, May 11, 1909.

I am asked by M. Teliarkow to convey to you a suggestion that it might perhaps be well to call on the Russian and British Ambassadors at Constantinople to instruct their respective consuls general at Baghdad to endeavor to induce the Nejet-Mettehids to aid the people of Persia to exhibit a spirit of reciprocity in their reception of the Shah's proposals of a constitution, &c., and to give His Majesty their assistance in effecting the reform which he proposes to introduce.

In the event of your accepting this suggestion, M. Teliarkow would draw up draft instructions to the two Ambassadors, and would submit them for your consideration.

[18141]

No. 444.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 244.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, May 14, 1909.

SITUATION at Bashire (see your telegram No. 38 of yesterday).

Has any arrangement been reached with regard to disposal of Customs receipts?

Withdrawal of bluejackets may be authorized. Unless foreigners require protection it will not be necessary to replace them.

18360]

No. 445.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 675.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 14, 1909.

RUSSIAN Government, so I am informed by Russian Ambassador, think it essential that now that the Shah has accepted the conditions as to the Constitution, an advance should be made to enable Persian Government to carry on. I informed him that if an advance is considered necessary by Russia we cannot object to her making it, but that until an Assembly sanctions it we cannot advance any part of our share of the loan of 100,000.

I pointed out to him that if the Shah, when he has obtained the money, refused advice and upset the Constitution it might appear that Russian money had been employed to overthrow the Constitution, and feeling here might become so strong that further co-operation would be rendered impossible. Russia would have to guard against this risk, and if such an event occurred she would have to take a firm stand, and the Shah had better follow the ex-Sultan into retirement.

18282]

No. 446.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 15.)

(No. 298.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, May 10, 1909.

IN accordance with the instructions which were conveyed to me in your telegram No. 654 of the 7th instant, I mentioned to M. Teliarkoff on the 8th instant that it had been stated that the Russian Government were contemplating the dispatch of troops to guard the Resht-Teheran road. I was authorized to express the hope that the Russian Government would, in any case, at first await the results of a threat to employ military measures, as I was given to understand that the road was for the present open, and the dispatch of a detachment might have the appearance of an intervention. M. Teliarkoff said that he intended to propose at a Cabinet Council that a force should be held in readiness at Baku, and that it should be made known at Resht and along the road that this force would be landed in Persia if the road were interrupted. This morning I received a private letter from his Excellency informing me that it had been decided that "a sufficient number of Cossacks should be held ready at Baku in case it should be necessary to reinforce the Cossack guard at Resht, and to protect and keep open *en route* the road connecting Teheran with the Caspian. In view, however, of the satisfactory turn which the negotiations of our Representatives with the Shah seem to be taking, we hope that the dispatch of the above named Cossacks will not be necessary."

During our conversation of the 8th instant M. Teliarkoff said that he would wish to inform me confidentially that the Shah had ordered that the suites of the Persian Cossacks who were with Ahmed-Dowleh should return to Teheran. As he had previously told me a Russian Captain had been sent from Teheran, when the hostilities between Tabreez and the Ahmed-Dowleh had ceased, to take charge of these Cossacks in order to prevent pillage in Tabreez.

I asked if this Captain would accompany the Cossacks on their march to Teheran. It seemed to me likely that they would meet the fedais from Resht who were dividing on the capital, and a collision might occur. It would be unfortunate if in these circumstances, a Russian officer were in command. M. Teliarkoff said that the Russian officer was not in the Russian service, but in that of the Shah, and must obey

[1649]

3 E

his orders. The Cossacks would seek to avoid any collision with the fedais, but if they found their progress to Tehran impeded they would naturally have to force their way through the obstacles. I said that I wished to tell him frankly that I had put the question to him, as comments would be made in England if a Russian officer were in command of a detachment of the Shah's troops which might come into collision with Persian Nationalists. He repeated that the officer was in the service of the Shah, and would not willingly come into conflict with the fedais; he would merely push his men through to Tehran as ordered.

I said that he had mentioned on a previous occasion that some Persian Cossacks had left Tehran to guard a bridge on the Kasvin road. Was a Russian officer to accompany these Cossacks? M. Teleaykoff replied in the negative, and added that orders had been previously given that no Russian officer was to leave Tehran if hostilities were likely to ensue between the Shah's forces and the Nationalists.

It seems to me that the position of the Russian officers is a little ambiguous. They are, I am told, no longer on the active list of the Russian army, and are supposed to be entirely in the Persian service. At the same time on certain occasions they receive and act upon orders from the Russian authorities. I think that the latter are desirous that the Russian officers should abstain from any interference in the national differences and conflicts, but this abstention must on occasions be difficult to observe.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[18405] No. 447.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 15.)

(No. 393.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 15, 1909.

REVOLUTIONARIES at Kazvin.

With reference to the penultimate paragraph of my telegram No. 392 of the 14th May.

My Russian colleague and I were this morning informed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs that he is not satisfied with the attitude of the Sipahdār. M. Sabline thinks that after the strongly-worded message delivered to this individual by the Russian secretary at Kazvin the remonstrance proposed in your telegram No. 241 of the 12th May would fall flat. He tells me that in this communication he threatened Sipahdār, if he did not rectify the revolutionaries, with "material and moral ruin." He promises to consult me before making any further communication to him.

Sir A. Nielson's telegram No. 242 of the 8th May.

There is no Russian officer with the Russian Cossacks returning from Tabreez. Captain Perdonosov was originally designated for this command, but it was thought better to retain him at Tehran in view of the situation at Kazvin. The Cossacks in question will return by a roundabout route, in order to avoid a possible conflict with the revolutionaries at Kazvin.

[18414] No. 418.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 15.)

(No. 394.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 15, 1909.

RUSSIAN troops at Tabreez.

I have received the following telegram, No. 122 of the 15th May, from His Majesty's consul-general at Tabreez:

"The Russian troops are treating Tabreez as a conquered city. Soldiers are patrolling the streets day and night, and to-day the barricades which the Nationalists had already begun to demolish are being blown up.

"2,000 toman and a bill for 1,000 toman has been scraped together by the Nationalists towards the indemnity demanded. This is already a very large sum to be raised in a ruined town, and they can certainly do no more. The Nationalists naturally

believe that there is some ulterior motive behind these harsh measures, and it is very important that the military authorities should change their attitude.

"(Following is confidential.)

"The Russian military authorities should be instructed to take no steps without the consent of their consul-general, as I gathered in a conversation which I had with him this morning that they frequently act in opposition to his advice. I spoke very strongly to him on this occasion, telling him that should no change take place I should be forced to cease the loyal support I had hitherto given to him."

The Russian Chargé d'Affaires has promised to recommend confidentially to his Government that instructions should be given to General Smolensky to listen to Russian consul-general's recommendations.

He tells me that the authorities have accepted as sufficient compensation the 3,000 toman.

[18415]

No. 449.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 15.)

(No. 395.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 15, 1909.

MY immediately preceding telegram of to-day.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has complained to the two legations of the behaviour of Russian troops at Tabreez. The following is a summary:—

1. 2,000 toman indemnity, demanded within forty-eight hours, for wounding of a Russian soldier by a stray bullet without awaiting trial of the offender, who has been caught.
2. Destruction of barricades, though inhabitants were already taking steps themselves to remove them.
3. Confiscation of Government buildings.
4. Seizure of arms from all persons indiscriminately, and even from shops.
5. Insults to women.
6. Plans of city are being made.
7. 3,000 Russian troops have just crossed the frontier and 250 have been added to those in the city.
8. Official letters of complaint are constantly written, and a policy of pin-pricks is pursued, though the town is calm and there are no Persian troops in the neighbourhood.

Cabinet has received urgent entreaties this morning from Tabreez, Kazvin, Resht, and Isfahan to secure withdrawal of Russian troops.

Sand-ud-Dowleh tells me that the continued presence of Russian troops will constitute an obstacle to reconciliation, as the people are possessed with the idea that these troops came in with the consent of the Shah. He thinks that the withdrawal of a large part of the force, leaving 600 men for the town and 400 for the road, would convince the public of the temporary character of Russian action, and would thus quiet the present agitation and make for reconciliation.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks that it would be premature now to ask for the complete withdrawal of Russian troops, but on the ultimate appointment of a governor to Tabreez his Government will put forward this request.

Jild-ul-Mulk, a prominent local Nationalist, has, at the request of the Tabreezis, been appointed vice-governor.

I am asking His Majesty's consul-general at Tabreez for his observations on Sand-ud-Dowleh's views.

As far as I can gather the Minister for Foreign Affairs has not mentioned the question of the withdrawal of the troops to my Russian colleague.

[18383]

No. 450.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 15.)

(No. 257.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, May 15, 1909.

TABREEZ. My immediately preceding telegram.

I am informed that the demand originally formulated by the Russian General was for disarmament and an indemnity of 10,000 tons. The advice of the Russian Government, however, was that the demand for disarmament should extend to Russian subjects only, and that an indemnity should be required if this demand were complied with.

According to a telegram received from the Russian Consul-General, payment of the indemnity in full will not be insisted on if a reasonable portion be paid up within the time allowed; he adds that the Nationalists began to lay down their arms of their own accord, and that they are urging the Russian revolutionaries to follow their example. The indemnity, he says, is to be levied from those who have refused to surrender their arms.

M. Telerykow points out that, while it is true that the Russian General has not followed on all points the advice given him by his Government, it is necessary, for the safety of the troops, that a good deal of latitude should be allowed to him.

The authority exercised locally by the General is, it seems to me, in excess of what we were led to expect, and I submit that the early dispatch of a Governor by the Persian Government is most desirable.

[18418]

No. 451.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey. (Received May 15.)

(No. 258. Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, May 15, 1909.

TABREEZ. My immediately preceding telegram.

M. Telerykow tells me that he wishes to inform me in confidence that some friction exists between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Viceroy of the Caucasus and the Russian General in command at Tabreez. The Viceroy of the Caucasus and the Russian General had not liked carrying out implicitly the instructions given by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The attitude of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, however, had the entire support of the Ministry of War, and the decision of the difficulty was, he referred to the Prime Minister. M. Telerykow felt sure that M. Stolypin would adopt the view that more moderation must be shown by the Russian General at Tabreez, and that he must carry out the instructions which would be sent to him from St. Petersburg through the Viceroy of the Caucasus. A fine of 2,000 tons had already been paid by the Nationalists, and this, in the opinion of the Russian Consul-General at Tabreez, ought to be considered sufficient. The Russian General, moreover, ought to keep within limits, and not forget that he was in a friendly country, to which he had been sent for specific purposes.

I replied that I had gathered that friction existed, and that what had struck me was the fact that General Snarsky had exceeded his original instructions. The infliction of a fine or any measure of that kind ought, it seemed to me, to have been decided by the usual diplomatic procedure, and General Snarsky ought not to act as if he were subject to no authority. I expressed a hope that M. Stolypin would settle the matter satisfactorily.

M. Telerykow said that my letter of last evening had decided him to disclose these internal difficulties, which he begged me to treat as confidential. Until the receipt of my letter he had hesitated to let me know of their existence.

[18242]

No. 452.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 259.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 15, 1909.

MESSAGE. WUNDERLICHES learn to the Sheikh of Mohammadiyah.

The action reported by you in your telegram No. 459 of the 11th instant has the approval of His Majesty's Government. The Sheikh and the concessionaires will have

on have to come to an agreement as to the terms of the Karun Irrigation Concession (see my telegram No. 211 of the 28th ultimo), and it might meanwhile be advisable that the Sheikh should be given to understand, at the first suitable opportunity, that payment for the concession will not be considered as included in the 5,000l. or 6,000l. which it is proposed that we should advance.

[18383]

No. 453.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 250.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 15, 1909.

GOVERNOR of Tabreez.

If you should see no objection, and if the appointment of a Governor is much delayed, you might, together with your Russian colleague, privately suggest the Aked-Dowleh.

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No. 454.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 16.)

(No. 306.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 16, 1909.

BUSHIRE customs.

With reference to your telegram No. 211 of the 11th May.

A temporary arrangement has been come to by which the customs receipts are to be paid into the account of the director of customs at the Imperial Bank. The bank's consent must be obtained before the withdrawal of any of this money.

The customs authorities are certain to be constantly pressed from Tehran to divert some part of the receipts, and until some kind of efficient control on the premises by the bank is established, they will always have the opportunity of doing so. Some such measure would be a necessary part of any really satisfactory arrangement.

With my official notification of the withdrawal of the blue-jackets I propose to give Saad-ol-Dowleh a verbal warning that if the arrears and monthly instalments due to the bank are not treated as a first charge, the consequences for the Persian Government will be disagreeable.

Should this warning be insufficient we may be forced to obtain the necessary facilities for the bank to check the receipts from the customs.

[18417]

No. 455.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 16.)

(No. 397.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 16, 1909.

TABREEZ situation.

I learn from His Majesty's consul-general that Djhal-ul-Mulk, in his position as vice-governor, has lately been doing excellent work. Great satisfaction is felt at his confirmation.

Mr. Wratlaw adds, in reply to inquiry mentioned in my telegram No. 245 of yesterday, that the Russian force is now quite unnecessarily large, and that the withdrawal of a large part of it would undoubtedly allay anxiety and have an excellent general effect.

[18419]

No. 456.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 16.)

(No. 250.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, May 16, 1909.

TABREEZ.

In a letter to M. Telerykow I have given the substance of Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 397 and have urged him to have instructions sent to General Snarsky not to exceed the instructions originally given to him and to do his best, during his temporary sojourn

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at Tabreez, to gain the sympathy of the Tabreezis. General Smarsky's action, I have pointed out, goes beyond the avowed objects for which the Russian force was sent to Tabreez and is calculated to give the impression that the General is treating Tabreez as a conquered city. I have asked that General Smarsky be instructed to take no further steps without first consulting the Russian Consul-General.

I have now been informed by M. Telarykow that General Smarsky is being instructed to abstain from patrolling the streets of the town; not to demand more than the 3,000 tomans of indemnity which he has already received; not to exceed the instructions given to him, and not to take any steps without first consulting the Russian Consul-General.

[18421]

No. 457.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 16.)

(No. 261.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

PERSIA.

St. Petersburg, May 16, 1909.

Yesterday I was informed by M. Telarykow that, according to a telegram from M. Sabine, certain members of the Council summoned to deal with the Electoral Law had made an announcement to the effect that there was no necessity for any new electoral law but that all that was required was the convocation of the old Medjliss without the introduction of any changes in its composition. This announcement had surprised M. Telarykow, who thought that the fact of its having been made argued ill for a satisfactory solution of the question. He had understood that the composition of this Council had been largely influenced by private suggestions on the part of the two Representatives, and he was at a loss to account for the inclusion in it of elements which apparently were opposed to a settlement on conciliatory lines.

To this I replied that no information tending to confirm M. Sabine's telegram had so far reached me.

[18430]

No. 458.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Bachelar.

(No. 251.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 16, 1909.

I HAVE received a communication from the Russian Ambassador, officially informing me that the Russian Consul was instructed on the 12th instant to be satisfied with the banishment and disarmament of the fedais at Tabreez, who are Russian subjects.

This refers to your telegram No. 391 of the 15th instant.

The Russian Government will also force the imposition of a fine for the attack made on the Russian sentry, if the conditions indicated above are carried out.

[18553]

No. 459.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 391.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, May 13, 1909.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 221 of the 21st ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of the reply which I have received from the Russian Government to my communication respecting the advance to be made to the Persian Government

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

Inclusion in No. 159

Aide-mémoire.

POUR compléter les explications verbales qui ont eu lieu entre le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères et son Excellence Sir Arthur Nicolson au sujet de l'aide-mémoire

britannique du 8 (21) avril enjoint, le Ministère Impérial des Affaires Étrangères a l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de l'Ambassade de la Grande-Bretagne ce qui suit.

Le Gouvernement russe a toujours envisagé comme nécessaire de contrôler la manière dont serait dépensée l'avance que les deux Gouvernements se sont déclarés disposés à faire au Gouvernement persan. Dans ce but le Gouvernement Impérial avait payé par son aide-mémoire du 28 mars, année courante, l'établissement d'une Commission spéciale de Contrôle. Vu la confiance satisfaisante que vient de prendre l'œuvre des réformes en Perse, il semblerait au Gouvernement Impérial urgent de procéder à l'extinction de la dite Commission.

Toutefois, en attendant que les pourparlers avec le Gouvernement britannique concernant la dite Commission aient pris fin, et pendant en considération les désirs exprimés dans l'aide-mémoire britannique du 8 (21) avril, le Gouvernement Impérial jugera opportun que la moitié de la première avance projetée, à savoir, 1,250,000 fr., soit fournie par l'Angleterre.

Dans le cas où le Gouvernement britannique se trouverait pas à même de faire ce versement simultanément avec le versement de l'autre moitié par la Russie, il incombait à la Légation de Russie à Téhéran de s'occuper de la manière dont l'avance du Gouvernement russe serait employée. Le Chargé d'Affaires de Russie recevrait, du reste, l'ordre de tenir la Légation britannique à Téhéran pleinement au courant de toutes les dispositions qu'il prendra dans cette matière.

Saint-Petersbourg, le 29 avril (12 mai), 1909.

[18430]

No. 460.

Count Benckendorff to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 17.)

Dear Sir Edward,

Russian Embassy, La Haye, May 15, 1909.

I AM instructed by M. Telarykoff to make to you the enclosed communication. He adds that Sir Arthur Nicolson fully concurred in the opinion of the necessity of severe measures for the safety of our guards.

May I point out that the telegram I received is dated the 12th May.

Yours, sincerely,

(Signed) BENCKENDORFF.

Inclusion in No. 460.

Note communicated by Count Benckendorff to Sir Edward Grey.

NOTS apprenons que des coups de feu de provenance inconnue ont blessé un soldat russe de garde auprès des Consuls russe et anglais et le soir un coup de feu a été tiré sur le Consul Impérial.

Pour empêcher le renouvellement de faits de cette nature le Gouvernement Impérial croit devoir prescrire à notre Consul de prendre, de concert avec le Commandant du détachement russe, des mesures sévères, compatibles avec les circonstances locales, pour la découverte et la punition des coupables.

Les cas échéant, nous pensons qu'il n'y aurait pas à s'arrêter devant des mesures telles que la démolition de la maison d'où sont partis les coups de feu, ou l'imposition d'une amende considérable sur le groupe de population qui se prêtent au recrutement des coupables.

Nous pensons exiger dans les quarante-huit heures la découverte et l'exécution des coupables, une amende de 10,000 tomans, le désarmement des fidais, et la surveillance des rues par nos patrouilles.

Si ces exigences n'étaient remplies, il faudrait procéder à la destruction par l'artillerie de maisons, caravanserais, et certains quartiers, en commençant par la maison où sont partis les coups de feu et ensuite le quartier nommé Sarai Amir Khiz (?).

C'est dans ce sens que des instructions avaient été données à M. Miller. Notre Consol nous informe que la population et les fidais sont exaspérés contre l'attitude et l'opinion de la culpabilité d'Arméniens et Géorgiens sujets russes qui ont intérêt à la continuation des troubles. Par de nouvelles instructions nous chargeons M. Miller, dès demain (aujourd'hui 29 avril 12 mai) de se contenter du désarmement des fidais

sujets russes et de leur expulsion de la ville et de Perse. En ce cas, il deviendrait possible de ne pas imposer d'amnistie.

Nous sommes convaincus que cette mesure aura l'approbation de toute la population de Tabriz et même des fidèles persans, qui sont convertis par l'amnistie du Schah.

[18556]

No. 461.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 398.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

REPRESENTATIONS to Mijteheds of Neje.

Tehran, May 17, 1909.

I entirely concur in the proposal in Sir A. Nicolson's telegram No. 255 of the 14th May.

[18607]

No. 462.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 399.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

IMPERIAL commissioner of Oil Syndicate.

Tehran, May 17, 1909.

I have again received official information from the Minister for Foreign Affairs with reference to my telegram No. 246 of the 1st April, and your telegram No. 161 of the 16th April, that the payment of 1,000*l.* should be made to him personally.

[18608]

No. 463.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 400.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

TABREEZ situation.

Tehran, May 17, 1909.

I have received the following telegram No. 126 of yesterday from His Majesty's consul general at Tabreez: "With reference to my telegram No. 393 of the 15th May:—

"Nationalists here have telegraphed to Isfahan and Resht advocating policy of conciliation with Shah.

"Samad Khan will probably go to help the governor of Souzboulak against the Kurds, the latter having asked for protection.

"I learn from the deputy governor that he has asked the Persian Government to order back the 300 Cossacks with Ain-ed-Dowleh for the purpose of policing Tabreez. Government have complied."

[18691]

No. 464.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 401.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

GOVERNMENTSHIP of Tabreez.

Tehran, May 17, 1909.

The Persian Government has left to the inhabitants of Tabreez a choice of four or five names for this post. The deputy governor is popular in the town. My Russian colleague and I are therefore still inclined to leave the question alone.

Ahmad-Dowleh, I think, would not be acceptable to the townspeople as governor.

Reference is to your telegram No. 230 of the 16th May.

[18692]

No. 465.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 402.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

SHAHISM and revolutionaries.

Tehran, May 17, 1909.

The Nationalist leader has replied to the communication made to him through the

Russian secretary at Kazvin, as reported in my telegram No. 393 of the 15th May, that the revolutionaries who are requested to lay down their arms are beyond his control. He does not for his part "wish to be assassinated," but suggests that, as they are Russian subjects, the Russian chargé d'affaires might like to talk to them.

M. Sabline believes that there are now at or near Kazvin some 400 Cossacks. He has advised the Sipahdar to return to Resht and entirely disassociate himself from these revolutionaries.

[18693]

No. 466.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 403.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

REVOLUTIONARIES at Kazvin.

Tehran, May 17, 1909.

The Central Committee at Kazvin has telegraphed to all the foreign legations protesting against the occupation of Tabreez by Russian troops and the issuing of a so-called ultimatum demanding disarmament by the Russian secretary at Kazvin.

The alleged ultimatum, I understand, was simply an exhortation to those under arms to take advantage of the amnesty by peacefully returning to their normal occupations.

[18416]

No. 467.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 253.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, May 17, 1909.

YOUR telegram No. 396 of the 16th instant: Bushire customs.

Proposal in penultimate paragraph approved.

[18607]

No. 468.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 254.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 17, 1909.

PAYMENT by Oil Syndicate to Persian Commissioner.

With reference to your telegram No. 399 of to-day, please report who is to act for the Imperial Commissioner. The Oil Syndicate wish to be informed.

[18248]

No. 469.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 679.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 17, 1909.

PERSONAL telegrams exchanged between the Shah and the Emperor of Russia.

With reference to your telegram No. 251, Confidential, of the 11th instant.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's Government much appreciate His Imperial Majesty's action in graciously giving instructions that we should be informed of what has passed.

[18419]

No. 470.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 681.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

RUSSIAN troops at Tabreez.

Foreign Office, May 17, 1909.

The prompt dispatch of your letter (see your telegram No. 259 of the 16th instant) has my entire approval. In view of the explanations which the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs gave you confidentially, I am not prepared at this moment to press for the withdrawal of any of the Russian troops, although I consider that some ought to be withdrawn at once, as they have exceeded all limits of what is justifiable.

[18556]

No. 471.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 682.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, May 17, 1909.

YOUR telegram No. 255 and Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 398 of the 14th and 17th instant: Proposed message to Mujtahids at Nedjef.

Please inform Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs that I agree.

[18774]

No. 172.

Mr. M. Ellinger to Foreign Office.—(Received May 18.)

Sir,

28, Oxford Street, Manchester, May 17, 1909.

I AM in receipt of Mr. Mallet's telegram of Saturday, the 15th instant, informing me, with reference to my letter to you of the 13th instant, that you will telegraph to Tehran if I undertake to pay cost of telegram and reply.

I do not think that any agreement made to induce the Nationalists to cease their interference with the mining operations at Ormuz, under the contract with Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co., and the Mountainjar can affect the rights of my firm to receive the purchase-price of the axle-shipped, and it appears to me that there is no necessity to cable Tehran upon the subject, as you will shortly receive full details by mail, which you will doubtless communicate to me.

If, however, you are of opinion that it is desirable in our interest to cable Tehran I shall be glad to hear further from you, and, in case it is ultimately decided to cable, my firm would certainly agree to refund the cost of the telegram and reply, should you be of opinion that this is a charge which should properly be borne by my firm.

Yours faithfully,

(Signed) M. ELLINGER.

[18820]

No. 473.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 18.)

(No. 401.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

ELECTORAL Law Committee.

Tehran, May 18, 1909.

With reference to Sir A. Nicolson's telegram No. 261 of the 16th May.

The suggestions as to the composition of the committee, which we made privately, have not been entirely adopted, but, in my opinion, the selection is not unsatisfactory. They are at present working well, and I am refraining from any interference with them.

The Russian Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs mentions a contention which was the work of Sanie-el-Dowleh, a feather-brained person, the number of whose admirers made his inclusion in this body necessary. This contention has now been overruled.

As reported in a previous telegram, Sanie-el-Dowleh, believing his life to be in danger, sought last at this legation. I received him, but on his refusal to leave the country, and on seeing that he intended to use us for political and private purposes, I turned him out.

[18822]

No. 474.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 18.)

(No. 105.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 18, 1909.

SITUATION at Urumia.

I have received the following telegram from His Majesty's consular-general at Tabreez, No. 127 of the 17th May:—

"Four days ago the Russian post left for Urumia with an escort of Nationalists. A letter from the same place received to-day makes no mention of Turks, and states that tranquillity prevails."

The reference is to my telegram No. 363 of the 5th May.

[18832]

No. 475.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 18.)

(No. 262.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, May 18, 1909.

TABREEZ.

To-day M. Tcharykow repeated to me again in conversation the orders which had been dispatched from here to General Saersky, in command of the Russian troops at Tabreez. I remarked to M. Tcharykow that in a very short time the Russian Government would doubtless be able to recall their troops from Tabreez, or at any rate reduce their number very considerably. To this M. Tcharykow replied that it was the earnest desire of the Russian Government to do so as soon as it was possible to adopt such a course.

[18830]

No. 176.

Consul-General Cox to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 18.)

(No. 486.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Bushire, May 18, 1909.

REQUIREMENTS of Oil Company.

Your telegram of the 29th April to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, repeated to me by the Legation.

I have to state, in the first place, Mr. Reynolds, the local manager of the Company, forwarded to his principals at Glasgow a copy of a letter, with inclosures, which he sent to me on the 30th ultimo. Please ask the Company to show you a copy of it.

Although Lieutenant Wilson, of the Oil Guard, has made a careful survey and examination of the ground which the Syndicate contemplate acquiring as the site of their refinery, no representative of the latter has apparently been sent to inspect. Both MacDonal and Wilson, and also apparently Reynolds are of the opinion that 2,000 ft. would not be an unreasonable sum to ask for as rental of the ground required, seeing that there will be more than 100 miles of pipes in the territory the Syndicate are said to have engaged to pay Lakhtiar's 1,000 ft. per annum. Another consideration to be borne in mind is that, according to Lieutenant Wilson's Report, the land required is desirable for purposes of agriculture, being eminently irrigable and culturable, although none of it is at this moment under cultivation. I append, in abbreviated form, a declaration in writing which the Sheikh, on whom I impose, I hardly the duty of behaving handsomely to the first extensive British enterprise on his territory in return for the support and favours he has so often received from us, has given me. The following are, as he understands them, the requirements of the Oil Company:

1. An area of uncultivated land through which a line of pipes can be passed to connect their plants.
2. A similar area on Akbari Island on which to construct a continuous line of buildings with a total footage extending 2,000 yards along the Shat-el-Arab bank, and having an area of 600 Persian farsachs, and on which to erect a refinery.
3. A strip of land for a right-of-way connecting the Balmushdar River with these buildings when complete.

4. A provision by which, if necessary, more uncultivated land adjacent to the plot on Abadan Island can be obtained. Such land to be granted at the same moderate rate up to a year from the date of the acquisition of the original plot, and at the correct market rate of the time after three years from that date.

5. A provision enabling the Oil Company to select another area of the same description on the island in the event of the area already held by them proving on further examination to be unsuitable.

6. The Sheikh is, as far as lies in his power, to procure favourable rates for the Company, should they desire later on to acquire land on the Karun, at Ahwaz, or at any other point for wharves or warehouses.

As regards the requirements mentioned in 1 and 2, the Sheikh is prepared to lease to the Company land as specified for as long as they may require during the duration of their Concession. He will allow them a good and sufficient title to the lands. This undertaking is given on the Sheikh's own behalf and also on that of his tribesmen and descendants.

As regards the requirements in 3, 4, 5, and 6, the Sheikh is ready to accede to the Company's requests, and offers them the choice of the following alternative terms: Either an advance payment to be made every ten years of a yearly rent of 650*l.*; or, instead of this, an advance payment to be made every year of a yearly rent of 1,000*l.*

Four conditions are made to these terms, viz. :—

1. That all the Company's plant of machinery, workshops, and other erections upon the land leased to them shall lapse to the Sheikh when the Company's Concession expires.

2. A guarantee must be given that the employes of the Company will not, without the cognizance of the Sheikh, engage tribesmen to work for them, or in any way interfere in tribal affairs.

3. The Sheikh to be the absolute and sole owner of treasure trove throughout the land leased to the Company.

4. In the event of the prolongation of the Concession beyond the original time, the Sheikh or his descendants shall reserve the right of concluding terms satisfactory to themselves for the further lease of the buildings, land, &c., to the Company.

The above is the substance of the Sheikh's declaration. His offer with regard to the rental, which I believe him to have made only out of deference to us, is, I think, very liberal when considered on its merits.

I take it that the Company think that they are enabled by the wording of their Concession to consent to the first and fourth of the stipulations made by the Sheikh, and if this is, in fact, their opinion, we might perhaps wait for another fifty years until the question is raised again before we intervened between the Persian Government and the Sheikh, and it is therefore perhaps not for us now to raise any objection. I understand that the demand of the Sheikh for these two conditions is the result of a conversation which he had with Reynolds.

Please inform Reynolds if you think that the Sheikh's declaration, of which I have given the substance above, makes it appear that there are satisfactory prospects that the Sheikh and the Company will arrive at a detailed and formal agreement. Reynolds has already a copy of the Declaration, and I have requested him to wait until I have received an answer from you before continuing the negotiation with the Sheikh, who is at this moment absent on a trip on the Karun. I would suggest that before finally deciding on the requisition of the site in question the Oil Company should examine very closely the advantages and disadvantages of the ground required on Abadan. Thus, I understand from officers on the spot, has not yet been done.

[18331]

No. 477.

Consul-General Cox to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 18.)

(No. 487.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Bushire, May 18, 1909.

THE Sheikh of Mohammerah, with whom I discussed the question of a loan, said that what he desired was a loan of 10,000*l.*, repayable in ten years. The sum of 5,000*l.* or 6,000*l.*, which I mentioned to him as the amount which His Majesty's Government contemplated, he declared to be inadequate. I believe the Oil Company were prepared to consider a loan of 2 lakhs.

[18932]

No. 477.

Consul-General Cox to Sir G. Barchey.—(Received at Foreign Office May 18.)

(No. 391.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

MOHAMMERAH.

Bushire, May 18, 1909.

The sheikh was compelled a short time ago to find a sum of 7,000*l.* in order to pay for his date garden. Messrs. Woonklaus, at Bussorah, had often offered to lend him money, and on this occasion Hajj Rais borrowed for him the 7,000*l.* which were required to make up the total of 7,000*l.* The sheikh has now promised to have no such dealings in the future, and to pay off his debt as soon as he is in receipt of the loan which he is now soliciting.

I pointed out to the sheikh in connection with this matter that, in the eyes of His Majesty's Government as well as of the general public, he was associated with all the dealings of Hajj Rais, and I made it quite clear to him that it was to his own interest as well as to ours that he should not forfeit our confidence by cultivating undesirable relations with foreigners. He replied that in a matter of this sort he put himself in the hands of His Majesty's Government, whose advice he desired to follow implicitly. The man who requires our careful supervision is, however, the sheikh's nephew, Hajj Rais, with whom I discussed the matter privately in a long conversation.

He admitted that though he was primarily an ordinary merchant his intimate relations with the sheikh necessarily resulted in the latter being identified with all his own actions, and, this being so, he professed his willingness to act as we considered that the best interests of His Majesty's Government and of the sheikh demanded.

We then spoke of the wharf which had been recently built, and which he had leased for the sheikh to Messrs. Woonklaus. He undertook to force the latter to give up their lease for lack of business in Mohammerah by means of a systematic boycottage (which would defy detection) on the part of himself and other merchants on whom he could impose his will. He stipulated, firstly, that I should find a British tenant for the wharf in the event of his plan succeeding, who would be willing to pay the same rent of 200*l.* yearly; and, secondly, that I should make good to his son the resignation of the agency of the German shipping line, which would be involved in the boycottage of Messrs. Woonklaus.

Both the sheikh and business of Mohammerah are run by this man, and I think that, for a time at any rate, it would be worth our while, if his project succeeds, to subsidise him as long as the position is maintained. The matter could be arranged through the intermediary of the Oil Syndicate in an indirect and convenient manner.

If Hajj Rais succeeds in ousting Messrs. Woonklaus, could not the Oil Company or Messrs. Shaw-Walpole be persuaded to lease the wharf at the same rental of 200*l.* per annum? A confidential undertaking to this effect on their part would assist us greatly. In the meantime Hajj Rais should get to work at once before Messrs. Woonklaus's suspicions are aroused. It is highly important that we should retain the good will and cooperation of Hajj Rais.

Personally I have no doubt that the sheikh is perfectly straightforward with us, but our interests demand that there should be a strong and vigilant influence constantly at his elbow. This influence is to be found in the person of His Majesty's representative at Mohammerah, who could both guide the sheikh and keep an eye on Hajj Rais.

If His Majesty's Government agree to adopt this course, I should be glad to be informed as soon as possible of the terms on which the money can be provided, the manner in which it will be paid, and the rate of interest; also, seeing that the Sheikh has need of money at once, whether the money could be telegraphed out either to Lynch or to the military authorities. There would be no harm in modifying the condition with regard to the period of ten years if it is thought an inconvenient one.

Please telegraph reply, as I promised the Sheikh that in recommending his request I would ask you to reply by telegraph.

[18949]

No. 478.

Sir A. Nicholson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 265.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

COSSACK Brigade at Tehran.

St. Petersburg, May 19, 1909.

I am informed confidentially by M. Tchernykhov that Colonel Margani, who is well known to my informant, and was for a long time in Transcaucasia, is to succeed Colonel Liakhoff in the command of the Cossack Brigade. Colonel Liakhoff is to be given a command in Russia.

[18837]

No. 479.

Consul-General Cox to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 19.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

ARABISTAN irrigation question.

Bushire, May 18, 1909.

The following is the substance of the written undertaking which the Sheikh of Mohammerah has given:—

1. He presumes that past events would make it necessary to obtain the Persian Government's consent before undertaking any scheme which is dependent on the construction of the dam at Ahwaz. If the Persian Government grant a concession for such a scheme, the Sheikh stipulates that it should be given in his name, and that the British Government shall assist him in obtaining it and refuse their concurrence in the event of the concession being granted in any other name whatsoever. On his side he undertakes, once the concession has been obtained, to apply only to Great Britain for the money and assistance of an expert nature which may be necessary for the execution of the scheme, not allowing foreign Governments or nationals of a foreign country to participate in any way.

2. He considers himself entitled to undertake any minor schemes of a profitable nature (such as, for instance, modern schemes on the Karun which can be carried out without necessitating the construction of the dam at Ahwaz, and schemes of irrigation from other rivers in his territory, such as the Shahr, Hindian, Kerkha, and Jarrahig) as being ordinary questions of tribal or domestic administration which do not necessitate reference to the Treasury of the Central Government. He promises, in the event of his undertaking any such scheme, to apply to Great Britain for any outside help of a financial or expert nature which he may require, and to employ persons or syndicates recommended to him by the British Government in preference to foreigners. He is convinced that it is both the wish and the intention of the British Government to safeguard his interests, and it is with this conviction that he gives the above undertaking.

[17553]

No. 480.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barchey.

(No. 69.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 19, 1909.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 78 of the 16th ultimo reporting on the situation at Isfahan.

I shall be glad if you will express to His Majesty's Consul-General at that place

[17619]

3 H

my satisfaction at the successful manner in which he has prevented interference with the lines of the Indo-European Telegraph Department.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[19031]

No. 481.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 20.)

Sir,

India Office, May 19, 1909.

I AM directed to enclose copy of a telegram from the Government of India, stating, with reference to the recent decision to withdraw the double company of native infantry stationed at Robat since 1906, that they have informed His Majesty's Minister at Tehran that the possibility of having in certain contingencies to send the troops back had been foreseen, and that the question would be reconsidered before the commencement of the next arms traffic season.

Viscount Morley, subject to any observations that Sir E. Grey may have to offer, proposes to approve the action of the Government of India.

The Government of India also suggest in their telegram of the 10th May that the decision not to increase from thirty to forty-five the escort of the consul in Seistan, communicated to them in the Secretary of State's telegram of the 6th January and 30th March last, should be reconsidered. On this point Lord Morley would be glad to be favoured with Sir E. Grey's views as to whether recent developments in the political position in Persia render it advisable to increase the escort in spite of the obvious objections to such a course.

I am, &c.
A. GODLEY.

Inclosure in No. 481.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 4, 1909.

SEE your telegram of the 30th March as to garrison for Robat.

His Majesty's Minister at Tehran has been informed, in reply to enquiry, that, according to present arrangements, withdrawal of double company of native infantry will take place when current arms traffic season comes to an end. On the 30th ultimo Minister telegraphed that he hoped to ops would only be removed until next arms traffic season commences. Indo-European Telegraph Department would otherwise be in difficult position, Kerman being nearest place upon which staff at Dehaneh could fall back. In reply, I have said that possibility had been foreseen of troops having to be sent periodically to Robat, and that the question would be considered before next arms traffic season begins. His Majesty's Government may wish, in view of present state of affairs in Persia, to reconsider recommendation of Major Kennion for increase of Seistan consular escort.

[19022]

No. 482.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 20.)

(No. 104.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 20, 1909.

BUSHIRE.

The bluejackets are being re-embarked. The foreign representatives at Bushire agree that the situation justifies this step, and the Dariga Begi has assured His Majesty's consul-general that he can effectively prevent any recurrence of disorders.

[19023]

No. 483.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 20.)

(No. 407.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 20, 1909.

ALA-ED-DOWLEH, whom it will be remembered, the Russian Government had mentioned to His Majesty's Government as a desirable governor for Tabreez, has now been offered the post of governor of Fars.

Fars greatly needs a strong governor, and if Ala-ed-Dowleh accepts the post, the condition of the province should improve.

[19024]

No. 484.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 20.)

(No. 108.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 20, 1909.

PEKSIAN Cabinet.

The immediate return of Nasr-ul-Mulk is greatly to be desired.

Could not the two Governments guarantee his personal safety in case of necessity?

My Russian colleague is telegraphing to his Government in the same sense.

[19024]

No. 485.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 689.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 20, 1909.

AS the two Legations consider Nasr-ul-Mulk's return important, His Majesty's Government would be ready, subject to the concurrence of Russian Government, to give assurance suggested in Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 408 of to-day, that, if it necessary, Nasr-ul-Mulk should receive protection from the two Legations.

[19164]

No. 486.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 21.)

(No. 409.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 21, 1909.

THE late Minister of Finance succeeded in obstructing the negotiations as to the Arabian telegraphs when they were approaching conclusion, and since then the disorganisation of the Government has delayed their resumption.

Now, however, the Minister for Foreign Affairs expresses his willingness to sign a convention the terms of which are well within the lines indicated in your telegram No. 36 of the 27th January, with the reservation, necessitated by the spirit of articles 23 and 24 of the new restored constitution, that notes must be exchanged to the effect that the arrangement will not come into force until it has received the sanction of the assembly.

I am inclined to accept this reservation after consulting Mr. Barker and a person who is in close relations with the nationalist party.

[19167]

No. 487.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 21.)

(No. 110.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 21, 1909.

IMPERIAL Commissioner of Oil Syndicate.

According to information received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Salik-ussultanaeh at present holds this office.

The payment of 1906, is, as I previously telegraphed, to be made to Sam-ed-Dowleh.

Reference is to your telegram No. 221 of the 3rd May.

[18949]

No. 488.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 690.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, May 21, 1909.

YOUR telegram No. 266 of the 19th instant; Russian Commandant over Persian Cossacks.

Please inquire whether Margani will leave the Russian army.

[19231]

No. 489.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey. (Received May 22.)

(No. 198.)

Sir,

Paris, May 21, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of a letter from the Ziles-Sultan, inclosing a telegram from Persia in regard to the pillage of villages belonging to him.

His Royal Highness asks what he is to do and whether His Majesty's Government can protect him efficaciously.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

FRANCIS BERTIE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 489.

Ziles-Sultan to Sir F. Bertie.

Excellence,

5, Rue Villaret de Joyeuse, Paris, le 19 mai, 1909.

JE vous envoie la traduction d'une dépêche qui m'est adressée d'Ispahan par un de mes fils et par mes hommes d'affaires.

En présence de cette situation, que dois-je faire et votre Gouvernement peut-il me protéger efficacement?

Je suis actuellement à Paris, mais je le quitterai samedi pour Genève, d'où je vous enverrai mon adresse.

Veuillez, &c.

(Signé)

ZELLE SULTAN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 489.

Muhammad Mirza to Ziles-Sultan.

(Télégraphique.)

Ispahan, le 17 mai, 1909.

LES Khadjéwaye Mookovoy (tribu située entre Bakhtyaris et Faraidan d'Ispahan), à l'instigation d'Emir Motakham (chef des troupes du Shah envoyées vers Ispahan), ont pillé des villages appartenant à votre Altesse. Nous avons télégraphié à Téhéran, mais n'avons reçu qu'une réponse évasive. Ce sont les villages de Borbonoud et de Faraidan. Malgré l'amnistie, ils ne veulent pas quitter le pays, et continuent les déprédations.

[19322]

No. 490.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey. (Received May 22.)

(No. 267.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, May 22, 1909.

NASR-UL-MULK. Your telegram No. 689 of the 21st May.

M. Teliarskyoff agrees with the suggestion that assurances should be given to Nasr-ul-Mulk, and instructions have been telegraphed to the Russian Ambassador in Paris to give such assurances conjointly with his British colleague, and to urge Nasr-ul-Mulk not to delay his departure for Tehran any longer.

[18837]

No. 491.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 255.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 22, 1909.

FOLLOWING are my comments on undertaking given by Sheikh of Mohammrah with regard to Arabistan irrigation (see Cox' telegram No. 496 of the 18th instant):—

It would in any case have been necessary to have secured the assent of Persian Government, and, especially in view of the fact that the Shah has agreed to establish a constitution, care must be taken not to make trouble between the Persian Government and the Sheikh.

I consider the Sheikh's proposals, reported in paragraph 3, to be satisfactory. It would be advantageous to secure the Concession for the Sheikh, and an opportunity must be created for doing so; in this way we should both expose ourselves less to Dutch criticism, and avoid difficulties with the Medjlis as regards Concessions to foreigners. One question, however, presents itself, namely, whether it is advisable entirely to exclude foreign capital, as the necessity of compounding with the Dutch concessionaire is a contingency which cannot be entirely excluded. Please acquaint me with your views on this question.

I think that Sheikh's offer in paragraph 4 may be accepted, as otherwise these minor points might be given to foreigners. Moreover, the Sheikh evidently considers it unnecessary to consult the Persian Government upon them, and in case of necessity will not be difficult to come to an understanding with Persian Government on the subject if they raise objections later on.

What are your views on the above and also on the question of German competitions (see Cox' No. 494 of the 18th instant)? Please reply by telegram.

[19326]

No. 492.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey. (Received May 23.)

(No. 411.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulabek, May 23, 1909.

WONKHAI'SS wharf at Mohammrah.

The arrangement with Hajji Rais, proposed in telegram No. 159 of the 18th May from His Majesty's consul-general, Bushire, appears to me rash. If it were to become known, the Germans would have cause of reasonable complaint, and its execution would give Hajji Rais an undesirable hold over us.

A strong and vigilant consul should be able to direct the sheikh and combat the efforts of his underling towards strengthening the German position, and I should be disposed to rely on the efforts of a consul of this character for the combating of German influence.

[19327]

No. 493.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey. (Received May 23.)

(No. 112.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 23, 1909.

PROPOSED recall of Ziles-Sultan.

The Shah has expressed a desire to recall his uncle and appoint him governor of Ispahan. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, in communicating this to me, asked whether his Imperial Highness's return would be objectionable to the two Governments. My Russian colleague and I have not replied.

On a former occasion, when he was governor of Ispahan, the Russian Legation had difficulties with him. They would be opposed to his reappointment to that post.

I have talked over the matter with M. Salbine, and I should be disposed to reply that there is no objection to Ziles-Sultan's return if his Imperial Highness is made governor of Fars.

Akred-Dowleh, who had been offered this post, has refused it, and the appointment of Ziles-Sultan would offer the best chance of quieting the province and of restoring the security of the roads.

[1649]

His return would naturally annul the guarantees given him by M. de Hartwig and Mr. Marling, but unless this fact were emphasised to him he would probably ignore it and obey the Shah's summons to return.

[19328]

No. 494

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey. (Received May 23.)

(No. 113.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 23, 1909.

ON the 20th May His Majesty's ship "Fox" left Bushire for Muscat.

[19329]

No. 495.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey. (Received May 23.)

(No. 111.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 23, 1909.

GENERAL situation.

His Majesty's vice-consul at Resht reports an improvement in the attitude of Cossacks there. My Russian colleague has received information to the same effect from Kazvin. M. Sabine is in communication with his Government as to the advisability of granting passports to those men which will enable them to return to their own country.

I learn from His Majesty's consul-general at Isfahan that the Bakhtiari chiefs, although differences still exist between them—are entirely satisfied with a letter addressed to them by the Shah. They intend to disband the greater part of their troops as soon as possible.

The committee for the elaboration of the electoral law is already far advanced in its work.

Negotiations concerning the Russian advance are proceeding between that legation and the Persian Government. The uses to which the money is intended to be put are the payment of the troops and diplomatic service.

Only 50,000*l.* is, I understand, to be advanced at first.

[19325]

No. 496.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey. (Received May 23.)

(No. 270.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

St. Petersburg, May 23, 1909.

MY telegram No. 255 [of the 11th instant] and your telegram No. 682 [of the 17th instant].

Following is translation of draft communication suggested by Russian Government, of which I am sending French text by post to-day:—

"Persia for several years past has been a prey to an internal struggle. Animated by feelings of true friendship towards that country, Russia and Great Britain have used all their influence in order to assist in calming the troubles by which she is torn. Their efforts have not been in vain; quite recently Shah, following advice of the two Governments, has decided to re-establish constitutional régime and to grant to his people reforms with a view to restoring calm to the country.

"In order to facilitate success of Shah's efforts to secure peace, the consular representatives of Great Britain and Russia are instructed to appeal to the patriotic sentiments of the spiritual chiefs of the Shah community, which are well known among Mussulmans of the East, and to influence which they exercise among their co-religionists.

"These representatives are therefore asked Mujtahids of Kerkela and Sejeif to lend their energetic support to this humanitarian object. In exhorting all parties of Persians to abandon fratricidal struggle and, in giving them wise advice, to exercise moderation, the venerable Mujtahids will contribute largely to the happiness of their beautiful country, which has suffered so much from the troubles of recent years, and will at last restore to it the order and calm so ardently desired by the Persian people."

[19321]

No. 497.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey. (Received May 23.)

(No. 72.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Paris, May 23, 1909.

I LEARNED from the Russian Ambassador last night that the Russian Government and the British Government wishing that the Nasr-ul-Mulk should become a member of the Persian Cabinet, the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs had telegraphed instructing him to concert with me for putting pressure on the Nasr-ul-Mulk to go at once to Tehran, and if he hesitated to do so to give him an assurance of Russian and British protection. M. de Nolodow had seen Nasr-ul-Mulk, who told him that the Shah had not made him any definite offer.

I am to receive a visit to-morrow morning from the Nasr-ul-Mulk.

[19456]

No. 498.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey. (Received May 24.)

(No. 91.)

Sir.

Tehran, May 5, 1909.

I HAVE kept you fully informed by telegraph of the events following upon the audience of the 22nd instant, at which the two Representatives tendered to the Shah the advice decided upon by His Majesty's Government and the Russian Government, but for facility of reference it seems desirable that I should now record them as briefly as possible in narrative form.

On the day following the audience the Minister for Foreign Affairs, by command of the Shah, visited the two Representatives at the Russian Legation and told them that His Majesty was still disquieted as to the danger of disturbances if he followed the advice of the two Powers, and desired to know whether they would give him guarantees for his safety and throne. We replied that we could not give him any assurances beyond those given in December last, and we pointed out that the best security that the Shah could have lay in following the advice we had tendered to him the day before. His Excellency then told us that the Shah needed more than the 100,000*l.* promised him. We reminded his Excellency that our programme held out hope of more than the 100,000*l.*, and we added that when the Assembly was working and the Financial Administration had been reformed the two Representatives would do their best to facilitate a substantial loan to the Persian Government, the need for which was well known to us.

On the following morning a Council was held, at which the Shah, his Ministers and others were present, to discuss our programme. Saad-ed-Dowleh visited me in the afternoon to say that he had vigorously urged the acceptance of our advice, and though he had been strongly opposed by the reactionaries present, he believed the Shah would, in the end, be guided by him.

On the 25th Saad-ed-Dowleh sent for the two dragomans and expressed the desire to discuss with them the details of the execution of the programme. His Excellency was told that before we could go into details the Shah must officially signify his acceptance of our advice.

Meanwhile, the news of the impending arrival of Russian troops in Azerbaijan had reached Tehran, and Taki Zade and the Local Assembly of Tabreez proceeded to use it as leverage in negotiations with the Shah, which resulted on the 25th in the grant of a truce for an indefinite period, facilities for the introduction of food into the town, and on the 26th in an amnesty for all in Tabreez. The events which led up to the dispatch of Russian troops across the frontier are narrated in a separate despatch. The matter is only mentioned here because of its influence as reinforcing our representations. It was probably the first time that the Shah realized that Russian intervention need not necessarily be in his favour; but though the intervention saved Tabreez, I cannot say that its effect on the Shah's attitude towards our representations has been yet as complete as one could have wished.

Sittings of the Council of Ministers, with the addition of some of the Shah's unofficial reactionary advisers, were held on the 25th, 26th, and 27th, at which Saad-ed-Dowleh did his utmost to combat the impulses of reaction. At one of these sittings the project was mooted of publishing an Ede-bi-huk law drafted some months ago by M. de Hartwig. This law had been on the eve of being promulgated last November,

when the artificial demonstration against the Nationalists, engineered at Baghi-Shah by the Court party, gave the Shah a pretext for suppressing it. As there was now good reason to believe that the Shah was again about to publish this totally inadequate measure in the hope of escaping from the full execution of our programme, my Russian colleague and I informed His Majesty through the Saad-ed-Dowleh that such a step would be inconsistent with our programme, and would in no way improve the situation. We pressed for a definite answer to our representations.

On the 29th, the Legations learnt that the Shah had dismissed the Grand Vizier and Amir Baladur Jang from their posts in the Cabinet and appointed his own uncle and father-in-law, Nafies-Sultaneh, Prime Minister with the portfolio of war. Nafies-Sultaneh is a reactionary of the most stubborn type, and although he has not been recently a member of the Cabinet, he has had an influence quite as harmful as that of Amir Baladur Jang. After consultation with my Russian colleague we agreed to inform the Shah in writing, through Saad-ed-Dowleh, that Nafies-Sultaneh's presence in the Cabinet was altogether unacceptable. We again pressed for an answer to our representations, and warned the Shah that if we had not received one by the 2nd May we should ask for another audience.

Early next morning we learnt from Saad-ed-Dowleh that he had been summarily dismissed from the Cabinet. Believing this step to be due to the firm stand he had taken during the few days preceding in favour of the Shah's accepting our programme, and feeling that his dismissal, coupled with Nafies-Sultaneh's appointment was calculated to cast ridicule on the representations of the two Powers, we decided to make a strong protest, and we dispatched the two dragomans to Baghi-Shah to state to the Shah that unless Nafies-Sultaneh was at once dismissed and Saad-ed-Dowleh reinstated we should telegraph to our Governments that the measures taken by the Shah showed clearly that His Majesty had rejected our advice. I enclosed a Memoirandum by Mr. Churchill giving an account of this audience; you will see that it was made quite clear to His Majesty that the two Powers had no intention to force their advice upon him. He was free to follow it or to reject it, but Saad-ed-Dowleh was indisputable for any Reform Cabinet, and therefore his dismissal, if persisted in, showed that His Majesty rejected one of the essential parts of our programme. What passed at this audience evidently made a deep impression, for early next morning Nafies-Sultaneh sent for Mr. Churchill, and, while protesting that he was not a reactionary, assured him that he would not accept the place in the Cabinet as the two Legations were so strongly opposed to him.

It had, as you are aware, been the intention of the two Legations not to discuss any details of the programme until the Shah had officially signified his acceptance. His Majesty's action, however, had made it in our opinion necessary to show our hand and had even led us to exceed our instructions. These instructions only authorized us to suggest privately the composition of the Cabinet. We had already gone further in bringing strong pressure to bear upon the Shah to reinstate Saad-ed-Dowleh, and we felt that as we had gone one step in the direction of discussing details it would be desirable that we should not only mention Saad-ed-Dowleh as indispensable to the desired Reform Cabinet, but also Naser-ol-Mulk, and to state to the Shah point blank that unless he forthwith appointed these two to the Cabinet the two Powers would consider he had rejected their advice; we felt that such a communication would put the Shah's sincerity to the test and would show at once whether it would serve any useful purpose to persevere in pressing the programme upon him. The proposed step, however, went so far beyond the line of private suggestion laid down for us that we felt we could not make the communication indicated without authorization, and we accordingly telegraphed on the 1st May, describing the situation which had arisen and asking instructions. Late in the evening of that day I received a visit from an Embassy from the Palace who assured me that the Shah did in fact accept our programme though he wished for explanations on certain points. He consulted me as to the form in which the Shah's official acceptance should be conveyed to us. I gave him no definite answer but after consulting my Russian colleague the following day, sent for the Embassy again and gave him a formula which we were prepared to regard as an official acceptance. I told him that though, if it were not signed by Saad-ed-Dowleh as Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Shah would be laying up great difficulties for himself when it came to executing the programme, yet, provided that the note was signed by an official of whose charge of the Foreign Office we had been officially informed, we should regard it as a formal notification of the Shah's acceptance of our advice.

On the 11th instant we received a notification that the Under-Secretary of State

was for the time directing the affairs of the Ministry, and an hour or two afterwards a communication on the lines suggested reached this Legation. In it the Under-Secretary of State stated that the Shah accepted our advice, but desired explanations on certain points of detail which might be given by the Representatives to Delegates from the Palace at an informal meeting. We have taken act of this communication and asked that an hour may be fixed for the meeting.

Meanwhile, notwithstanding the official announcement that the Shah accepts our advice Amir Baladur Jang, though dismissed from the Ministry of War, still remains at Baghi-Shah as commander of the Shah's body-guard, and Nafies-Sultaneh, against whose appointment to the Cabinet we had protested, still appears to be officiating as President of the Council and Minister of War. We had intimated to the Shah that on his officially signifying his acceptance of our advice we should be in a position to give him in writing the assurances given him verbally by the dragomans last December, but in view of these tangible proofs of His Majesty's continued stubbornness, we have thought it well to postpone the fulfilment of our promise.

To-day, however, on his birthday the Shah has taken a step in the right direction by issuing a rescript promising a Constitution. The Decree, an English summary of which I enclose, describes the Constitutional principle as the best foundation for the security of the people and for the reorganization of the Government and the State, and fixes a date for elections to be held according to an Electoral Law shortly to be published. Past experience leaves one sceptical as to the Shah's sincerity of purpose, but the Decree is in itself so far satisfactory that it contains nothing incompatible with the execution of the programme of reforms recommended by the two Powers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY

Inclosure 1 in No. 498

Memoirandum by Mr. Churchill.

M. BARANOWSKY and I saw the Shah at 7 P.M., and my Russian colleague, who acted as spokesman, said:

"We apologise for troubling your Majesty at so late an hour, but we are deputed by the British Minister and the Russian Chargé d'Affaires to tell your Majesty that unless you immediately dismiss Nafies-Sultaneh and reinstate Saad-ed-Dowleh the two Representatives will be compelled, to-morrow at noon, to telegraph to their Governments that your Majesty has taken measures which show clearly that your Majesty has no intention of following the friendly advice of the two Powers."

His Majesty asked by what right such a step would be taken. He had accepted our advice and had acted upon it. How could he be forced to have a Minister for Foreign Affairs who was personally disagreeable to him?

To all these questions M. Baranowsky replied that our instructions were to give His Majesty the above message, and we were not authorized to say any more.

The Shah, however, was very persistent, and declared that the two Representatives could not telegraph that he refused the advice of the two Powers in the face of his official declaration to the contrary.

I said that the proper channel for such a communication to the two Legations was Saad-ed-Dowleh, the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The Shah said that he would tell the two Representatives, through us—who, he assumed, came in an official capacity—that he accepted the advice as laid down in the representations and he had carried out most of its provisions already. He had dismissed Nafies-Sultaneh and Amir Baladur, he had given an amnesty, and he was preparing an Electoral Law; but he found nothing in the representations which justified us in forcing Saad-ed-Dowleh upon him. Nafies-Sultaneh would not be in the Cabinet, but he was determined not to have Saad-ed-Dowleh.

M. Baranowsky said that, in that case, at noon the following day the two Representatives would telegraph accordingly to their two Governments.

The Shah said we were using brute force and that he apparently was no longer so. He said that we must choose between himself and Saad-ed-Dowleh.

I took the opportunity of saying that the two Governments had no desire to force His Majesty to do anything—that, in fact, such an attitude was very much the reverse of the attitude of the two Governments. His Majesty had been given friendly advice

which, if he followed it, would lead to financial assistance on our part. He was, however, quite at liberty to reject the advice and to go his own way.

To this His Majesty replied that he would never reject the friendly advice of the two Powers. He had, in fact, accepted it, and would carry it out. All he asked was that they should give in on this small point, as he could not possibly get on with Saad-ed-Dowleh, who was personally distasteful to him and in whom he had no confidence.

M. Barnowsky said that he was mistaken as to Saad-ed-Dowleh, who was, in fact, the only man available who could carry out the programme of reforms on constitutional lines. I added that the choice of a reactionary such as Nafiz-Saltanah and the dismissal of Saad-ed-Dowleh proved clearly that His Majesty had no intention of carrying out the advice given to him. He had not as yet signified his acceptance, nor had he properly carried out the provisions of the programme.

The Shah then asked us who were the persons the two Legations had confidence in. To which we replied that when the formal acceptance of His Majesty had reached the two Representatives they would then, and then only, enter into details.

M. Barnowsky then reminded the Shah that his Legation had clearly told His Majesty that they would not consent to the dismissal of Saad-ed-Dowleh, but he had taken this step all the same. Now he would have to reverse it, or the two Legations would most certainly telegraph at noon the following day that he had rejected their advice.

The Shah, however, remained firm to the end, and we took our leave at 7.45 P.M.

(Signed) G. P. CHURCHILL,
Oriental Secretary.

Tehran, April 30, 1909.

Inclosure 2 in No. 198.

Imperial Rescript, dated May 5, 1909.

(Translation.)

AS it is necessary for the arrangements necessary to the State and the necessities of the people to put in order the Government Administrations, and as so far these Administrations have not been properly organized, and the disorganization of the Administrations has brought about all kinds of difficulties and disturbances, and as day by day the bonds of security and order are being torn further apart; therefore, in order to introduce order into the Government Administrations, the constitutional principle, which is the best foundation for the security of the people and for reorganizing the Government and State, has from this day, the 5th May, 1909, been commanded by us to be instituted, so that the Deputies of the people and the learned ones of the State should come to an agreement with the Government as to a settlement of existing difficulties, the drawing up of laws in accordance with the necessities of the dear Fatherland, the necessities of the time, and the limitations of the Islamic faith.

[Here follows further verbiage.]

Therefore, on the 19th July, 1909, the Deputies of the kingdom must be elected, in accordance with an Electoral Law which will be shortly published, and will assemble at Tehran as soon as possible in order to assist in bringing about the progress and happiness of the State.

(Signed) MOHAMMED ALI SHAH KAJAR.

[19342]

No. 199.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—Received May 24.)

(No. 307.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, May 15, 1909.

I TOLD M. Tchernykhoff yesterday that His Majesty's Government were not disposed to make any advance to the Persian Government until it was sanctioned by a National Assembly. At the same time I thought that I should point out to him that it would be wise, in present circumstances, to be exceedingly cautious in making any advance to the Persian Government. It was true that the Shah had made promises and had also followed the advice of the two Governments, still there was no absolute certainty that if he were furnished with funds he might not utilize them for the

purpose of endeavouring to effect a return to the old régime. If the arrears due to the Tehran troops were paid the latter might perhaps be used for suppressing the Nationalists.

M. Tchernykhoff said that the payment of arrears to the Tehran troops would, he considered, prevent them from taking to pillage and running riot; and that it was proposed to pay off the troops of the Ain-ed-Dowleh and disband them. This latter step, he was of opinion, was eminently desirable. In any case he could assure me that M. Salbine would keep Sir G. Barclay fully informed of every step that was taken and would be only too happy to listen to any advice which Sir G. Barclay might give him. It was essential that the two Governments should act in complete unison. At the same time it was really necessary to furnish some funds to tide over the present period and to give some confidence to the Shah. It was the "last chance" of the latter, and if the course which he had been induced by the two Governments to follow were to fail and he were to be dethroned the situation would become exceedingly complex. The proposal of His Majesty's Government to place the Russian share of the advance to the joint account of the two Legations was not feasible, but short of this the Russian Government were as anxious as ever to act in the closest co-operation with His Majesty's Government.

I told him that my Government had noted with satisfaction that M. Salbine would keep Sir G. Barclay fully informed of all the steps which he might take as regards the disbursements of the advance.

I asked him if he had any news as to what the Sipdudar was doing and whether he considered that he would advance on Tehran. M. Tchernykhoff replied that he had no anxiety on that score. The men with the Sipdudar were only partially armed; they had in front of them 100 Persian Cossacks with, he believed, some guns and the Ain-ed-Dowleh was hurrying up with 400 more Persian Cossacks with guns in their rear. An attack on Tehran was therefore improbable.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

19343]

No. 500.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 24.)

(No. 308. Confidential.)

St. Petersburg, May 15, 1909.

Sir,

M. TCHARYKOW told me yesterday that the Emperor was desirous that I should be kept fully informed of all that passed in regard to Persia, and that His Majesty had therefore ordered him to read to me certain telegrams which had passed between His Majesty and the Shah. On the 2nd instant the Shah telegraphed that he was about to proclaim his intention of convoking an Assembly, and that he was reorganizing his Ministry and calling together certain personages to elaborate an Electoral Law without delay. The Shah asserted his intention of following the friendly advice which had been given to him by the Russian Government, and stated that he would send a private and personal message through the Russian Chargé d'Affaires. The Emperor had waited a few days for this message, but, as none came, His Majesty telegraphed on the 11th instant to express his satisfaction with the measures which the Shah was taking to introduce a liberal régime, and wishing him every success in his praiseworthy intentions. On the 12th instant the Shah telegraphed announcing the measures which had already been taken, and asking that the Emperor would extend his protection to him, his family, and his country. The Emperor replied on the following day, reiterating his satisfaction at the course which the Shah was following, and stating that His Majesty could rely on his benevolent friendship and full sympathy. The Emperor, M. Tchernykhoff observed, had carefully avoided using the word protection in his reply, but had thought it desirable to give the Shah every encouragement. It was necessary to keep the Shah, if possible, on the throne, as, were he to disappear, the situation would be greatly complicated.

I asked M. Tchernykhoff to convey to the Emperor my respectful thanks for His Majesty's gracious confidence, which I was sure would be appreciated by my Government.

M. Tchernykhoff said that he would like to tell me that last March the Russian Consul-General at Bagdad had telegraphed suggesting that the Mujtahids of Nepeh might perhaps be requested to use their influence towards pacifying the population.

These personages had been approached through the Persian Embassy at Constantinople, but they had then stated that it was necessary that the Shah should convoke an Assembly, proclaim an amnesty, &c. The matter had then dropped; but now that the Shah had fulfilled the requirements of the Mujtahids, perhaps they might be induced to take steps towards impressing on the Persian population that they should meet the Shah's measures in a conciliatory disposition, and do what they could to assist His Majesty in carrying out the reforms which he was desirous of initiating. It might, M. Tcharykoff continued, be possible for the Russian and British Ambassadors at Constantinople to be authorized to issue instructions to the Russian and British Consuls-General at Baghdad to make a communication to the Mujtahids somewhat in the above sense, and, if His Majesty's Government approved of the idea, he would be ready to submit, for their consideration, the draft of a communication which the Ambassadors might be instructed to transmit to the Consuls-General at Baghdad. I told M. Tcharykoff that I would convey his suggestion to you.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[19344]

No. 501.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 24.)

(No. 309.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, May 15, 1909.

At my interview yesterday with M. Tcharykoff, he mentioned to me that the news which he had received from Tabreez was satisfactory. The Englishman was disarming the population and also compelling the Russian revolutionaries to hand over their arms. The Russian authorities were convinced that the attack on the Russian sentry was perpetrated by Russian revolutionaries, and not by the Persians, and the latter were actively searching for the guilty parties. M. Tcharykoff said that it was desirable that the Persian Government should appoint a Governor without delay, as at present there was no authority with which to deal. I told him that Sir G. Baring had been instructed to support M. Sabine in urging the appointment on the Persian Government, but that, of course, it was necessary that the Governor should be a man who would be acceptable to the Nationalists. M. Tcharykoff agreed, and asked what I thought of the Akmed Dowleh, who was at present at Berlin. He was a liberal man, and though the two Governments had limited themselves to privately suggesting the names of individuals for the Cabinet and the Council which was elaborating the Electoral Law, perhaps they might contrive to indicate unofficially the name of the Akmed Dowleh as Governor of Tabreez. I said that I did not recollect the antecedents of that gentleman, but that I would convey his suggestion to you. It was possible that the two Representatives might have a more suitable candidate in view.

On my return home I found Sir G. Baring's telegram No. 301, which repeated a telegram from Mr. Consul-General Wratishaw, stating that the demand of the Russian General for an indemnity of 10,000 tomans and instantaneous disarmament had caused much perturbation. I therefore wrote a private letter to M. Tcharykoff, giving him the substance of Mr. Wratishaw's telegram, and saying that this was the first time that I had heard of a request for an indemnity, and that I had understood from him on a previous occasion that the General would only demand the disarmament of the Russian revolutionaries, as the Russian Government (as he had then stated) had nothing to do with the Persian Nationalists. I have the honour to transmit copy of the reply which I received last night from M. Tcharykoff.

I should have thought that the more correct course would have been for the Russian Government to have made any requests which they might consider desirable to the Persian Government through the usual diplomatic channels, as it appears to me that the Russian General, assuming an authority which is hardly in accordance with the instructions with which we were told he was originally furnished.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

Inclosure in No. 501.

M. Tcharykoff to Sir A. Nicolson.

May 1 (14), 1909.

Dear Sir Arthur,
YOUR telegram from Tabreez refers to an anterior phase of the question. The General in command of our detachment had required within forty-eight hours, an indemnity (in Russian "schetd", i.e., "annule") of 10,000 tomans and the disarmament of all the revolutionaries.

We however, advised by telegraph that only the Russian subjects should be disarmed and expelled, and that, if this was done, no indemnity should be required.

Now our Consul telegraphs that the General will not require the indemnity in full, if a reasonable part of it be paid up within the prescribed limit of time; that the revolutionaries have begun to disarm of their own accord seven days ago, and are urging the Russian subjects to do likewise, and that many are doing so and leaving Tabreez; and lastly, that the indemnity will be paid by those who have not yet given up their arms. Thus our advice has not been followed out entirely, but it is necessary to give the General in command a good deal of latitude for the protection of the safety of his troops.

All these details have been telegraphed in good time to Borekendorff, for the information of your Government, and it is only now after receiving our Consul's answer that I am able to tell you of the outcome.

Yours, &c.
(Signed) TCHARYKOFF.

[19346]

No. 502.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 24.)

(No. 312. Confidential.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, May 16, 1909.

M. TCHARYKOFF asked me to call upon him yesterday afternoon. He said that he had received my letter on the previous evening regarding the action of the Russian General at Tabreez in requesting the payment of a fine and immediate disarmament. He had sent me a reply, but he wished to tell me confidentially how matters stood. I had perhaps gathered from his letter (copy of which I had the honour to transmit in my despatch No. 309 of the 15th instant) that there was some friction between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Viceroy of the Caucasus and the Russian General. The fact was that the two latter authorities did not receive with much good will the instructions which were conveyed to them, and considered that considerable latitude should be accorded to them in their execution of the general orders which they had received. Moreover the relations between the General and the Russian Consul at Tabreez apparently were not harmonious. It was, M. Tcharykoff said, very necessary that the General should understand that he was in a friendly country for certain limited objects, and should act with tact and caution. He was to speak with the Prime Minister that evening and he hoped that matters would be put on a satisfactory footing. He had not intended saying anything to me on these matters of a purely domestic and intimate character, but after my letter to him he had decided to let me know how matters really stood.

I told M. Tcharykoff that I had gathered relations were not working quite smoothly; and I had been surprised to hear not only that an indemnity or fine had been exacted, but that the Persians also were being disarmed. He had said nothing to me as to a fine, and he had stated that the disarmament was to be applied to the Russian subjects alone, as he had quite rightly observed that the General had nothing to do with the Persian Nationalists. I earnestly trusted that orders would be sent to keep the General strictly within the limits of his original instructions.

M. Tcharykoff said that after the attack on the sentry the General doubtless considered that he must take steps for the protection of his troops, and must impress on the population that similar attacks must not occur in the future. I remarked that I should have thought that the General of his own initiative should not have imposed a heavy fine on the inhabitants indiscriminately, but that if any indemnity were considered necessary it should have been requested through the ordinary diplomatic channels of the Persian Government.

[1649]

3 L

Later in the day I received Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 394, repeating the information which he had received from Mr. Wratislaw as to the patrolling of the streets, demolition of barricades, and other arbitrary measures taken by the Russian General. I wrote a letter to M. Tcharykoff calling his attention to the action of the General; and I beg leave to inclose a copy of my communication as well as of the reply which I received from his Excellency early this morning.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

Inclosure 1 in No. 502.

Sir A. Nicolson to M. Tcharykoff.

Dear M. Tcharykoff,

St. Petersburg, May 2 (15), 1909.

SINCE seeing you this afternoon a telegram from Tabreez has been repeated to me, to which I should wish to draw your serious attention. It appears that the streets are patrolled day and night by Russian soldiers and that the latter are blowing up barricades which the Nationalists were beginning to remove themselves. I am much afraid that the General may arouse hostile feelings in the minds of the inhabitants of Tabreez, which I know that you will agree with me it is most desirable should not exist. Moreover, I cannot conceal from you that if the action of the General becomes known in England, it may produce the impression that measures are being taken which go beyond the object for which Russian troops were dispatched to Tabreez. This object, viz, the protection of foreigners and the opening of the road, was perfectly legitimate and one which received the concurrence of my Government. My Government, I am sure, would view with regret any action which would have the appearance that the troops were treating Tabreez as a conquered city.

The town, ruined as it is, has paid 2,000 tomanis, and given a bill for 1,000 tomanis towards the fine or indemnity for the unfortunate incident of the wounding of a Russian soldier. More the inhabitants can hardly be expected to do; and I would wish to ask you to do what you can to induce the General to be lenient and moderate, and to impress on him that he should endeavour to gain the sympathy and good-will of the inhabitants during his temporary sojourn in Tabreez. It is, I venture to say, essential that the General should strictly observe the instructions which were originally given him, and I trust that you may be able to cause directions to be sent to him to take no steps without previous consultation with your Consul.

Yours, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

Inclosure 2 in No. 502.

M. Tcharykoff to Sir A. Nicolson.

(Private.)

Dear Sir Arthur,

St. Petersburg, May 2 (15), 1909.

I PERFECTLY agree with all you state in your letter of this evening, and in agreement with the President of the Council I have just written to the Minister of War asking him to give instructions to General Suarsky to give up patrolling the streets of Tabreez, not to insist upon the payment of more than the 3,000 tomanis which have been so far collected, and to keep within the limits of his instructions, acting after previous consultation with our Consul. I hope that orders in this sense will reach Tabreez by to-morrow evening and that matters will continue to improve in that city, as we learn that they have begun to do.

Yours, &c.
(Signed) N. TCHARYKOFF.

[19350]

No. 503.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 21.)

(No. 316.)
Sir,

St. Petersburg, May 18, 1909.

AS instructed in your telegram No. 679 of the 17th instant, I requested M. Tcharykoff to be good enough to convey to the Emperor the best thanks of His Majesty's Government for his gracious action in acquainting them, through me, with the messages which had passed between His Majesty and the Shah. I said that this step on the part of His Majesty had been very much appreciated by my Government. M. Tcharykoff, who was going down to Tsarskoe Selo this evening, said that he would have pleasure in communicating the above to the Emperor.

He then repeated to me the orders which had been sent to the Russian General at Tabreez, and which I have already reported to you in my despatch No. 312 of the 16th instant. I said that I have supposed that the moment would very shortly arrive when the Russian Government would find it possible to withdraw their troops, or, in any case, a considerable portion of them. He replied that the Russian Government were most desirous to withdraw all their troops as soon as it was possible. He was glad to say that trade with Tabreez was rapidly reviving, and the roads were covered with caravans and the people thoroughly contented.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[19353]

No. 504.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 21.)

(No. 320.)
Sir,

St. Petersburg, May 19, 1909.

M. TCHARYKOFF informed me to-day that it had been decided to give Colonel Liakhoff a good post in Russia, and that this would be gazetted in a very few days. The Emperor had selected Colonel Margani as the successor of Colonel Liakhoff. Colonel Margani, who is at present in command of a regiment in Siberia, spent many years in the Transcaucasian district, and M. Tcharykoff said that he was well acquainted with him at Mery in the early eighties. Colonel Margani, M. Tcharykoff informed me, had a great aptitude in making himself beloved by natives, and the Turcomans were greatly attached to him. He was a simple modest man, and he thought would do very well in Tehran.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[19354]

No. 505.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 21.)

(No. 321.)
Sir,

St. Petersburg, May 19, 1909.

THE individual, Panoff, who played a certain part in the events at Resht and Astrabad, was arrested recently at Moscow. He was passing himself off as a Persian subject, Babu Muiomet, and was in possession of a false passport. He was, so M. Tcharykoff told me, employed in collecting arms for dispatch to Persia, and at first he strenuously denied his identity with Panoff. He will be tried and probably detained for a considerable period.

M. Tcharykoff said that the Sigahdar was anxious to rid himself of the Caucasian revolutionaries who are with him, and is in negotiation with the Russian Consul at Resht in regard to them. The Russian Government hope also soon to be able to deport to Persia the Russian subjects who have been displaying their activity at Tabreez.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[19580]

No. 506.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 21.)

(No. 415.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 24, 1909.

WONCKHAUSS's wharf at Mohammereh.

I have sent the following telegram, No. 137, to His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire:—

"I should like to have your views on first paragraph of my telegram No. 137 (repeated in my telegram No. 111 of the 23rd May), although information as yet received does not lead me to look favourably on the proposed arrangement with Hajji Rais."

[19583]

No. 507.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 21.)

(No. 271.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, May 24, 1909.

COMMANDER of Cossack Brigade at Tehran. Your telegram No. 690 of the 21st instant.

The new commander, Colonel Mayani, will not be struck off the active list of the Russian army. M. Teliarkow explained to me that it was laid down in the Convention which regulates the status of the Russian officers employed in Persia that such officers should be on the active list of the Russian army. The removal of Colonel Lackhoff and others from the active list had formed the subject of a complaint from the Shah. Colonel Mayani, M. Teliarkow said, unlike his predecessor, was not on the general staff, and it was certain that he would abstain from all interference in politics.

To this I replied by pointing out that it was conceivable that in certain contingencies Colonel Mayani might be compelled to carry out the Shah's orders, and that, as a Russian officer on the active list, his position might thereby be rendered an invidious one. Could he not be seconded for as long as he remained in the service of the Shah?

M. Teliarkow explained that no such system existed in the Russian service, nor was it possible to put Colonel Mayani on half-pay.

The position of the other Russian officers would remain as it is at present.

The fact that Colonel Mayani would be in the service of a Constitutional monarch and not of an absolute Shah was pointed out by M. Teliarkow, who thought that the position of the Russian officers was greatly altered thereby.

[19584]

No. 508.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 21.)

(No. 272.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

St. Petersburg, May 24, 1909.

PERSIAN telegraphs.

Your telegram No. 691 of the 21st instant.

Russian Government are not yet ready with their reply to my last memorandum, but I am taking steps to hasten it.

19585

No. 509.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey. Received May 21.)

(No. 273.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, May 24, 1909.

RECALL of Zibos Sultan to Persia. Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 412 of the 23rd instant.

In conversation today with M. Teliarkow, I mentioned that the Shah had expressed a wish that the Zil should return to Isfahan as governor. M. Teliarkow said that if the Zil returned, he would, of course, do so at his own risk, but apart from this, any arrangements which the Shah might make with the Zil were a matter of indifference to the Russian Government.

[19586]

No. 510.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 21.)

(No. 274.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, May 24, 1909.

SITUATION at Urmia and Tabreez.

I was told to-day by M. Teliarkoff that a telegram from Urmia had reached the Russian Government, reporting that a state of complete anarchy prevailed at that place. The Russian consular guard at Urmia at present consists of only six men, and the Russian Government are accordingly sending from Tabreez a detachment of thirty infantry to reinforce it.

I once more remarked to M. Teliarkoff that everything now seemed to be quiet at Tabreez, and that I presumed, therefore, that the Russian Government would shortly withdraw or greatly reduce the number of their troops at that place. To this M. Teliarkoff replied that they were waiting until a governor arrived at Tabreez. On my remarking that the vice-governor seemed to be carrying on his functions in a competent manner, M. Teliarkoff said that a governor-general of the province was what they required.

[19587]

No. 511.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 21.)

(No. 73.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Paris, May 24, 1909.

I HAVE received your telegram No. 356 of to-day.

Please see my despatch No. 201, Confidential, of to-day's date, reporting my conversation with the Nasr-ul-Mulk.

I saw the Russian Ambassador this afternoon, and I informed him of the substance of this despatch, with the exception of the parts reporting the observations made by the Nasr-ul-Mulk in regard to the landing of bluejackets at Bushire, the question of the financial assistants to M. Bizot, and the proposed loan.

M. de Nelidow said that the Nasr-ul-Mulk had used much the same language in talking to him as he had to me, but he had said that if he returned to Tehran he would require an assurance that he would be accorded Russian and British protection, and he had spoken of his son's cure taking a month.

Do you still desire me to concert with the Russian Ambassador with a view to making representations to the Nasr-ul-Mulk urging his immediate return to Persia?

[19588]

No. 512.

Consul-General Cox to Sir G. Barclay.—(Received May 21.)

(No. 545 to Tehran.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Bushire, May 24, 1909.

GERMAN competition at Mohammereh.

With reference to your telegram to the Foreign Office of the 23rd May, it was inevitable that my suggestions sent by telegram should be condensed in form. I am, however, convinced that it would be possible to obtain Hajji Rais's allegiance and to attain the other ends in question in a manner which would neither give a handle to the Germans nor give Hajji Rais a hold over us, which would be most undesirable. Perhaps the matter might be postponed for consideration at a personal interview.

[19325]

No. 513.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 259.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 24, 1909.

SIR A. NICOLSON'S telegram No. 270 of the 23rd instant: Proposed message to Mijtehids.

Do you think the wording unobjectionable? Should some phrase be introduced safeguarding us, supposing the Shah's promises are not fulfilled or reforms turn out to be illusory?

[19329]

No. 514.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 260.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 24, 1909.

IS the Russian advance of 50,000*l.* mentioned in your telegram No. 414 of yesterday, correct? If so, please ascertain how, and report particulars to me.

[19327]

No. 515.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 261.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 24, 1909.

ZHAKES-SULTAN'S return. See your telegram No. 412 of the 23rd instant. If M. Sabline is similarly authorized, you may reply as you suggest. I think it would be advisable to obtain an assurance that he will act on constitutional lines if his appointment to Fars and the Ports takes place, for it is, of course, understood that he must do so.

[19322]

No. 516.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 356.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 24, 1909.

NARSUL-MULK.

You should concert with your Russian colleague and act in the manner indicated in your telegram No. 72 of the 23rd March and in my telegram No. 689 to Sir A. Nicolson of the 20th instant.

[18831]

No. 517.

Foreign Office to Sir Hugh Barnes.

Dear Sir Hugh Barnes,

Foreign Office, May 24, 1909.

I ENCLOSE paraphrases of two telegrams from Major Cox in regard to the proposals for the grant of a loan to the Sheikh of Mohammrah by His Majesty's Government out of funds which would be furnished by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, in return for the grant to them of a site for a refinery on Abadan Island, and a strip of land for a pipe line to connect the refinery with the oil wells.*

We should like to have your observations on the terms proposed with as little delay as possible.

In view of Major Cox' opinion that the Sheikh's terms as to rental are handsome, and only conveyed out of deference to us, the Company will no doubt give them their careful consideration.

As regards the Sheikh's views as to the amount of the loan to be granted to him by His Majesty's Government, I am to inquire whether the Company is prepared to accede to his request that it should amount to 10,000*l.*, repayable in ten years. If

* Nos. 476 and 477.

the Company is so prepared, it would be necessary for them to let us know as soon as possible the terms, &c., on which they would provide the funds, so that Major Cox may be informed without delay.

You will see, from Major Cox' earlier telegram, that he is anxious that Mr. Reynolds may be informed if the Sheikh's proposals are considered satisfactory by the Company.

We should be glad if we could see Mr. Reynolds' letter of the 30th ultimo, as suggested by Major Cox.

Yours sincerely,
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[18774]

No. 518.

Foreign Office to Mr. M. Ellinger.

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 24, 1909.

IN reply to your letter of the 17th instant, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to inform you that copies of the recent communications received from you in regard to the protection of British interests in the oxide mines on Hormaz Island will be sent by mail to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, but that otherwise no action will be taken on them for the present.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[18837]

No. 519.

Foreign Office to India Office.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 24, 1909.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, copies of telegraphic correspondence with His Majesty's Minister at Tehran and the Resident in the Persian Gulf on the subject of negotiations which have been proceeding with the Sheikh of Mohammrah with a view to the grant of a British Karim Irrigation Concession on the lines suggested by Sir W. B. Willcocks.*

It will be seen that the Sheikh is desirous that that portion of the proposed irrigation works depending on the construction of a dam at Alwaz should be dealt with in the following manner:—

His Majesty's Government, to help him in inducing the Persian Government in granting the Concession to himself in his own name only, when he engages to depend solely on British assistance. As regards such minor irrigation works as would be independent of any Alwaz dam, the Sheikh is prepared to undertake such schemes of that nature himself without reference to the Persian Government, giving priority to British concessionaires recommended by His Majesty's Government.

The following observations occur to Sir E. Grey in respect to these proposals:—

His Majesty's Government should, of course, have had to obtain the concurrence of the Persian Government in any case, and they must be careful not to create difficulties between the Sheikh and the Persian Government, more especially since the Shah has now undertaken to grant a Constitution.

The Sheikh's proposals, as stated in the third paragraph, sent to Sir E. Grey satisfactory. It will be for His Majesty's Government to endeavour to create an opportunity to acquire the Concession for the Sheikh. The only question which arises now is whether the entire exclusion of foreign capital is advisable, as His Majesty's Government cannot altogether exclude the possibility of being obliged to compound with the Dutch concessionaires. On this point His Majesty's Government must be guided to some extent by His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, who is being consulted by telegram. By obtaining the Concession for the Sheikh any difficulty which might arise with the Medjless about Concessions to foreigners will be avoided, and British actions would be less open to criticism by the Netherland Government.

As regards paragraph 4, Sir E. Grey is inclined to think that we may accept the

* Nos. 264, 307, and 478.

Sheikh's offer, as he himself does not think he need consult the Persian Government on those subsidiary points, otherwise there is a risk that he might give them to some foreigner. Moreover, if the Persian Government objects to independent action by the Sheikh hereafter, His Majesty's Government can take the necessary steps to settle any difficulty which may arise.

Sir E. Grey will be glad to be favoured with any observations which you may wish to offer in regard to this matter.

Sir G. Barclay's views will be communicated to your Department as soon as they are received.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. OUS MALLEY.

[19599]

No. 520.

Sir E. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 25)

(No. 201. Confidential.)
Sir,

Paris, May 24, 1909.

AS I had the honour of informing you by my telegram No. 72 of yesterday to be the intention of the Nasr-ul-Mulk, he paid me a visit this morning. He said that he had received a telegram from the Shah desiring him to come to Tehran. He had replied that, owing to the state of the health of his son, he could not for the present obey His Majesty's commands. Later on he would be quite ready to do personal homage to his Sovereign. He had brought his son to Paris for medical treatment; he was suffering from an affection of the kidneys which might necessitate an operation, and in any case would require a treatment of six weeks, so that for the next two months he (Nasr-ul-Mulk) could not go to Persia. The Russian Ambassador had spoken to him about the wish of the Russian and British Legations at Tehran that he should take office, but no desire had been expressed or offer made on the subject by the Shah. He would be ready, however, to take office if there were a prospect of the real adoption by His Majesty of the Anglo-Russian programme, which at present did not seem at all certain. Some of the new Ministers might do well, including Saad-ud-Dowleh, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, but His Majesty's Minister, knowing as he must, that persons' antecedents would naturally not place implicit trust in all his statements and representations.

The Nasr-ul-Mulk did not actually say that he would require an assurance of British and Russian protection if he had to return to Tehran, but he reminded me that he had left Persia under British protection, and the country was now in a very unsettled condition, and that his private affairs in Persia would before long require his presence. He referred to the landing of bluejackets at Bushire, which he said had had an excellent effect, and he expressed satisfaction at the refusal of the Persian Government to advance money to the Persian Government until after the assembly of a Persian Parliament. He further stated that M. Gout, the Sous-Directeur of the Eastern Department at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, whom he had met at a luncheon, informed him that the French Legation at Tehran had telegraphed to suggest that the Ministry should consult the Nasr-ul-Mulk on the subject of the selection of French officials to serve in the Persian service as assistants to M. Bizot, the French Financial Adviser. This suggestion had appeared to the Nasr-ul-Mulk very strange, and he had told M. Gout that he could not give any advice in the matter as he had no authority to do so from the Shah or from the Persian Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS BERTIE.

[19640]

No. 521.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 25.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards

herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a despatch to the Government of India, dated 21st May, with inclosures, relative to works to be undertaken at Bassidin.

India Office, May 24, 1909.

Inclosure in No. 521.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

My Lord. India Office, May 21, 1909.

WITH reference to the letter of your Excellency's Government in the Foreign Department, dated the 24th December, 1908, I inclose a copy of correspondence with the Foreign Office* regarding your proposal to incur expenditure at Bassidin, estimated in all at 3,903 rupees on:—

(a.) Repairing the landing-pier and some of the tombstones in the cemetery (891 rupees);

(b.) Demolishing the ruins round the British flagstaff, and constructing in their stead a rest-house for the use of His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Bandar Abbas (3,012 rupees).

2. It will be seen that the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury accept a moiety of the proposed expenditure as a charge against British revenues, with the exception of such part of the sum of 891 rupees, above mentioned, as may be expended on repairing the tombstones in the cemetery. In the circumstances, I am willing that the cost of these repairs, as well as that of the monument at Bassidin, should be defrayed wholly from Indian revenues.

3. Your proposals are sanctioned, subject to the modification stated above. The moiety of the cost to be recovered from British revenues should be charged in the annual statement of Consular expenditure in Persia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) MORLEY OF BLACKBURN.

[19659]

No. 522.

Mr. F. C. Strick to Foreign Office.—(Received May 25.)

*Ballie House, Lendenhall Street, London,
May 21, 1909.*

Sir,
HALUL Island in Persian Gulf.

Referring to my letters of the 14th, 22nd, and 21st April, and to your letter of the 23rd of same month, I have to-day received a letter from my Bushire agents, Messrs. A. and T. J. Malcolm, dated the 2nd instant, in which they write as follows:—

"We, however, cannot move in the matter before your obtaining sanction from the Foreign Office, and when you do this we shall arrange the needful with the Resident here."

As I am daily expecting to hear that the expedition sent out by my agents to prospect the other islands in the Gulf (as mentioned in my letter of the 21st ultimo) has arrived back at Bushire, I should consider it a great favour if instructions were sent at an early date to the British Resident at Bushire, to the effect that any agents may be permitted to send their men to explore the above island.

Thanking you in anticipation.

I am, &c.
FRANK C. STRICK.

* To Foreign Office, March 3; Foreign Office, March 26 (with inclosure); and No. 530.

[19700]

No. 523.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 25.)

(No. 416.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

RUSSIAN advance in Arabistan.

Gulshak, May 25, 1909.

I concur generally in your telegram No. 255 of the 22nd May. The sheikh's terms appear to me acceptable, since no concession which might be granted, irrespective of his wishes, by the central Government, would be workable in the Mohammereh district, and foreign competition would consequently be excluded.

A concession for the main scheme would, I agree, be less easily obtained in the name of a British company than in that of the sheikh. I cannot, however, hope that difficulties with the assembly will be avoided by using the sheikh in this way. Public interest in this scheme has been so great and such large ideas of eventual profit have been entertained that, when the sheikh submits his application, it will undoubtedly meet with the closest scrutiny, and when his projected methods of exploitation have been investigated, considerable opposition may be expected. But in shaping our policy in the Gulf the ultimate attitude of the Medjliss, in my opinion, will have to be disregarded in many matters if we are to maintain and strengthen our present position there.

Exclusion of foreign capital from the scheme would, of course, be desirable. I presume that the termination of the Dutch concessionaire's option would put an end to any claim for participation which he might make. Should we, however, find it necessary to come to terms with him, I think we could easily persuade the sheikh to admit under our auspices the necessary amount of Dutch money.

As to the time of applying for the concession, M. de Sturler's option expires in January 1911. It is, however, not improbable that the Medjliss will cancel it before. On the meeting of the Medjliss the sheikh might protest against the grant of the option to M. de Sturler during the time in which the constitution was in abeyance, and apply for the concession himself. This would possibly result in cancellation of option. If it did not do so, the sheikh would, at least by his application, obtain a first claim to consideration on its expiry.

Willecks, as you will remember, recommended the postponement of the scheme for several years, but the application for the concession need not on this account be delayed.

See my telegrams Nos. 411 and 415 and my private telegram to Hardinge of the 23rd May on the subject of German competition.

[19701]

No. 524.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 25.)

(No. 417.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulshak, May 25, 1909.

RUSSIAN advance to Persian Government.

Like the loans of 1900 and 1902, the whole 100,000,000, to be secured on Persian customs other than those of Fars or the Gulf.

The money is payable in instalments, a proper account of each of which must be rendered before the successive one can be paid.

A committee, including the Financial Adviser, is now engaged in drawing up a list of the more urgent requirements. These, I understand, will absorb the whole sum of 100,000,000.

It is expressly stipulated by the contract, which is still under examination by the Persian Government, that the Russian Legation must signify its approval of each item of the expenditure.

The advance is intended by the legation to be principally employed in paying off and disarming troops, but some other urgent claims are being pressed on the committee.

(Reference is to your telegram No. 260 of the 21st May.)

[19711]

No. 525.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 25.)

(No. 418.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulshak, May 25, 1909.

RUSSIAN troops in Azerbaijan.

I learn from His Majesty's consul-general at Tabreez that General Smarsky and M. Miller agree that a considerable reduction of the Russian troops in Tabreez might now be made.

[19326]

No. 526.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay

(No. 263.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 25, 1909.

GERMAN competition at Mohammereh (see your telegram No. 411 of the 23rd instant).

I am communicating with India Office with regard to exchange of Consuls at Mohammereh and Kermanshah as well as on the subject of appointment to former post of an Indian Political Officer of suitable qualifications.

As regards wharf question, I agree that no methods must be employed which would justify complaints against us, and that we must carefully avoid giving any instigation to a boycott of Wreckless.

Inform His Majesty's Consul-General at Boshire that I am consulting the Company with regard to the rental for land and for the pipe, and also on the subject of an increased loan.

[19587]

No. 527.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 357.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 25, 1909.

NASSIR-UL-MULK.

In reply to your telegram No. 73 of yesterday's date, you should now, if your Russian colleague is prepared to join with you, definitely offer to the Nassir-ul-Mulk the assurance suggested by His Majesty's Minister at Tehran in his telegram No. 408 of the 26th instant.

[19164]

No. 528.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 25, 1909.

WITH reference to previous correspondence I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, a copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, reporting that negotiations are almost completed for the proposed transfer of the Arabistan telegraph lines to the charge of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, and that the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs is prepared to sign a suitable Convention, provided notes are exchanged agreeing that its provisions are not to become operative until they are approved by the National Assembly.

Sir E. Grey proposes, if Viscount Morley concurs, to authorize Sir G. Barclay to sign such a Convention on the conditions proposed, and to inform him that it is presumed that His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg may be instructed to request the Russian Government to take action on the lines of the suggestion made by his Excellency in the third paragraph of his telegram No. 96 of the 24th February last, a copy of which was communicated to your Department on the same day.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[19738]

No. 529.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 26.)(No. 326.)
Sir,*St. Petersburg, May 23, 1909.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 255 of the 14th instan, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a proposed draft of a communication which the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs suggests should be conveyed to the Mughlids of Nejed through the British and Russian Consuls-General at Bagdad. Mr. Tchernyoff would propose that the communication, if approved by His Majesty's Government, might be telegraphed to the Russian and British Ambassadors at Constantinople for transmission to the respective Consuls-General.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

Inclosure in No. 529.

Draft Anglo-Russian Identic Communication.

DEPUIS plusieurs années la Perse est en proie à une lutte intestine. Animées de sentiments sincèrement amicaux envers ce pays, la Russie et la Grande-Bretagne ont usé de toute leur influence afin de contribuer à calmer les troubles qui le déchirent. Leurs efforts ne sont pas restés infructueux; tout dernièrement le Schah, en suivant les conseils amicaux des deux Gouvernements, s'est décidé à rétablir le régime constitutionnel et à accorder à son peuple des réformes destinées à ramener le calme dans le pays.

Afin de faciliter le succès de l'action pacificatrice entreprise par Mohammed Ali, les Représentants Consulaires de la Russie et de la Grande-Bretagne sont chargés par leurs Gouvernements de faire appel aux sentiments patriotiques qui animent les chefs spirituels du schisme et qui sont connus dans tout l'Orient musulman, ainsi qu'à l'influence dont ils jouissent parai leur coreligionnaires. En conséquence, ces Représentants demandent aux moughlids de Kerdah et de Nejed leur appui énergique dans ce but humanitaire. En exhortant tous les partis persans à abandonner la lutte fratricide et en leur donnant des sages conseils de modération, les vénérables moughlids contribueront puissamment au bonheur de leur belle patrie, qui a tant souffert des troubles des dernières années, et y ramèneront enfin l'ordre et le calme si ardemment désirés par le peuple persan.

[19782]

No. 530.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 26.)

Sir,

India Office, May 25, 1909.

WITH reference to the letter of His Majesty's Consul in Seistan of the 22nd May, 1908, enclosed with the Government of India's despatch of the 22nd October, 1908, I am directed to enclose copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, proposing for the sanction of His Majesty's Government, that defence works should be constructed for the protection of the consulate at Seistan at an approximate cost of 5,500 rupees (365*l.*) on the condition that a moiety of the expenditure is borne by British revenues.

Viscount Morley recognises the obligation to take all necessary measures for the protection of officers of the Indian services employed in Persia. If Sir E. Grey is satisfied that the political situation renders expedient the provision of the defence works recommended by the Government of India, the Secretary of State in Council is prepared to sanction their construction, on the condition that a moiety (approximately 183*l.*) of the total expenditure is accepted as a charge on British revenues, in accordance with the principle governing the division between the two exchequers of the cost of diplomatic and consular establishments in Persia.

As regards the point raised in paragraph 3 of Major Kemion's letter as to the objections that may be raised by the Persian Government to the erection of defence

works, I am to say that Lord Morley would be glad to be favoured with Sir E. Grey's views as to any action that may be required in the matter, in the event of the proposal of the Government of India being sanctioned.

I am, &c.
A. GODLEY.

Inclosure in No. 530.

*Government of India to Viscount Morley.**May 3, 1909.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

LETTER of the 22nd May, 1908, from His Majesty's Consul, Seistan, transmitted with our despatch of the 22nd October, 1908.

5,500 rupees is estimated cost of defence scheme for Seistan consulate, but, owing to certain structural alterations suggested by director-general of military works, this figure may be slightly exceeded. Your sanction is requested to expenditure amounting to 5,500 rupees approximately, of which British revenues should bear half, scheme being, in our opinion, necessary.

[19825]

No. 531.

Sir G. Bavelay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 419.)

(Telegraphic.) P.
NASR-UL-MULK.*Gulabek, May 26, 1909.*

With reference to the penultimate paragraph of Sir F. Bertie's telegram No. 72 of the 23rd May.

The Persian Government has officially informed the two legations of the appointment of Nasr-ul-Mulk as President of the Council with the portfolio of Finance. We will insist on the appointment being definitely offered to him if he shows any willingness to return.

[19851]

No. 532.

Sir G. Bavelay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 420.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 26, 1909.

PROPOSED communication to Pasha of Mesopotamia.

The only modifications I would suggest, in reply to your telegram No. 259 of the 21st May, are as follows:—

For "reforms," we might substitute "a general amnesty for political offences" (this wording would record a tangible fact, whereas reforms are rather a matter of appreciation), and for "will at last restore to it," "to the restoration of."

The whole object of the communication would be defeated by any reservation openly safeguarding us. We should do well, in any opinion, to avoid anything likely to be interpreted as an enforcement of the Nationalists' distrust of the Shah, and we should not reveal any misgivings we may have as to the prospects of constitutional government in this country.

[19851]

No. 533.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 700.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 26, 1909.

PROPOSED message to Mughlids of Nejed. See your telegram No. 270 of the 25th instan and Sir G. Bavelay's telegram No. 420 of to-day.

Subject to suggested alterations in latter telegram, I consider text of proposed message satisfactory.

[1619]

3 C

Identical instructions must be given to British and Russian Consuls-General at Bagdad in regard to the message, and, as soon as I hear that Russian Government agree, I will instruct His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople to concert with his Russian colleague for this purpose.

[19326]

No. 531.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office to India Office.**Foreign Office, May 26, 1909.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, copies of correspondence with His Majesty's Minister at Tehran and the Resident in the Persian Gulf respecting German activity at Mohammerah.¹

You will perceive that both these officers draw attention to the importance, if German influence is to be combated, of having at Mohammerah a strong and vigorous Consular Officer who would be able to guide the Shukh and restrain any efforts by his subordinates to improve the present German position.

It appears to Sir E. Grey that the best course of action in these circumstances would be to post at Mohammerah a suitable officer of the Indian Political Department who could keep in closer touch with the Resident than Mr. McDouall has been able to; and in such a case it will be necessary to find some post for Mr. McDouall in substitution for his present one.

In these circumstances the case could best be met perhaps by effecting an exchange between Mr. McDouall and Captain Haworth, His Majesty's Consul at Kermanshah. Such a change is favoured by Sir G. Barclay, and it would bring Captain Haworth within touch of Persian Gulf ports, which form the proper sphere of Indian Political Officers.

Should Viscount Morley concur in the proposed change, an understanding might also be arrived at by which the posts at Mohammerah and at Kermanshah should in future always be filled from the Indian Political and Levant Services respectively, such an understanding to be independent of the proposals now under consideration in your Department for the reorganization of the Consular Service in Persia which formed the subject of the letter from this Department of the 20th February last. Sir E. Grey will be glad to learn Viscount Morley's views on this proposal in principle and, if they are favourable, steps could then be taken to examine the financial and other details which will no doubt arise out of the proposed change.

Sir E. Grey will be grateful if a reply could be returned to this letter at Lord Morley's early convenience.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[18119]

No. 535.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office to Treasury.**Foreign Office, May 26, 1909.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, copies of correspondence with the India Office in regard to the financial arrangements involved in the proposed transfer of the Tehran-Meshed and Khat-Nasratabad telegraph lines.² The India Office propose that any increase of charge consequent on the transfer over and above a sum of 20,000 rupees per annum, to be borne, as hitherto, by India alone, should be equally divided between the Imperial and Indian exchequers in the same manner as all other expenditure in Persia of a political character.

I am to explain that on the occasion of the signature of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 as to Persia, the British and Russian Governments also concluded a separate arrangement providing in substance for the handling over, subject to the

approval of the Persian Government, of the telegraph line from Tehran to Meshed from British to Russian Administration, in exchange for the transfer of the Khat-Nasratabad telegraph line from Russian to British Administration.

Copies of this arrangement as well as of the Anglo-Russian Agreement itself are inclosed for the Lords Commissioners' information.

A perusal of these two documents will show clearly that the proposed exchange of telegraph lines, though not mentioned in the principal Agreement for reasons of diplomatic propriety, constitutes in reality a considerable item among the questions in regard to which a settlement was then effected with Russia; and efforts have been made by both parties ever since the conclusion of the arrangement to carry out this provision. For various reasons, among which may be cited the disturbed state of Persia, the proposed transfer has not yet been carried out, but it is possible that now that the situation has improved the settlement of this matter may proceed with more expedition.

Sir E. Grey concurs in the view that it would be fair to divide the contemplated expenditure between the two exchequers, and he trusts that, in view of the importance of the matter, not only to India, but to the rest of the Empire, the whole of which should benefit by the settlement of this troublesome question between this country and Russia, the Lords Commissioners will agree to the principle of division as suggested by the India Office pending the conclusion of such an agreement with Persia as will enable definite financial proposals to be made.

I am to invite their Lordships' attention to the observations contained in the last paragraph of the India Office letter of the 12th instant.

With regard to the incidence of the possible charge to Imperial revenues it may be observed that the cost of maintaining a telegraph line would not in any case fall on the Diplomatic and Consular Vote, and that a decision will be necessary as to the manner of meeting the expenditure.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[20059]

No. 536.

(No. 421.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey. - (Received May 27.)**Gulahak, May 27, 1909.*

SITUATION on Turco-Persian frontier.

I have received to-day the following telegram, No. 132, from His Majesty's consul-general at Tabreez :-

"I learn from a consular agent at Maraga that a large force of Kurds, accompanied by some Turks, is attacking Sanjabadak, which is expected to fall immediately.

"The advance guard of this force is drawing near Mimolab."

19978.

No. 537.

(No. 275.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Sir A. Neilson to Sir Edward Grey. - (Received May 27.)**St. Petersburg, May 27, 1909.*

TELEGRAPH arrangements in Persia.

At a meeting with experts which was held yesterday at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs the following points were specially mentioned by the Russians :-

1. That the present moment was favourable for effecting the contemplated exchange of lines, and should be taken advantage of.

2. Employment of Russians on Arabian lines.

The wording suggested in your despatch No. 60 for the agreement with the Persian Government seems to the Russians too vague, and might, in their opinion enable Persia to assert that Russians could not be employed on the lines without her consent. They would prefer the formula, "Save with the consent of the British Government, only Persian," &c., to the suggested wording, "Without the concurrence of the British Government, no others than," &c.

The stipulation as to control of possible extensions is not objected to, provided that the reservation with regard to extensions into the Russian sphere be made.

¹ Nos. 435 and 452; Major Cox, No. 391, *Telegraphic*, May 18; and Nos. 492, 506, and 509.

² India Office, January 6; to ditto January 30; India Office, May 12, 1909; Treaty Series, No. 24, 1907; Sir A. Neilson, No. 414, August 31, 1907.

3. Russia is anxious that work should be begun at once on the extra line from Tehran to Shahrud.

4. Tehran-Khanikin line.

Information is desired as to the financial position of this line, more especially with regard to some payment which the Indo-European Telegraph Company made in connection with it. The Russian Government are apprehensive lest the Persians should eventually hold them responsible for the sum advanced by the Indo-European Telegraph Company, and for other obligations contracted in connection with the line.

Before taking any action, it would be prudent to await an official reply in the above sense. I am assured that such a reply will be sent to me very shortly.

19564

No. 538.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barchus.

(No. 267.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, May 27, 1909.*

IMPERIAL Commissioner for Oil Syndicate (see your telegram No. 410 of the 21st instant).

Oil Company have now communicated to us text of late Sadr Azam's telegram to Sa'igh-ess-Saltaneh, in which latter is informed that he is Imperial Commissioner. The Company have already paid the Imperial Commissioner up to the 1st instant, in accordance with stipulation in the Concession which requires that payment be made to him. They wish in future to make their payments only to official approved by Persian Government, and are anxious to know who will be entitled under the terms of the Concession to receive payments as Imperial Commissioner.

20068

No. 539.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 28.)

(No. 529.)

Sir, *St. Petersburg, May 21, 1909.*

ON the receipt of your telegram No. 690 of the 21st instant I wrote privately to M. Tsharykow and inquired whether Colonel Margui would take service under the Persian Government on the same conditions as had recently been applied to Colonel Liakhoff and the other Russian officers, *i.e.* that he would be removed from the active list of the Russian army. M. Tsharykow asked me to call upon him to-day, and informed me that when Colonel Liakhoff and his officers were removed from the Russian army the Shah made great complaints on the subject. By the Convention which regulated the status of the Russian officers in Persia the latter were to be on the active list, and the Shah had therefore some ground for his complaints. Still the necessities of the case justified the Russian Government at the time in not maintaining on the active list officers who had perforce to take some part in political troubles.

Colonel Margui was not an officer of the General Staff, as has been his predecessor, but was a simple Cossack Colonel, and indeed half an Oriental himself. He was not sure that the Colonel was not a Musulman. He would certainly not interfere in politics in any way, and would confine himself to his duties of training and instructing the brigade under his charge. Moreover, the Shah was now a constitutional Sovereign, and being in his service now was a very different thing from serving an absolute monarch.

I asked whether it would not be possible to put Colonel Margui on half pay or to "second" him while he was in Persian employ. M. Tsharykow said that such a system did not exist in the Russian service. An officer either was on the active list or was retired. I said that, although the Colonel might abstain from all interference in politics, occasions might arise when it would be extremely difficult for him to refrain from obeying orders, and he might find himself placed in an inviolable position. M. Tsharykow said that of course the Colonel would have to protect the person of the Shah, but the situation in Persia would probably greatly improve very shortly. I asked what would be in future the position of the other Russian officers, and he replied that they would remain as they were and not be restored to the active list.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[20079]

No. 540.

Anglo-Persian Oil Company to Foreign Office.—(Received May 28.)

Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London,

May 27, 1909.

Sir, AS he was about to leave town yesterday morning, Sir Hugh Barnes sent on to me your demi-official letter of the 24th instant, and its inclosures, requesting me to deal with it in order to save time.

2. As regards the amount of the proposed loan, the present suggestion to increase it from 5,000*l.* or 6,000*l.* to 10,000*l.* does not in itself upset me, but from the form in which it comes before me, it would look as though the proposed loan to the Sheikh from this company through the Foreign Office were not, as we understood that it was, only a portion of a loan from the British Government to the Sheikh. In this connection I would refer you to my letter to Sir Charles Hardinge, dated the 28th of last month, which letter was drafted in your Office for my signature, and of which the following is an extract:—

" . . . If the proposal is agreeable to the Foreign Office I am to suggest that this company would contribute the sum of 5,000*l.* and 6,000*l.* through the Foreign Office towards the advance . . . "

Am I right in drawing the above inference? I ask, because if I am it alters the complexion of affairs to such an extent from what I put before my directors when I received from your Office the letter which I was authorised to sign on the 28th April that I shall feel bound to consult them again.

3. If, on the other hand, whatever sum we advance is to be this company's contribution through the British Government towards some larger sum to be advanced by Government itself, then I am ready, if and when the terms of the lease are made satisfactory, to raise our contribution from 6,000*l.* to 10,000*l.*

4. The terms on which we would contribute 6,000*l.* or 10,000*l.* are for a term bearing interests at 6 per cent. per annum and repayable in ten years, *i.e.* either at the end of ten years in full or by instalments as may be arranged, and a provision of the loan might well be that, in the event of default of payment by the Sheikh of any instalment of capital or interest, the same shall fall to be repaid, plus interest at 6 per cent. per annum, out of future instalments of rent as these become payable by the company to the Sheikh.

5. I shall be prepared, as soon as satisfactory terms are agreed upon, to remit the money in question by telegram to Persia.

6. With reference to Major Cox's telegram No. 486 of the 18th May, I enclose a copy of the letter from Mr. Reynolds, dated the 30th April, to which he alluded, of the inclosures thereto, and of Mr. Reynolds' letter to us of the 24th April explaining the position.

7. Major Cox telegraphed under a misunderstanding when he said that no representative of the syndicate had inspected the land that we want. We sent Mr. Andrew Campbell from Barmah to Persia last November, and the enclosed copy of a letter, dated the 27th November, 1908, from him to my colleague on the board, Mr. James Hamilton, will show you that he went very fully into the subject.

8. *En passant* I would ask you to note that all the land that we require is at present unencultivated, or, as Mr. Campbell puts it, "desert," and that in clause 3 of our concession from the Government of Persia is the following:—

"The Government also grants to the concessionaire the right of acquiring all and any other lands or buildings necessary for the said purpose with the consent of the proprietors on such conditions as may be arranged between him and them without their being allowed to make demands of a nature to surcharge the prices ordinarily current for lands situate in their respective localities."

9. Mr. Reynolds is not of opinion that 2,000*l.* per annum "would not be unreasonable." On the contrary, though he wrote on the 24th April that in the then circumstances he personally recommended us to settle for 1,500*l.* per annum (at that time knowing nothing of a proposed loan to the Sheikh, of course) he considered that we should have got better terms if he had tackled the matter some months previously, as we had intended him to do.

10. We know absolutely nothing of any arrangement or suggested arrangement for

[1619]

3 P

paying Bakhtiari or any other people 1,000*l.* per annum or any other sum for pipes passing through their territory, and we think that this must be a mistake on Major Cox's part.

11. So far as I can tell, the six numerous clauses describe our requirements fairly accurately, accurately enough for present purposes in regard to Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, and as regards 1 and 2 if these are detailed in the words used in the draft agreement attached to Mr. Reynolds' letter to Major Cox, dated the 30th April enclosed, they will be acceptable to us. The lease will be from the Sheikh to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company not to the concessions syndicate.

12. As regards the length of the lease, it must be coextensive with our concession from the Persian Government and any extension thereof. This last appears to be the most serious point of divergence between the Sheikh and my company.

13. Of the two alternative methods of paying rent offered by the Sheikh I am prepared to accept the decimal method of paying 6,500*l.* in advance. And I think that if this be given, the loan might stand at the original figure of 6,000*l.* as otherwise the Sheikh will be getting paid down now for rent and loan combined, 16,500*l.* plus whatever amount the British Government may be advancing to him.

14. With regard to the Sheikh's four conditions, we cannot agree to No. 4 as I have already stated in paragraph 12 hereto.

15. No. 3 I agree to, provided always that petroleum be not included as treasure trove, for on petroleum, if found, we are already paying to the Government of Persia.

16. No. 2.—The second stipulation, that we shall not interfere in tribal affairs, we agree to, and subject to my being sure that I understand the first part I would agree to it also. I can see no objection to our abstaining from engaging any of the Sheikh's tribesmen without his cognizance, but it might obviously lead to great inconvenience if at any time during a man's engagement the Sheikh had power to call upon us to dismiss him unless he (or we) did something or other for the Sheikh.

17. No. 1.—Clause 15 of our concession from the Imperial Government of Persia reads as follows:

"On the expiration of the terms of the present concession all materials, buildings, and apparatus then used by the company for the exploitation of its industry shall become the property of the said Government and the company shall have no right to any indemnity in this connection."

We cannot consequently give the Sheikh a good title to machinery, plant, and buildings, as against the Government of Persia. All we can undertake to do, is not to remove any machinery, plant or buildings at the end of our lease, thus leaving the Sheikh and the Persian Government to settle the question of ownership between them.

18. As regards the last sentence in Major Cox's telegram No. 456 Mr. Reynolds, who is in possession of a copy of Mr. Andrew Campbell's letter of the 27th November, 1908, together with a copy of the sketch attached thereto, should be in a position to select provisional sites subject to provision No. 5 detailed by Major Cox, and I think that we may presume from the detail given in his draft agreement that he has done so.

19. Mr. Reynolds is coming home on leave shortly, and partly for this reason and partly in consequence of your office letters Nos. 15593 and 15910 of the 27th April and 1st May, Mr. J. B. Lloyd, one of the partners of Shaw, Wallace, and Co. of Calcutta, Bombay, &c., has gone to Persia (I believe him to be now in Mohammerah) to take charge of all the company's affairs, and with plenary power from the company to negotiate this land and all other questions.

20. After reading this, you can spare me a few moments at any time convenient to you on Tuesday or Wednesday next, I will gladly call upon you and thereby save you both time and trouble in regard to the matter of my reply to Major Cox.

I have, &c.

E. W. WALLACE, *Vice-Chairman.*

Inclosure 1 in No. 540.

Mr. Reynolds to the Concessions Syndicate, Glasgow.

Dear Sirs.

Russorah, April 24, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to own receipt of a wire from you, via Bagdad and dated the 14th April, 1909, which reached me on the 18th idem, which was it is believed, intended to read:—

"Ascertain immediately and telegraph what are the best terms on which you can obtain land for refinery, also as to land and guard for pipe-line, in the territories of the Sheikh of Mohammerah. Arrange to carry out suggestions of Cox."

On my wiring you by Fao and Tehran on the 18th that which should read: "Have received your cable of 14th to-day. Repeat fourth, fifth and ninth words of cable." I received on the 20th your reply, via Aleppo, which bore the same date and by it I was enabled to read yours of the 14th, receipts of which I own above.

2. At the risk of being prolix, in your opinion, I would state that the Sheikh of Mohammerah has two confidential men attached to him, Mulla Humza, in respect of matters in Turkey, and Hadji Rais, as he is called for Persian matters, and in a matter such as the acquisition of land by us on the Shat-el-Arab, he would probably consult both these men.

On the afternoon of the 20th, in response for a request for an interview, I had a call from Mulla Humza and a chat on the subject and he assured me he would write and do his best to forward our wishes.

The same day I asked Mr. McDermott, His Britannic Majesty's consul at Mohammerah, to arrange an interview with Hadji Rais and it was only yesterday, in the morning that I saw him, and the Sheikh himself, with Hadji Rais, in the evening.

3. This man, Hadji Rais as he is called, is the power behind the Sheikh, and he can make or mar our negotiations with the Sheikh, being at the present time the strongest man in Arabistan, in consequence of which he has to be propitiated, and then the negotiations with the Sheikh will be comparatively easy to put through.

4. My meeting with Hadji Rais was friendly enough, and it was clear he was glad that we were thinking of establishing a refinery at Aladun Ishmi, on account of the advantage that Mohammerah would reap thereby, for I should tell you that I have always tried to put them off all idea of this, and said that my principals appeared to favour Bander Biham, by reason of its passing near to Kai Kaous in the pipe-line route.

To obtain his good offices he quite unblushingly asked for 1,000 shares on the understanding that they were of a value of 1*l.* each, and added he wished to buy another 1,000 shares and that he could sell many shares among the people about.

It is on this understanding that he agreed to do his best with the Sheikh of Mohammerah on our behalf, and the matter is alluded to in my wire of this date.

5. In the afternoon I visited the Sheikh of Mohammerah with Hadji Rais, and I gathered that the choice of sites was to them of no importance, and I named the northern as most suitable, for the reasons previously given.

I was then asked to name a price that I thought fair to pay for the land on lease for so long as the concession lasted, and the right to lay the pipe-line through his country.

To be brief, I named about 1,200*l.* per annum, and after some discussion the Sheikh asked me to name 2,000*l.* per year as the figure he wanted, and all cost of guarding to be on the company.

Then it was inexpedient to press for settlement of the many petty details which go to make a good and workable agreement, for it was late in the afternoon and I trusted to your accepting a figure of say 1,500*l.* per annum, when details could be discussed and agreement drawn, for which by the way I need your permission.

I do not think that you will do better than this now, though had it been done some few months ago it had been better, as then the news of the formation of the company would not have roused their cupidity, and the public news telegrams afforded them this information by the assistance of His Britannic Majesty's consul at Mohammerah. You though are aware of the causes of this unfortunate delay and are now aware that it was only on the 20th April that I had your authorisation to go ahead, acting on Major Cox's advice.

6. On my return here I wired, or hoped to wire you my message dated the 24th April, of which I enclose translation and original for your information. You will

see that the Sheikh absolutely refuses to sell the land to us, and it was questionable if it were expedient for us, being in the future neighbours, to attempt to work this sale under the authority of the concession, for the reason that the authority of His Imperial Majesty the Shah, inebulous at any time since the concession was granted, is now still more so, in fact they say he is dead as I write this.

Under these circumstances I recommend you to accept the terms suggested, viz., 1,600*l*. per annum for 1 square mile, about 640 jereb, I named, the right to lay pipe lines any where in his country, and all cost of guards to be paid by the company, the Sheikh nominating those so employed and we fixing the rate of pay in the agreement, and the guards to be paid monthly on or after the 13th on the month subsequent to that for which the pay is due.

G. B. R.

Inclosure 2 in No. 540.

Mr. Reynolds to Major Cor.

(Confidential)

Dear Sir,

Bussorah, April 30, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to state that I took occasion to call on Captain Trevor when he was here recently, and asked him to tell you of the result, so far, of my seeing the Sheikh of Mohammarah re the land which is required by my principals for the refinery they propose to put up on Abadan Island, some few miles south of Mohammarah.

Briefly put, we require 660 jerebs of land, which now is uncultivated, with a frontage on the Shat-el-Arab of some 2,000 yards, the area to extend from the Shat-el-Arab to the Balmishir River, and the exact boundaries will be defined after the survey in course of making is finished. We further require the right to lay our pipe-line, as far as possible, 2 feet to 3 feet under the ground, from the neighbourhood of the "White Oil Springs," via Weis and Alwaz, along roughly the left bank of Karun to Mohammarah and down Abadan Island to the site selected for refinery, between the two villages of Bairein, on north, and Barwards on south of same.

After some little discussion the price asked by the Sheikh per annum was 2,000*l*., the Company providing their own guards.

A draft agreement drawn up by me, and as yet not shown to the Sheikh, is inclosed, which will be found to embody all we require of him.

2. On the 22nd I wired my principals what should read as follows:—

"I had an interview with Sheikh of Mohammarah to-day, who, in consideration of 2,000*l*. per annum offers to hire us 640 acres on north site. Will permit pipe-line anywhere in his territories. Messrs. C. S. L. must pay their own guards. What do you authorise me to offer?"

"Would suggest that you make him an offer of 1,600*l*. Strongly recommend you to accept this. The Sheikh is not selling land."

I am this day in receipt of a message which runs as follows:—

"We are of opinion that 500*l*. per annum is ample for all land as per Campbell's survey and your selection and strip for pipe-line.

"We are arranging (that) Foreign Office, London, telegraph (to) British Minister, Tehran, authorising loan to Sheikh, conditional (on) his agreement with foregoing."

To this I have this day replied as follows:

"In reference to your cable of the 29th April no reference was made to loan. It is not understood."

3. I now, apologising for the trouble I am giving you in this matter, and recognising that His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran, may possibly wire you on the matter, send you the above information, that you may be *en coursed* with what I have done and what has passed between the Sheikh and myself.

I am leaving this for Alwaz and the Oil Field to-morrow, and should occasion require, and the line be not disconnected, you can wire me there to "Goodbye."

Yours faithfully,

G. B. R.

P.S.—I am sending a copy of this to my principals in Glasgow. Should it happen that, on behalf of the syndicate, the employment of an agent be required, I would be

glad if Messrs. Strick, of Bussorah, be asked to do what may be required, for the reason that Messrs. Grey Paul and Grey Mackenzie are agents to the Standard Oil Company of America.

The following is an agreement entered into between the Sardar Arfa, Amir Iman, Sheikh Khazal Khan, Bin Hadji Jabbar Khan, Sheikh of Mohammarah, on the one part, and hereinafter called "The Sheikh," and Messrs. the Concessions Syndicate (Limited) of Glasgow, N.B., on the other part, and hereinafter called "The Syndicate," in respect of land required by the latter in the territories of the former, for purposes of their business:—

"2. It is hereby agreed that, in consideration of the payment to him by the syndicate of an annual rental of—
1. The Sheikh undertakes to hire to the syndicate an area of 650 jerebs of 4,669 square yards per jereb on Abadan Island, and situated between the villages of Bairein on the north and Barwards on the south, being bounded on the west by the Shat-el-Arab, and on the east by the Balmishir Rivers, and having a river frontage of— yards on the former, and— yards on the latter.

"3. The Sheikh further undertakes to allow the syndicate, free of all costs, to lay the pipe-lines wherever they may require in his lands, or in the lands for the time being under his jurisdiction or leased by him of others or purchased, and such uncultivated land as may be needed by them for telegraph or telephone stations, pumping stations, or quarters for line inspectors or staff, of not more than 1½ jerebs at each spot.

"4. The Sheikh further grants the free use of an area of 10 jerebs at Alwaz, and bordering on the left bank of the River Karun, for purposes of storing material, erecting a store-house and such buildings as may be needed for the business of the syndicate. This area to be located opposite the island in the river and up stream from the garden adjacent to the landing-place used by steamers plying on the Upper Karun.

"5. The Sheikh further undertakes to nominate watchmen for the efficient guarding of the property of the syndicate, and in each district through which the pipes may be laid, or the syndicate's property exposed to possible loss, he will furnish the representative of the syndicate with the names of his representatives, who will be instructed by him to supply reliable men for this work, on receipt of a request from the syndicate's representative on the spot. Any changes in the personnel of his representatives he will from time to time advise the syndicate's representative.

"6. The guards employed being thus, as it were, guaranteed by the Sheikh, he undertakes to indemnify the syndicate for loss incurred by theft of property, when such is in charge of the said guards, and in the event of damage done wilfully to pipe-line, tanks or other property of the syndicate, he undertakes to do his best to trace the offenders, and in the event of identification, to inflict such punishment as may be other officers, in the future, from doing the same and with the object, also, of making the property of the syndicate respected in his lands.

"7. The Sheikh further grants the right to the syndicate to make all bricks, tiles, &c., required by them, and to erect on the lands so occupied by them, in accordance with the articles of this agreement, all buildings and machinery as may be needed by them for the proper execution of their business, which same buildings, &c., will become the property of the Sheikh on the expiry of the concession referred to in the following article.

"8. This lease of land, and all the conditions pertaining thereto, will remain in force for such a period as may be then remaining, at the date of signing this agreement, of the concession granted to Mr. W. K. D'Arcy by His Imperial Majesty the Shah of Persia—, and dated—, or such shorter time as the syndicate may wish, in consideration of the exigencies of their business, and, should the period of the lease be so curtailed, twelve calendar months' notice of their intention will be given in writing to the Sheikh, prior to the termination of the lease. Such notice will be sent to the Sheikh, and, at the same time, a duplicate to His Britannic Majesty's consul at Mohammarah, and its receipt by the latter will be held to be proof of its receipt by the former.

"9. This agreement, and all the articles therein, are accepted by the Sheikh a binding on him and his heirs and successors, whom ever they may be.

"10. The syndicate, on their part, agree to pay the above-named rental to the Sheikh in the following manner:—

and to the credit of the Sheikh in the hands of Messrs. the Imperial

[1619]

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the receipt by the bank of the money being accepted as the full receipt of the Sheikh himself.

"11. The syndicate bind themselves to employ as guards and watchmen only those who may be recommended as reliable by the Sheikh or his representatives in the various districts, but only so long as his support of their authority over them, and his assistance in the detection of thieves, and his punishment of them, when detected, be real and effectual.

"12. The payment to the guards and watchmen engaged from the Sheikh's men will be by the hands of the syndicate and on the following scale:—

"Fifty krams per month of the Christian calendar and without food, and this will take place fifteen days subsequent to the end of the month during which it were earned.

"13. In the event of a watchman, or any employé, leaving without giving due notice of one month, it is the rule of the syndicate that fifteen days' pay be forfeited, and, without exception, all native employés are engaged on these terms.

"14. The syndicate reserve to themselves the right to punish the watchmen by inflicting fines to the extent of half-month's pay as a maximum, and, in the event of their behaviour warranting a heavier punishment, they will be handed over to the representative of the Sheikh in the nearest place, who, instructed by the Sheikh in the sense of paragraph 6 above, will do his best to uphold the authority of the syndicate among their watchmen and the respect of their property among the people of the district, so avoiding unnecessary trouble to both parties of this agreement.

"15. This agreement is to be considered as in force from the date on which it is signed, from which date the syndicate become liable for the above-named rental."

G. B. L.

Inclosure 3 in No. 540.

Mr. Campbell to Mr. Hamilton.

Dear Mr. Hamilton,

Bussorah, November 27, 1908.

I HAVE selected two excellent sites for refineries on Aladin Island, one about 15 miles from Fao telegraph station, at the entrance to the river, and the other about 29 miles from Fao and 11 from Mohanmerah.

There appears to be sufficient desert at either place to put down all the refining plant in the world. In my opinion, the land is very suitable for our purpose, and, as there is a deep channel about half-a-mile broad at both points, steamers will be moored right alongside. Steamers landing plant will be able to do so within a few hundred yards of the sites. Steamers must not, however, draw over 18 feet, on account of the bar outside Fao. Those arriving about that draught are lightened outside the bar, and loading is completed there on departure.

From enquiries made here and on board the mail steamer, I find that 18 feet is the "safe" draught, though when I came up in the "Dwaika," drawing 16 feet, she had to scrape through the bar (which is soft and harmless as far as the ship is concerned) with only 14 feet of water. Then a "shammal" was blowing (a shammal is a strong north-westerly gale), and it appears that the wind has a great influence on the tidal rise of this river. A nor-wester blows the water out and a southerly wind blows it in, so that, during the latter state of weather, ships have been known to get out drawing 21 feet. For regular traffic 18 feet should not be exceeded. The tidal rise is only 8-10 feet. The water was quite sweet at the time I tried it, and the amount of salt it contains exceedingly small. I am told that it remains so at all seasons.

I enclose a rough tracing of the Admiralty chart you gave me in Glasgow showing sites selected. You will obtain a copy of the Basra River anchorage chart to place this over. I have left a copy of this tracing with Mr. Mackie, to whom you gave me a letter of introduction, and who has put me up comfortably, provided launches, &c., and accompanied me over the ground. He knows the spots, and will point them out when asked to do so.

These two sites are, as far as I can see, perfect for our purpose, and seeing the size of refinery in your mind, I suggest that you obtain not less than 500 acres having a river frontage of 1,500 yards. If, however, the ground is cheap enough, I should advise you to take up as much as you can get for the money you wish to lay out.

[20109]

No. 540*.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Louth.

(No. 325. Confidential.)

(Telegraphic). P.

Foreign Office, May 28, 1909.

KARUN irrigation.

Please transmit the following to His Majesty's consul general at Bagdad:

"Very Confidential."

"His Majesty's Government in communication with the Sheikh of Mohammereh concerning the Karun irrigation question.

"Inform Sir W. Willeck, and impress upon him the importance of the strictest secrecy, as it is highly desirable that no foreign Government or syndicate should get to know of it. You should add that His Majesty's Government earnestly hope that he will submit his scheme to them before showing it to anyone else."

I strongly advise you to secure site A-B (and failing it site C-D), which is situated, as you will see from the chart, just above Chahab Point. Your pipe-line could be easily led to it, it is right on the seaboard, about 20 miles inside the bar. As far as I can see from charts, there is no point on the Persian coast outside the bar where vessels could load. Only 15 miles from Fao it will be an easy matter to keep in touch with you at home by running a launch daily to the Indo-European telegraph station. I am told that it is impossible to obtain sanction to lay a private telegraph line through Turkish territory. Fao is in Asiatic Turkey. Mails arrive and can be despatched from there weekly.

The land selected is barren desert, that is, it is not cultivated, although it might be so profitably, for the ground is very fertile. I have carefully avoided villages and date plantations, so that there is nothing in the way. It so happens that where the channel is deepest there are no villages or cultivation. From all accounts the date industry is increasing, and more area comes under cultivation each year. The fact must not be lost sight of, therefore, that the land selected might be taken up at any time. Naturally the dates are grown as near the river as possible. If you consult the chart you will see that, as far as deep water is concerned, the sites selected are the only really good ones on the island. Both are on the Shat-el-Arab River, which is the channel for deep-sea steamers (10 feet draught) up to Bassorah. The river on the other side of the island, the Banisher, is too narrow and shallow for navigation or volume of water. I have therefore disregarded it. There is a flooding in spring time which, the natives say, covers the sites with about 6 inches of water. I do not think that serious, for the water can easily be banded out, and all foundations must be raised above highest water-level. I have asked Mr. Mackie to visit the sites when this flooding next occurs, and to report if there is more than a foot or two of water there.

Except for summer conditions—May-October, when the temperature is seldom below 100° Fahrenheit night or day, and sometimes as high as 110° Fahrenheit in the daytime—the working of a refinery should, I think, be satisfactory. There is apparently great variation in the temperature—depending on the prevailing wind—south hot, north cool. On the morning of the 20th it was 38° Fahrenheit at 6 A.M., and at the same time to-day it was 54° Fahrenheit.

Building materials are not plentiful, but there is lots of clay on the site for brick making, and if a ranged for well ahead, would be ready for building operations. I doubt if we could ever make bricks ourselves as cheaply as natives. Some of the bricks here are fairly good, and work out a little cheaper than Bangoon bricks. They would suit us quite well.

Yours sincerely,

ANDREW CAMPBELL.

[20198]

No. 511.

India Office to Foreign Office,—(Received May 29.)

Sir,

India Office, May 28, 1909.

IN reply to your letter dated the 25th May I am directed to say that Viscount Morley concurs in the proposal of Secretary Sir E. Grey to authorise His Majesty's Minister at Tehran to sign a convention as to the transfer of the Arabistan telegraph lines to the charge of the Indo-European telegraph department, on the condition that the provisions of the convention shall not become operative until approved by the National Assembly. Lord Morley would at the same time suggest that, in accepting this condition, Sir G. Barclay should ask that the convention should be kept secret until the time arrives for laying it before the Assembly for their approval. Copy of a note by Mr. Kirk is enclosed.

Lord Morley further concurs in the proposal to intimate to Sir G. Barclay that, on the convention being signed, instructions may presumably be given to His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Peterburgh to request the Russian Government to take action on his suggestion that the two representatives at Tehran should bring before the Persian Government at the first favourable opportunity the question of the exchange of control over the Tehran-Meshed and Khaf-Nasatabad lines.

I am, &c.

COLIN G. CAMPBELL.

Inclosure in No. 541.

*Note by the Director-in-chief, Indo-European Telegraph Department,
dated May 21, 1909.*

It seems to me that it may be safely anticipated that the signing of the new convention, even with the condition attached to its becoming operative, which Sir G. Barclay has shown to be required, will ultimately secure for the British Government the renewal of the telegraph concessions and the control of the Arabian lines.

I would therefore suggest that, in accepting the proposed condition, the British Minister might perhaps ask that the new convention should be kept secret until the time arrives for laying it before the Assembly for approval.

H. A. KIRK.

[20222]

No. 542.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 122.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

GOVERNORSHIP of Tabreez.

Tehran, May 29, 1909.

The appointment of governor-general of Tabreez has, I am informed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, been given to Ala-ed-Dowleh.

This appointment was suggested by the Russian chargé d'affaires, who tells me, however, that he did not bring strong pressure to bear.

His Majesty's consul-general at Tabreez thinks that Ala-ed-Dowleh should be welcomed by the Nationalists, as he has suffered in their cause (see Brussels despatch No. 7 of the 15th January, 1905).

On this point, however, I am not convinced, as his sincerity as a Nationalist is doubted; yet, in view of his strength and energy, which eminently qualify him for the post, I have not felt justified in discouraging the appointment.

The nationalist candidate was Mukhter-es-Sultaneh, who was governor before the disturbances, but I do not think the Russian Government would have welcomed his appointment, and much pressure would have been needed to secure it.

[20221]

No. 543.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 276.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, May 29, 1909.

Y.D.R. telegram No. 700 of the 26th instant. Suggested communication to Mujtahids of Kerbela and Nejed.

Proposed amendments are accepted by Russian Government, who have telegraphed to their Ambassador at Constantinople the text of the proposed communication.

[20224]

No. 544.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 277.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

PERSIA.

St. Petersburg, May 29, 1909.

I saw M. Tscharykow to-day and his Excellency told me that the Russian general staff did not consider Colonel Margani sufficiently scientific to take Colonel Linkhoff's place, and that he would therefore not get the appointment, but that the general staff would select one of their own members for the post. On previous occasions M. Tscharykow had given me to understand distinctly that the appointment of Colonel Margani was definitely settled.

His Excellency went on to say that his Government were proposing to the Shah that the Cossack Brigade should be increased from 1,500 to 2,000 men. Part of this force, I understood, would be stationed at Tabreez in order to form a body of police there.

In reply to an inquiry as to the state of affairs at Tabreez, M. Tscharykow said that all was going happily there. I remarked once more that, if that were so, the retention there of so large a Russian garrison was scarcely necessary. I said that I believed that both the Russian general and the Russian consul were agreed as to the possibility of now reducing the force. To this M. Tscharykow replied once more that the appointment of a governor-general was still awaited.

The views of M. Tscharykow as to the Zil-es-Sultan's return to Persia seem to have undergone some slight modification, for at our interview to-day his Excellency remarked that the Zil's return might constitute a danger to the Shah, and that although the Russian Government did not altogether relish his presence in Persia, yet they would leave the Shah to settle that question for himself. In the event of the Zil returning, M. Tscharykow added, no protection would be afforded to him by the Russian Government. His Excellency thought that the Shah's motive for desiring the Zil's return was probably in order that he might squeeze money out of him.

[20221]

No. 545.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Louthier.

(No. 327.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 29, 1909.

YOU may now co-operate with your Russian colleague in sending to the two consuls-general at Bagdad identical instructions concerning the communication to be made to the Mujtahids. (See St. Petersburg telegram No. 276 of to-day's date.)

[20229]

No. 546.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 30.)

(No. 423.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 30, 1909.

WITH reference to St. Petersburg telegram No. 275 of the 27th May and my No. 109 of the 21st May.

1. The present moment, I agree, is favourable, but the chances of the Assembly's ratifying our convention as regards the Arabistan line will, I am afraid, be reduced by the opposition which the exchange of the Tehran-Meshed and Kheef-Seistan lines will meet.

2. The convention is now ready for signature. To attempt to alter the text now would arouse suspicion and involve undesirable delay.

The article is worded: "The Persian Government agrees not to employ, without the concurrence of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, any but Persians or the employees of the department."

The Russian Government might possibly be satisfied with our undertaking should the case arise, to support their demand for Russian signallers.

3. A secret arrangement between the two Governments will, I presume, deal with the reservations as to the Russian sphere.

1. I do not like to enquire of the company here as to this payment, of which I know nothing; but it seems to me that we are now merely concerned with an arrangement by which Russia takes our place as regards the line. We have rights over the Tehran-Khaukkin line, but, according to Kirk (see his minute of the 11th February), no liabilities connected with it. Should Russia at some future time desire to exercise the rights which it is intended she should take over from us, it will be for her to come to a suitable arrangement with Persia respecting any liabilities which the Persian Government may have incurred in the administration of the line.

[30226]

No. 547.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 30.)

(No. 279.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, May 30, 1909.

TELEGRAPHIC arrangements in Persia.

The official reply to my *aide-memoire* has now reached me. In substance it is practically in agreement with my telegram No. 275 of the 27th May. Russian Govern-

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3 R

ment would wish the secret agreement with regard to the possible employment some day of Russian signallers on the Arabian lines to be worded somewhat as follows:—

(R.) "Reserving to themselves by means of a special agreement Persian Government's right of control over and repair on the Persian telegraph lines in Arabistan, and having the intention to admit for work on those lines and offices only Persian subjects and officials of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, British Government will not place obstacles in the way if in time it should appear necessary for the Russian Government to dispatch their telegraph officials to the lines mentioned for the purpose of telegrams in the Russian language on principles analogous with those which have been established in regard to the Khaf-Seistan line." (End of R.)

Attention is drawn in the memorandum to the necessity of effecting as soon as possible the exchange of the Tehran Meshed and Khaf-Nasratabad sections; and the memorandum goes on to say that it would be highly desirable that the necessary instructions should be sent to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran. The requisite authority has already been sent to M. Sabline.

[20236]

No. 548.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 30.)

[By post.]

(No. 75.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.*

Paris, May 29, 1909.

PERSIA.

Your telegrams No. 356 of the 21st instant, No. 357 of the 25th instant, my despatch No. 201 of the 21st, and Tehran telegram No. 419 of 26th May. The Russian Ambassador and I have together seen the Nasr-ul-Mulk to-day.

As the British and Russian Governments are prepared to give him personal protection he will be willing to return to Tehran if he receive the formal offer by the Shah of the position of President of the Council and Minister of Finance, but he cannot leave Europe for the next few weeks or two months, for there is to be a fresh consultation of doctors in a few days to decide whether his son, aged 14, is to go through a cure at Evian or undergo an operation for suppuration of the kidney. The cure would probably take six weeks.

The Nasr-ul-Mulk says that he does not seek office, but he will accept it for the good of Persia if the Shah will carry out the Anglo-Russian programme as described in the newspapers. He would very much like to have details of the programme.

[19978]

No. 549.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 706.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 30, 1909.

PERSIAN telegraph lines.

We are submitting points in your telegram No. 275 of the 27th instant to the India Office for their views.

[20231]

No. 550.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 425.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, May 31, 1909.

In my telegram No. 422 I reported the appointment of Alas-ed-Dowleh as governor of Tabreez. The Nationalists of Tehran are very indignant, as they regard Alas-ed-Dowleh as a reactionary, and they think his appointment due to Russian pressure.

His Majesty's consul-general seems, however, to be still in favour of the appointment. He points out how essential is a strong governor for Tabreez, and says that there is no reason to suppose the appointment will be generally unpopular in the town, though there is a noisy section which wants a local governor.

[20232]

No. 551.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 426.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, May 31, 1909.

ACTION of Russian military authorities in Tabreez.

I have received the following telegram, No. 131 of the 30th May, from His Majesty's consul-general at Tabreez:—

"More trouble has resulted from an insignificant encounter which took place four days ago between two local fedais in the Ilakmebad quarter. One of these fled to Russian consul-general, and the other was subsequently arrested by Russian troops, who blew up his own house and his brother's. They are all one more rascally than the other. While thus occupied, the Russian soldiers found a barricade, which had been up till then overlooked, and destroyed it.

"Sattar Khan and Bagher Khan, as a result of this action, went last night to the Turkish consul-general, and remain there in bust.

"(The following is confidential.)

"When I pointed out to my Russian colleague that, in my opinion, the military authorities were acting in a tactless manner and incompatibly with the spirit of the promises we had made to the inhabitants, and that I should be obliged to report accordingly, he replied that the matter did not meet with his own approval."

[20233]

No. 552.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 427.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, May 31, 1909.

ACTION of Russian military authorities at Tabreez.

With reference to my telegram No. 426 of to-day.

I learn from His Majesty's consul-general at Tabreez that the Turkish consul-general is said to be encouraging the anti-Russian movement, and has hired houses adjacent to his consulate to lodge bastis, whose numbers have increased during the day.

It is rumoured that Taki Zadeh contemplates taking asylum at the German consular agency.

Mr. Wraslaw adds that Russian consul-general is quite unable to exercise any control over the military authorities. Either this or his protestations as to his attitude are insincere.

[20234]

No. 553.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 428.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, May 31, 1909.

RUSSIAN action at Tabreez.

I fear that the good effect produced by the loyal co-operation of my Russian colleague in our efforts towards securing the restoration of constitutional government will be undone by the action of military authorities in Tabreez. It is necessary that a considerable portion of the Russian troops should at the earliest moment be withdrawn and the general in command of them instructed most strictly, and at once, to use his men for no purposes other than those for which they were avowedly dispatched, if we are not to see a re-emergence of the old mistrust of Russia.

This unwarrantable action of the Russians at Tabreez gives the Nationalists excellent ground for agitation, and while it continues we cannot hope to see the country settle down.

[20235]

No. 554.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 429.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

NASR-UL-MULK.

Gulabek, May 31, 1909.

A telegram has been sent to Nasr-ul-Mulk by the Shah, offering him the office of President of the Council with the portfolio of Finance, and inviting him to return at once to Persia.

Reference is to my telegram No. 419 of the 25th May.

[20228]

No. 555.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 251.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, May 31, 1909.

TABREEZ. I saw my Turkish colleague to-day, and he showed me a telegram which he had received from Rifat Pasha, stating that a report had reached Constantinople to the effect that Baghir Khan and Sattar Khan had taken "bait" in the Turkish consulate at Tabreez. Rifat Pasha expressed a hope that no difficulties would be made by General Suersky with regard to these refugees.

I told Turkish Pasha that no news in confirmation of this report had yet reached me. I added that, in view of the general amnesty which had been proclaimed for political offenders, I was at a loss to account for Sattar Khan, at any rate, having taken "bait." I could not see how such matters concerned the Russian general.

[20238]

No. 556.

Sir G. Lotherie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 192.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Constantinople, May 31, 1909.

MUTTEREDS.

With reference to your telegram No. 327 of the 29th instant, I have the honour to report that I have agreed with my Russian colleague on the terms of identic instructions which have to-day been sent to Bagdad.

[20234]

No. 557.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 708.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, May 31, 1909.

TABREEZ.

Report in Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 428 of to-day that good effect of loyal co-operation of the two legations in the interests of peace is being impaired by arbitrary action of Russian military authorities, and that the chances of a general restoration of confidence by means of a constitution are diminishing for the same reason, is much to be deplored.

Mention to M. Isvolsky how undesirable this state of affairs is, and press him to lose no time in sending definite instructions to the Russian general at Tabreez to confine himself to his original task of guarding the consulates and protecting the lives and property of foreign subjects.

It would be helpful towards restoring confidence if some start were made in recalling from Tabreez some portion of the large Russian force, which might well be done now that a strong governor-general has been appointed. This step should be strongly recommended to M. Isvolsky.

[20237]

No. 555*.

Sir G. Lotherie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 191.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Constantinople, May 31, 1909.

KARUN-KHERKER irrigation.

Very Confidential.)

Following is from His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad:—

"Referring to your Confidential telegram of the 29th May, Sir William Willcocks says that he has a clear idea how [?] the Kherker and Karun irrigation ought to be done, as the necessary information is obtainable from the old canals and works. In order, however, to make a definite scheme he would have to know whether the ancient Kherker dam was made of masonry or earth, and would have to have two engineers for two months to join the ancient Kherker dam to Morton's levels on the right bank of the Karun.

"Sir William is ready to put his knowledge and skill at His Majesty's Government's disposal, and he will not mention the project to any persons of foreign nationality."

[20287]

No. 558.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 1.)

(No. 372.)

Sir, *Constantinople, May 25, 1909.*
 ON the 19th March I received a note from the Persian Embassy here enclosing a telegram received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Tehran, announcing that Ottoman customs officials had established themselves at Soldouz, Sonjboulak, and Barandonz, in Persian territory, and were levying customs duties by force from Persian caravans.

I have caused repeated enquiries to be made here with regard to this allegation, but I am positively assured by both the Porte and the customs officials here that no customs posts have been established at the places mentioned in the Persian Ambassador's letter.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

[20504]

No. 559.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 1.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a letter to the Admiralty, dated the 25th May, relative to the proposed increase of the salutes of the Sheikhs of Mohammerah, Koweit, and Bahrein.

India Office, May 29, 1909.

Inclosure in No. 559.

India Office to Admiralty.

Sir,

India Office, May 25, 1909.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to enclose, to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, copy of correspondence as to the proposed increase from five to twelve guns of the salutes of the Sheikhs of Mohammerah and Koweit, and from five to eleven of that of the Sheikh of Bahrein, the salutes to be personal in all three cases to the present chiefs; also as to the grant of a salute of five guns to the eldest sons of the Sheikhs of Mohammerah and Koweit, and of three guns to the eldest son of the Sheikh of Bahrein, on the occasions when they visit one of His Majesty's ships as their fathers' representatives.

Subject to any observations which the Lords Commissioners may have to offer, Viscount Morley would propose to approve the introduction of these changes, and to leave it to the discretion of the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to decide, in consultation with His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, when it would be opportune to make the announcement to the sheikhs concerned.

I am, &c.

A. GODLEY.

[20502]

No. 560.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 1.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 14th May, relative to accommodation for troops at Rohat.

India Office, May 29, 1909.

[1619]

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Inclosure in No. 560.

Vicount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

I APPROVE proposals as to quarters for troops at Robat contained in your letter of the 28th January. Half cost will be borne by Army Council. Papers are being sent by post.

May 14, 1909.

[20562]

No. 561.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 1.)

(No. 430.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

PROPOSED increase of Cossack brigade.

Gulahek, May 1, 1909.

The moment seems unfortunate for the proposed increase mentioned in Sir A. Nicolson's telegram No. 277.

It is not only that, under the restored constitution, the legality of such a step, without the consent of the assembly, is doubtful, but people here will certainly regard any increase, whether it comprise Russian officers or not, as a proof of Russian reactionary sympathies. In this way the effect of the recent action of Russian troops at Tabreez will be aggravated, the Shah will be encouraged and the Nationalists perturbed.

The governor of Tabreez might well be furnished with an efficient guard from the Cossacks recently under Ain-ed-Dowleh, without any further reduction of the force here.

[20563]

No. 562.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 1.)

(No. 431.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

RUSSIAN advance to the Persian Government.

Gulahek, June 1, 1909.

The draft of the convention regarding this advance has been submitted to the Russian Government by M. Sablin. Since my telegram No. 417 of 25th May, a few minor amendments, in reference to the Persian Government, have been inserted. Thus the stipulation that the 100,000 *roubles* is to be advanced by instalments has been eliminated. I think, however, that without this clause sufficient precautions have been taken to prevent misuse of the money, and the Ministers concerned will be obliged eventually to render to the assembly a full account of the expenditure of this sum.

[20567]

No. 563.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 1.)

(No. 432.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

RUSSIAN military authorities at Tabreez.

Gulahek, June 1, 1909.

I have received the following telegram, No. 137, from His Majesty's consul-general at Tabreez:

"The Russian military authorities seem inclined to show too much activity. Several Russian subjects in the town, and particularly one active member of the Anjuman, have recently been arrested. The Russian general, in reply to my questions as to the reason of the arrest of the member of the Anjuman, stated that it was on account of disparaging remarks which he had made regarding the Czar and his Government, but it seems to me rather to be ascribed to the active part he had played in nationalist politics. The Persian leaders of this party consequently feel a rather natural anxiety as to their own security."

In a subsequent telegram Mr. Wratisslaw reports as follows:—

"The number of people at the Turkish consulate-general to-day is not great, and the proposed demonstration does not seem likely to be successful."

[20565]

No. 564.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 1.)

(No. 433.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Teheran, June 1, 1909.

RUSSIAN action in Tabreez.

I learn, with reference to my telegram No. 426 of yesterday, from His Majesty's consul-general at Tabreez, that the Russians have put forward a large claim for damages to their road against Sattar Khan. This is doubtless the reason that he sought refuge at the Turkish consulate-general.

This and other action of the Russian military authorities at Tabreez have roused considerable indignation in Teheran—a sentiment to which the more active Nationalists are not the only ones to give utterance.

[20426]

No. 565.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 1.)

(No. 282.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, May 31, 1909.

TABREEZ.

I have called M. Isvolsky's attention to the incident referred to in Sir G. Barclay's telegrams Nos. 426 and 427 of the 31st May, and have expressed the opinion that the settlement of small differences arising between the inhabitants of Tabreez had better be left to the Persian vice-governor. At the same time I suggested that the Russians might now diminish the number of their troops and withdraw them altogether on the arrival of the new Persian governor.

[20561]

No. 566.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 1.)

(No. 283.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, June 1, 1909.

TABREEZ. Your telegram No. 708 of the 31st May.

Last night I addressed a letter to M. Isvolsky on the subject of the Russian general's action at Tabreez, and this morning I went to see his Excellency.

M. Isvolsky had received a telegram from the Russian consul at Tabreez and read it to me. The telegram stated that two or three Russian subjects were under arrest and would be deported for having used inflammatory language. It said that a search had been made in their houses, but made no mention of houses having been blown up, nor of any interference with Persian subjects.

It was further reported by the Russian consul that communications had been passing of late between the Turkish consulate-general and Sattar Khan and others, and that Sattar Khan had now taken refuge at that consulate-general with about 200 other persons. It seemed that the Ottoman Government were willing to secure their safe departure from the country if they desired to go.

In the Russian consul's report there was apparently nothing to indicate that there was any connection between the arrest of the Russian subjects and the action of Sattar Khan and his companions in taking bast.

M. Isvolsky remarked that the information which had reached His Majesty's Government was evidently at variance with that which had reached him. I promised to telegraph to you the substance of the Russian consul's telegram, and said that perhaps we should succeed in clearing the matter up. I took the opportunity of suggesting once more that an immediate reduction of the number of the Russian troops at Tabreez would remove all misunderstandings and be of great advantage. M. Isvolsky remarked that he had only just come back to St. Petersburg; that he must acquaint himself with the situation and talk it over with his advisers in the Ministry for Foreign

Affairs. I observed that matters of internal Persian concern lay outside General Snarsky's province and that the latter should not overstep the objects for which he had been sent. To this M. Isedolsky replied that, so far as his information went, General Snarsky had not exceeded his functions and had only ordered the arrest of persons of Russian nationality.

[20595]

No. 567.

Indian Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 2.)

Sir,
Indian Office, May 28, 1909.
 WITH reference to your letter of the 26th instant, I am directed to say that Viscount Morley agrees in the view expressed by Sir E. Grey that, in the existing circumstances, an officer of the Indian service should be appointed to that place, and that the best means of giving effect to this proposal will be to appoint Captain Haworth to Mohammerah and Mr. McDonnell to Kermanshah.

Lord Morley sees no objection in principle to the proposal—which would be in accordance with the scheme put forward in your letter of the 20th February—that Mohammerah should be permanently allotted to the Indian service and Kermanshah to the Levant service.

I am to enclose draft of a telegram which, subject to Sir E. Grey's concurrence, Lord Morley proposes to address to the Viceroy on the subject.*

I am, &c.

COLIN G. CAMPBELL.

[20606]

No. 568.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 134.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulabek, June 2, 1909.

NASSIR-UL-MULK.

Another refusal of the Shah's offers, reported in my telegram No. 429 of the 31st May, has been received from Nassir-ul-Mulk, who excuses himself on the ground of his son's illness. He might, however, possibly be induced to change his mind by the assurance of protection from the two legations.

The existing situation might be relieved by the announcement that he had done so, which would be particularly opportune at the present juncture.

[20630]

No. 569.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 135.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulabek, June 2, 1909.

TABREEZ situation.

I have received the following telegram, No. 130, from His Majesty's consul-general at Tabreez:—

"I have this evening received a letter from my Turkish colleague, in which he informs me that Turkish protection has been accorded to the persons and property of Sattar Khan, Bagher Khan, and other leading men of Tabreez, whose names will be communicated to me at a later date. He further notifies that any claims put forward by British subjects against these individuals should be dealt with through his agency. May I reply that I must continue, as heretofore, to present to the Persian authorities' claims by British subjects against persons of that nationality?

"The demonstration will of course be encouraged by Turkish consul-general's action, which, I hear, was inspired from Constantinople."

I have telegraphed my approval of Mr. Whitshaw's proposed reply.

My Turkish colleague tells me that the arbitrary action of the Russian military

* Not printed.

authorities was responsible for the last, and not his consul's encouragement. He denies all knowledge of the Turkish consul-general having accorded the refugees at his consulate protection against foreign claims. He is telegraphing to him not to persist in this latter pretension.

[20684]

No. 570.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 136.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulabek, June 2, 1909.

RUSSIAN action at Tabreez.

I have received the following telegram, No. 140 of the 1st June, from His Majesty's consul-general at Tabreez:—

"There have been attempts, until now ineffective, on the part of the demonstrators to close the bazzars.

"Sattar and Bagher Khans, as far as I can learn, enjoy only the support of their personal retainers and those of their party who would profit by a continuance of disorder. They are endeavouring to gain the adherence of the general public by a policy of intimidation, but peace and quiet seem to be the only desires of the greater majority. I learn from several respectable people here that their names have recently been used in telegrams from the nationalist leaders to Tehran without any authorisation on their part.

"The agitation is undoubtedly being fostered by the Turkish consul-general, who is now occupied in the manufacture of Turkish flags for distribution to the people.

"The whole unfortunate complication, however, must be ascribed to the foolish action of the Russian military authorities."

[20685]

No. 571.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 137.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulabek, June 2, 1909.

NASSIR-UL-MULK would do well to telegraph his intentions without ambiguity if he really proposes to return as soon as his son's health allows.

The explanation of his attitude given to the two Ambassadors, as reported in Sir F. Bertie's telegram No. 75, does not at all coincide with the information which I have received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs here.

Reference is to my telegram No. 431 of the 1st June.

[20079]

No. 572.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 273.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 2, 1909.

LOAN to Sheikh of Mohammerah.

Following to be forwarded to His Majesty's Consul-General at Bashtire, in answer to his telegrams of the 18th May last:—

"With regard to reference to payment to Bakhtiariis of an annuity of 1,000*l.*, the Company know nothing of the matter, and do not understand what is meant.

"With regard to the first of the stipulations made by the Sheikh, the Company can only give an undertaking not to remove their buildings and machinery when the lease expires, as according to the terms of their concession their plant then passes to the Persian Government, and cannot therefore become the property of the Sheikh. It is added that such a guarantee is given, and that the Sheikh asks a rental of not more than 650*l.* per annum does it seem likely to you that the Sheikh would accept a payment down of 12,500*l.*, 6,000*l.* of which would represent a 6 per cent. loan which could be repaid either in full at the end of ten years, or in instalments while the remaining 6,500*l.* would represent the payment in advance of the capitalized value of ten years' rent?

[161*u*]

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"The draft agreement (see letter of the 30th April from Reynolds) explains what the Company would be prepared to accept in satisfaction of their requirements which the Sheikh has summed up under six headings. Ascertain if this draft agreement would be acceptable to the Sheikh."

[20236]

No. 573.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 711.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 2, 1909.

NASR-UL-MULK is acquainted with the résumés given of programme in the press, and is anxious for more definite information.

I consider that there would be no harm in letting him see text of programme, as suggested in Sir F. Bertie's telegram No. 75 of the 29th May.

Ask whether Russian Government see any objection to this.

[20792]

No. 574.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 3.)

(No. 428.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, June 3, 1909.

ST. PETERSBURGH telegram No. 283 [of the 1st June].

My Russian colleague and I have instructed the two consuls to concert together to send us full report as to events which preceded the Turkish bast, and to make reports as nearly as possible agree.

Whether or not Russian General has exceeded his orders, there can be no doubt that Turkish consul-general has acted in a manner calculated to inflame agitation against the presence of Russian troops, and a note which the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires has addressed to the Turkish Government, and to which my Russian colleague has had secret access, leads to the belief that the consul-general has acted under instructions.

Sent to St. Petersburg.

[20796]

No. 575.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 3.)

(No. 439.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 3, 1909.

EAST at Turkish consulate-general at Tabreez.

In my immediately preceding telegram I mentioned a note addressed by the Turkish chargé d'affaires to the Persian Government. My Russian colleague has now furnished me with a copy of this. It is, it appears, presented in reply to a communication from the Persian Government complaining of the Turkish consul-general's interference in affairs which concern only the Shah's Government.

In the Turkish note it is stated that the oppressive action of the Russian general was the cause of the bast, and the consul-general, in his quality of representative of a neighbouring and co-religious State, felt it his duty to give asylum to and protect the lives and property of the refugees.

Sadreddin Bey further asserts that these men can only quit the consulate in safety when the Russian general has modified his present attitude, and trusts that the Minister for Foreign Affairs will agree that the dictates of a foreign official cannot be forced on men who are the leaders of a whole nation and who have shed their blood in the cause of their country's independence.

[20795]

No. 576.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 3.)

(No. 286.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, June 3, 1909.

THE Turkish Ambassador has been advised by the Russian Government that the best course would be to allow Sattar Khan and those who are with him to leave Persia after having obtained proper guarantees for their security.

[19782]

No. 577.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 274.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 3, 1909.

DEFENCE works for His Majesty's Consulate in Scistan.

Are these, in your opinion, necessary, and is it advisable to continue them?

See telegram from Viceroy of India of the 3rd May last.

[20630]

No. 578.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 276.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, June 3, 1909.

YOUR telegram No. 435 (of the 2nd June, Tabreez).

Action approved.

[20783]

No. 579.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 713.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 3, 1909.

RUSSIAN action at Tabreez.

The conduct of the Russian military authorities tends to make it impossible for His Majesty's Government to maintain a passive attitude in Persian affairs, and threatens to subvert completely the arrangements now being concluded at Tehran and to embroil everything again. It is clear from telegrams received from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran that the Russians are intervening actively in the internal affairs of the country against the Nationalists, and this if it continues will eventually result in our being compelled to interfere in their favour. I consider that the situation thus created is becoming critical. It will become necessary for me to admit, if questioned, in Parliament, that Great Britain and Russia are no longer acting in concert in Persia. The Russian General at Tabreez has exceeded his instructions and gone beyond the declared intentions of his Government, and I cannot deny this unless some steps are taken by Russian Government to control his action. In default of such steps we shall witness a return of the old situation which was so deplorable—that of one Persian faction looking to Great Britain for support and the other to Russia. If we restrict our action to the protection of foreigners and maintain an impartial attitude it is essential that the Russian military authorities should do the same, and the Russian Government must understand this.

You should put these considerations before them, and represent to them that I can no longer attempt to explain or defend the situation in Parliament unless they make clear their intention to confirm their attitude to ours, which they could do at once by beginning to withdraw their troops, whose numbers exceed considerably those required for the purpose for which they were intended.

This step should therefore be urged upon M. Isvolski.

[20229]

No. 580.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 717.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 3, 1909.

ARABISTAN telegraph line. (See Tehran telegram No. 423 of the 30th May, and your telegram No. 279 of the 30th May.)

In view of Sir G. Barclay's telegram I think that it would be well for the agreement to be signed unaltered and without delay. Ascertain whether Russian Government are disposed to accept suggested declaration.

[20783]

No. 581.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 718.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 3, 1909.

RUSSIAN action at Tabreez. (See my telegram No. 717 of today.) It would be most deplorable if the longstanding conduct of the Russian military authorities at Tabreez were to upset the policy of the Russian Foreign Office and reverse its consequences. I am fully conscious that up to the present the good relations between the two countries have been strengthened by this policy, and that its effect on Persia is likely to be beneficial.

[20685]

No. 582.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 369.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 3, 1909.

NASR-UL-MULK'S return. (See telegram No. 437 of yesterday from Tehran, repeated to you.)

You should act in concert with your Russian colleague in trying to induce Nasr-ul-Mulk to send an unambiguous telegram to the Persian Government, as required by them.

[19231]

No. 583.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 246.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 3, 1909.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 198 of the 21st ultimo relative to the reported pillage of villages belonging to the Zils-es-Sultan.

To the questions asked by His Serene Highness in the letter which he has addressed to you as to what he should do in the circumstances and as to whether His Majesty's Government can afford him adequate protection, your Excellency should reply that His Majesty's Government are unable to extend further the protection accorded to himself and his family, but that discretion will be given to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran to do what he properly can unofficially, in conjunction with the Russian Charge d'Affaires, in the interests of humanity, should the report which has reached His Serene Highness prove to be well founded.

I am, &c.

(Signed) E. GREY.

[19031]

No. 584.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 3, 1909.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 19th ultimo relative to the withdrawal of the double company of native infantry stationed at Rohan since 1906, and to my proposal to increase the escort of His Majesty's Consulate in Seistan.

I am to inform you in reply that, as regards the former point, Sir E. Grey concurs in Viscount Morley's proposal, as set forth in the second paragraph of your letter, to approve the action of the Government of India, to withdraw the double company at the end of the present arms traffic season.

As regards the latter point, I am to state that, in Sir E. Grey's opinion, the present political situation in Persia affords no reason for reconsidering the decision already reached not to increase the escort of His Majesty's Consulate in Seistan.

I am, &c.

(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[20920]

No. 585.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 4.)

(No. 410.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulaheli, June 4, 1909.

ACTION of Russian military authorities at Tabreez.

With reference to Sir A. Nicolson's telegram No. 283 of the 1st June, my Russian colleague tells me, very confidentially, that the Foreign Office at St. Petersburg has administered a severe rebuke to M. Miller for neglecting to report more fully on recent events, and thus placing M. Isvolsky in a false position towards His Majesty's Ambassador.

The reports which I have received from His Majesty's consul-general at Tabreez have been confirmed by those of the Russian military authorities.

[20921]

No. 586.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 4.)

(No. 411.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulaheli, June 4, 1909.

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier.

The Persian Government have addressed a note to the two legations complaining of encroachments in the frontier districts by the Turks. Much of the note is vague, but the following allegations are more or less explicit:—

Four villages in Persian territory—Sheikh Kazi, Jezlikan, Chibrik, and Hijick—are threatened by Turkish troops. I cannot locate the last-named, but the first three are in the neighbourhood of Salmas.

Threats of pillage and other inducements to become Turkish subjects are held before the inhabitants.

Military measures have been taken in the Soujboulak district and custom-houses established. The Turkish consular agent has been inviting the population to acknowledge Turkish sovereignty, and rebellious tribes are being incited to attack the town.

Turkish passports have been given to Persian subjects by the Turkish troops who have drawn near to Urmia.

The note from the Persian Government finally requests that representations may be made by the two Governments at Constantinople.

[20916]

No. 587.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 4.)

(No. 77.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Paris, June 4, 1909.

I HAVE received your telegram No. 369 of the 3rd instant, and also a repetition of Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 437 of the 2nd June in regard to the Nasr-ul-Mulk.

The Russian Ambassador informed me that he had an interview with his Excellency in company with the Nasr-ul-Mulk to-day that he had as yet not received any instructions. The latter stated that he had received a telegram from the Shah on the 29th ultimo which merely said that, "the functions of Minister of Finance having been attributed to you, you are to come at once to Tehran." The Nasr-ul-Mulk sent a telegram on the following day expressing his devotion to the Shah, and asking that he might be granted the delay necessary for the completion of his son's treatment before

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himself returning to Tehran. He said he would write by post to the same effect. The Shah's curt telegram contains no offer of the Presidency of the Council, and he feels that it does not imply that His Majesty has confidence in him or looks upon his employment as welcome.

(Confidential.)

The Nasr-ul-Mulk says that he suspects that Saad-ed-Dowleh is anxious to be confirmed himself in the office of President of the Council, and will consequently put it to the Shah that he is unwilling for other reasons than his son's state of health to return to Persia, and so prejudice him in His Majesty's eyes. He considers that so long as the Minister for Foreign Affairs is acting as President he should be held responsible for the government of the country.

He says that he will be ready to act in accordance with any advice you may give him as soon as his son's treatment has been completed.

[20595]

No. 588.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 281.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 4, 1909.

PENDING final exchange of consulates between the home and Indian Governments, the latter are being instructed to arrange personal exchange immediately between McMahon and Haworth. You should take any steps which may be necessary.

For reference please see my telegram No. 263 of the 25th May.

[20795]

No. 589.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicholson.

(No. 720.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 4, 1909.

PLEASE see telegram No. 439 of the 3rd June from Tehran.

There would be no necessity to give any special safeguards to Sattar Khan and his followers (see your telegram No. 286 of the 3rd June) if they decide to leave Persian territory of their own accord and not under compulsion.

But the effect which would be produced in this country by their leaving Persia in order to avoid being subjected to oppressive treatment by the Russian general would be most unfortunate, as it would be considered that their departure was enforced in order to give satisfaction to the Shah and the reactionary party among his supporters, and that some of the most important of the Nationalists were being deported at the instance of the Russian general.

[20229]

No. 590.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 4, 1909.

WITH reference to the letter from this department of the 25th ultimo and your reply of the 28th ultimo, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, copies of correspondence, as marked in the margin,² on the subject of telegraphs in Persia.

It will be seen that four points have been raised by the Russian Government:

1. The proposed exchange of the Tehran Meshed and Khaf-Nasratabad lines.
2. The reservation of Russian rights on the Arabistan lines.
3. The construction of an extra line from Tehran to Shahrud.
1. The financial position of the Tehran Khamikin line.

In view of the fresh stage now reached by the question, the course proposed in the previous letter from this department will no longer meet the case; and Sir E. Grey

² Nos. 537, 547, 548, and 580.

would propose as regards point 2, if Viscount Morley concurs, to await a reply from the Russian Government to the enquiry addressed to them whether they would be satisfied as regards the Arabistan lines with a declaration by His Majesty's Government on the lines indicated in the telegram No. 279 of the 30th ultimo from His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

As to point 1, Sir E. Grey sees no reason for abandoning the course indicated in the last paragraph of the letter of the 25th ultimo from this department, and he considers that a communication in that sense should be made to the Russian Government.

I am to enquire, as regards point 3, what are the views of Lord Morley of Blackburn on the subject of the proposed duplication of the line to Shahrud; and I am to say that Sir E. Grey proposes to deal with point 4 by informing the Russian Government that there are no accounts on the Khamikin line, which is entirely worked by the Persian Telegraph Administration.

I am to suggest that this department should be favoured with a reply at Lord Morley's early convenience.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[20917]

No. 591.

Sir A. Nicholson to Sir Edward Grey.-(Received June 5.)

(No. 288.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, June 5, 1909.

SITUATION at Tabreez, and co-operation in Persia.

I saw M. Isvolsky today, and spoke to his Excellency in the sense of your telegrams Nos. 713 and 738 of the 3rd June. I had drawn up a private and confidential memorandum summarising their contents, and this I left with him.

M. Isvolsky, on his side, read to me a summary of some telegrams which the Russian consul at Tabreez had addressed to his Government, from which it appears that two separate incidents occurred, one relating to Russian subjects, and the other concerned with the arrest by the Russian authorities of some Nationalists and the destruction of houses referred to by Mr. Wratishaw.

I understand that reports on the subject will be furnished by the two consuls, so I will only state that, according to the information telegraphed by the Russian consul, an encounter between two bands of Nationalists seems to have taken place. It would appear that a man called Ynsuf was at the head of the aggressors, and that this man is said to terrorise the quarter of Tabreez in which the affray occurred. The party which was attacked fled, in the first place, to the vice-governor. He was not in a position to afford them protection, and so they took refuge at the Russian consulate. The Russian consul asserts that both the vice-governor and the population of the town approved of the action which the Russian general took, and that the vice-governor has been informed by the Russian authorities that as soon as he is ready to receive the arrested men they will be handed over to him.

M. Isvolsky expresses most earnestly the hope that an isolated incident of this kind will not be allowed to make any trouble in the relations between Great Britain and Russia as regards the co-operation of the two Governments in Persia; he promises that full enquiry will be made into the matter, and that General Smarsky will once more be given instructions. M. Isvolsky will try to arrange, at a sitting of the Special Committee which is to be held the day after to-morrow, that a portion of the troops should be withdrawn from Tabreez. He himself is in favour of this measure.

He gives me the most positive assurances that the idea of General Smarsky actively opposing the Nationalists is quite out of the question, and says that the Russian Government are determined that no such action should be taken. He would view any weakening of our co-operation as deplorable, and he appealed to me to make it clear to you that, even in the event of General Smarsky's action being proved to have been too energetic, the fact of his having acted in such a manner ought not to be allowed to sow discord between Russia and Great Britain. The reports which the two consuls have been instructed to furnish will doubtless be awaited before passing any final judgment.

[28918]

No. 592.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 5.)

(No. 289. Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, June 5, 1909.

MY telegram No. 288 of the 4th June.

M. Isvolsky tells me in confidence that a reproval has been administered to the Russian consul at Tabreez for not having reported fully on both the incidents referred to.

The whole affair has much upset M. Isvolsky, who is most anxious that you should not allow your action to be influenced by it. His Excellency observed that at the present moment, just prior to the Emperor's meeting with the Emperor William, any divergence in the views or action of the two Governments would be disastrous.

[20919]

No. 593.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 5.)

(No. 290.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, June 5, 1909.

ANGLO-PERSIAN Convention with regard to telegraph lines in Arabistan. Your telegram No. 717 of the 3rd June.

No objection is offered by the Russian Government to the immediate signature of the convention as now drafted; but, in view of the wording given in Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 423 of the 30th May, they suggest, as a solution, the addition to the proposed secret agreement between Russia and Great Britain of a clause to the effect that, in the event of Russia wishing at some future time to have Russian signallers on the Arabistan lines, these signallers should figure as employees of the Indo-European Telegraph Department and be attached thereto.

The Russian Government explain that they are moved solely by a desire to ensure that, in the event of Russian trade developing in those regions, there should be proper facilities for the transmission of messages in the Russian language.

They trust that, once the Arabistan convention is signed, steps may be taken to effect the exchange of the Meshed-Seistan and Khuf-Nasratabad lines with as little delay as possible.

[21054]

No. 594.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 5.)

(No. 291.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, June 5, 1909.

NASR-UL-MULK. Your telegram No. 711 of the 2nd June.

No objection is offered by the Russian Government to the proposal that the text of the programme of reforms should be communicated confidentially to Nasir-ul-Mulk.

[20916]

No. 595.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 284.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 5, 1909.

NASR-UL-MULK'S return.

You should concert with your Russian colleague and take necessary steps to clear this matter up (see telegram No. 77 of yesterday from Sir F. Bertie). Please also furnish me with your views on the subject.

[21055]

No. 594*.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 5.)

(No. 292.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, June 5, 1909.

TAIRREEZ: Sattar Khan.

I have addressed to M. Isvolsky a private letter in the sense of the observations contained in your telegram No. 720 of the 1th June. I gave it as my personal opinion that the wisest course would be to leave the Ottoman authorities and the Persian Government to settle the matter between themselves and to say that it in no way concerned the Russian authorities. I said that it seemed to me that, in view of the fact that a general amnesty for political offenders had been granted, there was no ground for Sattar Khan and his companions to fear any action on the part of the Persian Government against them.

[20919]

No. 596.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 5, 1909.

WITH reference to my letter of yesterday relative to the exchange of telegraph lines in Persia, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg,* conveying the consent of the Russian Government to the immediate signature of the Anglo-Persian Convention respecting the Arabistan line without alteration, and also a suggestion that a clause should be added to the proposed secret Anglo-Russian Agreement providing that any Russian signallers employed on these lines should be considered as servants of the Indo-European Telegraph Department.

I am to enquire whether Viscount Morley concurs in the proposal for the immediate signature of the Anglo-Persian Agreement, and whether he sees any objection to the addition to the secret Anglo-Russian Agreement of the clause desired by the Russian Government.

Sir E. Grey would be glad to receive an expression of Lord Morley's views on these two points with as little delay as may be convenient.

I am, &c.

F. A. CAMPBELL.

[21072]

No. 597.

Consul-General Cox to Sir G. Barclay.—(Received June 6.)

(No. 557.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Bushire, June 6, 1909.

SITUATION at Bushire.

There has been some fighting this morning between the retainers of the governor and a party of Tangistanis. The governor is dealing with the situation in an effective manner. His Majesty's ships "Sphinx" and "Lapwing" are here. The Tangistanis succeeded in penetrating into Bushire Island this morning before dawn. There are believed to be some 200 of them.

[21056]

No. 598.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 6.)

(No. 293.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

St. Petersburg, June 6, 1909.

MY telegram No. 292 [of the 5th June].

Minister for Foreign Affairs read to me instructions to Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran as to Sattar Khan. He was in substance to let Turkish Chargé d'Affaires know that ease was one to be settled between Turkish and Persian authorities; that as there was a general amnesty it was to be presumed that Sattar Khan had nothing to fear from the Persian Government; that the Russian Authorities had nothing against him, in fact they had been ready to protect him; that, if he and his companions wished to leave Persian territory voluntarily, Russian authorities would give them facilities if they crossed the Russian frontier. These instructions seem satisfactory, and they were communicated to the Turkish Ambassador here.

(Sent to Tehran.)

[20918]

No. 599.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 726.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 6, 1909.

RUSSIAN action at Tabreez.

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 288 and 289 of the 5th June, His Majesty's Government would deeply deplore the occurrence of any incident likely to create the

smallest difference of opinion between themselves and the Russian Government, and you may assure the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that it is our earnest desire that our cordial co-operation in Persia, the results of which have been so successful, may be continued. We trust, therefore, that recent incidents which have taken place at Tabreez may be satisfactorily cleared up, and that the Russian military authorities may receive stringent instructions not to allow their actions to overstep the limits upon which the two Governments have already agreed.

[21106]

No. 600.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 90.)
Sir,

Tehran, April 30, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to transmit a table showing approximately the receipts of the principal custom-houses in Persia during the year 1908-9 as compared with the previous year. The figures in this table, for which I am indebted to M. Mornard, show a falling off in the year just ended of between 500,000 and 600,000 tomanas.

It will be observed that the custom-houses which count for their receipts mainly in British trade, namely, Bander Abbas, Kermanshah, and those of Arabistan, have suffered a loss of 574,000 tomanas as compared with a shrinkage of only 183,000 in the custom-houses handling mainly Russian trade, namely, those of Azerbaijan and the Caspian ports.

An examination of the figures shows that whereas, in what may be called the Russian commercial zone, there is a diminution of 8·4 per cent. of the previous year's total, the receipts in the British and Indian commercial zone show a decrease of 23·3 per cent., and I have thought it worth while to bring these facts to your notice, as they go far to disprove the idea commonly prevailing that Russian trade has suffered more than British owing to the unsettled state of Persia.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 600.

Table showing approximate total receipts of Customs for 1908-9 as compared with the previous year.

	1908-9.	1907-8.
	Tomanas.	Tomanas.
Azerbaijan	350,000	533,433
Caspian Sea ports—		
Astara	162,000	161,264
Ghila	590,000	590,000
Mazanderan	172,000	141,255
Astabad	112,000	144,110
Khorassan	500,000	269,380
Southern ports—		
Bushire	500,000	945,000
Bander Abbas	162,000	189,000
Arabistan	100,000	189,000
Kermanshah	552,000	554,030
Persia's post (Tehran)	20,000	17,795
Total	3,024,000	3,315,597

[21108]

No. 601.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 93.)
Sir,

Tehran, May 11, 1909.

CONTINUING my narrative of the events following the presentation of the two Powers' advice to the Shah on the 22nd ultimo (see my despatches Nos. 87 and 91 of the 22nd April and 5th May respectively), I have the honour to report that the rescript issued on the Shah's birthday (5th May) promising a limited constitution, though well received at Tabreez, fell flat at Isfahan and other places, whence it elicited the declara-

[21104]

No. 599 A.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 88.)
Sir,

Tehran, April 24, 1909.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 316 of to-day's date, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Mohammerah, reporting on Sir William Willecocks's recent visit to Ahwaz, and his views as to the possibilities of utilising the waters of the Karun, Kerkha, and Jerrahi Rivers for irrigation purposes.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 599 A.

Consul McDowall to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 13.)
Sir,

Mohammerah, March 27, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to report that, at the suggestion of Major Cox, I accompanied Sir William Willecocks to Ahwaz in the launch of this consulate, and supplied him with all the information at my disposal regarding levels and other matters connected with irrigation from the rivers in this province. He obtained further information at Nasseri from Captain Lorimer, Lieutenant Wilson, and others, and visited the old dam at Ahwaz, and the bed of one of its canals, which had been ruined by want of regulating the water. Sir William is of opinion that both the Karun and Kerkha are unusually easy streams to irrigate from, and such irrigation would be highly remunerative.

By restoring the dam at Nahr Hashem, on the Kerkha, which was turned by that river some eighty years ago, the whole country from Hawzich to the Shat-el-Arab, between the Turkish borders and the Karun could be irrigated, that is, about 750,000 acres. This would be an unusually cheap project to carry out. The works to be permanent must be made on scientific lines; but the creeks, many of which already exist and only require clearing out, could be dug by the tribesmen, who would receive certain water rights in return. Probably 250,000, would be sufficient for the works, and, when once carried out, one European with a few Indians would be sufficient to supervise. If this were carried out, it would give good profits to a railway down the right bank of the Karun, and when this was once built, the objection to interfering with the navigation of the Karun would, from a commercial point of view, disappear.

As to the Karun, as an irrigation expert, Sir W. Willecocks does not take into consideration the question of navigation, which he considers should be sacrificed.

By a regulating weir at Ahwaz, 1,000,000 acres could be irrigated on the east side of the Karun, and, if necessary, the Jerrahi River could also be supplemented, giving another 500,000 acres; and should the Kerkha be found insufficient, a canal to the west of the Karun could supplement it. This project, though probably costing double that for the Kerkha, would also be an unusually cheap one.

The objection to carrying out works on the Karun at present is that the silt from the Karun is the great fertiliser of all the gardens on the Shat-el-Arab, this silt being carried up the Shat-el-Arab by the tide, as well as down it by the river current. To carry out irrigation works on the Karun would therefore do enormous damage to the date groves on the Shat-el-Arab, both Persian and Turkish. After eight years the Turks should have carried out irrigation works on the Euphrates and Tigris, which will release the silt now deposited in marshes and make the dates on the Shat-el-Arab independent of the Karun.

Sir William considers the soil on the banks of the Karun very good on the upper half, and could be made so on the lower half by washing and reclaiming. He is of

[1619]

3 X

opinion that rice and dates should be the principal crop, and then the winter cereals and beans. All Arabs in Mesopotamia tell him rice is the crop which they prefer.

Nahr Hashim itself is claimed by the Nizami-es-Saltaneh, but the Arabs of the country affected by the Kerkha project are under the sheikh of Mohammerrah, and include the Beni Truf. The Kerkha now goes into a marsh, depositing all its silt there.

Sir William's opinions appear to confirm the view which I have always held, that the Kerkha should be the first stream utilised.

A copy of this despatch is sent to Bushire.

I have, &c.
W. McDOUALL.

[21105]

No. 599 n.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 89.)
Sir,

Tehran, April 23, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Ahwaz, respecting the alleged intention of the oil syndicate to make over to the Bakhtiari khans, in pursuance of their agreement with them, 3 per cent. of the ordinary shares of one only of the several companies which are to be formed for the exploitation of the oil-fields in Arabistan. That this is in very fact the intention of the syndicate appears to me evident from a perusal of the prospectus issued by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company; a copy of which is in my possession.

Captain Lorimer justly remarks that "the khans are not qualified effectively to watch over their own interests in technical matters of business, of which they have no understanding."

Should the promoters of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company seek to take advantage of this ignorance by an arrangement which, even if in accordance with the letter, cynically disregards the spirit of their written agreement with the khans, they will only have themselves to thank if the latter, when they eventually discover the evasion practised upon them, do all they can to obstruct the conduct of mining operations.

It will be within the recollection of Mr. D'Arcy at least, that during the period when experimental boring operations were being conducted, and at moments when the prospects of the ultimate success of the enterprise were anything but cheerful, this legation has more than once strenuously advocated resistance to demands, almost amounting to blackmail, made upon the syndicate by the chiefs. The chiefs then had the whip-hand; now it has passed to the syndicate, and I trust it is not too late to appeal to their sense of fairness to afford in this matter to the khans generous treatment, which is so obviously in the interests of all concerned.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 599 n.

Consul Lorimer to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 11. Confidential.)
Sir,

Ahwaz, March 12, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith for your information a copy of a letter which I recently received from Lieutenant Wilson, commanding the Indian oil guard, in which he informs me of the probable intention of the syndicate, in exploiting the oil found in the Bakhtiari country, to form two or more companies, and to make over to the Bakhtiari khans the 3 per cent. of ordinary shares, payable under the agreement with them, only in respect to one company, which will be charged with the operations actually conducted in Bakhtiari territory.

2. I have since myself taken an opportunity of sounding Mr. Reynolds on the subject. He confirmed his statements made to Lieutenant Wilson, but when I pointed out that, leaving out of the question a refinery, which might or might not be established on Persian soil, there still remained the pipe line which seemed an integral part of any scheme for working the oil in the Bakhtiari country, and a portion of which would actually lie inside Bakhtiari territory, he replied that the company working in that territory would include so much of the pipe line as might lie within Bakhtiari limits.

3. The article in the agreement bearing on this question is decidedly vague. It merely states that:—

"After the formation of one or more companies to work oil in the Bakhtiari country, and after the oil is passed through the pipes, the first party (i.e., the syndicate) undertakes to give to the second party 3 per cent. of all the ordinary shares issued, which shares must be fully paid up."

Whether this may or may not warrant excluding the khans from participation in all companies making a profit from the oil before it is put on the open market, or at least before it is exported from Persia, is perhaps open to question, but if the decision is in favour of the syndicate, it would seem to me necessary to be prepared to take steps to secure a fair consideration of the rights of the Bakhtiaris. The khans are not qualified to effectively watch over their own interests in technical matters of business of which they have no understanding.

If the first company is merely going to sell the oil it produces to a second company, and if the ownership of the two companies, as seems probable, is practically one and the same, it will be very simple to secure that all the profits should go to the credit of the second company.

In this case the first company would only be nominally a business concern, and its shares, including the 3 per cent. of them given to the khans, would bear little or no interest, and have a very low market value.

4. Up to the present, as far as I know, nothing has been definitely settled, but it would be well that the question should have received consideration before it does come up in a definite form.

I have, &c.
D. L. R. LORIMER,
Captain, I.A.

Inclosure 2 in No. 599 n.

Lieutenant Wilson to Consul Lorimer.

My dear Lorimer,

Maidan Minaftun, February 10, 1909.

I WENT to Haft Shahidnu with Reynolds yesterday, he was hoping to find an oil show there of which he had heard, but we could not find it. In the course of conversation he told me that he considered it highly probable, if not certain, that when the new company or companies are floated to work the Bakhtiari oil, one company will be floated to obtain oil in the Bakhtiari country, and another to construct the pipe line, refineries, and to refine the oil, &c. The first named will simply sell oil to the second. He spoke of this arrangement as designed to prevent the Bakhtiaris having in reality 3 per cent. of the ordinary shares issued for the whole concern, as such a figure was absurdly large. The khans would get 3 per cent. of the ordinary shares of the first-named company, but nothing in the second-named company.

When I expressed some doubt as to the legality of such an arrangement, in view of the agreement with the Bakhtiari, he said that he himself was fully convinced that they were within their legal and moral rights in making such an arrangement.

MacCrorie tells me that the companies will probably be floated in May or thereabouts.

In view of paragraph 11 (as numbered by you) of the agreement between D'Arcy and the khans, I should say that, at first sight, the khans would seem to be entitled to 3 per cent. of all the ordinary shares issued by all the various companies floated in connection with Bakhtiari oil, in the same way that the Persian Government get 10 per cent. of the net profits of all companies formed to work oil in Persia.

Of course this view may be erroneous, but, I mention the matter to you in order that, should you desire to do so, you may hear Reynolds on the subject yourself.

Yours, &c.
A. T. WILSON.

tion that the Nationalists would be satisfied with nothing less than the old constitution. At Kazvin, in particular, which had just been taken by a party of revolutionaries from Resht, the rescript failed of its effect, and from accounts which reached this Legation from people who had recently passed through, it seemed probable that as soon as reinforcements, which were constantly arriving, strengthened them sufficiently they would march on Tehran. Outposts had indeed already been thrown out as far as Kevendeh, one stage out of the Tehran road. Rumour in the capital exaggerated the strength of this force, and Bagh-i-Shah was seriously alarmed. It was doubtless due in great part to this, and to fears as to what the Bakhtiari were about to do from Ispahan, that my Russian colleague and I have found the Shah amenable to reason. People who ought to have known better talked wildly of hundreds of Caucasians who were already almost within striking distance of Tehran. These were obviously cock-and-bull stories, but at the same time I knew the attitude of these men from Resht to be very unpromising, and it seemed to me quite possible that, even if the Shah adopted our advice in every particular, they would continue to threaten Tehran, and as I had reason to believe that my Russian colleague had already used menacing language to their leader, Sepahdar, I ventured to telegraph suggesting that the two Governments should consider what attitude their two representatives should observe should the Nationalists prove dissatisfied, even though the Shah should adopt our advice in its entirety.

I may remark parenthetically that I fear from the answer I have just received that this telegram, in the form in which it reached your department, cannot have conveyed my meaning with sufficient clearness. It was not intended to elicit instructions for myself so much as to suggest a possible danger of divergence of action between the two Legations, which I thought might be averted by an exchange of views between the two Governments. There were indications which made it seem at least doubtful whether even the complete adoption of our programme by the Shah would at this late date satisfy the Nationalists, and I feared lest in that eventuality, unless the two Governments had come to an understanding as to the proper attitude for their representatives, my Russian colleague might use language to Sepahdar and other Nationalists in which I could not join him—a contingency not calculated to make for reconciliation between the Shah and his people.

To resume my narrative, the meeting of the two representatives with delegates from the Shah, at which explanations or points of detail in our programme of reforms were to be given, took place at this legation on the 7th instant. The composition of the Shah's delegation: the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mushir-ed-Dowleh, Motamin-ul-Mulk, Musteshar-ed-Dowleh, Ala-ul-Mulk, and Heshmet-ed-Dowleh, was such as to afford hope that the meeting would have useful results. We opened proceedings by reading to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Moshar-es-Sultaneh, a statement to the effect that unless Saad-ed-Dowleh were immediately reinstated as Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Naser-ul-Mulk appointed Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, the two Powers would consider that the Shah had definitely rejected their advice.

We then went through the programme point by point. I need not weary you with the explanations we gave in response to all the enquiries addressed to us. The two points which gave most trouble were the advice concerning the grant of a general amnesty and the promise as regards financial assistance. On the first point we found some difficulty in convincing the delegates that the exclusion of certain classes of persons from the amnesty, those who had committed offences against the common law and acts of brigandage, was not specially directed against offenders on the Royalist side. In the end we succeeded in making them understand that the passage regarding these persons was only inserted in order not to bind the Shah to grant immunity to persons who had used the constitutional movement in order to commit crimes. As regards the question of financial assistance, the delegates seemed suspicious as to the intentions of the two Governments on account of the phrase, twice repeated, "if it thinks necessary." We were able to reassure them in part by telling them that we had both advised our Governments of Persia's urgent need of money. They complained that no money was at once forthcoming, adding that they could not possibly hope for the 100,000*l.* from His Majesty's Government for many months, for, however expeditiously the programme was executed, the difficulties of travelling were so great in Persia that it must be long before the Assembly could meet. From the wording of the promise regarding the Russian advance, they feared that the Shah would be precluded from using it for payment of arrears to the troops; my Russian colleague replied that he had pointed out to his Government the necessity for the payment of the troops, and added that he had reason to believe that the money was intended for the purpose. The delegates complained also of the mention of guarantees in connection with the larger loan of which

hopes were held out in the programme, and they asked us to substitute for "guarantee" the word "conditions"; they said the Assembly would be indignant at being committed to guarantees. We pointed out that it was usual for guarantees to be given in such cases, but that the wording really committed them to nothing. It would be open to the Assembly to accept or refuse any loan that the two Governments might see their way to facilitating, when it knew what guarantees were required.

Before the termination of the meeting my Russian colleagues and I gave the delegates two lists of persons who, in our opinion, would inspire confidence as members of the Cabinet and the committee for the elaboration of the electoral law. In doing so we made it quite clear that, except as regards Naser-ul-Mulk and Saad-ed-Dowleh, the persons named were merely suggested privately as suitable. Every effort was made by the delegates to induce us to withdraw Saad-ed-Dowleh's name. This was done by giving each one of the delegates strict injunctions on this point, and it was some time before we could make them see that they would gain nothing by persisting. After the conclusion of the meeting we asked the delegates if they felt authorised to convey to the Shah a message which did not, strictly speaking, come from His Majesty, but, on their consent, we begged them to urge upon His Majesty the pressing need, in view of His Majesty's precarious position, for the immediate publication of a proclamation announcing in unequivocal terms that His Majesty had already carried out such part of the measures we had recommended as admitted of immediate execution, and was taking the necessary steps for the prompt execution of the remainder.

Next day (the 8th May) the Shah made a last attempt to avoid reconstituting Saad-ed-Dowleh, and for this purpose he employed a stratagem thoroughly characteristic of his methods. Envoies were sent to both legations, who told my Russian colleague that I no longer insisted on Saad-ed-Dowleh, and informed me that the question was merely a personal one taken up by the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at the instance of his dragoman. The Shah further offered to sign the new telegraph convention if I consented to give way as to Saad-ed-Dowleh. It is perhaps needless to say that this very puerile attempt failed. In the afternoon I had an opportunity of telling the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs that M. Sabine and I were about to present a joint note fixing an hour by which certain parts of our programme had to be executed, and in which we should report the Shah's definite rejection of the advice of the two Powers. Possibly this message, which was no doubt conveyed to the Shah, hastened his decision. For next morning, the 9th instant, Saad-ed-Dowleh was sent for to the palace, when the Shah requested him to form a Cabinet and gave him complete liberty of action to deal with the situation. In the afternoon I called on his Excellency by constitutional government which he was about to submit to the Shah. This decree, which was to be accompanied by another granting a general amnesty, went even further than our advice, as it restored the old constitution, whereas the two representatives have throughout carefully refrained from recommending this precise form of constitutional régime. The two decrees were signed the same evening by the Shah and published yesterday, and translations of both are enclosed herewith, together with a translation of Saad-ed-Dowleh's note transmitting them to me.

The Cabinet formed, in accordance with our advice, is as follows:—

Minister of Finance and President of the Council of Ministers	...	Naser-ul-Mulk.
(Amir Nizam is carrying on the duties of Finance Minister pending Naser-ul-Mulk's arrival.)		

Minister for Foreign Affairs	...	Saad-ed-Dowleh.
Minister of the Interior	...	Farman Farma.
Minister of War	...	Mustafai-ul-Mumalek.
Minister of Justice	...	Mushir-ed-Dowleh.
Minister of Education	...	Motamin-ul-Mulk.
Minister of Public Works, &c.	...	Mohandis-ul-Manalek.
Minister of Telegraphs and Posts	...	Mukhiber-ed-Dowleh.

Saad-ed-Dowleh is acting as President of the Council of Ministers pending the arrival of Naser-ul-Mulk.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 601.

Saad-ed-Dowleh to Sir G. Barclay.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

Tehran, May 10, 1909.

WHEREAS by the rescript of my august master, His Imperial Majesty the Shah, the constitution of Persia has been re-established and the Parliament will be opened, in expressing the honour and pleasure with which this royal gift has been received by the nation and the Government, I have the honour to send your Excellency a copy of the rescript above mentioned, together with a copy of the rescript granting a general amnesty, and I thus invite your Excellency to take part in the national rejoicing.

I trust your Excellency will inform your Government of this by telegraph as soon as possible.

I avail, &c.

SAAD-ED-DOWLEH.

Inclosure 2 in No. 601.

Imperial Rescript, dated May 9, 1909.

(Translation.)

FROM the day that, by the will of Providence, we became the heir apparent of Persia, we always thought that the evils existing in this 6,000-year-old country, which is our beloved home, could not be removed without the co-operation of the nation, with the Government, and we constantly in this thought until the Persian nation helped us in this intention, and appealed to our late lamented father for a constitution.

Our telegrams and letters addressed to our august father, which still exist, are proofs of our sympathy with the nation.

After the grant of the constitution, when we came to Tehran, we took a great deal of trouble in getting it signed by our father.

When we came to the throne we exerted every effort for the maintenance of the constitution and the glory of the National Assembly, but the intrigues of the intrigues, as is known to everyone, made such a bad impression on our mind, and so disappointed us, that we thought the unfortunate proceedings of the Assembly were not calculated to remove the various difficulties in which Persia found herself. We therefore resolved, according to the usage of all countries, to dissolve the Assembly, but when on the 19th of Shavval (i.e., three months later) we wanted to reopen Parliament, the circumstances were such that every wise man thought that it would lead to no other result but bloodshed. For some time we were engaged in removing these obstacles, and now that the time is suitable and the difficulties have been removed, we are glad to ordain, by this rescript, the reopening of Parliament in accordance to that very same constitution without the slightest change. We also ordain that a certain number of enlightened Nationalists, who enjoy the confidence of the Government and nation, should be added to the Council of State for the purpose of elaborating an electoral law as soon as possible, and that when ready, elections should begin, and that as soon as two thirds of the deputies are ready, the National Assembly should be opened in the Balaistan (i.e., the same place as before).

MOHAMMED ALI SHAH KAJAR.

Palace of Bagh-i-Shah, May 9, 1909.

Inclosure 3 in No. 601.

Imperial Rescript, issued May 9, 1909.

(Translation.)

NOW that we have decided that Parliament should be opened, we declare to all governors of provinces that all persons charged with political offence, who may be found in any part of Persia, are amnestied without exception, and no one may be allowed to interfere with them. We also ordain that all persons who have been exiled are free to return or to go to any place they please. We further command that this rescript should be notified to Persians and foreigners alike.

(In the Shah's handwriting): It is correct.

Tehran, May 9, 1909.

[21110]

No. 602.

(No. 95.)
Sir,*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 7.)**Tehran, May 13, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to report that I learn from His Majesty's consul at Ahwaz that a difficulty has arisen between him and the syndicate's manager, which originated in the failure of Mr. Bradshaw, the acting manager, to keep in sufficiently close touch with Captain Lorimer regarding the syndicate's affairs.

The syndicate's instalments due to the Bukhtiarī Khans are paid to the Isfahan branch of the Imperial Bank of Persia, and the present misunderstanding has arisen from a sum having, by Captain Lorimer's instructions, been deducted from the November instalment to cover certain compensation claims of the syndicate. Mr. Reynolds complains of this action, although he admits that it was taken in the best interests of the syndicate, and has instructed the bank that no consul has any control over the funds deposited in the bank by the syndicate's manager; and that unless especially asked to do so by the manager, as was the case on one occasion, the bank must not carry out any instructions from the consul in regard to them. I need not trouble you with the correspondence which has passed between Captain Lorimer and Mr. Reynolds on the subject. It will be sufficient to say that Captain Lorimer, while maintaining—quite rightly as I think—that his action was justified on the occasion which gave rise to the dispute with Mr. Reynolds, admits that the latter is right in principle, while pointing out with justice, in my opinion, that a rigid adherence to this principle will lead to difficulties in the future, has written to the bank endorsing Mr. Reynolds's view.

Until the occurrence of this misunderstanding things between His Majesty's consul at Ahwaz and the syndicate's manager had worked smoothly, and Captain Lorimer's services in the interests of the syndicate are admitted by Mr. Reynolds, and have been acknowledged by the management in London. From Captain Lorimer's report it would appear that he had hoped that such a question as that which has produced the present misunderstanding would not be formalised. Circumstances have, however, made it desirable to give the manager a ruling in order to prevent similar misunderstandings in the future. This is all the more desirable, inasmuch as Mr. Reynolds is about to proceed to Europe, leaving the management in less experienced hands.

In these circumstances, I would suggest that the Anglo-Persian Oil Company should be approached, and that it should be intimated to them that it would facilitate matters if instructions on the following lines were sent to their Arabistan manager:—

1. That before issuing orders to the Imperial Bank of Persia for the payment of any quarterly instalment the company's manager should confer with His Majesty's consular representative, and should endeavour to meet the latter's wishes, should he raise any objection, or have any suggestion to offer on political grounds, of which he is the competent judge, as regards the manner in which it is proposed to deal with the instalment.

2. That the company's manager, before presenting compensation claims to the Khans, should assure himself that they are such as the consul can properly support, in the event of their being disputed.

3. That the company's manager (and the European staff) might be reminded in general terms that political relations with the Khans require very delicate handling, that the successful conduct of the company's operations largely depends upon these relations, and that frank and cordial co-operation between the representatives of His Majesty's Government and the company is accordingly the best safeguard for their mutual interests.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

[21111]

No. 603.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 7.)(No. 96.)
Sir,*Tehran, May 13, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah respecting the grievances of the Sheikh of Mohammerah against the Customs administration.

I have drawn Mr. Mornard's attention to the matter, and recommended the administration to adopt a more conciliatory attitude towards the Sheikh. Mr. Mornard promised to give the necessary instructions to the local officials, but he said that the difficulties between the Sheikh and the Customs were in large measure due to the former's smuggling propensities.

I have asked Mr. McDouall to bring to my notice the next specific case which comes to his knowledge where the Sheikh has ground for complaint against the Customs.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure is No. 603.

Consul McDouall to Consul-General Cox.(No. 8. Confidential.)
Sir,*Mohammerah, January 9, 1909.*

WITH reference to our conversation with the Sardar Arfa, I have the honour to inform you that his grievance against the Customs is as follows:—

At the time that we persuaded him to accept the customs the whole country between this and Lingah was waiting to see what the Sheikh would do, and many were prepared to rise against the customs if he had refused to accept them. He states that the firm under which the customs was established at Mohammerah declares that the directorship ("riasad") is vested in him; but as he has not the necessary men the Persian Government will appoint a director (M. Waffelart) and assistant (M. Mirzayantz), and that the rest of the staff will be appointed by him (Sheikh Khazal) in consultation with them. The first directors carried out these stipulations; they recommended men to him and he sanctioned their engagement, but they gradually referred less and less to him; the last director appointed one or two men without consulting him, and the present one has made sweeping changes in the staff without any reference to him at all.

I have, &c.

W. McDOUALL.

[21112]

No. 604.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 7.)(No. 97.)
Sir,*Tehran, May 13, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch, No. 86 of the 22nd ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a portion of the weekly diary of His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire giving an account of the circumstances which led to the landing of a force of bluejackets at that place from His Majesty's ship "Fox."

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure is No. 604.

Abstract of Bushire Diary for week ending April 11, 1909.

WITH reference to the concluding paragraph of last week's diary, the apparently satisfactory arrangement arrived at on the 4th did not last many hours.

Mirza Ahmed Khan, nominally appointed Nationalist governor, was not allowed by Seyid Morteza to assume functions as such, and the Seyid, notwithstanding his resignation of the day before and repudiation of responsibility for the maintenance of order, repented of his action and was allowed by the committee to resume his dominant position among them on his own terms.

They all met again on the 6th and it was decided that the Seyid should receive a salary of 360 toman per mensem, and the tofangechi, who were first to be paraded and mustered (the Seyid claiming pay for 2,000 or more, paid according to their *bond fide* numbers at 9 kran per day).

The committee also agreed not to ask the Seyid for any account of the 18,000 toman already assimilated by him ostensibly for payment of tofangechi.

On the 7th instant, the Resident and His Majesty's vice-consul had a long discussion with the mercantile portion of the committee, i.e. the three Persians into whose credit the customs receipts were now being paid; and they were pressed, now that they had received the Seyed back as head of the committee, to tie him down to some satisfactory arrangement in regard to the disposal of the customs receipts with due regard to British interests.

Their attitude, however, was *non possumus* and showed that they were in terror of the Seyed. They in fact asked for protection from the British Residency against him. The discussion was eventually broken off owing to the arrival of disturbing news from the bazaar, which sent the merchants off to look after the safety of their own offices.

According to the arrangements imposed by the Seyed, his tofangchis were being paid daily at the custom-house from the day's receipts.

The receipts on the 7th not being sufficient some of the Tangastani tofangchis were told to wait for a day. This they were unwilling to do and first tried to raid the customs; being checked there, they rushed into the town and commenced looting the shops. This news caused a general panic among the townspeople, who closed their shops precipitately and busied themselves with the defence of their houses.

Brisk fireworks commenced and promiscuous rifle firing was carried on throughout the night.

On the morning of the 8th it was found that, apart from the raid of the afternoon, several extensive robberies had been committed during the night, including a quantity of British goods.

The manager of the Imperial Bank reported that as he crossed the plain on his way home the previous evening two or more bullets from the direction of the Government house, where a number of tofangchis were in possession, struck the ground close to his trap, and bullets were from time to time whistling overhead both in town and outside.

Repeated communications were at once sent to the members of the committee, intimating losses suffered by British subjects the night before and protesting at the disorder which had been allowed to occur and warning them of the prejudice to their cause which must result by a continuance of it. A few hours later, no satisfactory reply having been elicited, they were called upon to state what arrangements were being made to keep order for the coming night, and warned that if the excessive number of tofangchis were not withdrawn and securely provided for, the Resident would have to advise His Government that they could no longer depend on the friendly attitude of the Nationalist party in Bushire and must take their own measures for the protection of British subjects and foreigners. The only reply to this was repudiation of responsibility by the Seyed, by the merchants, and by Mirza Ahmed Khan, for the preservation of order.

In the course of the afternoon the Russian, German, and Turkish representatives called on the Resident to urge the necessity of some serious steps being taken to restore order. A little later, the manager of the Imperial Bank reported that the three merchants in whose names the customs money had been lodged for the last few days, had under threats from the Seyed, withdrawn the whole balance (about 2,500 tomanis) and handed it over to the Seyed. Having done so, they intimated that they had no further connection either with the customs money or the so-called "Nationalist" committee.

In his last communication, in intimating that he was not responsible for order, the Seyed had added that he was trying to get rid of the tofangchis, that some had gone and others would follow.

It however appeared on the following morning, the 9th, that those who had left the town had only halted in the suburbs and were later on seen returning to the town. Furthermore, the tofangchis who had taken charge of the custom-house and the chaharbari refused to quit, and as it appeared that Seyed Morteza was only trying to temporise an ultimatum was sent to him, under the authority of His Majesty's Minister, on the afternoon of the 9th, to the effect that unless the tofangchis were at once sent off the island, and other proper measures taken to ensure the safety of British and foreign subjects, His Majesty's ship "Fox" would have to land men for the purpose.

The Seyed replied that all the tofangchis, except a few who were required for guarding the place, had left, and repeated that, as he had informed the Residency before, he was not answerable for the maintenance of order.

It appeared on the 10th that although many of the tofangchis, including most of those who were in occupation of the custom-house and the chaharbari, had left the town, they had not gone over to the mainland, but were marauding the suburbs. As all

the European community live in country houses scattered over the island, the distribution of these men over the island is just as great a menace as their concentration in town.

The seriousness of the position was accentuated by the occurrence of a fracas about 6 A.M. between some Angali tofangchis and a section of Tangastani in Sangi village through which the Europeans pass on their way to business. One Tangastani was killed, one Angali man wounded, and the Tangastani section, about 120 strong, were collecting for retaliation when the Resident visited the locality. The result of his inquiry was that they dispersed for a time into small parties, but are still on the island waiting for an opportunity to retaliate; and meanwhile the Khan of Angali is endeavouring to send more men in to support his dependents.

At 5 P.M. on the 10th, no satisfactory reply having been received from any quarter, 100 men from His Majesty's ship "Fox" and 4 Maxims were landed; 50 were accommodated in the Residency on one side of the town and 50 in the customs premises at the other.

Shortly before they landed a proclamation was issued informing the public that this measure had been forced on the British authorities by the continual disorder and absence of any responsible person able to secure the safety of British and foreign subjects.

The landing of the men, in regard to which the Resident had the full concurrence and thanks of other foreign representatives, was welcomed by the populace and no opposition whatever was offered. On their arrival the Residency guard of sepoy was distributed to such foreign consulates and dwellings of Europeans the situation of which made it advisable for them to have extra protection.

As soon as the last notice was published, on the 10th, an "istehad" was drawn up (it is said by Seyed Morteza's orders) to the effect that the tofangchis had been brought here only for the purpose of restoring the constitution, and not for any personal motives or disturbances; and that they were absolutely necessary for helping the Nationalists. The paper was taken to the local mollas to be signed by them. Seyed Mohammed Ali (late Sadr's son-in-law) told the Sheikh-ul-Hokuma (a Persian medical practitioner), who was the bearer of the paper, that he did not see his way to sign it, and that it should first be signed by the other mollas. No one has signed the paper, and the Seyed has told the bearer of it to obtain the mollas' signatures first and then to try to get the paper signed by the merchants.

[21114]

No. 605.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 99.)

Sir,

Tehran, May 14, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 88 of the 24th April, and to my telegram No. 323 of the 25th April, I have the honour to forward herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire, on the subject of Sir W. Willcocks' views regarding the Karun irrigation scheme.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 605.

Consul-General Cox to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 32/830. Confidential.)

Sir,

Bushire, April 4, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to forward a copy of my letter No. 829, dated the 4th April, 1909, with inclosure, which I have addressed to the Government of India in forwarding them a copy of Mr. McDonald's despatch dated the 27th March, on the subject of the Karun scheme and Sir William Willcocks' views regarding it.

I have, &c.

P. Z. COX, Major, British Resident in the Persian Gulf, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General for Persia, &c.

Inclosure 2 in No. 605.

Consul-General Cox to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Bushire, April 4, 1909.

WITH reference to Sir George Barclay's telegram of the 12th March, informing you that I was hoping to meet Sir William Willcocks in the Shatt-el-Arab, I have the honour to report that I was able to do so on the 22nd and 23rd ultimo.

2. I had hoped, after hearing Sir William's preliminary views, to have proceeded up the Karun with him, but owing to the nationalist developments here, was unable to do so.

Mr. McDouall, however, was good enough to fill the breach, and I now have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of an informal letter written to me by Sir William on his return, giving me his views, and a copy of the report submitted to His Majesty's Minister by Mr. McDouall as the result of his trip.

The salient consideration to which I beg to invite attention without delay is that Sir William Willcocks, who is, I suppose, the first authority in the world on such a question, considers that the best interests of the Sheikh of Mohammerah lie in the postponement of the Ahwaz scheme for some years, and in making a start with a scheme from the Kerkha.

Without further study, I cannot offer any useful observations with regard to the latter project, and think it advisable not to delay laying the present papers before Government.

A copy of this letter and the first inclosure is being forwarded to His Majesty's Minister.

I have, &c.

P. Z. COX, Major,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Inclosure 3 in No. 605.

*Sir W. Willcocks to Consul-General Cox.**Mohammerah, March 26, 1909.*

THE Karun is eminently suited for irrigation by means of a regulating weir at Ahwaz, which could—

1. On the left bank, irrigate directly some 1,000,000 acres, and send out a feed canal to supply any deficiencies in the Jerrahi, and so insure the irrigation of another 500,000 acres. The land is very good on the upper half, and capable of being easily washed and reclaimed in the other half. As the floods, both in time and in quantity, are very suitable, rice and dates would be the principal crops, and after them the winter cereals and leans. Rice is the best paying crop everywhere here.

2. On the right bank send out a feeder to supply all deficiencies of the Kerkha, if there are deficiencies.

By restoring the turned dam on the Kerkha (an easy work indeed, as the Kerkha is one-third the Karun) it would be possible to restore the ancient irrigation and fertility of the country round Hawiseh and to the east of Khush Hawiseh, Khush Bann, and Hadudieh. Here we have 750,000 acres capable of irrigation.

I consider both the above projects very easy and very remunerative, especially the Kerkha project, which might be undertaken immediately, and on which 250,000*l.* might be advanced.

Now I hate suggesting anything which would delay the development of a country so capable of development, and which is far behind the worst parts under Turkish rule (the desolation one sees is appalling, there is nothing like it under the Turk). I must, however, say that the 8,000,000 date trees on the Shatt-el-Arab depend almost entirely on their well-being on the Karun, and as a very large proportion of these trees is the property of the Sheikh of Mohammerah and Koweit, it would be unwise and unfair to touch the Karun until the Turks have had time to make the Shatt-el-Arab plantations dependent on the Tigris and Euphrates. Now, it must be recognised that all the disorganisation of the lower reaches of the Tigris and Euphrates is caused by the Karun

cutting across their entrance into the gulf and damming it up with its muddy waters. In a matter of eight years the Turks should have been able to make the irrigation of the Shatt-el-Arab plantations dependent on the Tigris and Euphrates, and then Macluff might lay on.

In my wildest dreams I never thought that the Karun and Kerkha were such fine streams and commanded such splendid lands. As far as the British enterprising public are concerned, the knowledge gained by our consuls in South-western Persia might just as well have been recorded in reports, put into leaden boxes, and then thrown into the deepest part of the Persian Gulf. Why should not our Minister get options for the Ahwaz, Bandikir, Kerkha, Susa, Dizfil, and Shushter weirs and canals, and see what can be done with them? The discovery of oil near Shushter will revolutionize the country and make all works easy. By the time the oil is ready we should be ready, or others will step in and reap the benefit of all our studies.

The Sheikh of Mohammerah might be asked to grant a strong escort and make a reconnaissance of the Kerkha dam. In Dervish days on the Nile I made a reconnaissance of the Nile under Dervish rule at the second catinet with an escort of 250 cavalry.

[21115]

No. 606.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 100.)

Sir,

Tehran, May 20, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the usual monthly summary of events in Persia during the last four weeks.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 606.

No. 5.—*Monthly Summary.**Tehran,*

FROM the 24th to the 27th April councils were held at Bagh-i-Shah to discuss the Anglo-Russian joint representations of the 22nd April. Saad-ed-Dowleh, who on these occasions firmly advocated a complete acceptance of the programme, met with great opposition, and incurred the Shah's displeasure, which resulted on the 29th in his summary dismissal. The Shah at the same time dismissed the whole Cabinet, including Mushir-es-Sultaneh and Amir Baladur, and appointed his uncle, Naib-es-Sultaneh, Prime Minister and Minister of War.

On the 30th April the British and Russian legations protested against this appointment, and their two dragonnades had an audience of the Shah at which they insisted on the reinstatement of Saad-ed-Dowleh.

On the 1st May the Shah sent his private secretary (Heshmet-ed-Dowleh) to inform His Majesty's Minister that he accepted the Anglo-Russian programme in principle; and the form in which the official acceptance was to be drawn up having been agreed to, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs wrote on the 4th May:—

“Je suis autorisé par Sa Majesté Impériale le Schah à faire savoir aux honorables représentants des deux Puissances amies qu'elle accepte les conseils amicaux qui lui ont été transmis au cours de l'audience du 22 avril”

The Shah having given orders that a *rescript* announcing the reintroduction of the constitutional régime should be published the following day (the 5th May), his birthday, an attempt was made by the reactionary court party to organise the usual counter-demonstration. The British and Russian legations therefore sent in a strong joint note declaring that the Shah would be held personally responsible if any disturbance of the peace occurred, and the plan was consequently abandoned.

On the 5th May the Corps Diplomatique was received in audience by the Shah, who was looking very well, and wore his precious emeralds, which showed up very well on a white coat. He also wore a remarkably fine diamond aigrette in his hat. A review of the troops in camp was afterwards held, to witness which a few of the

diplomats remained. The Silakhori irregulars, who had been collected by Amir Bahadur, and have done so much damage of late, were conspicuous, but their commander did not appear. The news of the capture of Kazvin by the Caucasian revolutionaries from Resht, which occurred during the previous night, was received by the Shah a short time before the audience and review. The Shah's rescript, reintroducing the constitutional régime, was printed on that day, but though a few copies were obtainable, it was not generally made public.

On the 6th May the British and Russian legations took official act of the Shah's acceptance of the Anglo-Russian programme. During the course of the day 100 Persian Cossacks, under a Russian officer, were sent to Keraj, a place some 30 miles on the road to Kazvin. The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs called on His Majesty's Minister, on behalf of the Shah, to say that Nâib-es-Sultaneh was no longer Prime Minister.

On the 7th May the Shah's delegates, six in number, called at His Majesty's legation to discuss the details of the Anglo-Russian programme with the two representatives. The following day (the 8th May) the Shah sent emissaries to the two legations to make a last appeal against the reinstatement of Saad-ed-Dowleh, but on the 9th May, finding that resistance was no longer possible, and being thoroughly frightened by the presence of the Caucasians at Kazvin, the following Cabinet was formed:—

Minister for Foreign Affairs and Acting President of Council	Saad-ed-Dowleh.
Minister of Finance (to be President when he arrives from Europe)	Naser-ul-Mulk.
Minister of the Interior	Farman Farma.
Minister of War	Mustafâ-ul-Mamelek.
Minister of Justice	Mushir-ed-Dowleh.
Minister of Education	Motamin-ul-Mulk.
Minister of Telegraphs and Posts	Mukher-ed-Dowleh.
Minister of Public Works, Roads, Mines, &c.	Mohandis-ul-Mamdeh.

On the 10th May a proclamation was printed and widely circulated in the Shah's name announcing the introduction of parliamentary institutions. The old constitution was declared to be re-established and the electoral law was to be elaborated immediately by a committee, and the National Assembly to open as soon as two-thirds of the deputies were in Tehran. At the same time another proclamation was issued granting a general amnesty. The same day the British and Russian legations gave the Shah written assurances, in the form of a joint note to the Foreign Minister, of sympathy and support "so long as His Majesty rules as a constitutional Sovereign," and promising him protection for his person in case of need.

On the 11th and 12th May the Council of State met to discuss the electoral law, and twenty members were chosen to form a committee for the purpose of drawing it up.

On the 13th and 14th May the refugees who had been at the Turkish embassy for over four months began to leave, and by the 15th had practically all left.

On the 14th May a proclamation was issued by the new Cabinet declaring that persons insulting Nationalists or making demonstrations against the constitution would be severely punished, and on the 17th a further proclamation was issued curtailing the Cossack brigade with the work of policing the town. On the same day the Shah moved from Bagh-i-Shah to Sultanabad, a country palace on the way to his country seat.

During the above period the Shah has exchanged several telegrams with His Majesty the Czar, in one of which the Shah asked for protection. Nâib-es-Sultaneh at the same time telegraphed to the Czar asking to be allowed to become a Russian subject.

Order has been maintained throughout in Tehran.

May 20, 1909.

G. P. CHURCHILL,
Oriental Secretary.

Tabreez.

The circumstances which led up to the entry of the Russian troops into Tabreez have been reported in a separate despatch. On the Russian approach the Royalist forces surrounding the city began to disperse, and early on the 30th April the Russian advance

guard, consisting of 180 men, entered without the occurrence of any untoward event, the remainder arriving later in the day. By the 3rd May there were 269 Russian troops in the town, and General Snarsky informed Mr. Wratislav that he had nearly 4,000 men under his orders. The postal service was resumed on the 1st May, and by the 4th May it was reported that Rahim Khau had left the neighbourhood of Tabreez, not without carrying off a good deal of loot. At the same time as the Russian troops began to arrive at Tabreez there arose the question of dispatching a force to Urumia, where the Russian vice-consul was reported to be apprehensive, although it did not appear that any incident had occurred warranting this step. The attitude of the Nationalists was, however, said to be offensive. Mr. Wratislav, who had been without news from Urumia for a month, deprecated the sending of troops except in the case of urgent necessity, as the Nationalist party was very strong along the Turkish frontier, and any untoward incident might lead to grave complications. Fortunately the proposal was negatived by the Russian Government. According to reports since received, all is now quiet in those districts. The Shah's proclamations of the 10th May ordering measures for the restoration of constitutional government were well received by the Nationalists, who, though they at first professed themselves anxious to receive guarantees for the execution of His Majesty's promises, on being informed by His Majesty's consul-general and his Russian colleague that it was now incumbent on them to work for a reconciliation, became reassured, and promised to send delegates to quiet Western Azerbaijan, and subsequently telegraphed to Resht and Isfahan counselling a conciliatory attitude. The pacific occupation of Tabreez by the Russians has unfortunately been marred by an incident which has greatly disturbed the Persian Government, and started a noisy agitation against the presence of the Russians, the pacificatory effect of whose intervention seems for the moment to be quite forgotten. On the night of the 10th May some shots were fired at a Russian sentry in the neighbourhood of the Russian consulate-general, and he was badly wounded in the arm. General Snarsky appears to have at first taken a somewhat exaggerated view of the affair, demanding an indemnity of 10,000 toman and increasing the number of troops in the town, and generally treating the inhabitants of the town in a high-handed manner. The Nationalists appear to have done their best to meet the demands of the Russian military authorities, and raised a sum of 3,000 toman. Mr. Wratislav urged strongly on his Russian colleague that a change of attitude was necessary, and gathered from him that the Russian military authorities often acted contrary to his advice. Moderate counsels appear to have prevailed at St. Petersburg, and on the 16th May Mr. Wratislav reported that his Russian colleague hoped that 3,000 toman would be accepted as an indemnity, and that he could now consider the affair as closed. The agitation in Tehran and elsewhere continues, however, and has already found voices in several forms. It is believed that so far the Russian legation has not been approached in the matter, but it seems to be a very prevalent idea that the Russian intervention was due to our suggestion, and that we must now get the troops out—"drive the troops out," as one gentleman put it—without delay. Whenever occasion has arisen it has been explained that it was not at our suggestion, but with our full approval that the temporary occupation was effected. Ahn-ed-Dowleh left Tabreez for Tehran on the 12th May accompanied by the Persian Cossacks, but the Cossacks have since been instructed to return to Tabreez at the request of the recently appointed vice-governor in order to assist in policing the city. The vice-governor in question is Glal-ul-Mulk, a prominent local Nationalist leader, whose appointment two or three days ago has given general satisfaction.

E. R.

Resht.

1. Mr. Rabino resumed his duties as His Majesty's vice-consul on return from leave on the 4th May.

2. The town has remained quiet during the month, though one unpopular priest is said to have been murdered by the Nationalists.

Kazvin.

On the evening of the 4th May a party of Nationalists from Resht, estimated variously at from 45 to 200 mounted men, entered Kazvin. The explosion of a few bombs and the firing in the air of their rifles by the horsemen was sufficient to make the greater part of the garrison surrender to them. Some fighting, however, took place

at the governor's palace, but by the afternoon of the 5th May the town was in the hands of the Nationalists and order was re-established. The governor appears to have fled before his palace was surrounded. The Shahseven horsemen, under Sordar Muzaffer, who formed part of the Shah's troops, did not stop to fight, but went off on the Zejmur road, where they began to rob travellers. On the way they abandoned their guns, which the Nationalists then seized. Kazim Agla, one of the generals with the Shah's troops, who was formerly in the Cossack brigade, and distinguished himself in the attack on the Assembly on the 23rd June last year, was shot by the Nationalists. Sepahdar arrived from Resht on the 11th May, by which time reinforcements had also come up from Resht. The total Nationalist force at Kasvin appears to be about 1,000 men. Though telegraphic communication with Resht was interrupted for some days, there has been no interference with traffic on the Resht-Tehran road, posts and caravans alike arriving safely and regularly.

Astrabad.

The depredations of the Turcomans, who plundered ten villages in the first half of April, drove numbers of villagers into the town, and about 1,000 persons took refuge in the Russian consulate. The Russian consul told the refugees that he would put an end to the Turcomans' activities in four hours if the people would promise not to mention the word "constitution." The Russian consul sent his munshi to the camp of the Turcomans, who replied that they would stop operations on receiving 2,000. and a telegram from the Persian Government expressing its satisfaction with them. Some days later the Turcomans, who number 6,000 men of various tribes, received a telegram in this sense from the Prime Minister. The telegram was taken to them by the Russian consul, but they did not believe it to be authentic, and refused to move camp. On the 18th April, however, they moved camp, but also plundered a village. On the 18th April the Russian commissioner with 100 Cossacks arrived, and took up his quarters at the Russian consulate. On the 22nd, one officer and ten Cossacks arrived, and on the 23rd two officers and 240 Cossacks. The latter took up their quarter in the Government House. The arrival of Russian Cossacks caused some alarm amongst the people, and, in reply to a telegram sent to the Prime Minister, the latter telegraphed that, in view of the friendship existing between the two Governments, the Russian Government had undertaken to restore order in the province. About 200 Nationalists took refuge in the Russian consulate. The Russian consul asked the local Assembly what they had done with the customs receipts. They denied knowing anything about them. The consul then produced a copy of a telegram sent by the Assembly inviting Panoff to Astrabad. Four Nationalists are said to have been arrested by the Russian gun-boat at Ashurada.

Meshed.

1. The event of the past month has been the arrival of the Russian troops. Four officers, seventy-five Cossacks, and a machine-gun detachment of thirty men with two Maxim guns, arrived on the 26th April, and were received by the Persian general with troops lined up. His Majesty's consul-general reports that the inhabitants were completely cowed by their arrival. Previous to the arrival of the troops the Russian consul-general received a deputation which protested against their coming. He told them plainly he had sent for troops because there was no security in Meshed; also that many of the leading inhabitants has expressed their approval of the troops coming. Major Sykes received many requests for an interview from representatives of the Assembly, and many petitions that the troops should be sent back, but he asked the Karguzar to explain that the matter was not one in which he could take any action. The Nayer-ed-Dowleh, who had been appointed governor-general, remained at Nishapur, being afraid to go on to Meshed. He has been dismissed, and, at the instance of the Russian legation, Rukn-ed-Dowleh has been reappointed, but has not yet left Tehran.

2. A gang of revolutionaries who left Astrabad about the middle of April cut the telegraph line near Miandashat and shot at the Persian telegraph clerk. They again cut the line near Sabzevar, and after seizing three horses left the main road for the side track to Kuchan. The leader is a Bulgarian, named Panoff, and a Frenchman, named Sminof, is also one of the party.

3. Captain Scourrat, the Russian military attaché, returned to Meshed on the 23rd April.

4. Major Reil, Indian army, arrived on the 15th May, and took over the duties of military attaché in Meshed from Captain Smyth.

5. On the 21st April six Russian Cossacks with a Persian clerk from the Russian

bank seized all the furniture of Salar Mukarrem and then and there auctioned it; 1,160 toman were realized, and the bank is now pressing for the balance required to make up 1,500 toman. Salar Mukarrem was commander-in-chief, and this action was absolutely illegal. Prince Dabija has said openly that it is only a question of months now before a Russian sits at Government House.

6. Kuchan, Dara Gez, Bujuard, and Sarakhs started local Assemblies early in April.

Turbat-i-Hayderi.

1. Salar Khan has continued to govern Turbat, and has collected 1,000 toman of the revenue. He has also collected a certain number of arms from various individuals. On the 4th April Yaver Assadullah defeated Salar Monziz, the former governor, at Sabukh; the latter fled.

2. Six Russian Cossacks left for Karez on the 11th April, and three arrived from Kerman on the 21st April on their way to Russia via Karez.

Seistan.

1. M. Bravine on the 31st March told Major Kennion that though Colonel Von der Flins had been refused permission last autumn to go to Kerman he had nevertheless started for that place. M. Bravine had sent in a report on the subject, and thought his attaché would get into trouble. According to M. Bravine the colonel had said he was going for a two months' tour in the Palang Kuk, but it was known that he intended going on to Kerman. On the 1st April M. Bravine said he had received orders to recall the colonel, but he had little hope of stopping him.

2. M. Bravine informed Major Kennion that his successor would be M. Tcherkassoff from Urumia. He and Dr. Otto would arrive about the same time, i.e., in about two months.

3. Captain Hunter, I.M.S., has received the official thanks of the Russian Government for the services he had rendered the Russian consulate during the last year. They were communicated to him officially in writing by M. Bravine.

4. It appears that the Meshed local Assembly had instructed the leading priests in Seistan to see that further payments of revenue are suspended. Mollah Mefti and the deputy governor both replied expressing their readiness to suspend further collections. The Karguzar has also been instructed to work in future through the Karguzar at Meshed, who was described as acting on behalf of the "nation."

Kerman.

Sabih Ekhtiar has been dismissed from the governorship, and Nizan-es-Sultanch appointed in his place. The latter being in Tehran appointed a committee of four to take charge for him, but of these only one, Bashir-i-Khakan, accepted the charge. He has since found it impossible to act as deputy governor as long as the ex-governor remains at Kerman and continues his intrigues. The Kalantar, who alone had kept the town together, resigned on the 20th April.

Bam.

Mirza Danood, the Russian agent, has engaged one Mollah Ibrahim Nainabadi as his assistant for Baluchistan.

Isfahan.

The situation is described in a separate despatch.

Yezd.

1. The state of the roads and surrounding country shows no improvement. Many bands of robbers are still active, one in particular in the Rafsijan district, on the Kerman road, is said to have looted sixteen villages besides several caravans. This band attacked a large camel caravan at Khushkuli, two members of the Indo-European telegraph department's staff being in the caravaners at the time. They were, however, able to proceed in safety to Rafsijan, as the robbers, having taken 400 camels, moved off with their booty.

2. Dr. Pugin was still at Yezd at the end of April. He had evinced much

interest in the mineral products of the neighbourhood. He had been joined by a M. Wahlmann, agent of the Russian firm of Scheibler.

3. On the 14th May a Parsee was publicly murdered by a Mohammedan, who then took refuge in a shrine. The Parsees, having appealed to His Majesty's acting vice-consul, His Majesty's Minister made representations to the Persian Government, and the Foreign Minister has promised to take action in the matter.

Kermanshah.

At the end of April the Sijabi and Guraa tribes were reported to be fighting. The news of Russian troops crossing the border, and of British sailors being landed at Bushire, made a great stir. Captain Haworth and his Russian colleagues combined to explain the real motives for their coming. The news of the granting of the constitution was received on the 4th May, and orders were issued for the illumination of the bazaar for one night. The people, however, insisted on keeping up the illumination for three nights.

Hamadan.

Telegraphing on the 15th May from Hamadan, Captain Haworth reported that the local Nationalists had been instructed by telegram by Sepahdar to make the same demands from the Shah as he was making. In view of this, and of the news that Sepahdar is dispatching some horsemen to Hamadan, many people were hanging out the nationalist flag from their houses.

Shiraz.

1. Early in April the local Assembly took two steps of importance: Nasr-ed-Dowleh was sent towards Noiriz with 200 infantry and one gun to keep the paces and prevent the nomads destroying the crops east of Shiraz; he was also furnished with an order of the Assembly confining him in the headship of the Khanush tribes. The second step was intended to meet the growing scarcity of food which was becoming serious. It was decided by a committee of sixteen that anyone holding stocks of wheat was to be compelled to sell to bakers at 1 kran for 14 lbs. The Kavam, his principal agent, and the governor-general also supplied three bakers with wheat. The party opposed to the Assembly, which appeared to be gaining strength, had its guns spiked by an invitation from the Assembly to elect two members to sit in the Assembly. Meanwhile the position of the governor-general was becoming more and more uncomfortable. On the 17th April His Majesty's consul had a long conversation with Nassir-ul-Mulk, who is coming steadily to the front as a moderate and sensible man with public experience, and attached neither to the Kavanis nor to the popular interest. He began by frankly admitting that all Persians would prefer a strong Persian administration to any foreign interference, but went on to make a strong plea for English intervention—at least, to restore order. He was speaking with unusual frankness, and admitted that his main preoccupation was pecuniary; and that he, and every other land-owner in Fars, was on the verge of bankruptcy owing to the ravages of the tribes; that this situation was bound to react on trade, and, if it continued unchecked, to end in famine. He finally put a number of questions about the increase of Russian consular guards, and enquired why no reinforcement was coming to Shiraz; 100 British troops marching up the Bushire road would, he said, be enough of itself to make the tribesmen at least pause in their work of destruction. On being informed that Mr. Bill saw no necessity for the increase of his present escort, he said in a half joking way, "But would you not if the consulate were to be attacked?" It may be worth noting that, although the Shirazis of the better class seem to realise that there is no hope of British intervention, it is quite impossible to prevent them talking about it. On the following evening a large meeting, attended by the members of the local Assembly and many other prominent persons, was held in Nassir-ul-Mulk's garden. The proceedings were nominally private, but the governor-general's vizier, Benan-es-Sultanolah, attended by special invitation, and it was generally understood that important business was to be transacted. The meeting first arrived at an agreement that, although the form of government now prevailing in Shiraz was in the fullest sense constitutional, still it was established contrary to the will of the Shah, and the members must be prepared to declare themselves hostile to the Shah. This having been generally admitted, Benan-es-Sultanolah was asked as representing Assef-ed-Dowleh whether the latter considered himself as the nominee of the Shah, with whom the Shiraz Assembly was at war, or of the Assembly

which was at war with the Shah. Benan-es-Sultanolah asked for time to transmit this very awkward question to the governor. This was granted, and at a meeting held on the following day Assef-ed-Dowleh was explicitly asked to explain his position in writing; he must either accept his appointment at the hands of the Assembly and renounce the Shah or he must resign. In the former case he must provide 10,000l., which he might recover from the revenue, and another sum of the same amount would be raised, as an advance on their revenue payments, by the land-owners, these sums to be devoted to raising and paying a force to restore order. The urgency of these demands is explained by the fact that Assef-ed-Dowleh had been showing unprecedented vigour in the collection of revenue from all land-owners resident in Shiraz, and they naturally wished to make sure of its destination. The governor-general's reply was not without ingenuity: he declared that he had always been in favour of the constitution, of which Mohammed Ali Shah was an integral part; that as the constitution was now in force in Shiraz he considered himself a constitutional governor, but if they insisted on his explicitly renouncing his allegiance to the Shah he must resign. This reply was written out and read by him to a number of leading persons. It had the effect, evidently designed by its author, of splitting up the opposition, the more extreme party insisting that it was tantamount to resignation, and the large number who were averse to consulting themselves hopelessly declaring that there must be a governor-general, and it was better to have one with some status other than the mere appointment of the Shiraz Assembly. The question of Assef-ed-Dowleh's remaining as governor was solved on the 24th by an abrupt intimation from Sowlet-ed-Dowleh to the local Assembly that unless Assef-ed-Dowleh was maintained in his position and properly obeyed he would come in himself to Shiraz and compel obedience to the governor-general. He also intimated his disapproval of the arrangement come to with the Kavanis, and of the method of selection of the present Assembly, which he said was quite irregular. He promised his co-operation, however, to a government of Fars which should consist of a properly constituted local council with Assef-ed-Dowleh as governor-general. This message naturally upset the constitutional apert card for the moment, and two prominent members of the Assembly left on the same day for Sowlet's camp, as did also a messenger from the Kavam. The latter visited the consulate on the 25th, and again enlarged on the difficulty of his position. The object of his visit, he said, was to ask for advice, and especially to call His Majesty's consul to witness that if he should be forced by the bitter personal hostility of the Lari Seyed to fight against him, it would not only be against his will, but quite independently of general political questions. He was telegraphing in the same sense to Seimsan. In reply to his request for advice, Mr. Bill, after premising that the consulate had no concern whatever with the constitutional question, and that the first interest of everyone in Fars, whether Persian or foreign, was the security of the trade routes, suggested to the Kavam that he and Sowlet-ed-Dowleh were in a position to render a great public service, which would also be of great benefit to himself as a land-owner, if they would unite in joint measures to keep these routes opened and properly policed. Kavam-ul-Mulk replied that he had already sent a messenger to Sowlet with that object, but that Assef-ed-Dowleh was determined to make mischief between them now that he was assured of Sowlet's support. It was then suggested that a personal interview between the two great men would tend to smooth over difficulties, and that the Imam Jumah, being a friend of both parties, would be a suitable person to arrange it. It is very much to be hoped that the Sowlet and Kavam may come together, and there is no real obstacle, as both have made it plain enough that they have no real convictions on the constitutional question, and will readily follow any Government that can maintain itself. Unfortunately, however, there are many persons whose private interest it is to keep them apart, and genuine co-operation between them, in which lies the only hope of public order, is most unlikely.

2. On the 9th April a Parsee visitor to the consulate produced a notice sealed by Seyyid Abdul Husain to all Shirazis, whether Mohammedans or not, in which he exhorted the inhabitants of Shiraz to take vengeance on the Kavanis, and finally solemnly warns all persons who have helped the Kavanis with arms or money, especially to Parsee merchants, that if anyone does this in the future he will be considered, like the Kavanis, as an infidel with arms in his hands, and his blood will be lawful to all Mohammedans. Several telegrams have been received from Bushire by private persons expressing satisfaction at the landing of bluejackets to preserve order, and it seems to be the general expectation of the Shirazis that they were coming there. Several persons having inquired from Mr. Bill whether it was true that British troops had been landed at Bushire at the special request of the Shah to suppress the local Assembly,

Mr. Bill, with the approval of His Majesty's Minister, suggested to the governor-general officially the desirability of issuing a public notice contradicting this misleading statement. Assaf-Dowleh objected that such a course would only give the rumour undesirable prominence. His Majesty's consul thereupon wrote privately to one of the leaders of the popular party who had shown some anxiety in the matter, and informed him that the landing had no other object but the protection of British subjects. To a request that the letter might be read to the local Assembly Mr. Bill replied that the letter was a private one, but as it was desirable to give the false rumour the fullest contradiction, the person to whom it was addressed was at liberty to show it to anyone he pleased.

3. The state of the road continues bad. There have been more robberies of posts and caravans. On the Isfahan side a series of assaults on telegraph ghilans has taken place, making it very difficult to induce them to go out and repair the damage done almost daily by the Arabs, of whom the Jabbara section appear to be no longer under control. Reports of plundering and destruction, especially by Arabs, have come in from all parts.

PERSIAN GULF.

Bushire.

1. The general situation is reported on in a separate despatch.
2. The Resident left on the 21st March for Mohammereh and returned on the 25th.
3. The new German consul, Herr Wassnau, arrived on the 29th March.

Bunder Abbas.

On the 17th March the popular party, as the result of reiterated orders by letter from Seyed Abdul Hussein Lari, seized the customs and appointed the Karguzar deputy-governor. The Belgian director of customs was given the opportunity of accepting service with the Nationalists, and landing over the receipts or of retiring from his post. He took the latter course and withdrew, being put on board the "Persepolis" by a boat from His Majesty's ship "Fox." After the customs and the government had been taken over by the Nationalists, the customs staff were sworn on the Koran to work with the Nationalists. Between the 17th and 26th March some 780 riflemen came into the town. They received 2 krans and 2 lbs. of bread daily. By the 22nd a local Assembly of six persons, representing different classes, had been started. The Nationalists prepared trenches along the shore and barricaded the streets in the town in anticipation of having to defend their position. The trenches extended from the town for 2 miles eastward and 1 mile westward. On the evening of the 20th the Persian gun-boat "Persepolis" arrived with the governor of the Gulf ports on board. A letter to him from His Majesty's consul requesting sufficient notice to enable him to withdraw British subjects from the town to the consulate if he contemplated taking any action was delivered at once by an officer from His Majesty's ship "Fox," and the captain called on him shortly afterwards. A message from the Nationalists was also sent on board, to which the governor replied that he would lend if he was allowed to, but not otherwise, and at 8 A.M. on the 21st the "Persepolis" left for Herjan without the governor having landed. On the 20th March His Majesty's consul, under orders from His Majesty's Minister, made a demand for the customs revenue of the port. On the 22nd the Karguzar called on His Majesty's consul to discuss the demand. He appeared anxious not to quarrel with the British Government. From reports from various sources it appears that the majority of the real population of the town was anxious that any desire of His Majesty's Government should be met and order maintained in order to secure the good offices of His Majesty's Government for the Nationalist cause, but a few Laris and bad characters influenced their councils adversely. On the 22nd news was received from Minah that the Nationalists had peacefully assumed the customs and government there. On the 24th twenty-five riflemen under Ali Mollah Sufi were sent to Minah to keep order there on behalf of the Nationalists. On the 28th March, at the request of His Majesty's consul, the riflemen in Bunder Abbas were informed that they were no longer required, and all except 350 soon disappeared. They committed no excesses in the town, but are said to have levied heavy toll on the villages. On the 29th March a special messenger from Lar brought Seyed Abdul Hussein's orders to the Nationalists not to pay customs receipts to the British Government, adding that he was about to send Sheikh Zakaria with 2,000 men

to Bunder Abbas. He also appointed Mishah-i-Divan to be permanently deputy-governor and conferred some titles. The Karguzar called on His Majesty's consul with Seyed Assadullah, the Nationalist leader, who was inclined to be impertinent. The Seyed did not like being taxed with the Nationalists breaking their word as regards the payment of half the customs receipts. On the 31st March another special courier from Seyed Abdul Hussein brought peremptory orders to Seyed Assadullah and the local merchants to seize the customs receipts already collected and to change the customs staff. Seyed Assadullah, on the 1st April, assembled the customs staff and ordered them to ballot among themselves for a director. This resulted in one Mirza Mustafa Khan being appointed director. On the 2nd April six more persons were selected to sit on the local Assembly. On the 4th April forty riflemen went to Hormuz in two boats and declared the place to have been taken over by the Nationalists. Twenty of them returned the next day bringing with them Mirza Khaili and Mirza Abdul Kerim, who were in charge of Muin-ut-Tujjar's red oxide mines at Hormuz; the other twenty remained to prevent the mines being worked. The Karguzar, as a result of His Majesty's consul's representations, sent a messenger to Hormuz matters at Hormuz. On the 4th April His Majesty's ship "Lapwing" arrived from Muscat. On the 5th April Mr. Wagner, director of customs, returned to Bunder Abbas and put up with His Majesty's consul. On the 6th April Seyed Assadullah received a telegram from Seyed Morteza Ahremi, requesting him not to interfere with the working of the mines at Hormuz, as they were farmed by Muin-ut-Tujjar.

Lingah.

On news of the overthrow of the royalist Government at Bushire reaching Lingah on the 25th March, the people of Lingah, both Shiaks and Sunnis, decided to take similar joint action. They approached Sheikh Shubbar, the leading priest, and under his leadership called upon the deputy governor to surrender. The latter, being helpless, surrendered, but was reappointed deputy governor on behalf of the Nationalists. The director of customs, an Armenian, was also called upon to surrender, but, being afraid of his life, took refuge in the British agency, where he remained until the 5th April, when, on a written assurance of safety being given him by the deputy governor on behalf of the Nationalists, he was induced to leave the agency and resume his duties as the employé of the Nationalists. Both Shiaks and Sunnis were afraid of people coming from the interior and robbing them, and accordingly put up defensive works outside the town and closed the roads to Lar and Bunder Abbas. The permanent inhabitants of Lingah were very uneasy at the existing state of affairs under the so-called Nationalist domination; while outwardly fearing to show disapproval of the action of the Laris, of whom they were in terror, they took precautions to prevent Lari riflemen and other bad characters entering Lingah, but they still feared that Seyed Abdul Hussein might send riflemen to the port. The occasional visit of a British man-of-war was therefore anxiously looked forward to, and created an intense relief among the people.

Mohammereh.

1. M. Ter Meulen handed over the Russian consular agency to his partner, M. Grinnau, Dutch consul, in the middle of March, and left Mohammereh on six months' leave.
2. On the 27th March the Serdar Arfa, accompanied by the Karguzar, visited the custom-house and informed the inspector-general of customs that, in order to avoid trouble or attempts by Nationalists to seize any custom-houses in the province, all monies must be retained in the custom-house. The inspector-general agreed to this, and also to keep the customs steamer "Muzaffer" at Mohannorah.

Ahwaz.

Lieutenant Rankin has relieved Captain Lorimer as His Majesty's consul.
C. B. STOKES, Major,
Military Attaché.

Fars.

The latest news to hand is that Nasr-ed-Dowleh and Ali Kuli Khan, acting in concert, have taken Lar and have decapitated Seyyid Muhammad and Seyyid Jaffar. Seyyid Abdul Hussain Lari is said to have been captured. One hundred Laris took refuge at His Majesty's consulate at Bender Abbas, demanding intervention to save Lar from Nasr-ed-Dowleh, but left on the same day (the 13th May) on the consul's promising to telegraph their request to Tehran. On receipt of the news of Nasr-ed-Dowleh's success reaching Shiraz, the leading Nationalist priest, Hajj Ali Agha, took refuge in His Majesty's consulate. According to him, Seyyid Abdul Hussain had been killed, and as this had happened after the issue of the amnesty, other leading Nationalists might meet with a similar fate. Later in the day (the 15th May) eight other leading Nationalists took refuge in the consulate, while a large crowd also assembled at the gate, and the bazars were closed. The governor-general and the Kuvann, who declared that Seyyid Abdul Hussain had not been killed, having given a guarantee, the refugees, Hajj Ali Agha and his son excepted, left the consulate the same evening and the crowd dispersed. On the 17th May the bazars were still closed. Mr. Bill anticipates that the return of Nasr-ed-Dowleh will be the signal for a riot at Shiraz. He has been instructed to impress on the Nationalists the necessity for all parties to work for a reconciliation between the Shah and his people and to avoid disorder.

C. B. S.

[21116]

No. 607.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 101.)
Sir,

Tehran, May 20, 1909.

AS reported in my telegram No. 368 of the 5th instant, my Russian colleague and I withheld the assurances we were authorised to give the Shah in writing, notwithstanding that His Majesty had officially signified his acceptance of the advice tendered to him by the two Powers. We did so because we felt indications that His Majesty had not really made up his mind to take certain measures which we regarded as indispensable, if there was to be any hope of a restoration of constitutional government.

When, however, on the 9th May the Shah appointed a Liberal Cabinet, and signed decrees ordering measures which we had advised as preparatory to the re-establishment of a constitutional régime, we felt there was no justification for further delay, and in reply to a private communication from the Minister for Foreign Affairs we addressed to His Excellency a joint note containing the assurances in question.

A copy of the two documents is enclosed herewith.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 607.

Saad-ed-Dowleh to Sir G. Barclay.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

Tehran, May 9, 1909.

NOW that His Imperial Majesty has issued a proclamation respecting the re-establishment of the constitution, I have the honour to remind your Excellency that on the 22nd December the dragomans of the British and Russian Legations gave verbal assurances of security to His Majesty the Shah on the part of the British and Russian Governments. Since no record of this has been kept by His Majesty, I request your Excellency to be good enough to send me a copy of the same signed by yourself and the Russian Chargé d'Affaires.

I avail, &c.

SAAD-ED-DOWLEH.

Sir G. Barclay and M. Sabline to Saad-ed-Dowleh.

M. le Ministre,

Téhéran, le 9 mai, 1909.

EN réponse à vos lettres privées d'aujourd'hui, le Ministre d'Angleterre et le Chargé d'Affaires de Russie ont l'honneur de faire savoir à votre Excellence que le texte des assurances données à Sa Majesté Impériale le Schah, le 22 décembre, de la part des deux représentants était le suivant:—

“Tant que Sa Majesté remplit sincèrement le rôle de Souverain constitutionnel il aura l'appui et la sympathie des deux représentants d'Angleterre et de Russie, et les deux représentants lui accorderont en cas de nécessité, et s'il la recueille, protection pour sa personne. Mais les deux représentants sont persuadés que les meilleurs garanties contre le danger que Sa Majesté prévoit seraient le rétablissement du régime constitutionnel et sa coopération sincère pour le bon fonctionnement de ce régime.”

Les deux représentants sont maintenant autorisés par leurs Gouvernements à renouveler ces assurances.

G. BARCLAY.
SABLINE.

[21117]

No. 608.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 102.)
Sir,

Tehran, May 20, 1909.

SINCE my last despatch respecting affairs at Tabreez, No. 80 of the 20th ultimo, the situation in that town has completely changed. Hostilities have ceased and Tabreez, temporarily in the occupation of Russian troops, is now exerting the influence it possesses in other centres of revolt to bring about a reconciliation between the Shah and his people.

It may be convenient that I should report as briefly as possible the events leading up to the arrival of Russian troops, which, while it has effectually secured the safety of foreigners—its primary object—has also incidentally saved the Persians of Tabreez from the horrors which would have followed its surrender to the Shah's troops, and materially contributed to such measure of success as has so far attended the representations of the two Powers urging His Majesty to restore constitutional government.

It will be remembered that when I last wrote provisions in the besieged town were almost exhausted and a request from some of the Legations for permission to introduce food for foreigners had been refused by the Persian Government, who suggested that in lieu of this foreign subjects should leave the town under safe-conduct. This was an illusory, not to say derisive, suggestion, as it was well known that the militant Nationalists of Tabreez, fully alive to the value to their cause of the foreigners as hostages, would never willingly permit them to leave.

On the 19th ultimo the question of the safety of foreigners became urgent. The two Legations learned from the consul-general that a plan was in contemplation for attacking the two consulates-general and the houses of their nationals in the hope of forcing Russian occupation in preference to surrendering to the Shah. There was also believed to be imminent danger of the famine-stricken population taking violent measures to obtain food from those foreigners better supplied with provisions than themselves. My Russian colleague and I, though daily expecting instructions to tender the advice to the Shah which it was hoped would relieve the situation at all the centres of revolt, decided that we could not risk the chance of delay, and we accordingly applied for an audience for the following morning, the 20th ultimo, in order to urge the necessity in the interests of the safety of our compatriots at Tabreez for a truce and for permission to introduce provisions. Our representations to His Majesty were, as already reported in my despatch No. 81 of the 20th April, successful, and the Shah promised to send orders forthwith to his generals at Tabreez for a cessation of hostilities for six days, during which all facilities were to be given for the introduction of enough food for that period for the whole town.

It should here be mentioned that on the previous day His Majesty's Ambassador

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at St. Petersburg had named the Minister for Foreign Affairs as to whether his Government would send the small force of Cossacks to bring away consuls and other foreigners who wished to leave, and on the 20th Sir A. Nicolson reported to His Majesty's Government that the Russian Government had decided to send a force to Tabreez with orders to protect the consulates and foreigners, to facilitate the entry of the necessary provisions, and to assist the departure of such foreigners as desired to leave. His Majesty's Government expressed cordial approval of any steps which the Russian Government might take to save the lives of foreigners from starvation or attack, on the understanding that such steps would not be taken in favour of either side, but solely for the protection of foreigners.

The truce granted by the Shah seemed to render the dispatch of troops no longer urgent and their departure was countermanded with the concurrence of His Majesty's Government on the news reaching the two Governments of the result of our audience of the 20th ultimo. Owing, however, to circumstances which have never been clearly explained, the Shah's generals received no orders regarding the armistice and no sufficient facilities were given for the introduction of food. The two consuls-general on learning that an armistice had been granted had induced the Nationalists to cease hostilities; consequently the non-observance of the terms of the truce by the Royalist generals rendered their position awkward in the extreme, and the situation seemed more threatening than before. Accordingly, on the 23rd ultimo, the Russian Government ordered troops to move on Tabreez; the force, as estimated by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, was to be 2,000 men, with instructions to abstain from any interference in the struggle between the two parties and to undertake no administrative duties. It was to be withdrawn when the situation had settled down. Mr. Writslaw and M. Miller, who apprehended danger to Europeans when it was discovered that Russian troops were coming, proposed themselves to inform the Nationalists of their advent, and were authorised to do so by the two legations, stating that the troops were not coming in the Shah's interests, but in those of Tabreez, in order to secure the opening of the Julla road and to protect foreigners and natives from the Shah's brigands; that the occupation was intended to last only until peace was made between the Shah and his people and that no one, whatever his nationality, would be molested for his share in recent events, and that the Shah's troops would not be admitted into the town. Although there was some fanatical agitation against the arrival of the troops, the intervention was used to good purpose by the local assembly and Taki Zade, who opened negotiations with the Shah's Government on the evening of the 24th. The Shah was urged to come to terms with his loyal subjects and thus avert the disgrace of a foreign occupation of Persian territory. This leverage was successful, and on the 25th His Majesty granted an armistice for indefinite duration and every facility for the introduction of food.

With the experience of the illusory character of the truce previously granted by the Shah to guide them the two consuls-general, who had to count with the utter unreliability of the Nationalists as well as the Royalists, considered that in the interest of the security of foreigners it would be unwise to stay the advance of the Russian troops on account of the Shah's concession. My colleague and I believed this opinion to be sound and we expressed our concurrence. I admit to having been to some extent influenced in this decision by the effect that Russian intervention, other than in the Shah's favour, would have on His Majesty as regards his attitude towards the advice of the two Powers tendered to him on the 22nd ultimo.

The dispatch of the troops was not counterordered, and on the 26th Mr. Writslaw and M. Miller wrote to the local assembly, giving them full assurances of the temporary character of the Russian action and explaining its motives. This produced a good effect in Tabreez, and Sattar Khan called on His Majesty's consul-general on the 29th April to express great gratitude to Great Britain and his hopes for the future.

The troops arrived on the 30th April under General Snarsky to the number of nearly 4,000, of whom some 250 were, in the course of the next day or two, brought into the town without any untoward incident, for the protection of foreigners. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had told Sir A. Nicolson that only small detachments would enter Tabreez to be used as guards for the consulates and other foreign institutions. His Majesty's consul-general considered that the number of men in the town was somewhat excessive, but did not think it worth while to raise any objection.

As you will remember, I was desirous that the arrival of the Russian troops should be formally announced to the Persian Government in joint note from the two legations. In this my Russian colleague was in entire agreement with me. I also thought that, if it could be arranged, the note might contain a reference to the landing of the blue-

jackets at Bushiro; but when the Russian Government was approached as regards the joint note they thought it unnecessary. Indeed, I gather from conversation with M. Sabline that his Government, on learning the proposal, expressed their surprise that he had not himself notified the dispatch of troops some days before.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

[21118]

No. 609.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 103.)

Sir,

Tehran, May 20, 1909.

AS reported in my despatch No. 78 of the 16th April, it was arranged by the Bakhtiari Khans at Isfahan that their forces should march on Tehran on the 21st ultimo. Serdar Assar had not on that day arrived at Isfahan, and the inability of the Khans to agree among themselves, coupled with their unsuccessful attempt to raise funds, prevented any move from being made.

Serdar Assar reached Isfahan on the 6th instant, and with the assistance of 7,000 tomans plundered from a royalist caravan and 9,000 tomans, the proceeds of a forced loan from three leading merchants of the city, the Khans on the 11th instated their troops, numbering in all about 3,000 men, to a camp 2 miles outside Isfahan, where they have since remained. Semsam-es-Sultanch explained that this step was taken in order to prevent disturbances within the city.

The continued presence of the Shah's army at Khaledabad, greatly exaggerated rumours as to its strength, one version giving the number of men as 8,000, having been current at Isfahan, has gone far to minimise the effect of the news of the Shah's concessions, and though the local Assembly of Tabreez has telegraphed to that of Isfahan urging the reception of His Majesty's promises in a conciliatory spirit, it is not yet known whether the Khans will be willing to compromise.

I learn from the Minister for Foreign Affairs that, as a matter of fact, the royalist forces are short of money and forage, and have been ordered to return to Kashan and the neighbouring villages to await further orders.

In Isfahan cases of disorder, robbery, and drunkenness became more frequent towards the end of the stay of the Bakhtiari soldiery in the town, while the state of the neighbouring country and roads remains deplorably bad. The presence of the Kugheli tribesmen on the Isfahan-Shiraz road and the general insecurity throughout the province have brought trade almost to a standstill.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

[21120]

No. 610.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 105.)

Sir,

Tehran, May 20, 1909.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 86 of the 22nd ultimo, I have the honour to report that the general situation at Bushire has during the past months undergone little change, and under the auspices of the bluejackets from His Majesty's ship "Fox" order has been effectively maintained.

Darya Beggi, the new governor, arrived on the 10th instant and was cordially received. His arrival might well have given rise to renewed disorders, but for an incident which enabled us to frustrate the intention of the Shah's Government to send him to Bushire with a force. It was intended that the "Persopolis" should be sent to fetch him and to collect a force to accompany him. Fortunately, in order to pay for the coal necessary for the voyage, the local director of customs diverted 12,000 krans from the customs receipts which it had been arranged with the consul-general should be temporarily impounded. This afforded justification for preventing the ship from sailing, and Darya Beggi arrived as an ordinary passenger by rail steamer.

His Majesty's consul-general has had occasion to complain of the action of the German consulate. The circumstances on which Major Cox based this complaint are briefly reported in my telegrams Nos. 353 and 362. I brought the matter privately to the notice of my German colleague who, after enquiry of his neting consul, somewhat

indignantly denied that the latter's action or that of his staff had been other than correct. The German Government, on representations at Berlin, have warned the acting consul to see that neither he nor his staff laid themselves open to suspicion of political agitation. I have so far not replied to Count Quidt's communication, hoping that he may let the matter drop. I fear, however, this is unlikely; in any case, I trust that a full report, which I am led to expect from Major Cox, will have reached me before the question is again raised.

The question of the retention of the customs receipts is, as explained to you in my telegram No. 396 of the 16th instant, satisfactorily settled temporarily, and I shall, when notifying the withdrawal of the bluejackets officially to the Persian Government, convey a verbal warning as authorised by you, that the consequences will be disagreeable to the Persian Government if the arrears due to the Imperial Bank of Persia and the monthly instalment are not treated as a first charge.

It is to be expected that the bluejackets may be withdrawn within the next few days, the Darya Beggi having assumed complete responsibility for the maintenance of order and the security of foreigners.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY

[21121]

No. 611.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Eduard Grey.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 106.)

Sir,

Tehran, May 20, 1909.

AS far as can be judged from Tehran, the prospects of reconciliation between the Shah and his people, and of His Majesty's being given another chance of ruling as a constitutional Sovereign, are hopeful. His Majesty is apparently giving the Cabinet a free hand to deal with the crisis; he will be well advised if he continues to do so. By Saad-ed-Dowleh's advice he left the capital on the 18th instant and has taken up his summer quarters at Sultanabad. So far the Cabinet has shown considerable tact in handling the situation, and is lending a sympathetic ear to complaints on points on which further concessions are desired by the Nationalists. At first it was not easy to formulate their further requirements owing to the difficulties of communication between the different centres of revolt and the lack of cohesion amongst the Nationalists of Tehran, but a committee of the leaders has now been formed at the capital, which the Cabinet has wisely recognized, and which it is hoped will, before long, have authority from the most important provincial centres to speak for the Persian Nationalists as a body. It has already presented a list of desiderata supplementary to what the Shah has granted on the advice of the two Powers, which has the imprimatur of Sepahdar and Tabreez. This list is as follows:—

1. The expulsion of mischief-makers. Amir Bahadur Jang and Mufakher-ul-Mulk are the two persons specially aimed at. The former still remains with the Shah, though we have pressed for his removal. Saad-ed-Dowleh has asked us to cease our pressure, for the present at least, and await developments. As his removal from the Palace was not a *sine qua non* of the programme of reforms, and his influence seems broken for the moment, we have deferred to Saad-ed-Dowleh's request. Mufakher-ul-Mulk was recently Vice-Governor of Tehran, in which capacity he was believed to have been mainly responsible for the murder of some basists at Shahabkhazim some weeks ago. My Russian colleague and I pressed for his dismissal, which has since been effected, but he is still at the Court in close touch with the Shah.

2. Disarming of the roughs at Tehran. A decree has been issued prohibiting the possession of arms without a permit and the promiscuous looting off of rifles by the Shah's troops and others, which has of late been such a disagreeable feature in Tehran. The decree confides the maintenance of order to the Cossack Brigade, so that there is some hope of its being executed. It contains a clause forbidding "assemblies which create disturbances." This, I understand, was directed really against reactionary demonstrations, but it has aroused some mistrust among the Nationalists, who see in it an infringement of the right of public meeting.

3. A definite pronouncement from the Shah that the old constitution, which he has restored, includes the 107 supplementary articles added in 1907. The decree of the 9th instant was on this point not sufficiently clearly worded. The Shah has already stated that the decree must be interpreted as restoring the old constitution in its

entirety, but the Nationalists ask for an explanatory decree on the point. One has been drafted by Saad-ed-Dowleh and submitted to the Shah.

4. That no further troops be brought to the capital. It is to be hoped that the money now about to be advanced by Russia will be employed to pay off and disband many of the useless troops now under arms.

5. That telegrams should no longer be censored. At first Nationalists of the capital wishing to communicate with their fellows in the provinces could have no confidence that their telegrams would be correctly transmitted. They have obtained satisfaction on this point, and the different nationalist centres can now communicate freely with each other.

6. That the Shah should do his best to end the Russian occupation in the north. There is no doubt a very strong feeling against the Russian occupation among the Nationalists, who cannot get rid of the conviction that the presence of Russian troops is welcome to the Shah. They choose to forget that Tabreez was *in extremis*, and was only saved from the horrors which must have followed surrender to the Shah's troops by the arrival of the Russian force. As I telegraphed on the 15th instant, Saad-ed-Dowleh, while thinking that complete evacuation would be premature at present, is of opinion that the withdrawal of a large part of the force might take place at once and would quiet the popular agitation against the occupation. I have acquainted my Russian colleague with Saad-ed-Dowleh's remarks to me on this subject, and added that His Majesty's consul-general was also of the opinion that there was no longer need for so large a force. M. Sahline told me that Saad-ed-Dowleh had not approached him on the matter.

It has been so unequivocally announced by the Russian Government that the occupation is merely temporary, and for specific and entirely legitimate objects, that one might have thought the Nationalists, who have certainly been the guinea by this intervention, could afford to be patient; but the hope that the Nationalists would accept the occupation in a reasonable spirit was destroyed by the harsh methods employed by General Snarsky in dealing with the recent incident of the shooting of a scouter. The profound mistrust which is felt for the Shah, and which had been to some extent allayed by His Majesty's concessions, burst forth with increased force, and the nationalist mind was convinced that the Shah was instigator of the general's proceedings.

7. That the mujtaheds of Kerbela and Nejeef should be informed that the constitution had been restored. This, I understand, has already been done by the Shah himself.

8. The liberation of Nationalists imprisoned at Tiflis. My Russian colleague, who knows nothing of this, has telegraphed to the Viceroy of the Caucasus.

9. Assurances to refugees, and their participation in the preparation of the electoral law. This has now been abandoned. There was no need for the first, in view of the general amnesty proclaimed, and the committee working at the electoral law is making good progress.

10. After the fulfilment of the above conditions, general illuminations in Tehran and the provinces.

All the above points, with the exception of that relating to the continued presence of Amir Bahadur Jang at the Court, lie outside of our advice, so that my Russian colleague and I have not supported this list of desiderata. The response it has received from the Cabinet is due to no pressure from us, and argues an earnest desire on the part of the Ministers to bring about a reconciliation.

As I have already informed you by telegraph, my Russian colleague and I, on the publication of the Shah's decree on the 10th instant, instructed our consuls at the centres of revolt to urge upon the Nationalists that, now that the Shah had made concessions which ought to satisfy them, it was their duty to work for pacification. Except for this, I have confined my interference to giving similar advice to the Nationalists of Tehran, and to pressing upon Saad-ed-Dowleh the desirability of recognizing the newly-formed nationalist committee of the capital as the best channel of negotiations, and especially for obtaining some definite idea of what Nationalists as a body desire in addition to what the Shah has already given.

My Russian colleague's influence has been employed principally with the Sepahdar, to whom he has used the strongest language. Unfortunately, however, the Sepahdar seems to be entirely in the hands of the four hundred odd Cossacks who are with him. It is satisfactory, however, to know that the desiderata above enumerated have been approved at Kazvin. It would seem to show that Sepahdar and the force with him are

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not so uncompromisingly resolved to depose the Shah as has been generally believed at Tehran. They are, however, very insistent, and when I saw Saad-ol-Dowleh yesterday afternoon he told me that Sepahdar had demanded an immediate answer to the desiderata. It may seem strange that the possibility of a march on Tehran of the 400 Cossacks and the Persians who are with them should loom so large in the situation, but they are known to be determined men, and they would no doubt, in any conflict with the Shah's tatterdemalion troops in Tehran, be able to give a good account of themselves. The Cossacks—the only respectable force in the capital—are far from being at full strength at the present moment. Till the Kazvin force is satisfied or disposed of the situation will not clear. My Russian colleague tells me that his Government have suggested that they should be disbanded by the Russian secretary of legation now at Kazvin. The latter has five Cossacks at his disposal.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

[21130]

No. 612.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 332.)
Sir,

St. Petersburg, May 25, 1900.

I MENTIONED to M. Telcharkoff yesterday that the situation at Bushire having calmed down, the blue-jackets who had been landed for the protection of the foreign subjects had been re-embarked. I added that matters seemed to have greatly improved at Fuhrez, and I presumed that the Russian Government would very shortly feel justified in withdrawing their troops, or in any case in greatly reducing their numbers. M. Telcharkoff said that they must await the appointment of a governor, though they were most anxious to recall the troops, as their sojourn in Tabreez cost money. I observed that the vice-governor appeared to be a competent man, and to give satisfaction to all parties. His Excellency said that the vice-governor was not a sufficiently important official, and that it would be necessary to wait for the arrival of a governor-general for the whole province with whom the Russian authorities could deal.

M. Telcharkoff said that he would like to tell me that after six weeks' silence the Russian Government had received a telegram from Urumia, which depicted the situation as one of complete anarchy. The anti-nationalist party had driven out the nationalist governor, who had fled to a distance of some 12 to 15 miles, but had announced his intention of shortly returning and wreaking vengeance on his rivals. The Russian consular guard consisted of only six men, and the Government considered it, therefore, prudent to reinforce it by a detachment of forty men, who would be dispatched from Tabreez. It would be necessary to transport them across the lake, and as the crafts available were not fitted to carry horses the detachment would have to consist of foot soldiers.

I have, &c.

A. NICOLSON.

[21132]

No. 613.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 339.)
Sir,

St. Petersburg, May 28, 1900.

I ENQUIRED of M. Telcharkoff a day or two ago when I might expect to receive a reply to the *aide-memoire* which I had addressed to him on the 18th March, relative to various questions connected with telegraph lines in Persia.

He said that M. Klenm had prepared a memorandum in reply, but that there were one or two points which required elucidation, and he would be much obliged if I would send one of the embassy secretaries to talk over the matter with M. Klenm. He could tell me that the Russian Government had no objection whatever to the construction of a second line in Shahrud, and were most anxious that the exchange of the control over the Tehran-Meshed and Khaf-Nasratabad lines should take place as soon as possible.

I commenced to speak to M. Telcharkoff on certain other questions which had been touched upon in my *aide-memoire*, but he said that he would be glad if I would not enter

into a discussion upon them, as he would prefer if the matter were treated with M. Klenm, who was better acquainted than he was with the subject.

I asked Mr. Kidston to see M. Klenm, and I have the honour to transmit a copy of a memorandum which he drew up in regard to a conversation which he had with the latter and M. Hartwig. The results of the conversation seem to me to be satisfactory; and I trust that I shall very shortly receive an official reply embodying the views of the Russian Government. It would be better to await the memorandum before any action is taken, so that there should be no possibility of any misunderstanding. I trust that the exchange of the Meshed and Scistan lines will be accomplished, as I submit that it would be well to complete the arrangement without further delay.

I have, &c.

A. NICOLSON.

P.S.—May 30. Since writing the above I have received the reply to my *aide-memoire*, of which I have the honour to transmit a translation.

A. N.

Inclosure 1 in No. 613.

Memorandum on a Conversation between Mr. Kidston, M. de Klenm, and M. Hartwig.

I WENT by appointment this afternoon to see M. de Klenm (late consul-general at Meshed, and now head of a department in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs) on the subject of Persian telegraphs, and found M. Hartwig with him. It was the latter who did all the talking.

He began by saying that the moment was most favourable for effecting the exchange of the Tehran-Meshed and Khaf-Nasratabad lines. Perhaps such a favourable opportunity might never occur again; the present Persian Minister of Telegraphs was an able and sensible man, who had always shown himself easy to deal with, and all the circumstances were propitious. Of course, if His Majesty's Government wished to delay matters a little longer in order to put through their Arabian arrangements and the extension of their concession to 1945 the Russian Government would offer no objection, but he urged the advisability of not letting so favourable an opportunity slip by.

He had always been of opinion that the question of the exchange should be treated at Tehran as a purely administrative matter, and that the best attitude for the Ministers to adopt was to represent to the Persians that their respective telegraph administrations had plagued them for so long over the question that they were anxious to get it settled for good and all. The purely administrative and utilitarian nature of the measure could be based on the geographical position of the lines to be exchanged, which made it easier for the Russians to forward material for the Tehran-Meshed section and for the British to perform similar service for that from Nasratabad to Khaf.

M. Hartwig then turned to more particular points.

Arabistan Lines.—He said that the Russians would have no objection to the stipulation that the Indo-European Telegraph Department should co-operate in the construction and maintenance of any extension of the Arabian lines, on the understanding that the rights would be waived in the case of an extension into their sphere. He showed some curiosity as to the true object of this stipulation, and I thought that there was no harm in telling him confidentially that it aimed at preventing the acquisition by a third Power of an extension from Mohammerah to Bussorah.

With regard to the possible employment at some future date of Russian signallers on the Arabian lines, he expressed some dissatisfaction with the proposed wording of the agreement with the Persian Government. The phrase: "that without the concurrence of the British Government no others than British subjects and the members of the staff," &c. was, in his opinion, too vague and left it open to the Persian Government, even in spite of any secret agreement between Great Britain and Russia, to insist that Persian consent was necessary for the admission of Russian signallers. After much discussion I suggested as an alternative formula: "that, save with the consent of the British Government, only Persian subjects and the members of the staff," &c. Both M. Hartwig and M. de Klenm expressed themselves as completely satisfied with this superficial alteration.

Tehran-Shahrud Line.—With regard to the construction of the extra line from

Tehran to Shahrud, M. Hartwig said that, far from opposing the project, the Russian Government would be only too glad if it were taken in hand at once. In fact, he gave me to understand that the pressure which the Persian Telegraph Administration was bringing to bear on the Indo-European Telegraph Department was due to constant representations from the Russian Legation. He explained that this was the main line of communication between the Persian and Russian systems, that the work was far too heavy for a single line, that the line was subject too frequent break-downs, and that consequently the Russian Legation at Tehran was constantly compelled to have recourse to the Indo-European Telegraph Company's line, and that this meant an enormous increase in their telegraph bill. He quoted figures to show how heavy this charge had been during his period of office at Tehran.

Tehran-Khanikin Line.—M. Hartwig characterised the action of his Government in taking over this line as a purely generous one. It was in a sneaking condition and would cost them a large sum of money and bring no advantage. They only consented to take it over in order to prevent any third Power from acquiring control over it. But before the actual transfer was effected they wished to be assured as to the financial position of the line. He had read somewhere in *Plataet* that the Indo-European Telegraph Company had paid over to the Persian Government a large sum of money in connection with some arrangement regarding this line. He had made enquiries of His Majesty's Legation and of the head of the Indo-European Telegraph Company at Tehran as to the object and conditions attaching to this payment, but had never been able to get to the bottom of the transaction. What the Russian Government now feared was that if they took over the line the Persian Government might suddenly come down upon them and present a bill for this amount. They therefore wanted to make sure, before taking any further steps in the matter, that they would take over the line free of debt.

I told M. de Klemm and M. Hartwig that the negotiations respecting the Arabian lines were now proceeding smoothly, and gave them the substance of Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 409. In these circumstances, I said, there would probably be little delay in effecting the exchange of the Tehran-Meshed and Khaf-Nasratul lines, which His Majesty's Government were quite as anxious as the Russian Government to carry out at the earliest possible opportunity.

I begged them to furnish Sir A. Nicolson as soon as possible with a memorandum in reply to those which he had sent on the 21st February (6th March) and the 5th (18th) March, and they promised that this would be done at once.

G. J. KIDSTON.

St. Petersburg, May 25, 1909.

Inclosure 2 in No. 613.

Aide-memoire communicated to Sir A. Nicolson.

(Translation.)

HAVING studied the *aide-memoire* of the British Embassy dated the 21st February (6th March) and the 5th (18th) March, 1909, on the question of the telegraph lines in Persia, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs is of opinion that the method proposed by the British Government for guaranteeing to the Russian Government the right of appointing, in the event of necessity, Russian telegraph officials to the Arabian lines by means of the conclusion of a special secret agreement on this subject between both Governments appears in principle to be wholly acceptable. The Ministry deems it only necessary to draw the attention of the embassy to the fact that, in the drawing up of the text of an agreement between the British and Persian Governments with reference to the Arabian lines, it is necessary to seek such a formula as would not place the appointment of Russian officials to the lines mentioned in dependence on the will of the Persian Government. The portion of the proposed text of the agreement cited in the *aide-memoire* of the embassy dated the 21st February (6th March), 1909, reads thus:—

"Without the concurrence of the British Government no others than Persian subjects and the members of the staff of the Indo-European Telegraph Department should be employed in the offices or on the lines of this system."

Such wording does not exclude the right of the Persian Government to oppose the appointment of Russian officials to these lines, even should the assent of the British Government have been given. For the removal of such a difficulty it is desirable to

revise the above-quoted text in such a manner that the possibility of opposition by the Persian Government to the admission of Russian telegraph officials to the Arabian lines shall be absolutely excluded. After this a secret agreement approximately in the following terms could be concluded on this subject between the Russian and British Governments:—

"Reserving for itself, by means of a special agreement with the Persian Government, the right of control and repair on the Persian telegraph lines in Arabianistan, and having the intention to admit for work on these lines and offices only Persian subjects and officials of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, the British Government will not put obstacles in the way if in time it should appear necessary to the Russian Government to dispatch their own telegraph officials to the lines mentioned for the transmission of telegrams in the Russian language on principles analogous with those which have been established in relation to the Khaf-Seistan line."

The Imperial Government on their part place no obstacles against the Indo-European Telegraph Department reserving for itself the right to take part in the construction and maintenance also of other telegraph lines which may be constructed in Arabianistan besides the Mohammereh-Ahwaz and Tehran-Bushire lines mentioned in the *aide-memoire* of the embassy dated the 14th (27th) January, 1909, and take note of the declaration of the British Government that this right of the Indo-European Telegraph Department will not be extended to portions of new lines which would enter within the limits of the Russian sphere of influence.

As regards the placing of a second wire on the Tehran-Shahrud line, respecting which mention is made in the *aide-memoire* of the embassy dated the 5th (18th) March, 1909, the Imperial Government deems the immediate realisation of this measure, which the Russian Mission at Tehran has long urged on the Persian Government as a guarantee of a more regular telegraphic communication with Russia, to be extremely desirable.

With reference to the Tehran-Khanikin line, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs permits itself to express anew the wish put forward in its *aide-memoire* dated the 16th (29th) January, 1909, namely, that now it should be clearly established that any financial accounts between the Indo-European Telegraph Department and the Persian Government which may arise with respect to the construction or maintenance of this line should be adjusted directly between the aforesaid department and the Government of the Shah, and shall not in any way affect the Imperial Government. The necessity of such a limitation arises from the circumstance that, on the one side, the financial position of the above-named line remains up to the present unexplained, and, on the other hand, there are several indications which give grounds to believe that certain financial accounts with respect to this line do in fact exist between the Indo-European Telegraph Department and the Persian Government.

In conclusion, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs considers it their duty to again draw the attention of the embassy to the extreme necessity of realising as speedily as possible locally an actual exchange between the two Governments of the lines Tehran-Meshed and Khaf-Seistan. In the opinion of the Russian Minister at Tehran, the present time seems to be a very opportune moment for doing this. The Imperial Government already long ago furnished their chargé d'affaires at Tehran with instructions on this subject, and it would be highly desirable that the British Minister at the Court of the Shah should be instructed to enter as soon as possible into an agreement on the necessary lines with M. Sabline.

St. Petersburg, May 10 (29), 1909.

[21138]

No. 614.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 345.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, May 30, 1909.

To my surprise M. Tcharnykoff informed me yesterday that Colonel Margani was not to be appointed chief of the Persian Cossack brigade at Tehran. I remarked that I had understood from him that the appointment of the colonel was a settled matter. He had indeed told me that telegraphic orders had been sent to the colonel to proceed to Tehran. M. Tcharnykoff said that the general staff was of opinion that Colonel Margani had received no scientific military training, and was simply a regimental officer. The want of scientific attainments had been, so M. Tcharnykoff observed, in his opinion, a recommendation rather than a disqualification. The general staff, however,

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thought otherwise, and was about to propose a candidate of its own. I inquired who the officer would be, and he replied that he did not know. He would, he added, like to inform me that the Russian Government were recommending the Shah to increase the brigade from 1,500 to 2,000 men, as the present number was not sufficient, and it might be necessary to detach some of them to act as police at Tabreez.

I asked what was his latest news from Tabreez. He replied that it was very good, and that "everybody was very happy." I remarked that in such circumstances I presumed that there would no longer be any hesitation in withdrawing, or in any case greatly reducing, the Russian force at Tabreez. I added that I believed that both the Russian general and the Russian consul-general were of opinion that such a step could now be taken. M. Tcharykoff said that they must await the arrival of a governor-general.

As I have since heard that the Ala-ed-Dowleh has been appointed governor-general, I will take the earliest opportunity of recurring to the subject of the withdrawal of the Russian forces with M. Isvolsky, who is expected in St. Petersburg this evening.

I have, &c.
A. NICOLSON.

[21142]

No. 615.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 350.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, June 1, 1909.

I RECEIVED last evening Sir G. Barclay's telegrams Nos. 426, 427, and 428 in regard to the arrest of a fedai and the destruction of his house and that of his brother by the Russian troops, and reporting at the same time that Sattar Khan and Baghir Khan as well as others had consequently taken refuge in the Ottoman consulate-general at Tabreez. I at once addressed a private letter to M. Isvolsky relating the above incidents and expressing the opinion that in cases between Persian subjects it would be better for the general to refer them to the Persian vice-governor. I added that as it appeared that Tabreez was tranquil I trusted that it would be possible for the Russian Government now to diminish the number of their troops, and to withdraw them entirely when the new governor-general assumed his duties.

I saw M. Isvolsky this morning, and informed him that since writing to him I had received a telegram from you urging that the Russian general should keep within the scope of his instructions, and explaining the unfortunate impression which his acts would cause.

M. Isvolsky told me that he had received a telegram from the Russian consul at Tabreez which gave an account of what had passed which was quite different from that which I had received. The Russian consul reported that two or three Russian subjects — Armenians so far as I can recollect — had been arrested for using inflammatory language, and would be deported. Their houses had been sealed off, but no reference was made to any having been blown up. The Russian consul added that for some little time past Sattar and Baghir Khans had been in communication with the Ottoman consulate-general, and that they had, with some 200 others, taken refuge in the consulate-general. M. Isvolsky remarked that there was a considerable discrepancy between the information which had reached my Government and that which he had received, and he regretted that such was the case. I said that there was undoubtedly a wide divergence in the news which we had respectively received, which I could not explain. His Excellency said that of course neither the Russian consul nor the Russian general had any ground for interfering with local affairs, but that they were justified in dealing with their own subjects. I did not deny this statement, and said that I would telegraph the substance of the telegram which he had read to me and await a reply. In the meantime I trusted that the Russian Government would consider the moment opportune for withdrawing a considerable portion of their troops, as from the information which I had received the situation at Tabreez was quiet. His Excellency said that he had only just returned to St. Petersburg, and had not had time to look through the papers or to consult with M. Tcharykoff and M. Klemm. He said that he could not give me an answer at once.

He then read to me a telegram which had been communicated to him by the Turkish Ambassador announcing the fact that the above-named two Khans had taken part at the Ottoman consulate-general, and stating that they hoped the Russian Government would make no difficulty if it were considered desirable to convey them

safely out of the country. I told his Excellency that Turkhan Pasha had also made me acquainted with the telegram from Rifaat Pasha, but at the time I had had no information on the subject.

I will return to the matter with M. Isvolsky when I receive further information in respect to the telegram from the Russian consul and when his Excellency has had time to acquaint himself with the recent events at Tabreez. I propose to continue to urge unrelentingly the reduction of the Russian troops, as it is evident that such reduction will have a pacifying effect, and will remove in great measure the misgivings of the Nationalists.

I have, &c.
A. NICOLSON.

[21285]

No. 616.

Consul-General Cox to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 2. Commercial. Confidential.)

Bushire, May 12, 1909.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to lay before you a report prepared by Mr. vice-consul Chick, in touch with me, on the progress of German shipping and trade in the Persian Gulf for the second year of the Hamburg-Amerika Line's operations, namely, the period September 1907 to October 1908.

The first year was dealt with in the previous report forwarded with my despatch No. 7, Commercial, dated 27th November, 1907.

The material collected for examination has been on the stocks since February last, and I regret that we have not been able to submit the complete report before; but it will be realised that the compilation has involved an immense deal of labour and application, the leisure for which Mr. Chick has only been able to snatch at odd periods of respite from the constant interruptions of local routine cases, which ordinarily fill up his working day. For the last six weeks moreover the petty urgencies of the political situation here have absorbed the time of myself and staff almost entirely.

Although the Hamburg-Amerika line have paid no dividends for the past year; although it may be the case that their position is still weak, and those concerned in the enterprise undecided as to whether the game is worth the candle; although, too, the commercial credit of Messrs. Wundthausen seems to be depreciated in the view of our own merchants, and they are enquiring on business on lines which our nationals cannot imitate! In spite of all these considerations, the statistics of this second year of the German campaign, seems to me to indicate that they have no cause to be disappointed with their progress, rather that we are afforded material for urgent reflection and action.

Thus, it will be seen from the information now furnished, that notwithstanding the fact that the period under report has been one of universal depression in shipping circles, the amount of outward cargo carried by the Hamburg-Amerika vessels has been very nearly double what it was for the first twelve months, while their homeward freights remain almost at the same figure.

Our own companies meanwhile have had a very bad year. Messrs. Strick, I believe, complain that on their Gulf service they can only just make ends meet, and Messrs. Bucknall have been in difficulties, and in any case will be running on very modest lines. Our merchants on shore, while disinclined to admit on principle that they are not holding their own, complain, as above stated, that the German firm is working on lines on which they cannot compete unassisted.

I can well understand the hesitation of His Majesty's Government to embark on a system of subsidies properly so-called, the application of which among other agencies of Imperial commercial policy it may be difficult to limit to the Persian Gulf. But I must admit that if we intend to maintain our predominant interests and position in this region, the adoption of a definitely constructive policy both in commerce and politics seems forced upon us, and how any policy is to be fully effective at present, which does not include some form of State aid to our trade I find it difficult to conceive.

I think it will be conceded that our nationals have so far been most patient and most persevering under great stress. Indeed, we know that more than one of the chief Manchester firms interested have of late been placed in great practical difficulties owing to the large amount of capital represented by goods and outstandings absolutely tied up in Persia owing to the continuance of the chaotic order of things which has now endured for three years.

Unless we come to their aid, enable them to cope on more equal terms with

German enterprise, and take steps to provide security for their goods on the main trade routes, we surely cannot expect them to persevere much longer in the unequal and unprofitable struggle in which they have for so long been involved.

As Mr. George Lloyd has represented, it need not be a question of providing State subsidies for long or indefinite periods, but rather for limited periods on specific conditions for the accomplishment of a specific purpose.

I venture to urge that the reality of the menace which the prospect of permanent competition, commercial and political, by Germany in the Gulf signifies, and the vital importance to us of killing it in its infancy if it be possible, cannot be gainsaid, and in forwarding the present report I beg to express the earnest hope that the suggestions already made by Mr. Lloyd in the directions of State aid, now reitimated here, will be taken into lively consideration.

I have, &c.

P. Z. COX, Major, British Resident in the
Persian Gulf, and His Britannic Majesty's
Consul-General for Persia, &c.

Inclosure in No. 616.

Report on German Shipping and Trade in the Persian Gulf Region for the period from September 1907 to October 1908.

(Confidential.)

THE following report deals with the cargoes imported to and exported from all ports of the Persian Gulf by the steamers of the Hamburg-Amerika line, and the business thereby put into the hands of Messrs. Woonckhaus and Co. during the second year of steamer sailings, which roughly embraces the period September 1907 to the end of October 1908. In this period twelve steamers of the German line and one steamer chartered by them visited the Gulf ports.

The report is for convenience divided into two parts, consisting of:—

Part 1.—General observations applying to German operations as a whole.

Part 2.—Analysis of and remarks upon German trade to and from each of the Gulf ports separately, together with information regarding various samples of goods forwarded.

PART I.

Imports to Gulf.

The total number of packages carried by thirteen German steamers in the year under review, to all Gulf ports except Bassorah, was as compared with the first year of sailings (twelve ships):—

	1906-7.	1907-8.
Muscat	6,227	9,583
Bander Abbas	5,217	17,685
Lingah	25,564	19,514
Bahrein	10,098	27,091
Bushire	10,808	20,013
Mohammerah	19,026	21,311
Abuaz	813
Total	69,070	125,863

Of this total of 125,863 packages the following cargo was, according to ships' manifests, either the own property of Woonckhaus and Co. or consigned to them for their clients, viz:—

Woonckhaus and Co.'s Share of Imports.

Imported to Bushire—	
Kerosene (Fiume)	15,000 cases.
Sugar (Hamburg)	800 "
"	100 bags.
" (Antwerp)	300 cases.
Candles	1,100 "
Beer (Hamburg)	111 "
Window glass (Antwerp)	400 "
" (Hamburg)	50 "
Oils (Hamburg)	67 packages.
Colours (Hamburg)	54 "
Various	201 "
Total	18,519

To Bahrein—	
Coffee (Hamburg)	4,056 bags.
Sugar	2,100 "
"	1,260 cases.
Kerosene (Fiume)	15,000 "
Vermocelli (Marseilles)	500 "
Earthenware	230 "
Ironware	200 "
Perfumery	62 "
Cottons, woollens	87 bales.
Sundries	234 packages.
Total	23,723

To Lingah—	
Kerosene (Fiume)	7,050 cases.
Macaroni	3,085 "
Coffee (Hamburg)	660 bags.
Sugar (a very large portion of, say, 6,000 packages in all)	6,655 "
Cottons	199 bales.
Total (some)	17,619

To Mohammerah—	
Kerosene (Fiume)	7,500 cases.
To Bander Abbas—	
Kerosene (Fiume)	1,000 "
Total	68,306

Exports from Gulf.

Exports by Hamburg-Amerika steamers in 1907-1908, as compared with 1906-1907, comprised:—

Exports.	1906-7.	1907-8.
Muscat Packages	813
Bander Abbas " ..	1,236	9,172
Lingah " ..	6,031	38,728
Bahrein " ..	25,131	1,272
Bushire " ..	8,496	963
Mohammerah { Tons ..	8,192	3,329
	8,768	
Total { Packages ..	49,386	58,948
	5,768	3,329
Abu Musa (red oxide) { Tons	1,800

Woonckhaus and Co.'s Share of Exports.—Of the 1907-1908 figures, 1,800 tons of red oxide, the 9,172 packages from Lingah, most of the 23,760 packages shells from Bahrein, 3,329 tons of grain from Mohammerah, and not less than 1,364 packages from Bushire represent business done by Woonckhaus and Co.

Interdependence of interests of Hamburg-Amerika Line and Woonckhaus and Co.—In commenting on the past year's operations it is difficult to separate the interests of Messrs. Woonckhaus and Co. from those of the steamer line. They are clearly interdependent. That is to say, a scrutiny of their joint operations for the period under review shows that, on the one hand, the Hamburg-Amerika line would have had little import cargo, and practically no export cargo from Persian ports, had it not been for Messrs. Woonckhaus and Co.'s shipments; and, on the other hand, Messrs. Woonckhaus could not have maintained their new establishment except at a loss had it not been for the assistance derived from their agency to the Hamburg-Amerika line.

Reasons for this Presumption.—It will be remembered that, previous to the advent of the German line, Woonckhaus and Co. confined their business to Lingah and Bahrein. Their subsequent establishment of branches in the other ports offers a strong presumption therefore that the firm were given financial inducements by the steamer line to do so; for the small amount of trade then in their hands did not otherwise justify the drafting out of another half-dozen German assistants to the firm.

As to financial inducements in the shape of lower freight rates than those granted [1619]

to other traders, we hear on good authority that shipments of pearl shells by Wonekhaus and Co. from Bahrain are charged 1s. per ton less than those of Gray, Paul, and Co.

The monetary assistance given to the Hamburg-Amerika line by the venture, whether by German capitalists or by the German Government directly, would seem to extend even to a subsidised interest in the firm of Wonekhaus and Co. itself, though of this we have not yet been able to obtain a direct proof. A German member of the firm of Heinicke and Co., of Shiraz, stated only the other day in Bushire that Wonekhaus and Co. were subsidised.

Conduct of these businesses in 1907-8.—The trade operations of the German firm at Lingah, Bahrain, and Bushire are reported, by those best able to judge, to be of so reckless a nature that no British firm, relying on its own capital, could sustain the losses which Messrs. Wonekhaus and Co. incur over the extravagant commission offered on the purchase of shells, the credits given and the general nature of their terms at Lingah, and bad bargains made, e.g., in their import of kerosene.

On the other hand, neither the efforts of the steamer line nor the trading company seem to have met with the early success which was expected in Germany. The last two years have been very lean for trade all over Persia—and to some extent Mesopotamia—and the year 1908 has seen great scarcity of money and such a poor harvest that the export of grain from Bussorah practically ceased for several months, the German steamship "Savoia" having to go down in water ballast to Bombay to find export cargo there. On the Arab coast also the great slump in the price of pearls in the world's market had a most deleterious effect on commerce. We learn, moreover, that Mr. Wonekhaus has quarrelled with his principal in Hamburg, Traun, Strucken, and Co. over the conduct of the business in the Persian Gulf, and he has for the last two years been absent in Germany, where he is reported to be engaged in onlooking further financial support.

Unprofitable Results up till Present.—One cannot but conjecture that at present opinion in Germany is undecided as to whether the game is worth the candle, in view of the enormous expenses which would devolve upon the shipping line before it would pay its way, and the need of a substantial subsidy from the German Government meanwhile.

But Depressing Influence on British Lines.—On the other hand there is no doubt that the competition of the German line has considerably affected the British shipping companies. Rates have been cut to a fine margin. Cargo, e.g., sugar, which was formerly carried in British, is now carried in German bottoms, and the subsidy granted to the German steamer is enabling them to monopolise direct trade from Europe to Bahrain and Lingah, which has been off the usual run of the British lines on account of the heavy expenses involved by the deviation.

As Illustrated by Freight.—The position in the Gulf has changed considerably for the worse since the report made in November 1907, for the intentions of German policy have become more apparent, and the benefit of lower rates of freight seems only temporary, i.e., until the competition in rates between the British and German companies finishes. For the last year export rates from the Gulf direct to Europe have been below what they should be.

		Per ton of 40 cubic feet.					
		s.	d.	s.	d.	s.	d.
1902	20	0	14
1901	27	6	30
1905	30	0	..
1906-7	30	0	25
1907-8	20	0	15
1908-9	15	0	12

And Coercive Tactics of Hamburg-Amerika Line.—The first intimation of the pressure brought by Herr Ballin, of the Hamburg-Amerika line on the Anglo-Algerian and other British companies, was received by the shipping agents in Bushire early in July, and it was then understood that the British agencies were not to book freights to Hamburg, nor the German agency to London. Freights for Suez Canal and other ports remained open to a "friendly competition." This arrangement however has not been strictly adhered to by the German line, who have frequently booked cargo from Bushire to London, nor as regards Canal ports. But it soon became clear that the agreement concerned more especially outward freights from Hamburg and Antwerp to the Gulf ports, which were to be left to the German steamers. Since early in 1908 no British steamer appears to have brought cargo direct from Antwerp to Bushire.

Effect on British Trade.—The trial already given to the arrangement has however brought to light the damaging effect on British trade which its continuance would occasion. The import trade from Europe to the Gulf, cotton goods excepted, largely consists of articles which have a continental origin, or are re-exported from the United Kingdom. The important imports of Austrian crystal sugar to the Gulf, for instance, have hitherto come chiefly from Hamburg, but the trade being through British firms established in Persia, and there being no German line, it has all been shipped from English ports. Similarly with the still larger amounts of Belgian loaf sugar; this had been previously to 1906 all brought from Antwerp in British bottoms. Other secondary imports of this class are Belgian glassware, Swedish matches and iron, foreign earthenware, all of which have in the past been ordered from firms in England, and brought out in British vessels. The result of the British lines agreeing to leave Antwerp and Hamburg to be served by the German steamers alone, or their acquiescing in preferential rates being granted by the German line from these ports, has been to throw these classes of goods very largely into the hands of the German line and the German firm.

The last few German vessels in the period of this report, viz., after the agreement was signed, brought to Bunder Abbas no less than 11,110 bundles of iron and steel bars and sheets; the trade in Swedish matches in Bushire is now confined to exports from Hamburg, and orders are mostly put through Wonekhaus and Co. As there will be no means of preventing preferential rates being given over the German railway system to such imports as originate in or are transhipped through the North Sea ports, there is every reason to fear that trade in such classes of goods, both for Persia and Mesopotamia, will eventually be captured altogether by German houses and manufacturers.

Present need of His Majesty's Government's Support.—As far as one can gauge the actual results of the German pressure, it appears certain that His Majesty's Government must afford temporary State-aid to the British lines, to enable them, while the German position is still weak, to stifle the German competition once and for all, failing which the British companies of themselves will not maintain the competition, but will follow the line of least resistance, and come to terms with the powerful German line.

Especially at Present Juncture.—It is understood here that new negotiations will shortly be opened by the Hamburg-Amerika line, in order to force an agreement on the British lines still more favourable to German interests, and the attitude of the British companies in this respect is clearly a matter of great moment to British trade.

It is further understood that the agreement existing amongst the British shipping companies, which have hitherto formed the combine, is just expiring, and everything points to the Anglo-Algerian Steamship Company being left to bear the brunt of German competition. It is submitted that every effort ought to be made to support it against the policy of its powerful German rival.

There is no doubt that it is of great importance that we should make use of the present epoch, when the German company and firm are apparently in an artificial and unsound position, to concentrate every possible resource in the endeavour to drive them off the field.

How Support might be given.—As far as we can judge here, this end might be assisted in three ways—

(A.) By Subsidies.

For all Ports to be visited.—A financial incentive seems the only method of insuring that the Anglo-Algerian Company (or other steamers running in agreement with company) should visit regularly and frequently all Gulf ports, Bahrain, Bunder Abbas, and Lingah included, should call at Antwerp (and Hamburg), and should be capable of maintaining a rate war for a time.

The amount of financial assistance necessary for this can only be estimated in London, but it might be useful to note, in reckoning the extra consumption of coal, that the mileage from Muscat, via Bunder Abbas, to Lingah, Bahrain, and Bushire, is about 778 miles, as against 582 miles from Muscat to Bunder direct; an extra four days would have to be reckoned for.

Export of Shells.—The second item needing a financial stimulus is the export of pearl and oyster shells from Bahrain and Lingah in British ships. It was urged in Major Cox's despatch No. 205 of the 19th January, 1908, that the British India Steam Navigation Company should be induced by the Government of India to grant a rate of

freight for through transshipment to London and Hamburg, which would enable the British firm shipping to take a larger share of the trade than the half, to which they are limited by the 1s. preference rates accorded by the German line to their own agents, in addition to lower freight rates. The market for shells has only been transferred of recent years from London to Hamburg, and a preferential treatment accorded by a British shipping company to shells shipped to England might possibly conduce to these being put on the foreign markets at cheaper rates than now.

Import of Sugar.—A third matter of great concern, in which purely commercial measures do not seem to altogether meet the situation, is the annually increasing import of German, Austrian, and Belgian sugars, as against the Mauritius and Marseilles sugar, which until recently formed the bulk of the trade. The following figures are the latest available:—

Imported to—					Loaf.	Crystal.
					Cwts.	Cwts.
Bushire	98,033	39,504
Bunder Abbas	37,255	24,551
Bahrain	962	8,137
Lingah	7,253	18,000 (cwt.)
Mohammedali	28,405	12,829
Muscat	28,405	24,204
Kowet		12,378
						20,400
						12,378

Out of the 98,033 cwts. of loaf sugar imported to Bushire in 1907-8 only 35,038 cwts. were of French origin—a large falling-off from the 41,097 and 109,753 cwts. from France in 1905 and 1906-7, whilst 51,600 cwts. were reckoned to be sugar exported from a Belgian refinery, and the balance was Hungarian sugar. The imports to Bunder Abbas, Bahrain and Lingah are altogether composed of Belgian and Hungarian sugars. Similarly, the import of crystal sugar to the Gulf is almost entirely confined to Austrian E.A.R. crystals, which are exported from a depot in Hamburg, with the exception of a brand S.P., which has been introduced from Germany by Wonnekhaus and Co. It will be remembered that the German consul at Bagdad, in his report for 1906, alluded to the "brisk trade in Belgian sugar from Antwerp which had been opened with the Gulf ports." There seem to be signs that the German steamer line is endeavouring to obtain the bulk of the carrying trade for continental sugar (except French), and should the rumour that the Austrian Lloyd intend to open up a connection with the Gulf prove true, the sugar business will be likely to slip still more from British hands.

A report on the sugar trade in the Gulf was sent to the Foreign Office in April 1908, and it was hoped that with this information, Messrs. Tate and Son would see their way to send local shipments of their article to various Gulf ports. In May 1908 a European named Guays did present himself at Bushire on behalf of Messrs. Tate, and inquired at the consulate-general whether a monopoly could be granted for the import of their sugar to Kowet. This was hardly a feasible project, and the Sheikh of Kowet refused to entertain it. Even if granted it would not appear to be likely to assist the introduction of British sugar into the Persian ports where we want to see it. Messrs. Tate's representative strangely enough confined his inquiries to Bunder Abbas and Kowet, and we trust that his rather perfunctory visit will not be the sum total of their interest in this market.

Under the circumstances the Board of Trade might advisably be asked to urge Messrs. Tate to do something in the matter, and should the latter's prices be too prohibitive to compete with continental sugar, as appears likely, further to consider whether some form of State interference would not be possible.

Falling into Hands of German Line.—Meantime, there is a large amount of continental sugar being brought out to the Gulf in German steamers by British firms, which need not so be brought if the British lines could be induced to call regularly both at Antwerp and Hamburg and also at the smaller Gulf ports; 5,019 bags at Mohammedali, 5,100 bags and 820 cases at Bushire, 6,655 bags of soft and 1,307 bags of loaf sugar at Lingah, 1,497 bags and 500 cases at Bunder Abbas, 3,797 bags and 1,460 cases at Bahrain, 13,154 bags of crystal sugar and 27,841 cases and bags of loaf sugar at Bussorah and Bagdad, representing a total of 69,200 packages, were brought by German

steamers in the year under report, and of this the greater part are consignments brought out by the several British firms, which would have come in British bottoms had there been British steamers to bring them.

Crystal Sugar from Mauritius.—As regards crystal sugar, an article of large consumption amongst the Arab than the Persian inhabitants of the Gulf, Government has already been informed of the attempt made from Bushire to assist the import of Mauritius sugar all round the Gulf. The Mauritius Government has been approached twice, but so far only one firm in Mauritius has been moved to make a trial, the credit system of business in Persia being rather incomprehensible to Mauritius exporters.

Altogether 150 bags have been consigned to Bushire, 100 to Dubai, 50 to Kowet, 50 to Lingah, and 50 to Bahrain. I am informed that orders for 700 more have now been secured at Bahrain and 150 at Kowet. Mauritius sugar is handicapped in the Gulf market, even given its prices are no higher than those of continental production; popular taste demands a whiter, larger crystal like "E.A.R." The only way of assisting it to recapture a fair share of the trade seems to point to cheaper freights from Mauritius direct or via Bombay. In March 1908 the freight by British India Steam Navigation Company steamer direct was 1 rs. 4 a. (=20d.) per 75 kilog.—exorbitantly high. The desirability of encouraging the export of this sugar to the Gulf by tempting rates of freight is perhaps worthy of suggestion to the British India Steam Navigation Company; a rate of 8 or 10 annas per 75 kilog should be aimed at.

Bombay is a central depot for the import of Mauritius sugar, and we have also tried to induce a British Indian firm in Bombay to try this sugar in Bushire, but without result as yet.

A further measure likely to make it more convenient to merchants to import Mauritius sugar is a reduction of the telegraph rate to and from Mauritius to the Gulf. This at the present time is 3 r. 11 a. per word, a prohibitive price for merchants telegraphing small orders. As there were no telegrams sent from Bushire to Mauritius in 1906 and 1907, and only two in 1908, a reduction should not prove difficult or unreasonable.

(B.) By British Firms not Shipping in German Vessels.

It has been shown that out of the total imports to all Gulf ports, except Bussorah, viz., 125,863 packages, some 68,396 were either the own property of Wonnekhaus and Co., or consigned to them for their clients.

Messrs. Ziegler's Shipments in German Ships.—At Bushire the British firm, Ziegler and Co., of Manchester, imported—

Russian crystal sugar by German boat	4,700 bags.
Dutch cottons—					
From Antwerp	283 bales.
From Marseilles	24 bales.
Glassware—					
From Antwerp	28 cases.
From Hamburg	16 cases.
Matches	55 cases.
Total packages	5,181

And others.—Messrs. Gray, Dawes, and Co., of London, have purchased 36 crates and cases of glassware in Germany for a client in Bushire, and brought them out in German steamers, and they have imported to Bahrain by German steamers:—

Crystal sugar (Hamburg)	2,196 bags.
Matches (Austria, Sweden)	250 cases.
Vernicelli (Marseilles)	125 "
Lampware (Hamburg)	21 "
Sundries (Hamburg)	235 "
Total packages	2,827

I further observe 23 cases cotton-silk velvet, imported to Bushire by Haji Al Akbar and Sons (Limited), of Manchester from Hamburg, and 11 cases plush. Total—46 packages.

At Bunder Abbas the consignees of the 14,368 bundles of iron and steel bars, &c., are, so His Majesty's consul states, exclusively Hindu firms from India, who imported them through firms in Karachi, e.g., Forbes, Forbes, and Co., and through Gray, Paul, and Co., at Bushire (Gray, Dawes, and Co., London).

Thus a few British firms are responsible for giving 22,468 packages of freight to

these German steamers, nearly all of foreign manufacture and origin. In the conviction that the presence of the German line and company in the Gulf, if continued, is likely to damage the trade hitherto done by British firms, might it not be advisable to approach privately the firms mentioned, and suggest their endeavouring to arrange their shipments by British vessels only, during a trial year or two? Were the British cargo taken away next year, and arrangements made for the calling of British ships at the smaller ports, the Hamburg-America line would find their import cargoes heavily reduced.

(C.) *By encouraging British Goods to compete with German Goods of the same class on the market.*

The third means of discouragement of the joint German enterprise, is to try to obtain, through the Board of Trade, British articles of manufacture to out-compete the goods now in demand in Persia, which afford cargo to the German vessels. To enable the Board of Trade to get the best possible idea of these, samples are being forwarded; but these are several lines calling for special attention. Sugar has been mentioned.

As illustrated by Kerosene.—As will be seen from the statistics, Messrs. Woonckhaus and Co. have imported from Fiume 35,550 cases to the Gulf ports last year, and 61,579 to Bassorah. The trade-mark of this Hungarian oil is two stars. Each case contains two tins of about 65 lb. weight each. The oil is believed to have been imported on a contract price for one year. This Majesty's consul at Fiume writes that the rate of freight to the Gulf is 1s. to 1s. 2d. per case, subject to special relates, and the approximate price per case is 3s. 6d. to 3s. 9d. At present, local prices in the Gulf are about 14 krans, equal, at present rate of exchange, about 5s. This would not leave much profit to the importers, so that it is most probable that they have a substantial rebate.

The only other sources of importation of kerosene are the United States and Russia (via Odessa and Suez). The import of Russian oil has fallen off considerably of late years. At Bushire, 3,000 cases in 1904, 18,000 cases in 1905, nil in 1906, 2,000 cases in 1907. The brand "Anchor" is, however, preferred by local Persians to any other for its quality. The American oil "Monkey" brand has gained a bad name in Bushire on account of the smoky light it affords. It is imported every year or so direct from New York by chartered steamer. In 1906, 158,850 cases were imported—20,100 to Muscat, 30,250 to Bahrain, 35,500 to Bushire, 73,000 to Mohammara and Bassorah. Prices of this oil have been forced down by German competition in 1909 to 13 krans per case, but its inferiority to the German prevents it from keeping the latter out of the market, as it should. The agents of the American brand are Gray, Paul, and Co., and it was hoped that they would have made better use of their agency for the Standard Oil Trust to drive the Hungarian oil out of the market. Should the Alwaz oil scheme prove profitable, there is little probability of foreign oil competing locally, but, meantime, Gray, Paul, and Co. might use their agency as a handle with which to beat the German importers. Apparently the Burma Oil Company cannot compete, owing to some understanding arrived at with the Standard Oil Trust.

Import of Indigo.

The import to the three ports, Bushire, Bender Abbas, Mohammara, declined from 378 cases in 1906-7 to 162 cases, despite the activity in Shiraz of German agents for the two manufactories importing. This result may be attributed partly to the bad state of trade generally and partly to the conservatism of the native population, but there is no doubt that the Indian natural article is seriously threatened. In 1908 reference was made from Bushire to the Government of India, with a view to ascertain if the synthetic dye of the "Badische Anilin Fabrik" ought not to be construed as coming within the prohibition of the Persian tariff against imports containing aniline in any form. As aniline does not necessarily occur in the synthesis of indigo, the Government of India decided that a protest could not be maintained on the ground of the prohibition.

In consequence, it only remains to attempt to keep good quality dyes on the market by introducing them to importers in Persia, and the Commercial Intelligence Department in India are being asked to endeavour to stimulate merchants in Madras to put themselves in touch with the Shiraz and Isfahan consulates. A member of the firm of Esent and Sarkis, in Isfahan, who passed through Bushire in 1908, made a specific complaint of the lack of good quality Indian dyes there, whereas he had made a successful trial with the German indigo.

Bushire customs returns show:—

	March 1906-7.	March 1907-8.	1908-9 (nine months).
	Cwts.	Cwts.	Cwts.
India	1,444	2,160	600
Germany	76	264	117

Export of Tobacco (Tombaku).

Attention is drawn to the export of tobacco from Bushire, now practically a monopoly in the hands of the "Société de Tombac" of Constantinople. In the Persian fiscal year 1907-8 this amounted to 19,506 bags, or 336,618 lb. of tobacco—nearly 20,000 cwt. In addition to the Turkish monopoly the Egyptian monopoly export from Persia amounted in the same period to 2,240 bags = 2,108 cwt.

The annual carriage of 1,100 tons freight is a matter of some interest to shipping companies. The agency of the "société" at Bushire has been for some years past with the Russian steamship company's agency, who retain the tobacco as far as possible for their vessels. At one period in 1908 it seemed as if the steamship service and agency would both be withdrawn altogether, but apparently the Russian Government subsidy has been again voted. In any case, a considerable amount of the tobacco has to be given by the Russian agents as freight to other lines, by reason of the paucity of their own sailings. The British combine has thus benefited largely from the friendly terms on which it has stood with the Russian steamer agents.

But the German agent at Bushire has already attempted in 1903 to obtain the tobacco for his ships. Herr Heinicke has this year been named agent at Shiraz for the "Société" vice a British subject, and similarly at Mohammara the agency has been lately transferred from Lynch Brothers to Ter Meulen, Grutman, and Co., a Dutch firm, who are shippers in German boats. In June last the Bushire agents of the Anglo-Algerian line wrote to the director of the "Société de Tombac" at Constantinople asking for preference shipment by his steamers. The reply was a non-committal one.

Desiderata put forward in 1906-7 Report.

Of the various points brought forward and recommendations made in 1907 only No. 2 has been actively taken up as yet, viz., the lighterage from British steamers in British owned lighters.

Lighterage Company at Bushire.

Some progress has been made at Bushire towards the establishment of a lighterage company. The British India Company's agents received instructions at the end of 1908 to have six sailing lighters built, and in February 1909 orders to undertake the lighterage of their own steamers at a rate of 2 r. 8 a. = 3s. 4d. per ton, the other British shipping companies having apparently not yet joined them in the venture. The measure has created a little resentment amongst lighterage and merchants owing to the high rate charged and suddenness of the step, but this will die down. The sooner the Anglo-Algerian and Bombay-Persian companies decide to join the movement, the easier will the position become, and it is again urged that a small steaming lighter will make all the difference, both for speed on the many windless days of the year, and for proving to the natives the superiority of the new scheme.

Other Branches of German Activity.

Apart from the subjects discussed above, there were several other features of German interest in these regions during the year under review.

Commercial Mission of Herr Kurt Jung.

This official was dispatched in the capacity of commercial delegate of the German Empire to make an exhaustive study of trade conditions in Southern and Eastern

Persia with the object of putting German commerce in direct relations with various Persian centres. He visited Yazd, Kerman, Bunder Abbas, Bahrein, Bushire, and Shiraz in succession.

At Bushire he inspected the bazaars, obtained statistics from the customs, and interviewed the principal merchants; to one of them he announced his intention of seeing that on his return to Germany more inducement was offered to direct trade between Persian and German merchants by better credits being offered in Germany.

While in Shiraz he manifested to Mr. Grahame particular interest in the consumption of sugar in the Shiraz district. In expressing his concurrence with the pessimistic views of the commercial outlook held by the German merchant in Shiraz, he regretted "that he should yet be called upon to write in an optimistic vein."

The Export of Red Oxide from Island of Abu Musa.

The German Government were successful in obtaining for Messrs. Wonekhaus and Co. the acquiescence of His Majesty's Government on behalf of the Sheikh of Shargah to their removing the oxide accumulated previous to suspension of the disputed lease by the Sheikh of Shargah, and the steam-ship "Louise" took away some 1,800 tons in 1908.

The knowledge that German influence was also at work at Tehran with a view to securing rights in connection with the more valuable deposits on the island of Hormuz goes to prove that, apart from any political and strategic designs, the German element is bent on securing a portion, or the whole, of the red oxide trade in order to provide a further stand-by for the business of both Wonekhaus and the Ilanburg-American line.

The question of the supply of the demand for red oxide seems likely to be complicated by the fact that many islands in the Gulf besides the two above mentioned contain deposits of the mineral, though of varying quality.

German Agent at Bushire Norwegian Vice-Consul.

The appointment of the German agent of Wonekhaus and Co. at Bushire as Norwegian vice-consul has no *bona fide* justification, for Norway has no imports or exports to and from Southern Persia. It is understood that there has been a similar German appointment at Tehran. At Bushire the measure would appear to be solely designed as a means of putting a German firm in a more advantageous position than English firms, while strengthening the hand of the German vice-consulate.

H. G. C.

PART II.

Imports into Bushire (September 21, 1907, to October 2, 1908).

Cargo.	1906-7.	1907-8.	Invoice or Approximate Value.
Hamburg—			£
Matches	Cases .. 1,720	835	1,974
Cotton goods	" .. 77	20	230
Woolen goods	" .. 5	37	828
Velvet and plushes	" .. 75	75	2,009
Leaf sugar	" .. 720	820	569
"	Bags .. 700		
Crystal sugar	" .. 5,100		7,140
Liquors: Whisky, &c.	Cases .. 87	318	
Beer	" .. 90	198	290
Cocoa	" .. 6		
Drugs	" .. 120	171	2,297
Glassware	" .. 28	38	426
Iron and brassware	" .. 30	35	30
Lampware	" .. 22	10	77
Carried forward	3,651	7,487	16,718

Cargo.	1906-7.	1907-8.	Invoice or Approximate Value.
Brought forward	3,651	7,487	£ 16,718
Hamburg (continued)—			
Sewing machines	Cases .. 25	21	168
Stationery	" .. 113		113
Paper, in bundles	" .. 73	170	869
Colours	" .. 60	130	66
Miscellaneous	Packages .. 113	106	
Personal	" .. 113	39	
Earthenware and porcelain	Cases .. 75	75	788
Provisions	" .. 28	112	
Indigo	" .. 18	327	
Furniture	" .. 27	30	
Oils: Linseed, castor, turpentine	" .. 97	69	
Total	4,148	8,198	19,137
Antwerp—			
Indigo	Cases .. 358	42	763
Cotton goods	" .. 171	368	2,909
Leaf sugar	" .. 1,600	550	650
Soft sugar	" .. 615		
Liquors: Whisky, wine	Cases .. 106		
Gaudes	" .. 800	1,100	540
Window glasses	" .. 1,700	520	139
Glassware	" .. 239	46	478
Miscellaneous	" .. 65	35	
Colours	" .. 42	680	
Cloth, woolen bale	Bales .. 13	325	
Total	5,688	2,716	6,434
Marseilles—			
Packages	220	99	
Fiume—			
Kerosene	Cases .. 752	15,000	£ 3,818
		(540,000 kilogs.)	

BUSHIRE.

Exports (13 ships).

Cargo.	1906-7.	1907-8.	Approximate Local Value.
Opium (for London)	Chests .. 103	199	£ 13,472
Gum, Tragacanth (Hamburg, London, and Antwerp)	Cases .. 657	1,016	5,542
Gum, insoluble	Bags .. 2,391		
Tobacco (Red Sea and Mediterranean ports).	Bales .. 295	611	1,224
Carpets (New York and Red Sea)	" .. 92	39	1,418
Poppysseed (Hamburg)	" .. 1,708	161	110
Linseed (Hamburg)	" .. 440	171	96
Quinidin seed (Hamburg)	" .. 51	41	88
Raisins (New York)	" .. 1,649	705	1,923
Rosewater (Red Sea ports)	Cases .. 174		
Barley (Hamburg)	" .. 108		
Wheat (Hamburg)	" .. 520	208	
Wool, raw (London)	Bales .. 45	102	2,782
Skins (London)	" .. 1	5	109
Cotton, raw	" .. 80		
Shells (Hamburg)	Baskets .. 320		124
Dates	" .. 626		
Almonds	Bags .. 400		
Miscellaneous	Packages .. 5	4	
Total packages	8,496	4,272	28,110

Imports.

[N.B.—Exchange cannot be exactly stated, varying as it does from 53 to 58 krans ; per 1l. At present about 55 per 1l.]

In considering the increased import cargo—26,013 packages as against 10,808 packages in 1906-7—it will be noticed that 15,000 cases of these contained kerosene from Fiume, in item which may or may not reappear in subsequent years, as depends on the measures taken by other importers of oil. Similarly 5,100 bags of sugar from Hamburg are accounted for by an unwonted opportunity of placing Russian crystals on the Bushire market which is not likely to recur often.

The various ports of origin for this cargo, as compared with 1906-7, were:—

		1906-7.		1907-8.	
		Packages.	£	Packages.	£
Hamburg	4,148	13,371	8,108	19,147
Antwerp	5,688	18,106	2,776	6,434
Marseilles	324	2,051	99	—
Fiume	752	241	15,000	3,818
		10,808	33,371	26,013	29,399

HAMBURG CARGO.

Matches.—The following totals are obtained for the various ports:—

		1906-7.	1907-8.
Bander Abbas	Cases. 2,270	17
Mohammerah	19
Bahrein	355
Bushire	1,720
Total	4,355	1,251

Hamburg is at present the port for transshipment of the Swedish matches in vogue in Southern Persia.

Sample No. 1.—Vulcan Trade-mark, "Globe" brand, in sulphur match made at Tidaholm in Sweden, and preferred by the peasantry to any safety matches on account of the easy ignition. Local price in Bushire: 162½ krans per case of fifty gross of about seventy-five matches, each 1½ inches in length. Invoice price (February 1909) c.i.f., Bushire is 50s. per case. Shippers in Hamburg are manifested as Vogler and Trummer (London House, 6, Lloyd's Avenue).

Sample No. 2.—"Key" brand, Austrian small safety matches. . . . Local price wholesale in Bushire: 125 krans per case of fifty gross. Latest invoice price available was 2l. 19s. 5d. c.i.f. Bushire.

We have lately received an enquiry from R. Bell and Co., the London manufacturers, as to the sale of their brands (but safety matches and priced at some 1s. 7d. per gross, presumably L.o.b. London). Would the Board of Trade ascertain what this firm's price c.i.f. Bushire would be for cases of fifty gross sulphur matches after the style of the Vulcan sample, and fixing them the prices of other British concerns.

Cotton Goods.—Only twenty cases were landed in 1907-8. Of these eleven were Manchester goods sent via Hamburg. Seven bales were German manufactures by Konig and Kuhlmann; no samples are securable.

Woolen Goods.—Increase from five to thirty-seven bales. Sixteen bales of woollen yarn were shipments by Times Dharwar and Co. destined for Isfahan; these are German manufactures. Invoice value of ten of these bales was 223l. 16s. 6d. Ten bales of yarn similarly went through to Isfahan, the shippers' name being Wilhelm Liepke. The weight of the bales is about 28½ Bushire mauns each = app. 185 lbs., English. Duty at Bushire 1 kran per 6½ lbs.

Sample No. 3.—Berlin wool, "Swan" brand, 3s. 8d. per lb. c.i.f., Bushire, according to invoice price.

Sample No. 4.—"Zephyr" yarn, pink, 3s. 3½d. per lb., c.i.f.

Sample No. 5.—"Zephyr" yarn, white, 3s. per lb., c.i.f.

Various black and white qualities are also imported; prices, 3s. 1d., 3s. 1½d., 3s. 4½d., 2s. 11½d. per lb. c.i.f.

Velvets and Plushes.—Seventy-six cases of velvets and plushes were landed from Hamburg in 1907-8, as against fifty-eight cases in 1906-7.

Of the seventy-six cases, twenty-seven were plushes and half-silk plushes shipped by Fetschi and Loez-z, of Hamburg, to Essal and Sarkis, an Armenian firm in Isfahan. They have declined to give samples when requested by His Majesty's consul-general, but a recent sample has been since obtained in Bushire. The manufacturers are T. L. du Ball et Cie. Nachfolger, of Lobberich (Rheinland). The colours supplied seem to be green and pink chiefly, also a little yellow and blue. The material, according to the invoice, is 63½ per cent. cotton and 36½ per cent. silk; or 67 per cent. cotton, 33 per cent. silk; or 59½ per cent. cotton and 40½ per cent. silk. The prices given below are freight free to quay in Hamburg. The cases are 91 × 79 × 54 centim. Gross weight from 68 to 70 kilog.; twelve, thirteen, or fourteen pieces to the case. Net weight about 30-42 to 33-18 kilog., plus packing, 39-72 to 43-12 kilog.

Sample No. 6.—Green plush; width, 18 inches; length of piece 29 yds. 1 ft.; price, 121 marks = 1s. 5d. per yard. Material: cotton 63½ per cent., silk 36½ per cent. *

The invoice value of these twenty-seven cases was 14,285 marks = 714l. 5s. 0d. Another ten cases imported also bore the same shipping mark.

Twenty-three cases velvets and cotton-silk velvets were shipped by Haji Ali Akbar and Sons (Limited), of Manchester, from Hamburg, as also eleven cases plushes. Samples of these are at present unobtainable from Isfahan.

Loaf Sugar.—Import by German steamer increased from 720 to 820 cases, of which 800 were imported by the German agency. The brand is U. T. O., a speciality of Messrs. Wonekhaus and Co., the label herewith attached bearing the firm's name in Persian. Local price is 63½ krans per case cash, and another quotation 6s. krans per bag of thirty-six cones at one month's credit.

Sample No. 7.—A cone of U. T. O. sugar (not sent).

Crystal Sugar.—Of the 5,100 bags imported in 1907-8, 4,700 were Russian crystals, as per—

Sample No. 8.—Invoice price at the date of order was 13s. 11d. per cwt. There is no regular demand for this brand, but price at the time proved 2s. 3d. per cwt. more favourable than the Austrian E. A. R.

The remaining 600 bags were partly, if not all, of the S. P. brand, a speciality of Wonekhaus and Co., and a German sugar.

Beer.—Attention is called to the sale of German beer in Southern Persia, chiefly for European consumption of course.

		1906-7.	1907-8.
Bander Abbas	Cases	12
Ahwaz	20
Lingbi	20
Bahrein	90
Total	200

A certain amount of German beer is also imported from India. The demand in this climate is only for beers of the lightest nature, but we should like to see the experiment tried of a light English beer of the nature of Wrexham Lager, or even lighter, if the Commercial Intelligence Department can state where such a beer can be obtained.

Sample No. 9.—A specimen bottle of Wonekhaus' light coloured Pilsener beer of the Pilsener-Urquell brand. The retail price in Bushire c.i.f. is 23 rupees per case of forty-eight bottles.

Sample No. 10.—A specimen bottle of Wonekhaus' dark-coloured Munich beer. Retail price Bushire c.i.f. 22 rupees per case of four dozen (not sent).

Drugs and Chemicals.—One hundred and seventy-one cases of drugs were imported in German steamers in 1907-8 as against 120 cases in 1906-7. Thirty-seven cases, with a total value of 22,400 krans, were exported from Hamburg by Koch and Reimers and forwarded to the "Pharmacie Militaire" in Tehran. His Majesty's vice-consul at Tehran has been asked whether this military pharmacy is under German management, and if not, it might be possible to introduce a British firm exporting chemist's goods to

* See Addenda, p. 306.

† Not reproduced.

the management of the "Pharmacie."* The other 140 cases were almost all consigned to chemists in Tehran, e.g., the German chemist Schwinn, the French Maulion, and the Armenian Carnick Dalgoudjian. Firms exporting from Hamburg were Koch and Reimers, and Blombel Gebrüder, medicaments particularly mentioned being chlorate of potash and vasoline (twenty-five cases). An invoice of the vasoline shipped by J. D. Riedel, "Aktiengesellschaft," in Berlin for the German chemist in Tehran gives three cases "white" vasoline, 80 kilog. weight, size 120×36×30 centim. Each case holds fourteen tins of 5 kilog. each and costs, with discount, 60.20 marks=3*l.* 0*s.* 2*d.* Another three cases contained each 130 tins of half a kilog. each, costing, with discount, 66.95 marks=3*l.* 6*s.* 9*d.* There is a flourishing trade for chemists in Tehran, and perhaps British exporters could be given good introductions there.

Paper.—One hundred and seventy bales of paper were imported to Bushire from Germany in 1907-8 as against 166 bales in 1906-7, nearly all destined for Tehran, the market for papers in Persia. Of the former twenty-nine cases printing paper were consigned to the "Imprimerie Phares" in Tehran by Fertsch and Lacisz, of Hamburg, and sixteen bales wrapping paper to the German chemist in Tehran by Koch and Reimers. An invoice for wrapping paper supplied by J. D. Riedel, "Aktiengesellschaft," in Berlin, to Tehran, gives prices for two cases of 87 and 88 kilog. each containing 730 sheets as 70.10 marks=3*l.* 10*s.* 10*d.* per 1,460 sheets. Kahn and Kahn also exported seventy-four bales of paper, presumably for printing purposes, and we notice the name of James Spicer and Sons exporting twenty bales. There seems no reason why all the considerable amount of paper required annually in Tehran should not be English, instead of German. Perhaps British paper manufacturers and firms could be put in direct touch with buyers in Tehran instead of applying to Bushire, where there is no market; 149 packages at least of the total went through without breaking bulk, so that samples are not available here.†

Linseed and Turpentine.—Out of 97 drums of turpentine and linseed imported 53 were brought from Hamburg to the order of a British subject in Bushire. As regards turpentine, the drums hold, some 5 gallons and some 10 gallons, and the value of the total 53 drums was 41*l.* 17*s.* They were for use on the Persian Customs buildings. The present prices at which they were bought are 2*s.* 6*d.* per gallon, and the second quality 2*s.* 2*d.* per gallon, c.i.f., Bushire. The British subject in question will probably require some 200 gallons during 1909, and would like to know English quotations.

Glassware.—Ninety-eight cases imported as against twenty-eight in 1906-7. Sixteen cases of the former (with a total declared value of 6,565 kranas) were procured by Messrs. Ziegler and Co. to the order of the Alldich Company in Shiraz from Messrs. Vairon and Co. and Tschekert and Co. in Hamburg. Of these His Majesty's consul at Shiraz informs us that five cases were tall glass candle-stands with elongated glass shades, each case containing twenty to twenty-five stands or shades; two cases contained coloured glass tumblers with saucers to match, for which there is some sale in Shiraz.

Sample No. 11.—Tumbler with saucer. Retail price 10 kranas. Two cases contained thick glass trays.

Sample No. 12.—Thick glass tray. Retail price in Shiraz 18 kranas each. (N.B.—Both these samples bear the mark of the Compagnie des Cristalleries de Baccant.) Six other cases contained large flower-holders 2 feet and 1 foot high, sold in sets, but almost all still unsold. There is in ordinary years a certain sale for flower-stands and vases in Shiraz and Isfahan, and another British firm has been trying Bohemian-made glass this year in Shiraz. Some English glass-making firms might be recommended to Messrs. Ziegler in this connection.

Thirty-four crates and cases of glassware, chiefly tumblers, decanters (total value of 100*l.* 9*s.* 3*d.*) were also brought by Messrs. Gray, Dawes, and Co. from Hamburg for a customer in Bushire. I much doubt if this order is likely to be repeated.

Lacqueware.—Nine cases went through to Tehran, bulk unbroken, value of the same being 3,850 kranas.

China and earthenware.—Import of seventy-five cases. Thirty-nine of these were unfractured as porcelain plates and twenty-four cases as crockery shipped by Alois Schweiger and Co., of Hamburg, and bills of lading consigned to the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China at Bombay, and forwarded to Shiraz. They were, it is understood, a sort of desert or fruit plate, with a portrait of the Shah in the centre. No samples available at Bushire.

* See Addenda, p. 307.

† Ibid., p. 307.

ANTWERP CARGO.

Cotton goods.—368 bales imported in 1907-8 as against 171 bales in 1906-7. Of these 323 bales were imports on consignment by Messrs. Ziegler and Co. from G. J. van Heek and Zonen of Enschede in Holland, with a total value of 140,495 kranas (2,554*l.*), being drills and cambrics of Dutch manufacture, which have had a constant market in Isfahan for some years past. There is no sale for them in Bushire and Shiraz, and they do not break bulk.

Sample No. 13.—Cambrics "Peacock" brand, 16 yards per piece, 44 inches wide, costing 4*s.* 1*d.* per piece c.i.f.

Sample No. 14.—Cambrics "Lion and Sun" brand, 16 yards per piece, 44 inches wide, costing 4*s.* 1*d.* per piece c.i.f. Bushire.

Sample No. 15.—Black drills, 26 inches wide, 40 yards per piece, at 9*s.* 2*d.* per piece c.i.f. Bushire.

Sample No. 16.—Grey drills, 28 inches wide, 40 yards per piece, at 9*s.* per piece c.i.f. Bushire.

To the last prices has to be added 10*d.* per piece, packing, for freight and insurance.

Perhaps the Board of Trade would consider the possibility of either (1) putting some Manchester firm up to a trial of British drills and cambrics, vying in quality and as cheap in price as these Dutch goods, which ought not to have this constant market in Persia; or (2) ascertaining whether Messrs. Ziegler would change their source of supply. (See also under Mohammerrahi).

Of the remaining bales from Antwerp, thirty-nine bales were shipped by the Holland Bombay Trading Company (Limited) to Shiraz, and have not yet been traced on the market.

Candles.—Total imports to Gulf ports in 1906-7 was 1,898 cases (Bushire 800 cases), and to Bushire in 1907-8, 1,100 cases.

These are specially consigned by Traun, Strucken and Co., of Hamburg, the principals of Wonckhans and Co., to the latter for sale. They are stearine candles from the Apollo manufactory at Schiedam, in Holland, and are in two brands.

Sample No. 17.—"Paragon," thirty packets of six candles per case. Wholesale price in Bushire, 28 kranas.

Sample No. 18.—"Excelsior," thirty packets of six candles per case. Wholesale price, Bushire, 26½ kranas.

In January 1909 the retail price of the latter was 25 kranas per case, customs duty lying with the local buyer (almost another 2 kranas). These Dutch stearine candles are more heavily priced than the Burmah Oil Company's wax candles, to the extent of 3 or 4 kranas per case, but there is always a good sale for stearine candles for use in the Gulf in preference to wax candles on account of the susceptibility of the latter to the heat. Another point about this import of stearine candles is that they all seem to be made in Holland, in Schiedam or Amsterdam, but bear the marks of different importing firms. Thus until lately Messrs. D. Sassoon and Co. were large importers of a brand also made at the Apollo factory in Schiedam. The Customs statistics for the year March 1906-7 and March 1907-8 show 1,221 and 1,473 cwt.s. respectively, coming from stearine candles in the United Kingdom, would the Board of Trade think it advisable to put them in communication with British firms trading in the Gulf, so as, if possible, to lessen the need of British firms going to Holland for the article?

Window-glass.—Following are figures for the last two years by German steamers only:—

	1906-7.	1907-8.
Bushire	Cases ..	1,790
Bahrein	" ..	50
Bander Abbas	" ..	100
Mohammerrahi	" ..	400
Total	" ..	1,800
		670

As far as the import to Bushire was concerned, it was all business done by the German firm. Window-glass is brought chiefly in two colours—blue and red—and also

* See Addenda, p. 307.

the plain white. The import is, it is believed, at present totally of Belgian manufacture. Customs statistics at Bushire show:—

						£	Cwts.
March, 1907-7	1,206	= 930
" 1907-8	703	582

Generally imported in cases of sixty panes, 12 × 10 inches and thirty 24 × 12 inches.

Sample No. 19, (a) and (b).—Blue and red glass. Case weighs about 70 lbs. Duty $\frac{1}{4}$ kran per 6½ lbs., and coolie hire $\frac{1}{2}$ kran per case. Current retail price 30 krans. Cost price, 7 rs. 8 a. = 10s. c.i.f. Bushire.

Sample No. 20.—White glass. Retail price, 20 krans; cost price, 5s. 4d. Weighs about 60 lbs. Sixty panes, 10 × 12 inches.

MARSEILLES CARGO.

Cotton Goods.—Messrs. Ziegler and Co. have again imported from Switzerland, this year ten bales per German steamer for Shiraz and fourteen bales for Isfahan. The manufacturers appear to be Trumpy, Schaeppi and Co., of Mülledi. Those imported to Shiraz were all of one quality, and are reported still unsold.*

Sample No. 21 (b).—Known on the Shiraz market as "Yazma." The quotation is 21 krans for five dozen, cash. A square scarf, black with green-flowered border. Weight of the bales was 24 Shiraz minus 180 lbs., including packing. Length of the bale 3 feet.

Exports.

Call for no special mention, and are unimportant. The 700 bags of raisins were exported by Herr Heinkele, the German trader in Shiraz, direct to New York, where Isfahans to have a small but regular market. The rose-water and tobacco were for the Red Sea only. The opium and gum tragacanth (largely) were exports for London shipped by Persians, but it may be noted that Messrs. Ziegler exported some 150 chests of opium during 1907-8 from Isfahan to a German merchant in Darmstadt.

ADDENDA.

Velvet and Plushes, p. 303.

Sample No. 6, (a). Plush, 18 inches wide. Each 40 yards. Invoiced in London at 1s. 4d. per yard c.i.f. Ahwaz. Bought in Hamburg (probably) at 1s. 3d. per yard c.i.f. Ahwaz, less 5 per cent. Sold in Isfahan at 1s. 5½d. per yard c.i.f. Ahwaz, payment by 3 months' draft on London.

Packing.—Each piece of 40 yards in one card-board box, then packed in stout tin lined wooden cases of twelve pieces each. Cases to be iron lashed.

Proportion of Shades.—Six pieces per shade per case.

Sample No. 6, (b). Plain velvet, 18 inches wide. Each piece 40 yards. Invoiced in London at 1s. 4d. per yard c.i.f. Ahwaz. Bought in Hamburg (probably) at 1s. 3d. per yard c.i.f. Ahwaz, less 5 per cent. Sold in Isfahan at 1s. 3d. per yard c.i.f. Ahwaz, payment by 3 months' draft on London.

Packing.—As above.

Proportion of Shades.—Five pieces red, five pieces green, two pieces blue per case.

Note.—All velvets sold in Isfahan are of same qualities as these two samples, varying only so much as 2d. or 3d. per yard as per quality. The colours, however, must be the same as the cuttings, viz., red, green, blue, and purple. Other shades do not find so ready a sale.

Black and Coloured Drills, p. 305.

Sample No. 15 (a). Wholesale price, Isfahan, 36 krans cash per piece.

Sample No. 15 (a). Colour 3, retail price 38 krans cash per piece.

Sample No. 15 (a). Colours 3 and 4 together. Retail price 36 k. 80 c. cash per piece.

Sample No. 15 (a).—Colours 1 to 9 assorted. Retail price 39 k. 23 c. per piece cash.

White Drills.—Wholesale price, Isfahan, 31 k. 60 c. cash per piece. Retail price 32 k. 40 c. per piece.

* See Addenda, p. 307.

Printed Cotton Cashmeres.

Sample No. 21.—(Many designs). Width 19 inches; 30 yards per piece. Wholesale price 1 kran cash per yard; retail price 1½ kran cash per yard.

Printed Woollen Cashmeres.

Sample No. 21 (a).—(Many designs). Width 19 inches; 30 yards per piece. Wholesale price nearly 2 krans cash per yard; retail price per yard 2 krans cash.

Drugs and Chemicals, p. 303.

The reply has been received that the Pharmacie is an institution of the Persian Government; but has hitherto imported all their drugs from Germany (J. D. Kiedel, 12-13 Gerich Strasse, Berlin), as this German company is very accommodating in the matter of transport charges, &c. The Persian in charge of the Pharmacie, Mirza Abdul Hussein Khan, affirmed that German drugs were considered the best in Tehran.

Paper, p. 301.

The Imprimerie "Pharos" in Tehran states that they obtain finer qualities of paper from Hamburg house, allowing six months' credit and 12½ per cent. discount. Following samples have been forwarded by Mr. Vice-Consul Stuart:—

Specimen No.	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.
	Parchment paper	"	"	Pink	Blue	Post 4to.	"	"	8vo note	8vo	Smooth card-board	Bristol	Visiting cards	Parchment envelopes	Fancy boxes of note paper and envelopes	This specimen.

	28	32	40	12½	18	15	12	18	7	9	78 per 100 kilog.	60	3-70-8 per 1,000.	9½	7-20	10
	per 1,000 sheets.	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"

MUSCAT.

Imports.

Description.	1906-7.	1907-8.	Value (Muscat £)
Arms and ammunition
Loaf sugar
Sugar (soft)
Malches
Vermicelli
Paints and colours
Henna
Cotton goods in bales
Peas
Perfumery
Liquors: Wine and whiskey
Syrups
Wood for date boxes
Miscellaneous
Olstones
Total	6,227	6,760	157,742

The most striking feature here is the enormous increase in the number of cases of arms and ammunition imported from 2,071 in 1906-7 to 5,241 (1,439 cases guns and 3,802 cases ammunition) in 1907-8. Taking the Hamburg-American Company's freight for arms to be 120 marks per case of arms and ammunition, this alone will have benefited them to the extent of some 31,446. Any measures taken internationally as a result of the Arms Conference towards prohibiting the import into Muscat would, therefore, seriously damage any profits which the German Shipping Company make on their run up the Gulf, and materially aid us in the object in view, viz., the discouragement of that company from competition with British ships in the Persian Gulf.

Cotton Goods.—Five hundred and fifty-one bales of American sheeting were imported from Aden—where they had come from New York—as against 597 bales in 1906-7. About 1,000 to 1,200 bales of this sheeting are said to be consigned annually from Aden to Muscat, almost always for sale on shippers' account, the latter in 1907-8 being the Indian firm in Aden, Haji Abdooy Jumma, Lalji and Co. 85 bales, and Menhau Messa 436 bales.

The freight per bale from Aden to Muscat is 1 r. 8 a. to 3 r. 8 a. by the British lines, and 1 r. 8 a. to 3 r. 4 a. by the German lines, but weight depends on the number shipped. Private arrangements are entered into with the shipping agents, and the British is generally higher than the German rate by 4 to 6 annas.

The Political Resident at Aden has now been asked to use his good offices privately with the shippers in order to encourage them to give the British lines calling at Aden the benefit of their shipments to Muscat.

Apart from the question of discouraging shipments from Aden to Muscat by the German line, there is the question of replacing these goods in Aden and Muscat by Manchester goods, which does not come into the scope of this report. For the information of the Board of Trade, it is noted that these American sheetings have been on the market in Muscat now for a number of years. There are about ten to fifteen different qualities imported, twenty-five pieces of 30 yards to the bale.

Sample No. 22.—American sheeting, "Flying Horse" brand (also described by shippers as "Lantern Brand"), 80 per cent. of the total quantity of American sheeting imported into Muscat is of this quality. Width, 36½ inches. Wholesale price per bale in Aden 140 rupees = 9l. 6s. 8d. Wholesale price in Muscat 112 dollars (present rate of exchange is 13½ rupees = 100 dollars) = 146½ rupees = 9l. 15s. 8d. Retail price in Muscat per piece of 30 yards 4 dollars 8 annas. Number of yards per dollar, 6 yards. Importers (from Aden) Abdul Aziz Mithani, Gopadji Walji.

Sample No. 23.—American sheeting, "Cow Head" brand. Width, 36½ inches. Wholesale price per bale in Aden 130 rupees = 8l. 13s. 4d. Wholesale price in Muscat 110 dollars (at 131 rupees per 100 dollars) = 144 rupees = 9l. 12s. 6d. Retail price per piece of 30 yards 4 dollars 6 annas. Number of yards per dollar, 6 yards. Importers (from Aden) Khoja Habib Murad.

Sample No. 24.—American sheeting, "Camel and Traveller" brand. Width, 37 inches. Wholesale price in Muscat 104 dollars (at 131 rupees) = 136½ rupees = 9l. 1s. 8d. Retail price in Muscat 4 dollars 2 annas. Number of yards per dollar, 6½ yards. Importers (from Bombay) Bajest et Cie, French firm.

Sample No. 25.—"Spartan" brand. Width, 37 inches. Wholesale price in Muscat dollars, 104 rupees (at 131 rupees) = 136½ rupees = 9l. 1s. 8d. Retail price in Muscat dollars, 4 rupees 2 annas. Number of yards per dollar, 6½ yards. Importing firm Motig Kevorkoff (from Aden).

Sample No. 26.—"Lancer on Horse" brand. Width 36½ inches. Wholesale price in Muscat 104 dollars (at 131 rupees) = 136½ rupees = 9l. 1s. 8d. Retail price in Muscat per piece of 30 yards 4 dollars 2 annas.

N.B.—The Muscat dollar exchange fluctuates heavily. These goods are generally sold in Aden on a credit of three to twelve months, at an extra charge of 3 rs. 4 a. = 4s. 6d. per bale per three months.

Vernicelli.—There was an increase from 79 to 175 cases imported. The import from Marseilles to Bahrain and Muscat is quite considerable, and it would seem worth the while of the British shipping companies to induce the shippers to give up confining their consignments, or, at any rate, according to preference, to the German line. It was noted in last year's report that, according to rumour, the Hamburg-American line had concluded a special arrangement with the exporters of vernicelli from Marseilles.

The ochre ("wares") brought to Muscat in these German ships is also transhipped from Aden to Muscat for sale on commission. In this case too, if the consignments

is made via Bombay or the Anglo-Algerian line, the freights are higher than the Germans' by 8 or 4 annas per bag.

Each bag contains about 225 to 350 lbs., and prices range from 1s. to 2s. 4d. per lb., according as the stuff is mild or strong in colour.

Included in the miscellaneous articles landed are fifty-four cases of presents to His Highness the Sultan of Muscat from East Africa, valued at 2,000l.

One hundred bags of crystallised sugar were imported by the French firm of Bajest et Cie.

BUNDER ABBAS.

Imports.

Description.	1906-7.	1907-8.	Approximate Local Value.
Lost sugar	1,625	400	£ 524
Crystal sugar	730	1,437	1,701
Kerosene	1,000	333
Iron bars	3,118	2,979
Steel bars	2,444	791
Iron plates	8,806	2,998
Liquors, brandy	123	93	153
Indigo	10	40	762
Beer	42	32
Window glass	100	76
Embossed wire	23	127
Piece goods	35	118
Miscellaneous	144	791
Matches	2,270	17	50
Candles	300
	5,247	17,685	9,944

Exports.

Description.	1906-7.	1907-8.	£
Gum tragacanth	1,090	599	2,108
Poppy seeds	15	85	10
Locowe seeds	51	18	71
Pistachios	3	10	7
Tobacco	75	12	228
Carpets	61	427
Assafetida (London)
Miscellaneous	2
	1,236	819	2,941

Imports.

Imports by the Hamburg-American line rose from 5,247 to 17,685 packages. Of this, no less than 14,368 were bundles of iron and steel bars and iron plates. I am informed that these were mostly shipped from Antwerp, and not Hamburg, to British Indian (Hindu) firms, who apparently obtained these goods by sending orders through British firms in Karachi, e.g., Forbes, Forbes and Co., Macdonald and Co., Volkart Brothers, and E. D. Sassoon and Co., and also Messrs. Gray, Paul and Co.'s agency at Bushire. The names of the chief Hindu consignees in Bunder Abbas are:—

Hukmatrai Mohandas.
Hussanand Chetandas.
Thuronnal Radhakshani.

Messrs. Gray, Paul, and Co. at Bushire state that the stuff ordered through them by the first-named Hindu was principally Swedish iron and basic steel, obtained from

Messrs. R. W. McClellan and Co. (Limited), 108, Cannon Street, London. The invoiced prices of these (presumably f.o.b. Antwerp) are:—

						£	s.	d.	
Basic steel bars (flat)	5	2	6	per ton.
" " (square)	5	18	0	"
Swedish iron	11	7	6	"
Sheet iron	6	15	0	"

Some of the stuff is, however, apparently of Belgian manufacture, for in Bunder Abbas they quote purchase prices in Brussels for delivery c.i.f. Bunder Abbas as follows :—

						s.	d.	
Steel bars (round)	At	6 14	per cwt.
" " (flat)	"	6 5	"
Iron bars	"	6 9	"

Another quotation given to His Majesty's consul in Bunder Ablas was :—

					s.	d.			
Steel bars	At 6	1	per cwt.	c.i.f.	Bunder Abbas.
Iron bars	" 6	6	"	"	"
Iron plates (sheets)	" 8	10	"	"	"

The following samples are sent with yet other quotations:—

Sample No. 27.—Steel bar $1\frac{1}{4}$ inches thick, usually 12 feet long. Purchase price c.i.f. 6s. 6d. per cwt. Local retail price 2 kranis per man of 9 lbs.

Sample No. 28.—Steel bar $\frac{5}{16}$ inch thick. Usually $3\frac{1}{2}$ feet long. Purchase price c.i.f. 7s. per cwt. Local retail price $2\frac{1}{2}$ krans per man of 9 lbs.

Sample No. 29.—Iron bar $\frac{1}{2}$ inch thick, usual length 3 feet. Purchase price c.i.f. 6s. 2d. per cwt. Retail price 2 krans per man.

5s. 2d. per cwt. Local retail price 2 krans per man.
Sample No. 30.—Iron bar $\frac{3}{8}$ inch thick, usual length 3 feet. Purchase price
 5s. 9d. per cwt. c.i.f. Local retail price 2 krans per man.

These metals are used for building in Bunder Abbas, and the import is likely to be well maintained in succeeding years, the annual demand amounting to about 4,000 cwts. valued at nearly 3,000*l*. I was informed in January 1909 that other consignments, that had been ordered out, were coming by German steamers. The markets supplied are Yezel, Kermisa, Sirjan, Lar, Darab, and local. The Board of Trade will be able to judge of the possibility of putting English steel and iron on the market in Bunder Abbas as well as the other Persian ports. See also the article on Messrs. Forbes, Forbes, Macdonald, and Co., Messrs. Gray, Dawes, and Co., the other firms and Hindu traders mentioned, sent the best people to canvass.

Almost all the 1368 bundles mentioned were brought during the last five or six months of the period covered by this report, i.e., during the period the British consular had made an agreement with the Hamburg-American line to call at Antwerp and Hamburg. In the same space of time no steamers of the British consular landed any metals at Bunder Abbas, but only 148 bundles of iron were imported from British India Steam Navigation Company's boats. This fact only serves to accentuate the undesirability, from the British point of view, of the English lines conceding any rate or pool agreement with a foreign line by which the former are debarr'd from calling at such a port as Antwerp, for it gives foreign trade an opportunity for a foothold in Bunder Abbas. It has been observed that the tendency is for direct trade between the Gulf ports and Europe to be more numerous than the trade with India to develop or not advance. And so it is an anomaly to find Bunder Abbas, which is specially designed as being the British sphere of influence, relying for its direct trade with Europe in an article like iron, on ships of a foreign nation now carrying on an active competition against British trade.

So far, Messrs. Wonekhaus and Co. have not established a regular agency in Bender Abbas, but there have been reports of their intention to send one of their assistants there, and it is expected that they will do so as soon as telegraphic communication is started with other ports.

Messrs. Gray, Paul, and Co. have been often urged to post one of their European staff in Bunder Abbas for some months each year, and should Messrs. Wouckhaus and Co. open business, this would become a matter of necessity as far as our commercial interests in that port are concerned. In Lingah we are now experiencing much incon-

venience from the German firm having had its position unchallenged and rather all its own way for the last six years.

Enamel Ware.—No samples are available, all having gone forward to Yezd without breaking bulk. The importers in this latter place are the respectable Parsee firm of Jamshidian, whose name might be noted by British exporters of this ware.

Sugar and Kerosene.—The import to Bunder Abbas is alluded to under the comments in Part I of this report.

Exports.

Only one steamer of the British combine called at this port for direct shipment to the United Kingdom during the thirteen months September 1907-October 1908. This accounts for shipments to London of gum tragacanth, &c., taking place in German steamers. At the same time, it is a pity that British steamers cannot call more regularly.

BAHREIN.

Imports.

Description.	1906-7.	1907-8.	Local Value.
			<i>£</i>
Loaf sugar	Cases	821	1,466
Matches	"	355	284
Candles	"	50	4
Vermicelli	"	3,216	1,171
Coffee	Bags	4,252	4,887
Henas	Cases	49	"
Cotton goods	Bales	172	108
Woolen goods	"	7	"
Gold thread	Cases	21	54
Haberdashery	Bales	76	"
Perfumery	Cases	83	93
Glasware	"	3	"
Chinaware and crockery	"	36	77
Sewing machines	"	67	179
Machinery	"	42	478
Furniture	"	11	"
Miscellaneous	Keys	20	"
Embossware	Packages	269	47
Lampware	Cases	"	57
Window glass	"	"	23
Crystal sugar	"	"	30
Soup	Bags	"	37
Copper sheets	Cases	"	4,053
Colours	Bundles	"	39
Kerosene	Cases	"	31
Iron wire	"	"	3
Gunnet	Cases	"	14,525
Stationery and paperware	Bards	"	533
Condensed milk	Cases	"	200
Metal ware	"	"	136
Cotton quilts and wicks	"	"	10
			2
Total packages	10,098	27,994	28,649

Exports.

Description.						1906-7.	1907-8.	Approximate Local Value.
Shells..	Packages	12,432	28,760	£ 9,636
Dates..	" "	12,567	9,568	3,823
						25,399	38,724	12,859

imports.

British trade is seriously handicapped in these islands by the fact that no steamers of the British lines importing goods direct from Europe call there, the reason given being that the deviation from the direct course from Muscat to Bushire, and the time spent in the anchorage at Bahrain, is too expensive in proportion to the freight obtained to make it worth their while under actual conditions. Before the advent of the German company this attitude did not inflict any special damage on British imports to the islands, for the British India Steam Navigation Company had practically the whole of the carrying trade, but now the very considerable amount of cargo brought direct from Europe each year is borne by German ships only. It is superfluous to dilate on the evil influence this has on the trade in goods of British origin, or on the undesirability of an Arab island under British protection having to rely for its intercourse with Great Britain on the regular monthly German steamers. If it cannot pay the English steamers to call, it presumably must be a dead loss to the Hamburg steamers to do so. The inference drawn is that the subsidy made to the German line alone permits it to undertake expenses attendant on calling regularly at Bahrain, Bander Abbas, and Lingah.

It is hardly to be wondered at that the agents of the German line lose no opportunity of hampering the operations of their rivals, when shipping or receiving consignments by the German steamers.

According to a good source of information, the freight on shells exported by Wonekhaus and Co. and their clients, is allowed by the shipping line a rebate of 1s. per ton less than the freight accorded to the British firm, Gray, Paul, and Co., and their clients.

1. On one occasion in 1908, when the German steamer brought to Bahrain a large amount of sugar and other goods for both Gray, Paul, and Co. and Wonekhaus and Co., the latter's cargo was landed and the British company's over-carried to Bushire, under the pretext of stress of weather. This enabled the German firm to get their cargo on the market first, and involved the British company in considerable loss. When the claim was made to the German steamer agents in Bahrain they declined to consider it, maintaining that under the bill of lading Messrs. Gray, Paul, and Co. would have to fight their case in Hamburg.

2. A second claim made by Gray, Paul, and Co. with reference to bags of sugar certified to have been torn when taken from a German vessel was met by the German agents with the same reply.

3. Gray, Paul, and Co. appear unable to compete in such an important line as piece goods, although, according to the steamer's manifests, ninety-four bales of English cottons were imported direct by German steamers, due to the large rebate of 5s. per ton offered for English cotton goods sent to Hamburg for transshipment. Only two bales of these were for Messrs. Gray, Paul, and Co.

The upshot of the case in Bahrain is that the British firm find it irksome to have their import business from Europe direct in the hands of a German shipping company whose agents and protégés, Wonekhaus, are their own chief opponents. The writer recently saw a letter from Messrs. Gray, Davies, and Co. in reply to an enquiry by the Bahrain agency whether they could arrange for shipments of sugar in other than German ships. They explained that they had no choice in the matter: the freight by British steamer to India being 36s. per ton, by Austrian Lloyd transshipment in India and British India Steam Navigation Company 32s., and by Hamburg American steamer only 26s. 6d. per ton.

A regular call at Bahrain (Lingah and Bander Abbas) by the Anglo-Algerian and other companies directly serving the Gulf would solve most of these questions; and in connection with the recent endeavour of the Board of Trade Commissioner to arrange for the establishment of sample rooms, at considerable cost to the Government, by which English goods would be on hand on the Gulf markets, it should be remembered that the scheme is likely to be nullified in Bahrain and Lingah unless it can be arranged for such goods to come direct from Great Britain to British ships.

The following interesting table shows how German trade and Wonekhaus and Co. benefit by their direct intercourse with Europe to the disadvantage of Gray, Paul, and Co.:-

		Wonekhaus and Co.	Gray, Paul, and Co.
Crystal sugar	Bags ..	2,100	2,195*
Loaf sugar	Cases ..	1,260	..
Iron wire	200	..
Earthenware	330	1
Vernicelli	500	125
Perfumery	62	5
Cotton and woolen goods ..	Bales ..	87	2*
Matches	Cases ..	25	250
Coffee	Bags ..	4,055	..*
Kerosene	Cases ..	14,625	..

IMPORTED by Gray, Paul, and Co. by British India Steamers.

Coffee	4,016 bags.
Crystal sugar	400 ..
Loaf	100 cases.
Cotton and woolen goods	19 bales.

One thousand to 1,500 packages is estimated to cover Bahrain's import per month from Europe, and there would seem to be no reason why continental sugar, at any rate, should not be brought in British ships, provided there is no transshipment.

Crystal Sugar.—As stated in the Bushire report on the import of sugar to the Gulf the crystal, par preference in this and other ports, is E.A.R., an Austrian brand, shipped from a depot in Hamburg. Bahrain, like most Arab ports, is more partial to crystal than loaf sugar, and more than anywhere else it offers the best prospects for reviving the import of British sugar from Mauritius. The Bahrain agent of Messrs. Gray, Paul, and Co. has been able to book orders for some 1,000 bags in the last few months, and writes that he hopes to be in a position to put through a fairly large business. But until they can turn out in Mauritius crystals of a larger size and whiter colour, more like the Austrian E. A. R., a large supply of this latter is certain to continue in demand in the various ports.

The following samples are forwarded with Bahrain prices:—

Sample No. 31.—Iron wire used to making fishing traps, sold at 12 rupees per cwt. = 16s.; sixteen coils, as per sample, come packed in gunny bags. It is required every year, as the cage traps do not last long.

Sample No. 32. Lamp-ware.—(a.) Chimney, as per sample, two tied together, and 800 of these packed in a wooden case. Price per case, 133 rupees = 3l. 17s. 4d. Retail price, 2 annas per chimney. 2d. Annual sale about thirty cases.

(b.) Glass oil reservoirs, as per sample, 500 packed in a case. Wholesale price, 2 rs. 12 a. per dozen = 3s. 8d. Retail price, 4 annas each = 4d. Annual sale about ten cases.

(c.) Hand lumps as per sample, 500 in a case, at 2 rs. 12 a. per dozen = 3s. 8d. Retail 4 annas each = 4d.

(d.) Table lumps as per sample, twenty-five dozen in a case, wholesale price 25 rupees per dozen = 1l. 13s. 4d. Retail price 2 r. 8 a. per lamp = 3s. 4d. Annual sale two cases.

Sample No. 34. Gold Thread.—(a.) As per sample, fifty bundles in a case, 700 rupees per case = 46l. 13s. 4d., and 14 rs. 8 a. per bundle = 19s. 4d.

(b.) As per sample, fifty bundles in a case, 500 rupees per case = 33l. 6s. 8d., and 11 rupees per bundle = 14s. 8d.

(c. and d.) As per samples, fifty bundles in a case, 500 rupees per case = 33l. 6s. 8d., and 10 rupees per bundle = 13s. 4d.

Sample No. 35. Perfumery.—(a.) Eau de Cologne, as per sample bottle, six bottles packed in a small wooden box, and fifty similar boxes in a big case, 4 rupees per dozen bottles = 5s. 4d. Single bottle 6 annas = 6d.

(b.) Eau de Cologne as per sample bottle, six bottles packed in a small wooden box, and fifty similar boxes in a big case, at 5 rupees per dozen bottles = 6s. 8d. Single bottle at 8 annas = 8d.

(c.) Eau de Cologne as per sample bottle, twenty-four small bottles in a big case, at 1 rupee per dozen bottles = 1s. 4d. Single bottle at 2 annas = 2d.

Sample No. 36. Scents.—(a.) As per sample, six bottles fixed on a cardboard come mixed with other qualities, packed in cases with grass, 6 r. 4 n. per dozen bottles = 8s. 4d., and 10 annas per single bottle = 10d.

(b.) As per sample, three bottles in a paper box and similar boxes of mixed scents are packed in a wooden case, 4 rs. 10 a. per dozen bottles = 6s. 2d. 8 annas per single bottle = 8d.

(c.) As per sample, three bottles in a paper box lined with golden paper outside and inside, 7 rs. 4 n. per dozen bottles = 9s. 8d., and 12 annas per single bottle = 1s.

(d.) Each bottle in a small paper box and three of these boxes are packed in square paper boxes and several of these packed in wooden cases, 24 rupees per dozen bottles = 11. 12s. Single bottle 2 rs. 2 n. = 2s. 10d.

(e.) As per sample three bottles in a paper box and each bottle in a separate box, 24 rupees per dozen = 11. 12s. Single bottles 2 r. 2 a. = 2s. 10d.

(f.) As per sample three bottles in a paper box and each bottle in a separate box, 18 rupees per dozen bottles = 11. 4s. Single bottle 1 r. 10 n. = 2s. 2d.

(g.) As per sample three bottles in a paper box and each bottle in a separate box, 9 rupees per dozen bottles = 12s. Single bottle 14 annas = 1s. 2d.

(h.) As per sample three bottles in a paper box, 8 rs. 4 a. per dozen = 11s. Single bottle 12 annas = 1s.

(i.) As per sample three bottles in a paper box, 6 rupees per dozen bottles = 8s. Single bottle 10 annas = 10d.

Sample No. 37. Piece Goods, Manchester.—(a.) Head shawls red, 100 dozen per bale, 12 rupees per dozen = 16s., and 1 r. 4 a. each = 1s. 8d.

Sample No. 38.—"Lungi" (Registered Trade-mark No. 27529) 1,000 per bale. Twenty lungis at 6 rs. 12 a. = 2s., and rupees 0 : 6 : 6 : each = 6½d.

Sample No. 39.—"Lungi" 1,000 per bale at 8 rupees per twenty = 10 rs. 8 a., and 8 annas each = 8d.

Sample No. 40. Earthenware.—(a.) Bowls packed in wooden cases with grass, as many as required by the consignee, 10 rupees per dozen = 13s. 4d., and 14 annas each = 1s. 2d.

(b.) Bowls packed in wooden cases with grass, as many as required by the consignee, 9 rupees per dozen = 12s., and rupees 0 : 13 : 6 : each = 1s. 1½d.

(c.) Bowls packed in wooden cases with grass as many as required by the consignee, 4 r. 8 n. per dozen = 6s., and 8 annas each = 8d.

(d.) Bowls packed in wooden cases with grass as many as required by the consignee, 4 rupees per dozen = 5s. 4d., and 6 annas each = 6d.

(e.) Bowls packed in wooden cases with grass as many as required by the consignee, 3 rupees per dozen = 4s., and 5 annas each = 5d.

(f.) Bowls packed in wooden cases with grass as many as required by the consignee, 5 r. 8 n. per dozen = 7s. 4d., and 10 annas each = 10d.

Sample No. 41. Dishes (Plate).—Four sizes packed in grass in wooden cases, 30 dozen per case—

(a.) 1 r. 2 n. each = 1s. 6d. each.

(b.) 14 annas each = 1s. 2d.

(c.) 12 annas each = 1s.

(d.) 10 annas each = 10d.

Samples (b) and (d) sent.

Sample No. 42. Rice Dishes.—Three sizes, packed as many as required by the consignee—

(a.) 9 rupees per dozen = 12s., and 12 annas each = 1s.

(b.) 6 r. 8 n. per dozen = 8s. 8d., and 4 annas single = 10d.

(c.) 3 rupees per dozen = 4s., and 4 annas each = 4d.

Sample No. 43. Cups and Saucers.—Packed in grass, in wooden cases, 50 dozen per case at 2 r. 8 n. per dozen = 3s. 4d., and 4 annas single = 4d. There is a sale for about 2,000 dozen of this article annually.

Sample No. 44. Coffee Cups.—1,500 cups in a case at 6 r. 12 a. per 100 cups = 2s., and 1-6 anna single cup = 1½d. There is a sale for about forty to fifty cases annually.

Sample No. 45. Earthenware.—(a.) Ten-pots with handles, 5 dozen per wooden case, 10 r. 8 a. per dozen = 14s., and 1 rupee each = 1s. 4d.

(b.) Water-tumblers come in three sizes, 35 dozen in a wooden case, 3 rupees per dozen = 4s., single, 5 annas = 5d. The sample is the larger size.

(c.) Soup plates (for rice) come in three sizes (blue-streaked thirty dozen per case. 3 rupees per dozen = 4s. Single 5 annas = 5d.

The sample is the largest size.

(d.) Plates (table) come in three sizes, thirty dozen per case. 2 r. 8 a. per dozen = 3s. 4d., 4 annas each = 4d.

(e.) Rice plates come in three sizes, twenty dozen in a case; 4 r. 8 a. per dozen = 6s., 8 annas each = 8d.

(f.) Bowls come in three sizes, 35 dozen per case; 8 rupees per dozen = 10s. 8d. and 12 annas each = 1s.

(g.) Bowls, small, two kinds, thirty dozen per case, 2 r. 2 a. per dozen = 2s. 10d., and 3-6 annas each = 3½d.

(h.) Oval trays, two white and one blue. Twenty dozen, all three kinds come in a case. White larger 14 rupees per dozen = 18s. 8d., and 1 r. 8 a. each = 2s.; blue, 10 rupees per dozen = 13s. 4d., and 1 rupee each = 1s. 4d.; white, small, 8 rupees per dozen = 10s. 8d., and 12 annas each = 1s.

(i.) Water basins, three kinds: all blue, twenty dozen in a case, 13 rupees per dozen = 17s. 4d., and 1 r. 4 a. each = 1s. 8d.

White and blue, twenty dozen in a case, 10 rupees per dozen = 13s. 4d., and 1 rupee each = 1s. 4d.

White and blue streaked, twenty dozen in a case, 8 rupees per dozen = 10s. 8d., and 12 annas each = 1s.

Sample No. 46. Glassware.—(a.) Sugar pots, twenty-five dozen in a case, 4 rupees per dozen = 5s. 4d., and 6-6 annas each = 6½d.

(b.) Water glasses in two sizes. Of the larger size twenty-five dozen packed in a case, 3 rupees per dozen = 4s., and 5 annas each = 5d. Of the smaller size fifty dozen are packed in a case at 2 rupees per dozen = 2s. 8d., and 3 annas each = 3d.

Sample No. 47. Soap.—Five samples forwarded.

(a.) Comes in paper boxes three pieces in each. twenty-five gross in a case at 30 rupees a gross = 2½l., 2 r. 8 a. per dozen = 3s. 4d., and 4 annas each piece = 4d.

(b.) 1 r. 8 n. per twelve pieces = 2s.

(c.) 2 rupees per twelve pieces = 2s. 8d.

(d.) 12 annas per twelve pieces = 1s.

(e.) 10 annas per box = 10d.

LINGAN.

Imports (13 ships).

	1906-7.	1907-8.	Value.
Loaf sugar	Bags .. 5,772	1,800	£ 1,046
Crystal sugar	" .. 5,298	6,555	9,384
Macaroni	" .. 2,944	3,085	2,571
Piece goods	Bales .. 112	312	5,754
	Cases .. 46	1,389	
Brocade and thread	" .. 6	19	880
China-ware	" .. 131	147	686
Coffee	Bags .. 620	660	2,156
Soap	Cases .. 100	67	
Haberdashery	" .. 141	34	907
Iron	" .. 142	100	
Kerosene	Cases .. 16,800	7,050	2,115
Paints	Cases .. 8	6	
Beer	Cases .. 20	16	
Miscellaneous	" .. 37	29	
Perfumery	Packages .. 15	18	720
Candles	" .. 714
Glassware	" .. 29
Total packages	20,564	19,534	27,791

Exports (Wonckhaus').

		1906-7.	1907-8.	Value.
Oyster shells	Baskets ..	5,082	8,123	£ 2,708
Pearl	Cases ..	541	131	591
Raspberries	" ..	40	300	310
Avocadoes	" ..	51	"	"
Dried grapes	Bags ..	"	51	30
Almonds	" ..	"	35	47
Limes	" ..	96	"	90
Poppyseed	" ..	"	11	90
Gum Tragacanth	" ..	67	19	76
Miscellaneous	Packages ..	148	2	"
Tobacco	Bags ..	"	300	Aden cargo.
Gum mastic	Baskets ..	"	200	"
Total packages		6,031	9,172	3,822

At Lingah the German position is stronger than in any of the other ports, and the situation of British trade there has become more serious during the last year in the face of the continued predominant influence of Messrs. Wonckhaus and Co. For this the British combine is largely to blame, since, as in the case of Bahrain, their ships do not call at Lingah, and all direct intercourse with Europe is thus confined to the regular monthly arrivals of the Hamburg American steamers.

It used to be thought that the needs of the smaller Gulf ports could best be supplied from India by the weekly steamers of the British India Steam Navigation Company and the Bombay Persian line, and that it was unjustifiable expense for the home-going English lines to share in the carrying trade. This idea has been exploded by the operations of the German subsidized line, for it is plain that a great part of the trade has been deviated from India to Europe by the fact that many necessities, *e.g.*, sugar, &c., can be put on the market in Lingah as cheaply as, sometimes cheaper than, goods imported via India. The reason is not far to seek when it is considered how heavy the British India freight rates are from Bombay to Lingah.

At Lingah, as at Bahrain, the German agents of the Hamburg American line have not been slow to use their monopoly of direct European trade to harass their English rivals, and it is at Lingah there appears to be a good opportunity for the British firm to force Mauritius sugar, which is carried in English ships, out to the market, but unless some special arrangements for very low freight can be made with the British India Steam Navigation Company, the difference in price *et cetera* between it and the Austrian "E.A.L.", which is the standard by reason of its white colour and the size of the crystals, is too small to enable it to capture more than a small portion of the trade.

It is disquieting to hear such frequent reports both from natives and Europeans of the manner in which the German firm now "run" Lingah, and the present situation may thus be summed up:—

Lingah ceased to be an important port with the enforcement of the Persian customs tariff by the Belgian administration, the trade having largely transferred itself to Dubai, on the Arab coast; but inasmuch as the institution of the German service has opened a direct trade between Europe and Lingah (which Dubai has not got) business in Lingah has slightly recovered. There are, however, no native firms there with any reserve capital, and up till lately only a native agency of Gray, Paul, and Co. Wonckhaus and Co., with a manager and two German assistants, are thus left without any real competitors. It is interesting to note the remarks made on the latter's methods of business by the Residency agent (a very shrewd Arab and a trader himself):—

(Translation.)

"Messrs. Wonckhaus and Co., whenever they import any merchandise, and Lingah merchants have already got similar goods in stock, lower the price and sell it. No native merchant who has thus imported goods will sell them at a loss as long as he is able to stand out; but after having waited for some time he is obliged to, and sells at a loss. He does not import that merchandise a second time, but buys those goods from

Wonckhaus and Co. But if a large firm were to take steps to import merchandise, Messrs. Wonckhaus and Co. will be obliged to curtail their own business, since they know that such a large firm will not stop importing a particular line because it has once dropped money on a transaction."

He then gives an instance in point: In the first year of steamers' sailings 5,772 cases and bags of loaf-sugar were imported, as will be seen in last year's report; this year only 1,307. He induced David Sassoon and Co. (Limited) to send a large consignment of sugar; the Germans lowered the prices; Messrs. Sassoon maintained theirs. The Germans sold at a loss, and finally closed their business in sugar for the time being. He concludes:—

"In my opinion, if a firm of good standing were to begin to bring merchandise to Lingah, and shut their eyes to profits for one year, without doubt Wonckhaus and Co. will have to close up their business altogether. Even though that firm were to suffer losses in the first year, yet in the second year they would make up for it."

These recommendations of his cannot be too strongly urged on the principals of such a firm as Gray, Paul, and Co. (Gray, Dawes, and Co.). After repeated representations from Major Cox during the last year they deputed to Lingah in the autumn a Eurasian from among the number of their subordinate staff—a man of mediocre capacity not equal to competition with the German representative. It is doubtful if there is sufficient trade in Lingah for two European firms, and the British firm might well consider the advisability of ousting the German firm out of the place by fighting the Germans on their own trade ground. At present this is hardly being attempted.

When the Manchester partner of the firm of Haji Ali Akbar and Sons (Limited) (of London and Manchester) was making a tour early in 1908 in Southern Persia, in the course of which he had booked important orders during his journey from Bunder Abbas via Lar to Lingah, he expressed, while in Bushire, a desire to open an agency of his firm (which is a considerable exporter of Manchester cottons to Persia) in Lingah. At the same time he urged the importance of expediting the appointment of a consular officer at Lingah, where he had gained the impression that British trade interests were at present inadequately represented.

There is unfortunately a good deal of truth in this remark largely owing to the undesirable influences acquired in Lingah by Mr. Brown (the manager of Messrs. Wonckhaus and Co.) and his anti-British tendencies. Mr. Brown, who is the son of Scotch parents born in Germany, will be remembered as taking a prominent part in the Abu Musa affair, in which his efforts have materially assisted the German cause. During the existence of a local Medjlis in Lingah Mr. Brown modelled closely in Persian politics and took part in the discussions with a view to displacing the German support of the constitutional movement. He has given credits of such liberality, and in many cases has forgiven natives unpaid debts, that he has bound many Arab traders to support the German firm exclusively, while at the same time these unbusinesslike transactions have strengthened the conviction of British firms in the Gulf, that Wonckhaus and Co. must be covered by financial support in Germany in order to make these losses and yet continue to do business on their present lines.

While the writer was at Lingah in December 1908 Mr. Brown and his assistants had started on a short tour in the interior, which, they gave out, was with the object of looking for mineral deposits in Bostane. He has been assiduous in creating a connection with Oman, especially Dubai, where he has an agent, and he has not scrupled to employ smugglers. The method followed was to bring coffee and other goods to the warehouses of Wonckhaus and Co. in Lingah and declare them for transshipment, to ship them in a native craft in his employ nominally to Dubai, but really to have them re-landed up a place 5 miles from Lingah, whither they would be brought back by night.

It is hoped that if a vice-consul be appointed, and a firm like Messrs. Gray, Paul and Co. can be prevailed by Government to compete strenuously with the German company in all their lines of business, the position of Messrs. Wonckhaus and Co. would soon be shaken in Lingah.

Imports for 1907-08.

Nineteen thousand five hundred and fourteen packages imported, as against 26,664 in 1906-7, and 9,172 packages exported, as against 6,031 in 1906-7.

The decreased import of loaf sugar has been explained above, but the Residency

agent reports that for the last few months Messrs. Sassoon have ceased to forward it, and Messrs. Woneckhaus and Co. are beginning to sell again. It is hoped that this British firm will not retire from the business.

The brand imported by the German firm is Belgian, bearing the mark "U. T. O." with the inscription of the name of Woneckhaus and Co., Lingah, Balrein, and Bushire in Persian. The retail price of the case was 2½ kranas (approximately 11d.) per Lingah man of 6½ lbs.

Crystal Sugar.—Six thousand six hundred and fifty-five bags, as against 5,293 brought by the Hamburg-American line in 1906-7. Of these a proportion belonged to Gray, Paul, and Co. Those imported by the German firm are of two kinds, each bag weighing 2 cwt.

Sample No. 48 (not sent).—Costs 23 r. 8 a. per bag.

Sample No. 49 (not sent).—Costs 22 rupees to 22 r. 8 a. per bag.

Three-quarters of this sugar were forwarded for sale in Jahrum and Laristan, the remaining quarter to Shibkuh ports on the Persian coast, and to the Oman ports on the Arab coast.

Kerosene.—The annual Lingah consumption of this oil is about 12,000 cases, half of which goes to the interior in Laristan and Jahrum, and the rest is used for Lingah and the small ports of the Persian and Arab coasts. In 1907-8 7,050 cases were imported by the German firm from Finme. Actually there are about 2,500-3,000 cases of the German oil on hand in Lingah, none of other kinds.

Piece Goods.—Two hundred and two bales imported by the German line. There is nothing to show what number, if any, of these were of British manufacture. In any case it is improbable that anything except British cottons would be imported, were the direct British steamers to call. It would certainly contribute to spoiling the Germans' business. The following samples are forwarded, but I am informed that these goods are not now in demand, and the German firm change their samples frequently. Their principal business would appear to be in *loin cloth* ("langoute" in Persian) which are always in demand.

Sample No. 50.—"Lingoute," *loin cloth*, red and black; price per twenty 15 rupees cash in Lingah. (Other types enclosed.)

Sample No. 51.—"Langoute," *loin cloth*, white; price per twenty 6 rupees = 8s.

Sample No. 52.—(a.) *Piece goods* bought from Woneckhaus and Co., all customs and lighterage dues included, retail price, 8 annas = 8d. per yard. Length, 40 yards; width, 30 inches.

(b.) Retail price, 2 annas per yard. Length, 60 inches; width, 40 inches.

(c.) " 2½ " " " 50 " " 40 "

(d.) " 2½ " " " 50 " " 35 "

(e.) " 3 rupees cash per yard. Length, 25 inches; width, 30 inches.

(f.) " 2½ annas per yard. Length, 60 inches; width, 35 inches.

(g.) " 3 " " " 60 " " 40 "

(h.) " 2½ " " " 50 " " 40 "

(i.) " 2½ " " " 40 " " 45 "

(j.) " 3 " " " 50 " " 40 "

(k.) " 2 rupees cash per yard. Length, 30 inches; width, 60 inches.

Mucaroui.—About 500 to 600 cases are annually imported into Lingah, also for transshipment to the ports of the Oman coast opposite.

Earthenware.—One hundred and thirty-one cases were imported by these vessels in 1906-7; 147 in 1907-8. Four samples sent.

Sample No. 53.—*Earthenware bowls*, large and small, at 2 rupees = 2s. 8d. per dozen cash in Lingah.

Sample No. 54.—*Saucer*, large, at 3 rupees = 4s. per dozen cash.

Sample No. 55.—*Saucer*, small, at 1 r. 8 a. = 2s. per dozen cash.

Exports.

Nine thousand one hundred and seventy-two packages in 1907-8, an increase upon 6,031 in 1906-7. All the cargo, except that to Aden, is Messrs. Woneckhaus and Co.'s own consignment, it is understood. The only matter calling for serious attention is the heavy extent to which the German export shells.

MOHAMMERAH AND AHWAZ.

Imports.

Description.	1906-7.	1907-8.	
		Ahwaz only.	Mohammerah only.
Loaf sugar	Cases .. 1,750	300	..
Crystal sugar	Bags .. 2,750	..	3,010
Matches	Cases .. 10	30	130
Paints, colours, and indigo 6	..	20
Henna	Bundles .. 19
Cotton goods	Bales .. 118	256	258
Woolen goods 4	10	..
Velvets and plushes	Cases .. 8
Gold thread 5
Drugs 9	2	..
Window glass 100
Glassware 17	..	8
Iron brassware	Bundles .. 135	..	529
Iron hoops 40	..	219
Empty cartridges	Cases .. 34
Wall paper 68	..	1
China root 20
Wood for date boxes	Bundles .. 3,700	..	9,600
Machinery	Cases .. 9
Provisions 127	56	125
Miscellaneous—			
Local	Packages .. 169
Up country 313	36	124
Other 615
Perfumery	Cases	2
Furniture	21	23
Leather	1
Wines	Cases	52	11
Tea	136
Beer	20
Kerosene	50	7,500
Total packages 10,026	813	23,761

Exports.

		1906-7.	1907-8.	Value.
Barley	Tons .. 3,743 (bulk)	724 (bulk)	£	6,160
	Bags .. 480
Wheat	Tons .. 41 (bulk)	2,562	..	25,503
	Bags .. 3,678
Gum 2,770	122	..	149
 700	220	..	124
Linseed	Tons	43	..	271
Sesame	Bags .. 421	503	..	2,635
Tobacco	Bundles	412
Opium	Chests .. 43
Various	Packages .. 116	101
Total	Tons .. 3,787	3,329	}	35,314
	Bags, &c. .. 8,208	963		

Imports.

Total 23,761 packages imported, and 813 consigned direct to Ahwaz, against 10,026 packages altogether in 1906-7. This large increase is chiefly explained by:—

1. An import of 7,550 cases of kerosene by Woneckhaus and Co., who sold it as a lot to three native merchants at 14 kranas per case wholesale, and at 17 kranas per single case of two tins each.

2. An increase in the bundles of wood for date boxes imported from 3,700 to 9,600. This wood was consigned to a Jew in Bussorah, who packs dates near Mohammereh, and as a rule is Swedish or from Finne. The agent for the Government of Mysore Forest Department has made several inquiries of the consulate to know if he can place Indian wood on the Gulf market, and the opportunity will now be taken to ascertain if he can produce any articles as cheap as the common white Swedish or Finne pine wood, for which there is a very large demand every year in Bussorah during the date season.

3. An increase in the import of crystal and loaf sugar from 2,750 bags and 1,750 cases to 5,049 bags and 300 cases.

Of this increased amount 2,000 bags were, I am informed, consigned to Ter Meulen Gratania and Co., the Dutch firm in Ahwaz; 2,150 bags was crystal sugar ordered by Mohammereh native merchants from Hamburg.

Cotton goods.—Quite 296 bales of piece goods and covers of the total amount imported were imported by the Dutch firm Ter Meulen and Gratania in Ahwaz, and are manufactures of Van Heek and Zonen, of Enschede in Holland. (See reference to cotton goods under Bushire heading.) Apparently their native agent in Isfahan used to sell them there, but they have lately, I am told, been debarred from competition with Ziegler's for these Dutch goods.

Ten.—This, curiously enough, is also an import by the Dutch firm from Holland, eighty-six chests being sent up to Ahwaz.

Exports.

Save for its first five ships at the close of 1907 the German firm has been unable to count of the bad harvest, to purchase grain (just as British firms), at Bussorah, Mohammereh, and the figures show a falling off of 3,000 tons of barley, with an increase of 2,000 tons of wheat. The other exports are insignificant. The last five steamers passed down river homeward bound without calling at Mohammereh.

It is to be noted, however, that Messrs. Wonekhans and Co. have purchased on an eight years' lease a site on the Karun bank for a wharf.

H. G. C.

[21241] No. 617.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 442.)

(Telegraphic.) P. Gulahek, June 6, 1909.

ACTION of Russian military authorities at Tabreez.

I have received the following telegram No. 141 from His Majesty's consul-general at Tabreez:

"The main incidents preceding the last are as follows:—

"The manager of the Russian Road Company, on the 20th May, urgently pressed my Russian colleague to send in to the vice-governor a chain against Sattar Khan and his followers for damage caused by them to the company's property, amounting to 22,000 roubles. M. Miller tells me that, in order to keep this gentleman quiet and put an end to his accusations of personal sickness pending the arrival of a governor-general, he put in the claim.

"A quarrel took place on the 26th May in the Hikkauchad quarter between two rival houteamans of Sattar Khan, Naib Hussein, and Naib Yusuf, both of whom are notorious scoundrels. Yusuf, with some partisans, fired on Hussein's house, but no damage was done. Hussein fled to the vice-governor's house and afterwards to the Russian consulate-general, where he sought refuge. My Russian colleague requested the vice-governor to investigate the matter. The latter made an enquiry, but failed to take any definite steps.

"Consequently, a company of Russian troops went on the 29th May to the scene of the quarrel, where they arrested Yusuf, his brother, and five of their companions, who were carrying arms in defiance of the orders of the governor-general. Two of these men were subsequently released. After the arrest, the troops blew up the houses of Yusuf and his brother.

"The alleged reason for this step was that, under the instructions given to the Russian general, it was their duty to prevent armed encounters in the town.

"A Russian subject, one Sheikh Ali Asgar, who is a mullah and a prominent member of the Anjuman, was arrested on the same day by order of my Russian colleague and deported for trial in Russia. M. Miller tells me that this man has shown strong anti-Russian feeling, speaking slightly of the Czar and his Government, and has held up one of his own servants to ridicule.

"A had character, likewise a Russian subject and a Nationalist, had been arrested previous to this and sent to Russia, where he was wanted by the police for smuggling. Similar charges have motivated the arrest at Julfa of other Russian Nationalists.

"I have submitted the draft of the above to my Russian colleague, and he has expressed agreement with my statement of the facts. I, on my part, agree with him that the general public looked without particular emotion on the above-recorded events, although the more hot-headed Nationalists were disturbed and offended by them."

[21242]

No. 618.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 443.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, June 6, 1909.

ATTITUDE of Russian consul-general at Tabreez.

I learn from His Majesty's consul-general at Tabreez, with reference to my telegram No. 440 of the 4th June, that he fears that unpleasant consequences may result to his Russian colleague for his neglect in the matter of the full report, which was, he is sure, a mere accident. Mr. Wratlaw is afraid that the Russian Government believe M. Miller not to be on good terms with him. They are, on the contrary, he assures me, excellent friends, and as a colleague he is all that could be desired.

I have communicated to my Russian colleague this testimony to the good feeling between the two consuls-general.

[21243]

No. 619.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 444.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, June 6, 1909.

I LEARNED to-day from M. Sablino that he has received a proposal from the Persian Government that the Cossack brigade should be increased by 250 men.

Upon my remarking that a had impression would be caused by such an increase, and that the present was not an opportune moment for it, my Russian colleague replied that this was no new idea; in fact, for some time past it had been intended to bring the force up to a strength of 2,000 by an increase of 500 men. He added, however, that possibly the increase of only 250 men now proposed could not be realised at once, owing to the present financial difficulties of the Persian Government.

(Reference is to my telegram No. 430 of the 1st instant.)

[21245]

No. 620.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 445.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, June 7, 1909.

YOUR telegram No. 284 and Sir F. Berjio's No. 77.

(R.) "In response to representations from the two legations, another telegram to Nasr-ul-Shukh has been drafted by the Shah. It is curt, but states distinctly that he has been appointed President of the Council and Minister of War in his reply that if Nasr-ul-Shukh cannot return at once he will make it quite clear in his reply that he accepts and will return as soon as possible. It would be well that we should know wording of his reply." (End of R.)

(The following is confidential.)

Perhaps the causes of the recent litch had better not be examined into. Saad-od-Dowleh wishes to be appointed President of the Council himself, and he is not above having recourse to tortuous methods. I should greatly regret his appointment to the

[1619]

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post, although he has, I admit, done useful work. He has been practically dictator long enough, and the Nationalists distrust him, and in order that confidence may be restored and the Minister for Foreign Affairs' influence counteracted, the presence of Nasr-ul-Mulk is much to be desired.

[21275]

No. 621.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 446.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 7, 1909.

BUSHIRE customs.

The temporary arrangement referred to in my telegram No. 396 of the 16th May has given place to normal conditions, which now prevail at Bunder Abbas and Bushire.

As regards our share of the receipts at the former port during the nationalist régime (see my telegrams Nos. 167 and 189), I propose to hand over the sum to which this amounts, i.e., 5,000 toman, to the bank, as, owing to the decline of receipts at Bushire, their interest is in arrear. I shall inform the Persian Government of this step.

[21295]

No. 622.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 447.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, June 7, 1909.

ST. PETERSBURGH telegram No. 290.

May I now sign convention subject to exchange of notes proposed (see my telegram No. 409)?

Preamble runs as follows:—

"The following agreement is made between the Governments of Persia and Great Britain."

I presume that this is sufficient?

[21054]

No. 623.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 287.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 7, 1909.

PERSIAN programme.

Russian Ambassador in Paris and Sir F. Bertie are being instructed to act together in showing the text of note enclosed in your despatch No. 87 of the 22nd April to the Nasr-ul-Mulk. The Russian Government raise no objection to programme being thus communicated to him confidentially.

For reference please see Sir F. Bertie's telegram No. 75 of the 29th May.

[21450]

No. 624.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 728.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 7, 1909.

RUSSIAN action at Tabreez. Your telegram No. 288 of the 5th June.

Count Benckendorff has given me explanations similar to those given you by M. Isvolsky. He said that the Russian authorities were not at all responsible for Bagher and Sattar Khan having taken refuge at the Turkish consulate, which was, in fact, due to the Turkish consul's intrigues.

I asked the Ambassador to make it quite clear to his Government that I wanted to be able to defend the military action of Russia as being in harmony with the policy of the Anglo-Russian Convention and with their own assurances, and that my anxiety about the matter was due to this. I recognized that Russian influence had been

[21361]

No. 627°.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey. —(Received June 8.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, June 7, 1909.

KERMANSHAH and Mohammerah consulates.

Reference is to your telegram No. 281 of the 4th June.

An application for sick leave has been received from Captain Haworth. Major Cox has suggested, and I concur in his suggestion, that in the event of there being any delay in the selection and appointment of a new man for His Majesty's consulate at Mohammerah, Mr. Wilson, of the oil guard, might take charge in the interim. When MacDougall goes to Kermanshah from Mohammerah I presume his salary and allowance will remain the same.

[1619]

4 N°

established in Northern Persia before the signature of the convention; I was not jealous of that influence, nor did I wish to utilise the convention as a means to diminish it, but I was anxious that it should be used by the Russians themselves in such a manner as would be helpful in the development on natural lines of Persia's internal government and consistent with Russian independence. I concurred in deprecating any Turkish interference, but I pointed out that, if a withdrawal of Russian troops did not begin, the Turks might claim that a strategical question had been raised by the Russian occupation, and that, to protect themselves from having their flank turned, they must adopt an active policy and take measures similar to those taken by the Russians. If I were questioned I would not be able to say that the maintenance at Tabreez of a large Russian force was, under present circumstances, necessary; the best answer to the charges now being made would be the withdrawal of a large part of the Russian troops, and such a step would have an excellent effect.

Count Benckendorff said that he hoped that a decision in this sense was now being taken by a Council of Ministers, and that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs quite held this view.

[17562]

No. 625.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 79.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 7, 1909.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 87 of the 22nd April last, reporting what passed at the audience which you and your Russian colleague had with the Shah on the 29th April, to present the *aide-mémoire* containing the general representations by the two Powers to His Majesty.

I approve the terms of this statement.

I have, &c.
E. GREY.

[21357]

No. 626.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey. —(Received June 8.)

(No. 449.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, June 7, 1909.

DRAFT electoral law has been telegraphed to the nationalist provincial assemblies for approval.

[21478]

No. 627.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey. —(Received June 8.)

(No. 450.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 8, 1909.

MESHED situation.

I have received the following telegram, No. 28, from His Majesty's consul-general at Meshed:—

"Four days ago, subsequent on the attempt on the life of the Karguzar, the leading shrine official was murdered in his own house. In the neighbourhood of the two consulates-general there was heavy firing this morning, and some shots struck these buildings. To-day a murder has been committed in the assembly.

"Although the situation is serious, there is no special reason for anxiety as to the safety of Europeans."

[21461]

No. 628.

Consul-General Cox to Sir G. Barclay.—(Received June 8.)

(No. 561.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Bushire, June 8, 1909.

SITUATION at Bushire.

The following continues my telegram No. 557 of the 6th June.

Yesterday morning before dawn the Tangistanis were ejected, and in the evening Seyyid Murtaza was captured, after some casualties had occurred in the course of an energetic resistance. Much credit attaches to the governor for the effective manner in which he dealt with the situation.

[21054]

No. 629.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 251.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 8, 1909.

I INSTRUCTED His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg to ascertain whether the Russian Government would have any objection to the communication to Nasr-ul-Mulk of the text of the programme of reforms presented to the Shah by His Majesty's and the Russian representatives at Tehran.

Sir A. Nicolson has now reported that the Russian Government are willing that this should be done, and I have accordingly to request your Excellency to concert with your Russian colleague with a view to handing a copy of that document to Nasr-ul-Mulk.

In making this communication to Nasr-ul-Mulk, your Excellency should express to him the hope of His Majesty's Government that, if he cannot return to Persia at once, he will state clearly in his reply to the Shah's invitation that he accepts the post offered to him, and that he will afford to His Majesty's Government an opportunity of seeing the text of his answer. His Majesty's Government trust that he will return to Persia as soon as possible.

I transmit to your Excellency herewith printed copies of Sir G. Barclay's despatch No. 87 of the 22nd April,* containing as an inclosure the text of the note in question. Your Excellency should hand a copy of this note to Nasr-ul-Mulk without, however, giving him a copy of the covering despatch.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[21295]

No. 630.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 8, 1909.

WITH reference to my letter of the 5th instant, relative to the proposed settlement between His Majesty's and the Russian Governments of questions connected with telegraph lines in Persia, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a further telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran on the subject.†

The views of Viscount Merley respecting the immediate signature of the Anglo-Persian Convention were asked for in my letter above referred to, and, with regard to the remainder of the telegram, I am to state that Sir E. Grey proposes, if his Lordship concurs, to inform Sir G. Barclay that the preamble quoted appears to His Majesty's Government to be sufficient for the purpose for which it is intended.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

* No. 399.

† No. 622.

[21483]

No. 631.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 9.)

(No. 451.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 8, 1909.

ACTION of Turkish consul-general at Tahreez.

The bast at Tahreez was doubtless, to some extent, due to the intrigues of the Turkish consul-general, but the pretext for it would not have been forthcoming without the regrettable action of the Russian military authorities.

In reply to the proposal made to Sattar Khan and Bagher Khan that they should retire to Turkey, my Turkish colleague tells me that they profess their willingness to depart on condition that the Turkish consul-general provide them, with the concurrence of the Russian general and the Persian authorities, with guarantees for (1) the protection of their own and their families' property; (2) a safe-conduct as far as the frontier; (3) permission to return as soon as the Russian troops shall have evacuated Azerbaijan. They promise, as long as the constitution remains inviolate, not to interfere in politics nor again to take up arms.

I have pointed out to M. Sabline that I feared that a bad impression would be created by the departure of these two men, since, even if no compulsion were used, the Nationalists would be ready to interpret it as expulsion. He replied that he was giving his support at St. Petersburg to a suggestion of his consul-general, that the Russian troops should now gradually evacuate Tahreez, with a view to combating any such impression.

(Reference is to your telegram to St. Petersburg No. 728, and Sir A. Nicolson's No. 293.)

[21484]

No. 632.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 9.)

(No. 452.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 8, 1909.

KAZVIN situation.

The governorship of Mazandaran and Gilan has been given to the Sipahdar, who promises, as soon as the newly appointed governor of Kazvin takes up his post, to leave for Resht.

The situation at the former town has improved and, according to a report received from the Russian secretary there, the major part of the revolutionaries will shortly retire to Resht.

[21574]

No. 633.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 9.)

(No. 453.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 9, 1909.

RECALL of the Zil-es-Sultan.

I have received a telegram from His Majesty's consul at Shiraz reporting that the insecurity of the Isfahan road is growing daily more pronounced.

With reference to my telegram No. 412 of the 23rd May and Sir A. Nicolson's telegram No. 277 of the 29th May, I think that order could be restored by the Zil; but, in view of the lukewarm attitude of my Russian colleague and his Government towards His Imperial Highness's return, I do not feel justified in pressing for it.

[21582]

No. 634.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 9.)

(No. 451.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 9, 1909.

SEISTAN defence scheme.

There is, to my mind, no reason why these works should be undertaken for the Seistan consulate rather than any of the other consulates, at some of which the danger

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of the organised attack contemplated by Major Kennion, though certainly remote, is nevertheless less so than at Seistan.

No doubt it would be an excellent thing in itself if all the consulates in Persia could be rendered immune against any such danger; yet the very considerable expenditure entailed, and the stir which would inevitably be provoked by these measures of defence, would not, in my opinion, be justified by the risk to which our consulates are exposed.

(Reference is to your telegram No. 274 of the 3rd June.)

[21573]

No. 635.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 9.)

(No. 195.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Constantinople, June 9, 1909.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 331 of the 2nd June I have received the following from His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad:—

"Sir William Willcocks expresses the hope that something may be accomplished at Kerkia, and that the Ottoman Government will be induced to execute the project which he has proposed. He does not intend to return to London this year."

[21574]

No. 636.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 288.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 9, 1909.

I THINK you are right in suggesting that we should not press for the recall of Zil-es-Sultan if your Russian colleague does not seem to favour the idea (see your telegram No. 453 of to-day's date).

[21613]

No. 637.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 10.)

(No. 360.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, June 5, 1909.

WHEN I had the honour to receive your telegrams Nos. 713 and 718 of the 3rd instant, explaining your views in regard to the reported action of the Russian general at Tabreez, I asked M. Isvolsky to be good enough to accord me an interview. His Excellency, having to be present in the Duma, was unable to see me until the evening, and I prepared a private and confidential memorandum to leave with him, of which I have the honour to transmit a copy. At the time of writing it there was some little doubt as to what had actually happened at Tabreez, and I therefore alluded to the action of the Russian general, not so positively as a fact as I should have done had I been then in possession of information which subsequently reached me.

In the first place, I spoke to M. Isvolsky in the sense desired by you; and I begged his Excellency to send renewed instructions to the Russian general to keep strictly within the limits of his original orders, and I again urged that in any case a portion of the troops should be withdrawn. M. Isvolsky said that since he had last seen me he had received some further telegrams from the Russian consul, from which it would appear that a Nationalist named Yousoof was complete master of a certain quarter in Tabreez, and that he had had a grudge against another Nationalist, which developed into a disturbance between the partisans of the two individuals, during which shots were exchanged, and a general hubbub had ensued. The other Nationalist had fled at first to the Persian vice-governor, who was powerless to afford any protection, and he had then taken refuge with the Russian consul. The vice-governor was without troops or police, and the Russian general had consequently taken the matter into his own hands, and arrested some of the disturbers of the peace. He had also blown up two houses and a barricade, the removal of which he had requested during some days past. The Russian consul had informed the vice-governor that he would be pleased to transfer to him the men whom he had in custody, but that the vice-governor had requested that they should be retained at the Russian consulate, as he had no means of keeping them,

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No. 635 A.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 9.)

(No. 266.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

PERSIAN appointments.

St. Petersburg, June 9, 1909.

I received a visit this afternoon from the Persian Minister. The object of Isaac Khnn in coming to see me was fairly obvious. He expressed doubt as to whether Nasr-ul-Mulk was a strong enough man to fill the position of President of the Council, though he would make an excellent Minister of Finance if he were in charge of that department only. He suggested that Saad-ed-Dowleh, who was not likely, he feared, to work harmoniously with others, would do better as President of the Council than Nasr-ul-Mulk. Saad-ed-Dowleh is a relative of Isaac Khan.

I told Isaac Khan that there was nothing more to be said on the subject, as the post of President of the Council had already been accepted by Nasr-ul-Mulk, who I trusted would soon be on his way to Tehran. I observed that the two functionaries must make up their minds to work in harmony.

Isaac Khan told me that on Friday next Ala-ed-Dowleh would be leaving Berlin for Tabreez, and that he ought to reach the latter place in ten days from the date of his departure.

[21595]

No. 635 B.

Consul-General Cox to Sir G. Barclay.—(Received at Foreign Office June 9.)

(No. 571.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Bushire, June 9, 1909.

MOHAMMERAH.

I did not reply at once to your telegram of the 3rd June, which repeated a telegram from the Foreign Office, as I was hoping to see Reynolds on his way through. However, I did not hear of his coming until too late, and therefore missed my chance of seeing him.

Firstly, with reference to the loan, I informed the sheikh, as I had been instructed, of His Majesty's Government's willingness to lend him 5,000 or 6,000, but he begged for 10,000, saying that the smaller sum was not enough.

After having undertaken to ask for 10,000 I can hardly repeat the offer of the smaller sum, nor would the sheikh be any the more likely to accept it if at the same time the question of the payment of rent by the company were to be raised. As, moreover, I have received a letter from him by the present mail in which he presses for an immediate settlement of the matter, I recommend reconsideration of the grant of 10,000.

As to the first condition imposed by the sheikh, if he or the trial headsmen were to learn that the company had at this stage of the proceedings categorically declared that buildings would eventually become the property of the Central Government, they would be much upset. For the purposes of article 3 of the concession, would it not be possible to regard the sheikh and tribesmen as "proprietors"? Or, if this is not feasible, I would suggest that, after verifying the facts as far as possible, the sheikh should be informed that his firm, which we have never actually seen, bears a later date than the oil concession. He might at the same time be advised not to raise the question for the present, but to be satisfied with an undertaking on the company's part, that the buildings will be left and that, when the time comes, the matter will be settled with the Persian Government. With regard to the sheikh's fourth stipulation, I presume the same argument would apply.

I should, however, be glad to learn the views of His Majesty's Government and of the company, as it is almost certain that the sheikh will enquire as to the attitude of the former.

Reynolds's draft agreement, list of requirements:

Second paragraph At the point selected, where the company thought that the breadth of Abadan Island was 1 mile, it turns out in reality to be 2 miles.

Fourth paragraph: It was not to be expected that the sheikh included in the price, which was agreed upon for the plot of land and pipe line on Abadan Island, the grant

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of land for building on the bank of the Karun River, either at Mohammerah or Ahwaz, and Reynolds's telegram to his principals dated the 22nd April makes it clear that he did not do so.

I did not think that it was worth my while discussing the other details of the requirements in Reynolds's draft agreement until a settlement had been come to concerning the broad preliminaries. However, I do not think there is anything, with the exception of the above points, to which the sheikh is likely to object. After the settlement of the preliminary conditions, which are now under correspondence, I thought that the company's local agent could arrange these details with the sheikh.

having no police or other force at his disposal. The consul said that the vice-governor and the greater part of the inhabitants had expressed their satisfaction at the action of the Russian general. The Russian consul did not apparently connect the proceedings of Sattar Khan and his companions in taking refuge in the Ottoman consulate with the above occurrences. He seemed to consider that the course followed by the above individuals was the result of some previous intercourse between them and the Ottoman consul. As to the other incident, the arrest of some other Russian subjects, I need not perhaps report, as a reality it is a matter solely within the province of the Russian authorities.

After M. Isvolsky had made me acquainted with the substance of the information which had reached him, I gave him my memorandum to read, so that he should refresh his memory of what I had stated verbally. His Excellency said that he most sincerely trusted that His Majesty's Government were not intending to magnify an isolated incident, and to base on it any change in the course which the two Governments had hitherto pursued in common. The close co-operation of the two Governments must on no account whatsoever be weakened in the slightest. He perfectly understood that embarrassing and troublesome questions might be asked in Parliament, and he quite appreciated the views which you had expressed as to the position in which you might possibly be placed. Still, even admitting that the Russian general had gone further than he ought to have done, or than was necessary, this surely did not afford sufficient reason for the two Governments to separate from each other. There could be no possible question of the Russian Government taking an active part against the Nationalists, and he really did not see why His Majesty's Government should contemplate the possibility of themselves taking part against the Shah. His Majesty was now a constitutional Sovereign, and had really no part or lot in what had occurred at Tabreez. He could promise as that renewed instructions would again be sent to the Russian general to restrict himself closely to the duty of protecting Russian subjects and institutions, as well as foreigners, and not to interfere in local affairs. As to the withdrawal of the troops, or a portion of them, he could assure me that the Russian Government had no desire to retain them longer than was necessary. He himself was of opinion that a portion of them could now be withdrawn, and he would, at a meeting to-morrow of the special committee which dealt with Persian affairs, advise that such a step should be taken. He could not promise that the committee would agree, and the military members or others might not consider the moment opportune, but he would give his voice in favour of the step.

He could tell me confidentially that he had reproved the Russian consul for not having fully reported the incident with the Nationalists when it occurred, as it had placed him in an embarrassing position. He remarked that it was essential that no divergence of views or of action should arise between the two Governments just prior to the meeting of the two Emperors in Finnish waters.

I have, &c.
A. NICOLSON.

Inclosure in No. 637.

Memorandum by Sir A. Nicolson.

(Private and Confidential.)

CONSIDERABLE uneasiness is being felt in London at the reported action of the Russian troops at Tabreez. Sir E. Grey fully recognises that the Russian Government have hitherto pursued a policy which was strengthening the good relations between the two Governments, and was likely to have a beneficial effect in Persia. It would be the greatest misfortune if this policy were to be endangered by the action of the Russian troops at Tabreez. There appears to be some ground for fearing that the Russian military authorities at Tabreez are taking an active part against the Nationalists. It is to be hoped that this is not really the case, as, if so, it would render the continuance of a passive attitude on the part of His Majesty's Government impossible, and the British authorities might eventually be drawn into intervening against the Shah. The deplorable situation would then arise of each country supporting different sides. It is earnestly to be desired that the strictest instructions be again sent to the Russian general to keep most carefully within the limits of his original orders, which were to protect foreigners and abstain from all intervention in internal affairs. The most effective measure for allaying all misunderstandings and misapprehensions would undoubtedly be

to withdraw a portion of the Russian troops, whose numbers in reality exceed what is required by the situation.

Sir E. Grey is most anxious to maintain the closest co-operation with the Russian Government in all Persian affairs; and he knows well that this is equally the desire of the Imperial Government. He would deeply regret if, in reply to questions in Parliament, he was not able to deny that the Russian general had gone beyond the declared instructions and intentions of the Russian Government, and he forced to admit that the two Governments were no longer acting in unison.

The Russian and British representatives have called on their respective consuls at Tabreez for reports as to what actually occurred before Sattar Khan and others took "last" at the Turkish consulate-general; and it is to be hoped that these reports will throw more light on the situation.

St. Petersburg, May 22 (June 4), 1909.

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No. 638.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 10.)

(No. 361.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, June 6, 1909.

ON receipt of your telegram No. 720 of the 4th instant, relative to the attitude which the Russian authorities might assume towards Sattar Khan and his companions, I addressed a private letter to M. Isvolsky, stating that if these individuals left Persian territory of their own free-will there was no necessity to accord them any special guarantees; while if they were deported either at the request of the Russian authorities or in consequence of the action which the latter were assumed to have taken against them, it would be considered that some important Nationalist leaders were being expropriated to please the Shah and the reactionary party. I expressed the opinion that I was sure that the creation of such an impression was far from His Excellency's desire. I added as my personal opinion that it seemed to me that the question of "last" was one which the Turkish authorities should arrange with the Persian Government, and that the Russian authorities had nothing to say in the matter. Moreover, as a general amnesty had been proclaimed for political offences, I did not see what Sattar Khan and his friends had to fear from their authorities.

M. Isvolsky asked me to call upon him this afternoon, and he read to me the instructions which he had sent to M. Sabline. They were to the effect that the refugee Sattar Khan and his friends had taken at the Turkish consulate were apparently due to some encouragement on the part of the Ottoman consul-general, and had nothing to do with certain incidents which had recently occurred at Tabreez. M. Sabline was to inform the Turkish chargé d'affaires that the question of "last" was one to be settled between him and the Persian Government, and that the Russian authorities did not wish to intervene in the matter. The Russian authorities had no reason to take any action against Sattar Khan and his companions, but, on the contrary, that they had been ready to afford them protection. If the above-mentioned individuals wished to leave Persia voluntarily and crossed the Russian frontier, the competent authorities would be ready to afford them facilities.

I told His Excellency that these instructions, which he had communicated to the Turkish Ambassador here, seemed to me satisfactory and to place the matter on a proper footing.

M. Isvolsky said that the departure of Sattar Khan from Persia had been raised by the Ottoman Government and not by him, and he had merely said that their departure might be of advantage to the cause of tranquillity.

As the instructions to M. Sabline will, presumably, supersede the note which was shown to me by Turkish Pasha, and which replied to a communication from Rifat Pasha, I did not consider it necessary to inform His Excellency that in that note the Russian Government had stated that "it imports" that Sattar Khan should leave the country. The question has now, I submit, been put on proper lines, and it can be left to the Ottoman and Persian authorities to settle it between themselves.

Those incidents at Tabreez have certainly been most unfortunate, and I trust that now that a frank interchange of views has taken place they will not lead to any further consequences. It would indeed be deplorable if they were to affect in any way the understanding between the two Governments, which in my humble opinion it is so

essential to maintain, not only with reference to Persian affairs, but in other matters which may possibly be of even more moment.

I have, &c.

A. NICOLSON.

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No. 639.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 10.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a letter from the Government of India dated the 20th May, 1909, with enclosures, relative to irrigation in the Karun district of Ahwaz.

India Office, June 9, 1909.

Inclosure 1 in No. 639.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Secret.)

My Lord,

Sinla, May 20, 1909.

WE have the honour to forward, for your Lordship's information, the accompanying copy of a letter dated the 4th April, 1909, with enclosures, from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, on the subject of irrigation in the Karun district of Ahwaz.

2. Sir William Willcocks's opinion as to the potential wealth of the Karun valley only confirms the importance of retaining our present position of paramount influence with the Sheikh of Mohammarah, and of preventing him from procuring from other than British sources the funds for its exploitation.

His Majesty's Government will doubtless take into consideration the view which Sir William Willcocks has expressed, as to the desirability of giving a scheme of irrigation from the Kerkla River preference over the Ahwaz scheme, should the Sheikh decide to grant a concession to a British company in consideration for the loan of 5,000*l.* or 6,000*l.* which it is proposed to negotiate through the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

We have, &c.

MINTO.

KITCHENER.

H. ADAMSON.

J. O. MILLER.

W. L. HARVEY.

G. F. WILSON.

S. P. SINHA.

Inclosure 2 in No. 639.

Major Cox to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Bushire, April 4, 1909.

WITH reference to Sir George Barchey's telegram of the 12th March informing you that I was hoping to meet Sir William Willcocks in the Shatt-el-Arab, I have the honour to report that I was also to do so on the 22nd and 23rd instant.

2. I had hoped, after hearing Sir William's preliminary views, to have proceeded up the Karun with him, but owing to the nationalist developments here, was unable to do so.

Mr. McDouall, however, was good enough to fill the breach, and I now have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of an informal letter written to me by Sir William on his return, giving me his views, and a copy of the report submitted to His Majesty's Minister by Mr. McDouall as the result of his trip.

The salient consideration to which I beg to invite attention without delay is that

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copy of a note by the Director-in-chief of the Indo-European Telegraph Department of this Office on the subject, and to say that Viscount Morley concurs generally in the views expressed by Mr. Kirk.

The points in question are as follows :—

1. The immediate signature of the agreement with the Persian Government as to the Arabistan lines.
2. The reservation of Russian rights on the Arabistan lines.
3. The exchange of the Tehran-Meshed and Khaf-Nasratabad lines.
4. The construction of a second wire from Tehran to Shahrud.
5. The financial position of the Tehran-Khanikin line.
6. The terms of the preamble to the agreement with the Persian Government as to the Arabistan lines.

As regards (1) and (2), Lord Morley concurs in the proposal that the agreement with the Persian Government as to the Arabistan telegraph lines should be signed at once; and, in the circumstances, he is prepared to accept the clause which it is suggested should be added to the proposed secret agreement with Russia, providing that any Russian signallers employed on these lines should be considered as servants of the Indo-European Telegraph Department. It would be desirable to secure the stipulation asked for by Mr. Kirk, that no expense should be entailed on the department by the arrangements, but Lord Morley would not press this condition if there is a difficulty about its acceptance by the Russian Government.

As regards (3) and (4), it may be observed that the question of the exchange of the Tehran-Meshed and Khaf-Nasratabad lines is to some extent connected with that of the construction of a second wire from Tehran to Shahrud, which is desired by the Russian Government, and to which, in Lord Morley's opinion, as was indicated in my letter of the 14th January last, no objection need be taken. It would be of advantage if action on the proposed exchange could be deferred till the convention as to the Arabistan lines has been ratified by the Persian Assembly; and postponement would, as pointed out by Mr. Kirk, facilitate the immediate construction of the second wire from Tehran to Meshed, the cost of which the Persian Ministry of Telegraphs have made arrangements to defray. Should the question of the exchange be raised with the Persian Government, it might prove impracticable to proceed with the construction of the second wire till the Meshed-Tehran line had passed under Russian control, when the matter would no longer concern the British Government.

As regards (5), Lord Morley concurs in the reply proposed by Sir E. Grey to the enquiry of the Russian Government concerning the financial position of the Tehran-Khanikin line. Mr. Kirk's note furnishes the material for supplying any further information that may be asked for.

As regards (6), Lord Morley concurs in Sir E. Grey's view that the preamble is sufficient, and may be approved.

I am, &c.
A. GODLEY.

Inclosure in No. 640.

Minute by the Director-in-Chief, Indo-European Telegraph Department, of June 7, 1909.

THIS note will deal with both the Foreign Office letters of the 4th and 5th June.

The four points raised by the Russian Government are—

1. The proposed exchange of the Tehran-Meshed and Khaf-Nasratabad lines. The Russian Government trust the exchange will be proceeded with as soon as possible after the signature of the Arabistan Convention. No objection can very well be raised to this from the British side, although Sir G. Barclay has reported in his telegram of the 30th May that the opposition which this exchange will encounter will affect unfavourably the chances of the Assembly ratifying the Arabistan Convention. This might be pointed out to the Russian Government, and they might perhaps be prepared to allow the question of the transfer to remain in abeyance until the Assembly had approved the Arabistan Convention. As an inducement to allow the question to remain in suspense it might be pointed out to the Russian Government that the Indo-European Telegraph Department would at once set about putting up the second wire that the Russians desire between Tehran and Shahrud. Sir G. Barclay, in his telegram of the 27th May, speaks of the Russians wanting extra lines, but, to be exact, what

[21751]

No. 611*.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 10.)

(No. 202.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Constantinople, June 10, 1909.

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier.

Referring to your telegram No. 337 of the 5th June, energetic representations have been made by the Persian Ambassador at the Porte on the subject of the Turkish action referred to in Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 411.

The Grand Vizier assured him that Turkey had no intention of permanently occupying territory belonging to Persia, but the Turkish consulate at Diinan had been attacked by Persian Kurds, and a Turkish officer had been killed, and therefore the Turkish Government must take steps to protect their people as long as no Persian authority existed.

[1649]

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they require is a second wire erected on the existing single-wire line. By the time this second wire was up the Assembly might have passed the Arabistan Convention, and the transfer of the line could then be pressed for without detriment to British interests, and also to Russian interests as far as the Khanikin line is concerned.

2. The reservation of Russian rights on the Arabistan lines. The final proposal on this subject is that, if Russia should wish at any time to employ signallers on the Arabistan lines, such signallers should be attached to the Indo-European Telegraph Department, and considered employes of that department. The proposed arrangement is not altogether desirable, but it could be worked, and might therefore be agreed to subject to the condition that the Indo-European Telegraph Department was not put to any expense by it. The Russians do not apparently remember that their Russian telegrams will have to be transmitted over the Indo-European Telegraph Department's lines to get to or from the Arabistan lines, and their efficient transmission will not then rest with Russian signallers. They could be informed of this when the time comes that they wish to employ Russian signallers on the Arabistan lines, and it might make them less disposed to avail themselves of the proposed arrangement.

3. The construction of an extra line from Tehran to Shahrud. I have already dealt with this question. The Persian Minister of Telegraphs has asked the Indo-European Telegraph Department Director to get the second wire erected, and has arranged for payment of the cost of the work, so that it can be commenced at once when I have instructions to carry it out.

4. The financial position of the Tehran-Khanikin line. Sir G. Barclay's telegram of the 27th May shows that the Russian Government desire information especially as to a payment made by the Indo-European Telegraph Company in connection with this line. By an agreement dated the 14th June, 1906, the company obtained from the Persian Government a renewal of its telegraph concessions up to 1945, and the agreement shows that to obtain this the company made to the Persian Government an advance of 40,000*l*. On the same date the company received from the Persian Government a document to the effect that His Majesty the Shah had no objection to the company coming to an understanding with the British Government as to taking over the Khanikin line, and that, if the line was taken over, the conditions for its working were to be settled by a convention between the Persian Government and the company. The existence of this document may prove of value to the Russian Government, as, if they came to terms with the company for working the line, the British rights over the line could be passed over nominally to the company without, possibly, the opposition the direct transfer to the Russian Government may raise. It will be seen that the payment made by the company was for a renewal of their concessions, and not in connection with the Khanikin line.

It appears to me that it is very important that the Anglo-Persian Agreement should be signed as soon as possible, as we shall then have an agreement ratified by the executive of the Persian Government. Whatever may happen later in the Assembly, the executive part of the Government could not afterwards accept any arrangement by which the concessions shown in the agreement could pass into other hands, and with regard to the Arabistan lines, this is an important matter. It would help our position also if the signing of the agreement could be kept secret until it was to be put before the Assembly.

H. A. KIRK.

[21712]

No. 611.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 10.)

(No. 455.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, June 10, 1909.

MY telegram No. 449 of the 7th June.

At the last moment a hitch occurred, and electoral law has not yet been forwarded to provincial assemblies. There are points in it which may encounter objections from the Cabinet.

(Sent to St. Petersburg.)

[1649]

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[21736]

No. 642.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 289.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 10, 1909.

PERSIAN telegraphs.

See my telegram No. 739 to Sir A. Nicolson of to-day.

The preamble proposed in your telegram No. 447 of the 7th June will be sufficient. No alteration is necessary in the Arabian agreement, which you may sign at once.

[21736]

No. 643.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 739.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 10, 1909.

PERSIAN telegraphs.

Please see my telegram No. 289 to Sir G. Barclay of to-day.

The declaration, as reported in your telegram No. 279 of the 30th May, and with the addition of the clause proposed in your telegram No. 290 of the 5th June, has my approval. You are authorised to act in the sense of the first sentence of the third paragraph of your telegram No. 96, dated the 24th February. With reference to the remaining points you will receive a reply later.

[21361]

No. 644.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 10, 1909.

I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, a copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran,* on the subject of the proposed exchange of consulates between His Majesty's consuls at Mohammerah and Kermanshah.

I am to enquire the views of Viscount Morley respecting the proposal that Lieutenant Wilson should take charge of His Majesty's consulate at Mohammerah when Mr. McDonnall proceeds to Kermanshah.

As regards the last sentence of the telegram, I am to say that it would seem advisable to await the observations of the Government of India on the question of permanent exchange of the consulates between the Indian and Home Governments before consulting the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury in regard to the salary and allowance of Mr. McDonnall at Kermanshah.

I am, &c.

W. LANGLEY.

[21758]

No. 615.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 11.)

(No. 227.)

Sir,

Paris, June 9, 1909.

ON receiving to-day your despatch No. 254 of yesterday, I arranged with the Russian Ambassador that the Nasr-ul-Mulk, who had asked to see me, and I should call on his Excellency together this afternoon.

What the Nasr-ul-Mulk said on his visit to me he repeated almost in the same words at our interview with the Russian Ambassador, to whom I learnt from his Excellency he had paid a visit in the morning and had held the same language. It was to the following effect. There had been a consultation between the well-known French medical authorities, Doctors Dieulafoy, Marion, and Cartaigne. They had given it as their opinion that the renal affection from which his son was suffering might be successfully treated medically, instead of surgically, by a course of waters at Evian

which would occupy about six weeks. He had received yesterday from the Shah a telegram in the following words:—

"Le portefeuille du Ministère des Finances avec la présidence du Conseil des Ministres vous ont été confiés. Vous êtes tenu de hâter votre départ."

The Nasr-ul-Mulk said that the terms of this telegram did not show my sympathy with him in his trouble or confidence in him, but he was prepared to accept the offer made to him in the hope that he might gain His Majesty's confidence, and that his services might be of benefit to Persia.

I found that the telegraphic instructions which the Russian Ambassador had received directed him to communicate to the Nasr-ul-Mulk the six points set forth in the note read in translation to the Shah on the 22nd April, copy of which was enclosed in Sir George Barclay's despatch No. 87 of that day, but that nothing had been said to M. de Nélidow as to making known to the Nasr-ul-Mulk the whole note. His Excellency had in fact not received the text of the note. With his consent, however, after he had read the note, I gave it to the Nasr-ul-Mulk for perusal, but, as the Russian Ambassador was only authorised to communicate the six points, I thought that you would wish me to confine myself to a like communication. I therefore gave to the Nasr-ul-Mulk a copy of the portion only of the note from point 1 to the end, instead of handing to him as instructed by your despatch the whole text of the note.

After the Nasr-ul-Mulk had read the note, and the Russian Ambassador and I had expressed to the Nasr-ul-Mulk the hope of the Russian and British Governments that if he could not return to Persia at once he would state clearly in his reply to the Shah that he accepted the post offered to him, and that they trusted that the illness of the Shah was not a pretext for not going at once to Tehran. He was ready to accept the offer made by the Shah, and he showed to us the reply which he intended, if we saw no objection to its terms, to telegraph to His Majesty. I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of that reply and of the Shah's telegram to which it is the answer, of which, at my request, he gave me a copy, for your information, and of which later in the day I sent copies to the Russian Ambassador. You will notice that, whilst thanking the Shah for the offer of office and accepting it, he begs His Majesty to give him permission to see his son through the treatment prescribed for him before proceeding himself to Tehran.

The Nasr-ul-Mulk stated that he hoped to gain the confidence of the Shah, and with His Majesty's support to carry out the Anglo-Russian programme which he had just read. In cases of doubt or difficulty he would confer with the British and Russian legations as to the best course to adopt. If he found that owing to the attitude of the Shah or for any reason not due to his own personal feelings he found it impossible to carry out the programme or work as Minister for the good of his country he relied on the British and Russian Governments to enable him to make an honourable retreat from office, and to continue to him when out of office the protection to him personally of which they had given to him the assurance if he returned to Persia as he was about to do by desire of the Shah in order to take office.

The Nasr-ul-Mulk then said that he hoped to be free to start for Persia by the end of July. He proposed, after arranging with the French authorities for the selection of the financial experts which were to be placed at the service of the Persian Government, to go to London there to establish his son and to confer with you on financial matters, and then to go to Petersburg for the same purpose on his way to Tehran.

Finally, the Nasr-ul-Mulk referred to the disorders on the Turco-Persian frontier, and to the importance of sending to the scene of the disturbances a capable Persian governor, on which he trusted that the British and Russian legations would insist.

As the Russian Ambassador had not been furnished with the note enclosed in Sir George Barclay's despatch of the 22nd April I gave him a copy of it.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS BERTIE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 645.

The Shah of Persia to Nasr-ul-Mulk.

(Télégraphique.)

LE portefeuille du Ministère des Finances avec la présidence du Conseil des Ministres vous ont été confiés. Vous êtes tenu de hâter votre départ.

[Non datée.]

Inclosure 2 in No. 645.

Nasr-ul-Mulk to the Shah of Persia.

(Télégraphique.)

REMERCE humblement votre Majesté Impériale sa haute faveur; m'incline devant sa volonté suprême. Animé d'un ardent désir, ose compter sur sa protection et puissant appui. Nouvelle consultation confirme lésion royale non fils, qu'on espère combattre par cure Evian, dont réussite permettra départ immédiat pour me charger des fonctions qui me sont attribuées. Supplie permission suivre traitement.

[Non datée.]

[21783]

No 646.

Anglo-Persian Oil Company to Foreign Office.—(Received June 11.)

Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London,
June 9, 1905.

Dear Mr. Mallet,

SHEIKH OF MOHAMMERAH.

With reference to my interview with you on the 7th instant, it appears to me that telegraphic delays are so great that the matters of the land and details of the lease will not be settled before this week's mail gets out to Persia.

I have therefore had prepared, and I now enclose three copies of a form of agreement between the company and the Sheikh of Mohammerah, such as I am prepared to recommend my co-directors to sign. For telegraphic reference I call it the "Minadale" agreement, and as its clauses are numbered, if any telegraphing about it becomes necessary, it will be facilitated.

I suggest that you send one copy to Major Cox direct, and another to Tehran. The third copy herewith is for your file.

Yours truly,

E. W. WALLACE.

Inclosure in No. 646.

AGREEMENT entered into between the Sayyar Arfa, Amir Tamen, Sheikh Khazal Khan, Ibi Madji Jabbar Khan, Sheikh of Mohammerah, on the one part and hereinafter called "the Sheikh," and Messrs. Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited) of London, E.C., on the other part and hereinafter called "the company," in respect of land required by the latter in the territories of the former, for purposes of their business.

IT is hereby agreed that, in consideration of the payment to him by the company, of a decennial rental of 5,500*l*, the Sheikh undertakes to him to the company an area of about 650 jerehs of 4,669 square yards per jereh on Abadan Island situated between the villages of Bairen on the north and Bawaria on the south, being bounded on the west by the Shat-el-Arab, and on the east by the Bahmanshir River and having a frontage of about yards on the former and about yards on the latter, and a strip of land for a right of way connecting the above with the Bahmanshir River.

2. The Sheikh further undertakes to allow the syndicate, free of all costs, to lay such pipe-lines as may be necessary in his lands, or in the lands for the time being under his jurisdiction or leased or purchased by him from others, and also such uncultivated land as may be needed by them for telegraph or telephone stations, pumping stations, or quarters, for line inspectors or staff, of not more than jerehs at each spot.

3. The Sheikh further grants to the company the free use of an area or areas aggregating 10 jerehs at Ahwaz with river frontages on the Karun for purposes of

storing material, erecting store-houses and such other buildings as may be needed for the business of the company. If the company select a site or sites on the left bank of the Karun they may select areas located opposite the island in the river and up-stream from the garden adjacent to the landing-place used by steamers plying on the Upper Karun. If the company select areas on the right bank of the river they may select one area above the rapids and one below the rapids.

4. Should the company find the ground selected as above after further examination not suitable for their requirements they shall have the right to select other sites of the same area and description. Should the company require more uncultivated land adjacent to the lands hereby leased to them, such land is to be granted to them by the Sheikh at the same moderate rate if the company asks for such further land within three years from the date of this agreement or if they ask for such land after three years from the date of this agreement they shall pay rental at the market rate obtainable in the district for similar land.

5. The Sheikh further undertakes to nominate watchmen for the efficient guarding of the property of the company, in each district through which the pipes may be laid, or the company's property exposed to possible loss. He will furnish the representative of the company with the names of his representatives, who on receipt of a request from the company's representative on the spot will be instructed by him to supply reliable men for this work. Any changes in the personnel of his representatives, he will from time to time advise the company's representative.

6. The guards employed being thus guaranteed by the Sheikh, he undertakes to indemnify the company for loss incurred by theft of property, when such is in charge of the said guards, and in the event of damage done wilfully to pipe-lines, tanks or other property of the company, he undertakes to do his best to trace the offenders, and in the event of identification, to inflict such punishment as may deter others, in the future, from doing the same, and with the object, also, of making the property of the company respected in his lands.

7. The Sheikh further grants to the company to make all bricks, tiles, &c., required by them, and also to erect on the lands so occupied by them in accordance with the articles of this agreement, all buildings and machinery as may be needed by them for the proper execution of their business, which same buildings, &c., will not be removed by the company on the expiry of the concession referred to in the following article—

8. This lease of land and all the conditions pertaining thereto shall remain in force for the full period of the concession granted to Mr. W. K. D'Arcy by His Imperial Majesty the Shah of Persia, dated the 28th May, 1901, and of any extension or renewal thereof. In consideration of the exigencies of their business should the company wish to curtail the period of their lease, then twelve calendar months' notice of their intention must be given in writing to the Sheikh, prior to the termination of the lease. Such notice will be sent to the Sheikh, and at the same time a duplicate to His Britannic Majesty's consul at Mohammerah, and its receipt by the latter will be held to be proof of its receipt by the former.

9. If at any time should the company desire to acquire land on the Karun, at Ahwaz or any other point for wharf or warehouse, or anywhere in the country under the Sheikh's jurisdiction, he is as far as possible to assist the company in procuring favourable rates for acquiring the same.

10. The company on their part agree not to engage without the cognizance of the Sheikh's tribunals for their work, or in any way to interfere in tribal matters.

11. The company, as lessors of the land, agree that all treasure trove throughout the land leased to the company belongs to the Sheikh alone. By "treasure trove" is meant gold and silver or precious metals in a natural state, or coins and objects of antiquity of the same metals.

12. The company, on their part, agree to pay the above-mentioned decennial rental to the Sheikh in advance in the following manner:—To the credit of the Sheikh in the hands of Messrs. The Imperial , the receipt by the bank of the money being accepted as the full receipt of the Sheikh himself. The first payment shall be made by the company within three days of receiving notice of the signature of this agreement.

13. The company bind themselves to employ as guards and watchmen only those who may be recommended as reliable by the Sheikh or his representatives in the various districts, and only so long as his support of their authority over them, and his assistance in the detection of thieves and his punishment of them, when detected, be real and effectual.

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14. The payment to the guards and watchmen engaged from the sheikh's men will be by the hands of the company and on the following scale :—

Fifty kranas per month of the Christian calendar and without food, and this will take place fifteen days subsequent to the end of the month during which it was earned.

15. In the event of a watchman, or any employé, leaving without giving due notice of one month, it is the rule of the company that fifteen days' pay be forfeited, and without exception all native employés are engaged on these terms.

16. The company reserve to themselves the right to punish the watchmen by inflicting fines to the extent of a half month's pay as a maximum, and in the event of their behaviour warranting a heavier punishment, they will be handed over to the representative of the sheikh at the nearest place, who, instructed by the sheikh in the sense of paragraph 5 above, will do his best to uphold the authority of the company among their watchmen, and the respect of their property among the people of the district, so avoiding unnecessary trouble to both parties of this agreement.

17. This agreement and all the articles therein are accepted by the sheikh as binding on him and his heirs and successors, whoever they may be.

18. This agreement is to be considered as in force from the date on which it is signed, from which date the company become liable for the above-named rental.

19. In any question which may arise where there is difference between the sheikh, his representatives, and the company or their employés, which cannot be adjusted amicably, they shall be referred to His Majesty's consul, either at Mohammereh or Ahwaz as the case may be, who shall finally settle the matter in dispute.

[21818]

No. 647.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 11.)

(No. 456.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 11, 1909.

PAYMENT of Oil Commissioners.

With reference to your telegram No. 267 of the 27th May.

Sadighes-Sulaiman should receive the salary up to and including June. His return to Tehran has, however, recently been ordered. The legation will, on his arrival, be apprised of the name of the official who will then have been appointed to take his place.

[21862]

No. 648.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 11.)

(No. 457.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 11, 1909.

SITUATION at Urmia.

I have received the following telegram, No. 150 of the 9th June, from His Majesty's consul-general at Tabreez :—

"The authorities at Tabreez have received a deputation from Urmia, who have come to lay their grievances before the Persian Government. The situation, they say, is rendered intolerable by the constant menace of Kurdish raids and the continual encroachments of the Turks. They are anxious that Miltasheun should again take up the governorship, supported by a sufficient number of troops. I think, however, that he will in all probability refuse."

"I have spoken to these deputies, telling them that for the present they must show a little patience; but if no steps are taken to protect them, I hear that a Turkish governor may be called in by the whole population. A general bust at the Russian vice-consulate at Urmia is also being discussed."

"The deputation have, my Russian colleague tells me, asked him to send to Urmia a force of 300 Russian troops. He declined, saying that this was not feasible. 'The frontier question is becoming acute. Is its resumption likely?'"

No doubt there is an increase in Turkish activity on the frontier, in spite of the vagueness of the details mentioned in the note from the Persian Government reported in my telegram No. 441 of the 4th June.

You may now think that the time is ripe for renewed representations at Constantinople, since the ill-advised action of the Russian military authorities in Tabreez has given the Turkish consul-general at Tabreez a preponderating position which makes this activity particularly undesirable.

[21871]

No. 649.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 11.)

(No. 458.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 11, 1909.

MESHED situation.

I have, with reference to my telegram No. 450 of the 8th June, received the following telegram (No. 30) from His Majesty's consul-general at Meshed :—

"Please see my telegram of the 7th June.

"The Russian consul-general and I are convinced that the town is in a state of complete anarchy.

"The firing which I then reported was rather of the nature of an anti-Russian demonstration. Indeed, this character of the movement is now strongly pronounced, and the staff of the Russian consulate-general are afraid to leave that building. At any moment an outrage on a European subject may occur.

"The governor-general being most unlikely to come to Meshed at this juncture, and his vizier being hunted for his life, we do not see any chance of improvement in the situation.

"After careful consideration of my Russian colleague's recommendation that the force at present in Meshed should be increased in the interests of maintaining order, I agreed that it seems advisable that some such action should be taken."

My Russian colleague is recommending a further increase of the Russian guards now in Meshed.

The newly-appointed governor-general, Ruku-ed-Dowleh, left Tehran on the 5th June, and the two consuls-general have done everything possible to induce the people to offer no opposition to him.

[21877]

No. 650.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 11.)

(No. 459.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 11, 1909.

TURKISH encroachments on the Persian frontier.

I have received the following telegram, No. 149 of the 8th June, from His Majesty's consul-general at Tabreez :—

"The Soujboulak district has been evacuated by Kurdish forces."

(Reference is to my telegram No. 421 of the 28th May.)

[21878]

No. 651.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 11.)

(No. 460.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 11, 1909.

OIL company and Sheikh of Mohammereh.

With reference to Baskire telegram No. 202 of the 9th June, we cannot find any record here of the firm in question.

It is thought to have been granted to the sheikh in the year subsequent to the oil concession, on the occasion of Hajji Rais's visit to Tehran in 1902.

It will, I am afraid, be impossible to say how far this firm may be made to override article 15 of the concession until it has been produced.

It is, however, possible that the sheikh, if he is treated generously in the matter of the loan, may be satisfied with an assurance from us that he will have the assistance of His Majesty's Government in bringing the question of buildings, &c., on the land leased to a satisfactory conclusion, should the Persian Government claim them on the expiry of the concession.

[21882]

No. 652.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 11.)

(No. 461.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, June 11, 1909.

NASSR-UL-MULK has telegraphed accepting office when the success of Evian treatment for his son will permit of his return.

(Sent to St. Petersburg.)

[21883]

No. 653.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 11.)

(No. 462.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 11, 1909.

ANGLO-RUSSIAN programme of reforms.

It appears from several telegrams addressed to the two legations that there is a current idea that a certain curtailment of Persian independence is involved by the Anglo-Russian representations to the Shah.

I think (see your telegram No. 193) that it would now be well to publish our programme and so correct this prevalent misapprehension. Under the present circumstances the Russian Government would possibly withdraw their objection, and, if so, a Persian newspaper which will shortly appear could be given the general substance of our representations, with the exception of the preamble.

[21736]

No. 654.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 743.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 11, 1909.

PERSIAN Telegraphs.

Please see my telegram No. 739 of yesterday's date.

You should suggest to the Russian Government that it would be better to await the ratification by the Persian Government of the convention respecting the Arakistan telegraph lines before taking in hand the proposed exchange of telegraphs, though we have no objection to the construction of a second wire from Tehran to Shahrud being undertaken at once.

The Persian Ministry of Telegraphs have arranged to bear the cost of construction of the second wire from Tehran to Meshed, and the construction of this line would be facilitated if action on the proposed exchange were postponed. The Tehran-Meshed line may pass under Russian control before it is possible to proceed with the construction of the second wire, in which case the British Government will no longer be concerned in the matter. This may easily happen if the question of the exchange is raised at once with the Persian Government.

The Persian Ministry of Telegraphs has entire control of the working of the Tehran-Khamikin line, and in respect of this line there are no accounts between the Persian Government and the Indo-European Telegraph Department.

[21884]

No. 653°.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 11.)

(No. 463.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 11, 1909.

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier.

Should any representations be made to the Porte on the subject of the encroachments on Persian territory reported in my telegram No. 457 of yesterday, the retention as Turkish Tajur Bashi at Urumia of a certain Peter Ellow would be a fitting subject for complaint. This person, as officially reported by Mr. Wratislaw, is a notorious swindler, and the police of British Columbia have out a warrant against him on the charge of obtaining money by false pretences. At Urumia he has been constantly intriguing, and the sale of certificates of Turkish protection to all who could be induced to buy them has brought him in very considerable profits.

[21736]

No. 655.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 744.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 11, 1909.

PERSIAN Telegraphs.

Arrangements for Russian signallers must, of course, not involve the Indo-European Telegraph Department in any expense.

See my telegram No. 739 of yesterday.

[21952]

No. 656.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 12.)

Sir,

India Office, June 10, 1909.

IN reply to your letter of the 9th instant, I am directed to say that Viscount Morley concurs in the proposal of Sir E. Grey to approve the suggestion made in Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 446 of the 7th instant, that the British share of the customs receipts at Bunder Abbas during the Nationalist régime, amounting to 5,000 tomans, should be handed over to the Imperial Bank of Persia, and that the Persian Government should be informed accordingly.

I am, &c.

A. GODLEY.

[21997]

No. 657.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 464.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 12, 1909.

PROPOSED diminution of Russian troops at Tabreez.

I have received the following telegram, No. 153, from His Majesty's consul-general at Tabreez :—

"I learn from the Russian consul-general that he had a conversation with General Suarsky yesterday relative to the reduction of the Russian force. They were, he added, in agreement as to the advisability of this step, and propose to commence by withdrawing the field batteries and howitzers.

"As the camp at present occupied by the Russian troops is not suited for summer quarters, His Majesty the Shah has been pleased to put at their disposal his garden, 'Baghi Shimal,' whither they will shortly be transferred."

[21998]

No. 658.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 465.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 12, 1909.

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier.

I have received the following telegram, No. 152 of the 11th June, from His Majesty's consul-general at Tabreez :—

"Turkish soldiers and some nationalists have come into conflict at Dilman, the capital of the Salmas district. Letters received here indicate that the affray was due to an effort on the part of the Turkish consul for Khoi, who was then at Dilman, to give protection from the local authorities to a Kurdish Persian subject. Both sides had considerable casualties; but finally, learning that Kurds were approaching the town, the nationalist governor fled, and his party submitted to the Turkish consul."

Sadreddin Bey has, he tells me, no information as to this incident. He has recommended to the Porte that a commission be sent into this district to enquire into recent events.

[22044]

No. 659.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 299.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

ARABISTAN telegraph lines.

Your telegram No. 743 of the 11th June.

Before the receipt of the above telegram I had already addressed to the Russian Government, in accordance with the authority given to me in your telegram No. 739 of the 10th June, a memorandum in which I stated that the opinion of His Majesty's Government was that the first favourable opportunity might be taken by the two representatives at Tehran for bringing the question of the exchange of telegraph lines before the Persian Government. The Russian Government are most desirous that there should be as little delay as possible in effecting the exchange, and if I were to suggest to them now that the exchange should be deferred until the Arabistan Convention had been ratified by the Assembly, I think their view might be that obstacles were being constantly placed by us in the way of the execution of the terms of an agreement concluded as far back as 1907. It would be better, I think, to make no further communication on the subject here, and the question as to when "the first favourable opportunity" occurred could be decided by Sir G. Barclay.

St. Petersburg, June 12, 1909.

[22001]

No. 660.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 301.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

TABREEZ and Meshed.

I saw M. Lavolsky to-day, and his Excellency told me that in all probability his Government would order the number of Russian guards in the town of Tabreez to be reduced, and also a reduction of the detachment lying outside. The special committee dealing with Persian affairs was to hold a meeting to-night, at which it would be decided how many troops should return to Russia. I said that a good effect would be produced by the reduction of the Russian force, and expressed my satisfaction at what he had told me.

M. Lavolsky then went on to say that the committee would also discuss to-night the situation at Meshed. He said that, in the opinion of M. de Klenau, all that was necessary was a moderate increase of the consular guard at Meshed.

M. de Klenau, who is now attached to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, was formerly Russian consul-general at Meshed.

St. Petersburg, June 12, 1909.

[21595]

No. 661.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 292.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

LOAN to Sheikh of Mohammerrah.

Following is for transmission to His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire:—

"Company's agent is Lloyd, who is thought to be at Mohammerrah. They will agree to pay in advance £5,000, being amount of ten years' rent. His Majesty's Government consider terms of lease (draft of which will be sent direct to you by next post) to be reasonable.

"Subject to those conditions as to repayment of capital and amount of interest which have already been mentioned, and if the company's lease is granted on satisfactory terms, we are ready to advance to Sheikh an immediate loan of 10,000. You may communicate this to the Sheikh."

See your telegram of the 9th instant.

Foreign Office, June 12, 1909.

[21878]

No. 662.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 293.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 12, 1909.

LEASE of land to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company by the Sheikh of Mohammerrah. Is more required than an undertaking that company will not remove machinery, buildings, &c., if the lease is extended or when it expires? I do not understand to what firman Cox is referring.

See your telegram No. 460 of the 11th June.

[21758]

No. 663.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 294.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 12, 1909.

FOLLOWING is text of telegram addressed to Nasr-ul-Mulk by the Shah:—

"Le portefeuille du Ministère des Finances avec la présidence du Conseil des Ministres vous ont été confiés. Vous êtes tenu de hâter votre départ."

Following is Nasr-ul-Mulk's reply:—

"Remercie humblement votre Majesté Impériale de la haute faveur; m'incline devant sa volonté suprême, animé du désir de la servir, ose compter sur sa protection et puissant appui. Nouvelle consultation confirme l'ésen réelle mon fils, qu'on espère combattre par cure kivan, dont réussite permettra départ immédiat pour me charger des fonctions qui me sont attribuées. Supplie permission suivre traitement."

Nasr-ul-Mulk says he will visit London and St. Petersburg, and expects to leave Europe by the end of next month.

[21952]

No. 664.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 295.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 12, 1909.

THE proposal in your telegram No. 446 of the 7th June relating to the customs at Bushire meets with my approval.

[21595]

No. 665.

Foreign Office to Consul-General Cox.

(No. 1. Confidential.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 12, 1909.

WITH reference to the telegram No. 292 of this day's date to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you copies of correspondence, as marked in the margin,* on the subject of the proposed loan to the Sheikh of Mohammerrah.

You will find the exact terms on which the company are willing to grant a loan of 10,000 in the draft lease enclosed in Mr. Wallace's letter of the 9th instant. Sir E. Grey will be glad if you will concert with Mr. J. B. Lloyd, the company's agent, who is now at Mohammerrah, as to the steps that should be taken to communicate the draft to the Sheikh.

His Majesty's Government trust that the terms contained in the form of lease, which appear reasonable, will be accepted by the Sheikh without alteration, but should in the course of the negotiations a deadlock arise over any point, Mr. Lloyd has power to effect a settlement on the spot.

I am to invite your special attention to the fact that the company must insist on

their lease from the Sheikh being coextensive with their concession from the Persian Government or any extension thereof, and also that as regards the question of the lapse of the company's buildings, machinery, &c., at the expiration of their concession from the Persian Government, or of any extension thereof, the company are unable, in view of their engagement to the Persian Government, to agree to the proposed reversion to the Sheikh, but they are quite willing, if it is thought advisable to dispense with a definite pronouncement, that such buildings, &c., shall lapse to the Persian Government, and it does not seem necessary to raise this question with the Sheikh, who should be contented with a statement that the company undertake that the buildings, machinery, &c., will not be removed at the expiration of the concession, or of any extension thereof.

I am, &c.,
LOUIS MALLET.

[22238]

No. 666.

Consul-General Cox to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 14.)

(No. 3. Commercial. Confidential.)
Sir,

Bushire, May 23, 1909.

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 486 and 496, (dated the 18th May, 1909, I have the honour to forward copies of the vernacular originals on which they were based, with translations, as under:—

- (i.) Translation of a written declaration recorded by Sheikh Khazal Khan, sheikh of Muhammerah, regarding the purchase of land, &c., by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, dated the 24th Rabi II, 1327 (15th May, 1909).
- (ii.) Translation of an undertaking given by Sheikh Khazal, sheikh of Muhammerah, in connection with the Karun irrigation scheme, dated the 24th Rabi II, 1327 (15th May, 1909).
- (iii.) Translation of an undertaking given by Sheikh Khazal, sheikh of Muhammerah, in connection with possible schemes of irrigation from rivers in his territory apart from Karun scheme based on construction of Ahwaz dam, dated the 24th Rabi II, 1327 (15th May, 1909).

2. Copies are also being sent to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran and the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have, &c.

P. Z. COX, Major, British Resident in the
Persian Gulf, and His Britannic Majesty's
Consul-General for Fars, &c.

Inclomro 1 in No. 666.

Written Declaration recorded by Sheikh Khazal Khan, Sheikh of Muhammerah, on May 15, 1909, regarding the Purchase of Land, &c., by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

(Translation.)

WHEREAS a friendly discussion has taken place between me (Sheikh Khazal) and Major Cox and Mr. McDoull, regarding the desire of the Anglo-Persian Company to lease certain lands in the territorial limits of myself and my tribe, for the establishment of an oil refinery and structures connected therewith, and for the laying of a pipe line from the head of the oil wells, and for the works in connection therewith, and whereas it appears that their precise requirements are as follows:—

1. A strip of land for bringing the said pipe line from the head of the above oil pipes to the refinery is needed.
2. A plot of uncultivated land on the Island of Ahbadan, with a frontage of 2,000 yards on the Shatt-el-Arab between villages of Bruini and Bawairda is required, the area of which shall not exceed 650 jareels.

3. Right of way between this plot of land and the Bahmanshir (*i.e.*, Turra) River.

4. Right to acquire further uncultivated land contiguous to the said plot, in case of necessity, at the same fair rate as that (ground) above mentioned from the present date up to a period of one year. If they want it after that lapse of time it will be leased at the fair current rate of the time.

5. If the above plot of ground be eventually not approved for the above-mentioned works the Oil Company have the right to acquire instead another site of the same size on another part of the Island of Ahbadan upon the same terms.

6. If the Oil Company require any other land on the banks of the Karun, &c., for wharfage and storage and for other purposes, of course to the best of my power I am ready to meet their requirements at the fair current rate of the time.

Therefore, I, Sheikh Khazal Khan, on my own part and on behalf of my descendants and my tribes, agree that I will lease to the Oil Company the above land which they may need for the pipe line and refinery establishment and connected works, with good title, inasmuch as concerns my rights over it, for such time as the company, during the duration of their concession, may require. This lease is subject to one of the following terms, of which the company are at liberty to choose whichever they may prefer.

That is to say:—

1. For an annual rental of 650*l.*, to be paid in advance every ten years.
2. For an annual rental of 1,000*l.*, to be paid to me annually in advance; it being stipulated that—

(a.) After the expiry of the period of their concession which will be defined [*i.e.*, in the subsequent agreement which would be drawn up between the company and the Sheikh.—P.Z.C.] all the buildings, workshops, &c., for themselves and for the oil refinery, &c., and all the buildings which they may construct in those limits, with the necessary gear for the refinery of oil which they may possess there, all become my property, and the company will not have the right to remove them or to demand their value.

(b.) The company's officials have no right to interfere in the affairs of my tribes. For instance, if they require to engage (tribesmen as) servants, &c., it must be with my cognisance.

3. If at any time in the process of excavating land for the buildings and workshops and laying the pipe line, any treasure should come to light in those lands, it is my property, and they have no right to take possession of it or make any demands on that account.

4. In case, after the expiry of their concession, they should obtain a renewal of the concession from the Government, then they must lease these buildings, workshops, and this property, with the land, in a way satisfactory to me or to my descendants.

Dated 24th Rabi II, 1327 (15th May, 1909).

KHAZAL-BIN-JABER.
(Seal of Khazal.)

Inclomro 2 in No. 666.

Undertaking given by Sheikh Khazal, Sheikh of Muhammerah, in connection with Karun Irrigation Scheme.

(Translation.)

I, KHAZAL, am hereby pledged and bound, should I at any time obtain from the Persian Government the concession for constructing the Ahwaz dam, that in the case that the British Government afford me assistance and co-operation in obtaining the concession and in arranging for the supply of funds and engineers for construction of the Ahwaz dam and for the irrigation of the land for cultivation, and in all respects that may be necessary, in that case I have no right to give my share or participation in this affair to any subjects of foreign Powers, or to bring engineers or experts for this work from any foreign Powers, save it be from the British Government and from among British subjects. And from among outsiders and foreigners, except subjects of the British Government, I will not permit anyone to share or participate, on this condition—that the concession for constructing the Ahwaz dam should be in my own name and under my own control, and that the British Government do not allow any concession

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for erecting the Ahwaz dam to be given by the Persian Government in the name of syndicates from among their own (i.e., British) subjects, nor from among subjects of any foreign Powers or of the internal Government.*

Dated 24th Rabi II, 1327 (15th May, 1909).

KHAZAL BIN-JABER.
(Seal of Khazal.)

Inclosure 3 in No. 668.

Undertaking given by Sheikh Khazal, Sheikh of Mohammerrah, in connection with possible Schemes for Irrigation from Rivers in his Territory, apart from Karun Scheme based on construction of Ahwaz Dam.

(Translation.)

I, KHAZAL, am hereby pledged and bound as regards the rivers which are in my territories such as the Kerkha, Shacor, Jorahi, and Hindiyan, and (as regards) minor works of irrigation from Karun River except the Ahwaz dam scheme, should I at any time, with a view to irrigating the face of the land, wish to take action in the direction of damming them; seeing that it would be a measure of tribal and domestic administrative expediency, there is no necessity for (obtaining) the permission of the Persian Government.

In furthering those measures, should I think it necessary and expedient to obtain outside capital and assistance for the execution of such projects, I undertake to give the right of refusal, for the completion of the execution and for helping me in the carrying out of the projects, to such approved British syndicates as the British Government themselves may think fit to introduce to me, and I will ask no other Government or foreign subjects for money and assistance without first giving the opportunity of refusal to the British; and I make this undertaking in the confidence that the aforesaid exalted Government have the intention and desire to see that my best interests are fully protected.

Dated 24th Rabi II, 1327 (15th May, 1909).

KHAZAL-BIN-JABER.
(Seal of Khazal.)

[22263]

No. 667.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 14.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 7th June, relative to the Mohammerrah Consulate.

India Office, June 12, 1909.

Inclosure in No. 667.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P.

India Office, June 7, 1909.

IT is considered desirable by Foreign Office, in present circumstances, that present incumbent of Mohammerrah Consulate should be removed and that suitable officer of Political department should be appointed in his place; such an officer, besides keeping in closer touch with Resident, would be better able than present incumbent to guide the Sheikh and to restrain efforts to improve German position on the part of Sheikh's subordinates. In order to provide for present incumbent, Foreign Office proposes his transfer to Kermanshah and the appointment to Mohammerrah of Captain Haworth. If

* *i.e.*, that the concession shall be in the name of no Persian, British subject, or foreigner, but in the Sheikh's name only.—P. Z. C.

you see no good reason to the contrary, instructions should be sent accordingly without delay. The matter is an urgent one. His Majesty's Minister at Tehran was informed on the 4th instant by telegraph.

It is also proposed by Foreign Office that Mohammerrah shall be assigned to Indian service and Kermanshah to Levant service as a permanent arrangement. The exchange proposed would be in accordance with a scheme which is now under consideration, and as to which I shall shortly address you, for allotting all consulates in Persia, except Scistan and those on Gulf littoral, to the Levant service. This scheme commends itself to me both on political grounds and because it will reduce expenditure, owing to salary and establishment in the Levant service being on a lower scale. I propose to agree to present proposal respecting Mohammerrah and Kermanshah in anticipation of decision on general scheme. Please let me know if you have any observations to make.

[22287]

No. 668.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 14.)

Sir,

India Office, June 12, 1909.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 24th May as to the proposals made by the Sheikh of Mohammerrah for acquiring, with our help, from the Persian Government a Karun irrigation concession, to be developed by him under British auspices and with British capital, to the exclusion of foreign participation.

In reply, I am to say that Viscount Morley concurs generally in the views on the subject expressed by Sir E. Grey, but that, in his opinion, it will be desirable, in the present undeveloped stage of the question, to avoid giving the Sheikh more than general pledges of approval and support. Sir C. Barclay's telegram No. 416 of the 25th May shows that difficulties may arise in the way of giving effect to the Sheikh's proposals in their present form, and it may prove inconvenient hereafter to have given too definite pledges to the Sheikh.

Lord Morley understands that he is not asked to consent to the application of Indian revenues for the purposes of any advance of capital or guarantee of interest that may be required to give effect to the scheme.

I am, &c.
COLIN G. CAMPBELL.

[22296]

No. 669.

Messrs. Elliager and Co. to Foreign Office.—(Received June 14.)

Sir,

28, Oxford Street, Manchester, June 12, 1909.

WE beg to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 24th May. We have now heard further from the Menia upon the subject of the oxide. The Mountjarr writes us in reply to certain propositions that we have made to him for the exploration of the sulphur mines, that these propositions have had his attention, but the present state of affairs has changed all his ideas. He attached a great importance to a contract concluded with Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co., which he considered would secure his peace of mind, whilst he states on the contrary he finds this has only embarrassed him and tied him hand and foot. He stated that some days previous to the 15th May he was advised by the legation that the British Minister had been informed by the consul at Bunder Abbas that the latter had arranged with the Nationalists not to interfere in the oxide business, and that the value of any oxide which might be shipped would be deposited at the consulate until the conditions existing between the Government and the people had ceased. He stated that for many reasons he could not accept this proposal, and that he had informed the Minister at Tehran of this. He maintains that these propositions are quite contrary to what he expected after the written and verbal promises which he had received assuring him that if he could conclude a contract he would receive every protection. According to his view, even if the Nationalists carried away the whole of the stock of oxide at Ormuz, the collection upon his honour would not be as great as that caused by the sequestration of the money in the consulate.

He further states that it is evident that he will himself have to do all that is necessary to protect his position, that this will cost considerable money, and that in

consequence of these extra expenses, he is of opinion that he will be forced to cancel the contract with Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co., so that he may shortly ship a considerable quantity of oxide which is in stock at Ormuz, as the continuation of this stock at Ormuz places him in a very dangerous position.

He acknowledges receipt of our letter, in which we assured him that His Majesty's Government will fully protect the stock of oxide at Ormuz, so as to maintain him in a position to carry out his contract with Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co. He, however, points out to us that we should obtain full assurances so that he does not cancel his contract. He asks for protection of the stock of oxide and for his people during the mining operations, and the loading of the steamers; that the price of the oxide shall be paid to us and no other party, according to the contract. Also protection against the intervention of any third party either of the Government or the people, in the mining operations, so that the monopoly which he assured to Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co. under this contract can be maintained. He states that although the revolutionaries have evacuated Ormuz after having been defeated, he cannot feel completely reassured until he has obtained the assurances on the three above-mentioned points, and that the Government will not be allowed to transfer his concession to another.

We had hoped that you would by this time have received from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran details of the arrangement which has been made. Our Mr. M. Ellinger will be in town early next week, and we shall be glad if you will kindly let us know by return of post whether it will be convenient to see him at 3 o'clock on Tuesday the 15th, afternoon.

Faithfully yours,
ELLINGER AND CO.

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No. 670.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 14.)

(No. 466.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahck, June 13, 1909.

SHEIKH of Mohammerrah and oil company.

In your telegram No. 293 you enquire which is the firman referred to in Major Cox's telegram No. 571 of the 9th June. I regret my omission to explain. The sheikh so far has not produced the firman in question, but he asserts that the rights of his tribesmen never land on Abadan feland and the banks of the Karun are confirmed by it.

In the ante-penultimate paragraph of Bushire telegram No. 571, Major Cox hinted at an inconvenient enquiry which might be made, and it was with a view to evading this that I put forward the suggestion of an assurance in my telegram No. 460 of 11th June.

The assurance which you indicate might at first be tried, and should it fail to satisfy the Sheikh my suggestion might then be adopted.

With reference to the enquiry contained in the third paragraph of Bushire telegram No. 571, I think it improbable that the firman, when ultimately produced, will admit of the construction suggested by Major Cox.

[22327]

No. 671.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 14.)

(No. 467.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, June 14, 1909.

FOLLOWING received from Bushire, No. 212:—

"During the past week Bushire Chamber of Commerce have written and begged me to move you to make fresh urgent representations regarding hopelessly insecure state of the roads and continued deadlock in trade.

"12th June acting Russian consul-general, who left for Shiraz on 6th June with his Cossack escort, telegraphed to me that his party had been fired upon; one of the Cossacks' horses was hit, and he himself narrowly escaped, his horse being struck."

(Sent to St. Petersburg.)

[22330]

No. 672.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 14.)

(No. 468.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahck, June 14, 1909.

INSECURITY of the roads.

With reference to the incident reported in my telegram No. 467 of to-day's date, I learn that the Russian consul-general at Bushire stated—when he informed Major Cox of the attack that had been made on him—that he was convinced that the Russian and British Governments ought not to defer any longer from taking such action as would terminate once and for all such brigandage and misrule as is at present rife in those parts.

I am not sanguine as to any improvement taking place unless the Shah appoints the Zil-e-Sultan as governor, or, failing that, a corps of road guards, properly drilled and paid, is instituted. Nevertheless I shall not fail to make the representations which the Bushire Chamber of Commerce suggest.

I have not again noted the question of His Imperial Highness's return, but I am given to understand that he has returned no answer to the Persian Government's invitation to come back.

The question of road guards is not a matter that can be settled off-hand. I had never received the last paragraph of your telegram No. 151 until I read it in the Persian Confidential print of the 14th April, section 3. Major Cox is to pass through here next month, and I propose to consult him before replying to the above. In any proposals, however, which I may eventually make, the heading "road guards" will certainly claim a not inconsiderable part of the advance we are to make to the Persian Government.

[22216]

No. 673.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 14.)

(No. 302.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, June 14, 1909.

TABREEZ and Meshed.

My telegram No. 301 of the 12th June.

I am told by M. Isvolsky that at the meeting of the special committee last night it was decided that a certain number of troops should be withdrawn at once from Tabreez, and that the numbers of the force should be gradually diminished until, on the arrival of the governor-general, the whole force should be withdrawn. M. Isvolsky promised to furnish me to-morrow with a memorandum stating the number of men which would be withdrawn now.

The Russian Government will send a suite of Cossacks to Meshed, and a certain number of Cossacks will also be sent to Ardabil, where the Shahsevids have been pillaging, &c., and where a large number of people have in consequence taken refuge at the Russian consulate.

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No. 674.

Consul-General Cox to Sir G. Barclay.—(Received at Foreign Office June 14.)

(No. 597.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Bushire, June 14, 1909.

MOHAMMERRAH. See my telegram No. 571 of the 9th June.

The agreement made between the Bakhtiari Khans and Mr. D'Arcy stipulated that when the pipe line had been laid down an extra 1,000*l.* was to be paid, and also that after the concession had expired the buildings were to lapse to the Khans. No objection was made by the Persian Government to the latter provision when Mr. Grant Duff sent a translation of the agreement to the Foreign Office at Tehran.

[2 1883]

No. 075.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 751.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 14, 1909.

I PROPOSE to allow Sir G. Barelay to communicate to a Persian newspaper substance of terms of Anglo-Russian representations to Shah, as suggested by him in his telegram No. 462 of the 11th June, but before taking any action I should like to know whether the Russian Government have any objection.

[22216]

No. 676.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 752.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 14, 1909.

RUSSIAN action at Tabreez.

Please convey to M. Isvolsky thanks of His Majesty's Government for communication reported in your telegram No. 302 of to-day, announcing intended withdrawal of a portion of Russian force.

[22463]

No. 677.

Mr. F. C. Strick to Foreign Office.—(Received June 15.)

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Baltic House, Leadenhall Street, London, June 14, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that I have to-day received from my house at Bussorah, Turkish Arabia, a telegram dated the 11th instant, reading:—

"Reported Hamburg-American Line (Bussorah Agency) endeavouring secure management Mouinitojar's steamers Karun."

I am, &c.

FRANK C. STRICK.

Possibly you will have already received the above information, but I thought there would be no harm in my passing it on to you.

[22461]

No. 678.

Sir G. Barelay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 15.)

(No. 469.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, June 15, 1909.

TURKISH chargé d'affaires writes to me in further reference to His Majesty's consul-general at Tabreez' telegram No. 152, that tribes have attacked Turkish guard at Khof, which has occasioned a small movement of Turkish troops towards that place. Moreover, in view of inability of Persian Government to prevent incursions across frontier, Porte has been compelled to take certain protective measures without impairing rights of Persian Government. Object of Ottoman Government is stated to be restoration of order in these districts and to protect Turkish and other foreign subjects.

(Sent to St. Petersburg.)

[22460]

No. 679.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 15.)

(No. 303.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, June 15, 1909.

TABREEZ. My telegram No. 302 of yesterday.

Information as to the number of troops to be withdrawn from Tabreez is awaited from the Viceroy of the Caucasus, and M. Isvolsky is therefore still unable to give me

the figures. In reply to my enquiry as to whether, in the event of a question being asked in the House of Commons, you could reply that the number of the troops at Tabreez was about to be reduced by order of the Russian Government, M. Isvolsky said that you could certainly give such a reply, as a decision in that sense had been already taken.

[22466]

No. 680.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 15.)

(No. 304.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, June 15, 1909.

PERSIAN programme.

Your telegram No. 751 of the 14th June and telegram No. 462 from Sir G. Barelay.

There is no objection on the part of the Russian Government to the publication of the substance of the programme, but they would wish the preamble and point C, which deals with financial assistance to Persia, to be omitted.

[22330]

No. 681.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barelay.

(No. 297.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 15, 1909.

INSECURITY of roads in Persia.

I approve of your proposal to make representations desired by Chamber of Commerce (see your telegrams Nos. 467 and 468 of yesterday).

[21582]

No. 682.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 15, 1909.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 25th ultimo on the subject of a proposal that defence works should be constructed for the protection of His Majesty's consulate in Seistan, and to transmit to you, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, copies of correspondence with His Majesty's Minister at Tehran on the subject.*

In view of the adverse opinion held by Sir G. Barelay, Sir E. Grey would suggest, if Lord Morley sees no objection, that the Government of India should be told that the proposal had better be dropped.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[22044]

No. 683.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 15, 1909.

WITH reference to your letter of the 9th instant, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, a copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg stating that the Russian Government might misunderstand the motive of His Majesty's Government should the suggestion be made to defer approaching the Persian Government respecting the exchange of the Nasratabad, Khaf, and Meshed-Tehran telegraph lines until the Persian Assembly has ratified the proposed Arabian telegraph agreement.

In view of the considerations advanced by Sir A. Nicolson, Sir E. Grey proposes, if Viscount Morley concurs, to say nothing more on the matter to the Russian Government and to leave it to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran to decide as to what would be the first favourable opportunity of raising the question of the exchange with the

Persian Government. Sir G. Barclay is aware of the views of His Majesty's Government, and may be trusted to use every endeavour to prevent the Russian representative at Tehran from taking any premature action, should he show any disposition to do so.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[21884]

No. 684.

Foreign Office to Colonial Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 15, 1909.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, to be laid before the Secretary of State for the Colonies, a paraphrase of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran,* in which reference is made to a person called Peter Ellow, who is Turkish consular agent at Urumia, in Persia, and who is described as being wanted by the police of British Columbia for obtaining money by false pretences.

Sir E. Grey will be glad if urgent enquiries could be made of the British Columbia authorities as to whether the statements in the telegram are well founded.

I am to request that Sir E. Grey may be favoured with an early reply.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[22189]

No. 685.

Foreign Office to Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 15, 1909.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 27th ultimo respecting the arrangements now being negotiated with the Sheikh of Mohammerrah in connection with your pipe line and refinery in South-West Persia.

A telegram has now been received from His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire pointing out that the agreement concluded by Mr. D'Arcy with the Bakhtiari Khans on the 15th November, 1905, contains a provision for the reversion to the Khans of such buildings as were Mr. D'Arcy's property, after the expiration of the period of the concession granted by the Shah. The Persian Government appears to have taken no exception to this provision.

As there is some similarity in the degree of dependence of the Sheikh and the Khans on the Persian Government, the existence of this provision in the case of the Khans seems somewhat to affect the considerations advanced in your letter of the 27th ultimo against allowing a similar reversion in the case of the Sheikh.

Sir E. Grey will be glad to receive any observations which may occur to you on this point.

I have, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[22563]

No. 686.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 470.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 16, 1909.

OIL syndicate and proposed advance to Sheikh of Mohammerrah.

Please refer to Major Cox's telegram No. 213.

The attitude of the Persian Government towards the Bakhtiari agreement is ascribed by Sir C. Spring-Rice not to any objections to its contents but to other reasons (see his despatch No. 17 of 1907). Mr. Grant Duff, however, in his despatches Nos. 27 and 213 of the previous year transmitted two notes showing incontestably that any stipulations made with an individual would be combated by the Persian Government if any injury would be caused thereby to such rights as the agreement with the concessionnaire conferred on them. The right to the reversion,

* No. 658*.

upon the expiration of the concession, of all buildings, materials, &c., is certainly one of them.

There is nothing in the concession, so far as I can see, whereby the right to buildings, &c., is limited to those on Crown lands.

While anxious to do what is possible for the sheikh, I do not see that we can do more than give him the assurance which I had the honour to propose in my telegram No. 460.

[22564]

No. 687.

Consul-General Cox to Sir G. Barclay.—(Received at Foreign Office June 16.)

(No. 610.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Bushire, June 16, 1909.

MOHAMMERRAIL Your telegram No. 163 of the 13th June repeating telegram from the Foreign Office.

It is desirable that all obances of delay, after the draft lease has been received, should be obviated. To this end any new points contained in the draft, as well as His Majesty's Government's views on the question of the reversion of the buildings, might be communicated to me by telegraph.

[22466]

No. 688.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 299.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 16, 1909.

PUBLICATION of gist of joint representations to the Subb. Your telegram No. 462 of the 11th June.

Subject to modification mentioned in Sir A. Nicolson's telegram No. 304, you may now concert with M. Sabline as to publishing text of representations.

[22660]

No. 689.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 17.)

Sir,

India Office, June 16, 1909.

WITH reference to my letter dated the 11th February, 1908, as to the adjustment between the Imperial and Indian Exchequers of liabilities on account of the advance of 300,000*l.* made to the Persian Government in 1903 and 1904, I am directed to enquire if the Secretary of State for India can now be informed whether the procedure proposed in the third paragraph of my letter has the concurrence of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

I am, &c.

(Signed) A. GODLEY.

[22705]

No. 690.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 17.)

(No. 471.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 17, 1909.

THE following telegram No. 83 was addressed to me to-day by His Majesty's consul-general at Isfahan:—

"To-day I received a farewell visit from Sirdar Assad, who had announced his intention of leaving with some of the other khans for Tehran. He would not inform me what force he was taking with him, but it appears from outside reports that this will consist of some 1,000 armed men, with one mountain gun. He explicitly stated that he would not fight unless he were attacked by the Shah's troops.

[1649]

4 X

His plans do not as yet appear to be settled, but he will probably follow the Naizar road to Kum.

Sirdar Assad's advance is ostensibly undertaken with a view to insisting on the constitution being properly put in force by a Cabinet composed of Ministers of liberal views.

[22706]

No. 691.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 17.)

(No. 472.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 17, 1909.

I AM sending the following reply to Mr. Grahame's telegram No. 88 :—

"I am amazed to hear that Sirdar Assad proposes to advance on the capital in order to exact that the constitution be put into force, and I request you to inform him of the above.

"The report appears to me to be almost incredible, as so far no one has offered any obstruction to the carrying out of the measures recommended by the two Powers with a view to the restoration of parliamentary government.

"At the present moment any demonstration such as is reported to be contemplated by him would be most ill-timed, as it would delay the restoration of order, and would further complicate the situation by causing the elections to the assembly and the convocation of that body to be deferred.

"I am requesting M. Sablino to send similar instructions to your Russian colleague."

[22707]

No. 692.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 17.)

(No. 473.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 17, 1909.

MR. WRATISLAW'S telegram No. 155 of the 15th instant is as follows :—

"A general meeting was summoned on the 14th instant by the refugees now in bast at the Turkish consulate-general. Three members of the Tabrez Medjliss were present, but the majority of the merchants kept away, and the meeting was sparsely attended.

"Speeches of a violent nature were delivered against the Russian and British Governments. In my opinion, my Turkish colleague is abusing his rights in allowing his consulate-general to be used for such purposes.

"Said-el-Menalik, the governor of the nationalists, who fled from Sahnas, is now in the town; his followers are under arms in the neighbourhood."

I have mentioned this matter to my Turkish colleague. He is making enquiries, and meanwhile, as a measure of precaution, has furnished his consul-general with instructions to avoid any action which might be regarded as incorrect.

[22708]

No. 693.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 17.)

(No. 474.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 17, 1909.

TO-DAY the convention regarding the Arabistan telegraph lines has been signed in accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram No. 289 of the 10th June.

[22296]

No. 694.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 300.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 17, 1909.

REDD oxido. Your telegram No. 371 of the 7th May.

We have heard through the Moin-at-Tujjar's agent in England that the arrangements referred to for temporarily holding up oxide payments are not regarded as satisfactory by the Moin. How does the matter now stand? Has a normal state of affairs been brought about since the grant of the constitution?

[22463]

No. 695.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 311.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 17, 1909.

THE Bussorah agency of the Hamburg-Amorika line are said to be trying to acquire the management of the Moin-at-Tujjar's Karun steamers. The report originates in a telegram received by Messrs. Strick from their Bussorah agency. What action do you recommend if the report is true?

[22563]

No. 696.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 303.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 17, 1909.

LOAN to Sheikh of Mohammerah.

I must leave details to your discretion.

I should have thought that with a little management formula I suggested might have obviated discussion, but I have no objection, if you think it desirable, to your giving assurance mentioned in your telegram No. 460 of the 11th June at once. With regard to Bushire telegram No. 610 of the 16th June, and telegram No. 470 of the 16th June from you, the prospect of a sum much larger than he had asked for being lent to the sheikh should make negotiations much easier. On a satisfactory arrangement being concluded, you may give assurance as to the loan at once. But I can see no necessity to telegraph points of difference in lease unless there is some reason to hurry.

[22849]

No. 697.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 761.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 17, 1909.

PERSIAN telegraphs.

His Majesty's representative at Tehran may be left to settle on a propitious moment for broaching to Persian Government the question of exchange, and he may be trusted to do all that can be done to restrain M. Sablino from acting prematurely, should he appear so disposed.

I agree with your telegram No. 299 of the 12th June, that the question of deferring action at Tehran need not be mentioned to Russian Government until after the ratification of the Arabistan agreement.

[22296]

No. 698.

Foreign Office to Messrs. Ellinger and Co.

Gentlemen,

Foreign Office, June 17, 1909.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 12th instant, on the subject of the protection of the oxide deposits in Hormuz Island.

His Majesty's Minister at Tehrau has been informed by telegraph of the dissatisfaction expressed by the Moin-ut-Tujjar with the arrangements made for the temporary sequestration of any payments accruing under the terms of his contract with Messrs. Weir and Co.; and he has been asked whether normal conditions have been restored now that a constitution has again been granted by the Shah of Persia. Sir G. Barclay has also been asked how matters stand generally in regard to the question of Hormuz oxide.

A further communication will be addressed to you as soon as an answer is received, in order that an interview with you may be arranged if necessary.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

No. 699.

[Nil.]

[22849]

No. 700.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 18.)

Sir,

India Office, June 17, 1908.

IN reply to your letter of the 15th instant, I am directed to say that Viscount Morley concurs in the view of Sir E. Grey that, for the reasons given by His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg, it would be undesirable to say anything more to the Russian Government as to postponing the question of the exchange of the Nasratabad-Khaf and Meshed-Tehran telegraph lines, and that it may be left to His Majesty's Minister at Tehrau to decide what would be the first favourable opportunity of raising the subject with the Persian Government.

I am, &c.
A. GODLEY.

[22803]

No. 701.

Persian Transport Company to Foreign Office.—(Received June 18.)

*3, Salter's Hall Court, Cannon Street, London,
June 17, 1909.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to refer to your letter of the 22nd April relative to the property at Shellfish leased from Sheikh Morteza.

We take note of the arrangements made to refer the dispute between the Mouin-el-Tejar and Sheikh Morteza to the Shari Court at Nejeff.

The difficulty which now presents itself to us is how we are to secure that a decision will be arrived at by that court within reasonable time. We are of opinion that the real object of the Mouin-el-Tejar is to prevent or delay the building of our shed. Protracted proceedings at Nejeff will satisfy this object.

We submit that the case is not simply that of a dispute between two Persian subjects, the settlement of which properly belongs to the Shari Courts. We suggest that the matter on which we are applying for the protection of our legation is the interference of the Mouin by force to prevent us from carrying on our lawful business, namely, the erection of a cargo store for the steamship "Shushan" at Shellfish on ground duly leased by us for that purpose from Sheikh Morteza. The ground in question was not in the actual possession of the Mouin-el-Tejar, for we had occupied the ground and partly built the store before he intervened. On our title being questioned we exhibited title-deeds apparently complete, whereas the Mouin was unable to produce complete documentary titles. We suggest that under these circumstances our legation has good ground to require of the Persian Government that the case of disputed Persian ownership, on which the interference of our business hangs, shall be tried in a secular court without undue delay, and that a representative of His Majesty's legation shall be entitled to attend the proceedings.

We have just received an advice from our Ahwaz agent stating that Sheikh Morteza now objects to the expense and loss of time involved in an enquiry conducted at Korbela and proposes Dizful. We are not aware whether the Mouin would agree to this change of place.

Our agent at the same time informs us that the Sheikh Morteza is so confident of his title to the land in question that he now offers to complete the buildings needed for our purposes. As our contention is that Sheikh Morteza is the legal owner of the land, we see no objection to this course, and have consented to make him a small advance on his personal security for building purposes.

We presume that if we obtain possession of the premises in this way without further protest from the Persian Government His Majesty's legation will not allow us to be ejected at any subsequent time unless and until successful proceedings shall have been taken against us in His Majesty's consular courts.

I have, &c.
H. W. MACLEAN, Secretary.

[22854]

No. 702.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 18.)

(No. 475.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier.

Gulahek, June 18, 1909.

I have received the following telegram, No. 156, from His Majesty's consul-general at Tabreez:—

"Mokhashem has been appointed governor of frontier districts between Khoi and Urumia. He is inclined to accept the appointment. It is intended to put a large force at his disposal, but it seems probable that lack of money will prevent this. There would, moreover, be danger of a collision with the Turks were any considerable force to accompany him. Mokhashem's sentiments are notoriously anti-Turkish, and the Turks themselves are not ignorant of his views."

The dispatch of a large force to the frontier regions might well cause mischief, and could serve no useful purpose. After consultation with M. Sahline I propose to take steps privately to discourage this.

[22855]

No. 703.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 18.)

(No. 476.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

BASTIS at Turkish consulate-general at Tabreez.

Gulahek, June 18, 1909.

I have received the following telegram, No. 157 of the 17th June, from His Majesty's consul-general at Tahreez:—

"The Nationalists in asylum at the Turkish consulate-general have by telegraph petitioned the Turkish Parliament to assist them in their efforts to ensure a withdrawal of Russian troops. They are at the same time endeavouring by a process of intimidation to secure the signatures of respectable persons for a similar document and also in the hope of closing the bazaars."

"My Russian colleague and I have written to the Turkish consul-general that these Nationalists are abusing the rights accorded to them by Turkish protection; and I am using what influence I have to counteract these intrigues."

Sadreddin Bey tells me that he is asking his consul-general for an explanation of the refugees' action.

[22886]

No. 704.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 19.)

Sir,

Downing Street, June 18, 1909.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to transmit to you, for the information of Secretary Sir Edward Grey, copy of a telegram to the officer

[1649]

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administering the Government of Canada on the subject of Peter Ellow, Turkish consular agent at Urumish, in Persia.

I am, &c.
FRANCIS J. S. HOPWOOD.

Inclosure in No. 704.

The Earl of Creve to Governor-General Earl Grey.

(Telegraphic.) Downing Street, June 16, 1909.
PLEASE telegraph as soon as possible whether Peter Ellow, now Turkish consular agent, Urumish, Persia, is wanted by police authorities in British Columbia for obtaining money dishonestly.

[22887]

No. 705.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 19.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 15th June, relative to the Rohat garrison and the Seistan consular escort.

India Office, June 18, 1909.

Inclosure in No. 705.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. India Office, June 15, 1909.
I APPROVE action reported in your telegram, dated the 4th May, as to Rohat garrison.

In the opinion of His Majesty's Government no ground is afforded by present political situation in Persia for reconsidering the decision not to increase the consular escort in Seistan.

[22889]

No. 706.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 19.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 11th June, relative to the Mohammereh Consulate.

India Office, June 18, 1909.

Inclosure in No. 706.

Viscount Morley to the Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. India Office, June 11, 1909.
MOHAMMERAH. See my telegram dated the 7th June.

As Haworth is taking sick leave, Foreign Office propose that, when McDonald goes to Kermanshah, Wilson, of Oil Guard, should take charge at Mohammereh. Please say whether you have any objection to this, and what rate of pay should be drawn by Wilson.

[22970]

No. 707.

Anglo-Persian Oil Company to Foreign Office.—(Received June 19.)

*Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London,
June 18, 1909.*

Sir,
I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated the 15th instant, calling my attention to clause 6 of an agreement made on the 15th November, 1905, between Mr. Preece on behalf of the then holders of the Persian concession on the one hand and the Bakhtiari chiefs on the other.

This was the first time that my attention was called to the clause in question, and it has taken me a couple of days to investigate the matter.

I find from Mr. Preece that when he negotiated this agreement with the chiefs and discussed the question of their allowing Europeans and others under them to go to live and work in the Bakhtiari country, when the chiefs claimed that on the departure of these people their buildings should revert to the Bakhtiari who had in his mind that such buildings would be all or mainly catcha, and that consequently the clause would be unobjectionable—in any case, that it involved comparatively speaking only a small sum of money.

It is true that in all human probability it can only involve a small sum of money, as it does not cover plant, pipes, machinery, or anything of a kindred nature, but all the same I think that putting it into the agreement was a mistake.

However that may be, it is a mistake to suppose that the Persian Government has taken no exception to this agreement. I have to-day obtained a copy (attached hereto) of a letter dated the 16th August, 1906, from the British Legation in Tehran to Sir Edward Grey, which shows that the Persians took exception to it in the strongest possible manner.

In any case, I am sure that you will feel that my company cannot now safely commit a similar mistake, and, besides, the Sheikh's demand, as set forth in Major Cox's telegram No. 486 of the 18th May, 1909, is of a far more wide-reaching nature, viz. :—

"That all the company's plant of machinery, workshop, and other erections upon the lands leased to them shall lapse to the Sheikh."

As on these lands it is proposed to erect an oil refinery and all necessary buildings, with plant, machinery, and pipe lines, the value involved will certainly not be under a quarter of a million sterling, and may easily run to a million or more if the company has before it the successful career that we all anticipate.

In conclusion I ask leave to say that my company has no objection as such to allowing a reversion to the Sheikh on the expiry of the concession or of any renewal or extension thereof, but that it is precluded by one of the terms of the concession from specifically promising such reversion to the Sheikh as against the Persian Government, and I sincerely hope that Major Cox, when this is clearly put before him (as it will be by our Persian agents, Messrs. Lloyd, Scott, and Co. on arrival of to-day's outward mail, if it has not already been put), will succeed in persuading the Sheikh to either waive his demand or else to be satisfied with the undertaking given in my letter of the 27th ultimo, paragraph 17.

I am, &c.
E. W. WALLACE, Vice-Chairman.

Inclosure 1 in No. 707.

Mr. E. Grant Duff to Sir Edward Grey.

(No. 213.)
Sir,

Galahak, August 16, 1906.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 196 of the 19th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of a note from the Mushir-ed-Dowleh regarding the agreement signed last autumn between the Bakhtiari Khans and the oil syndicate.

You will see that the Persian Government deny that without their approval the concessionaires have the right to make with any person an agreement the stipulations of which affect the rights of that Government.

I have, &c.
EVELYN GRANT DUFF.

Inclosure 2 in No. 707.

Mushir-ed-Dowleh to Mr. E. Grant Duff.

(Translation.)

July 26, 1906.

I HAVE received your note of the 18th instant respecting the statements made by the Bakhtiari chiefs to Abbas Kuli Khan in connection with the agreement made by them with the oil syndicate.

In reply to the reference made in your note to Article 3 of the concession, I have the honour to state that the article in question only refers to the lease or purchase of lands about which the concessionaires can come to terms with the owners, but the latter cannot, without the knowledge or approval of the Persian Government, make with any person an agreement the stipulations of which affect the rights of the Government.

The Persian Government cannot accept the agreement which the oil syndicate propose to make with the chiefs, and when the draft was sent to the Foreign Office a reply was sent in writing, saying that the Persian Government could not accept and certify the agreement in question, and also, in my note respecting the complaints made by the Shoja-es-Sultan, I referred to the matter and await an answer for communication to him.

[22925]

No. 705.

Messrs. Ellinger and Co. to Foreign Office.—(Received June 19.)

Sir,

28, Oxford Street, Manchester, June 18, 1906.

WE are in receipt of yours of yesterday and note that His Majesty's Minister at Tehran has been informed by telegraph of the dissatisfaction expressed by the Moin-ut-Tijjar at the arrangement made for the sequestration of any payment under the terms of his contract with Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co. and ourselves.

We presume that our letter of the 13th May last made it perfectly clear to you that any sequestration, temporary or otherwise, of the value payable by Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co. against shipments of oxide would be seriously prejudicial to our interests quite irrespective to those of the Mein, as it is provided under the contract between the Moin, Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co., and ourselves that all such moneys should be payable to us. We regret very much that we are still without any clear explanation of the real arrangement that has been made. It has always appeared to us highly improbable that His Majesty's Minister at Tehran could have agreed to any arrangement as to the sequestration of any money other than that which may be payable under the terms of the concession to the Persian Government, and we still hope that this may be the case. Since we wrote to you on the 24th May considerable sales of the Ormuz oxide have been made, and the British companies running steamers home from the Persian Gulf have within the last few days been invited to make offers for the carrying of oxide from Ormuz homewards, and consequently at any moment it may become necessary to know where we stand.

We take it from your letter under reply that His Majesty's Minister at Tehran will telegraph you in reply to your enquiry how matters stand generally and whether normal conditions have been restored now that a constitution has again been granted by the Shah of Persia, but if this is not so and you only expect to hear in reply to your enquiries by letter, we shall be glad to now have an opportunity of reconsidering the question as to whether it would not be advisable to get the information by telegraph as suggested by you in Mr. Mallet's telegram to us of the 15th ultimo.

We are, &c.

ELLINGER AND CO.

[22938]

No. 709.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 19.)

(No. 477.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 19, 1906.

PLEASE refer to my telegram No. 423 of the 30th May respecting exchange of telegraphs.

I will do all I can on the lines indicated in your telegram No. 302.

There has been a considerable change in the situation since the dispatch of my above-mentioned telegram; in fact, so strong has the animus against Russia become that fear of the Assembly would prevent any Minister from agreeing to the exchange in question.

Our convention respecting the Arabistan lines would almost certainly founder if the present scheme were pushed through, and the latter should therefore, if possible, be postponed.

[22961]

No. 710.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 19.)

(No. 478.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 19, 1906.

I VENTURE to submit, in reply to your telegram No. 299, that more harm than good would be occasioned if the Anglo-Russian programme were published with the omission of point 6.

It is now no secret that an advance from the Russian Government forms part of the joint programme, and distrust will accordingly be increased if no allusion is made to it.

About a fortnight ago the "Evening Standard," quoting the "Vossische Zeitung," published a grotesque travesty of the joint programme, and the misapprehension that has arisen about the scope of that instrument is doubtless to be attributed to that publication.

[22974]

No. 711.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 19.)

(No. 479.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 19, 1906.

BAKITTIARI advance.

News has reached the Palace that 1,000 Bakhtiari, as reported in my telegram No. 471 of the 17th June, have set out from Ispahan. The Court and Cabinet are greatly alarmed.

It is believed that they are marching on Kaskan, where there is a considerable force of Royalist troops.

The chief of the latter force, Amir Mafakham, is now in Tehran. He fears that his men will join forces with the other Bakhtiari unless pay is forthcoming.

[22976]

No. 712.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 19.)

(No. 480.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 19, 1906.

MESHED situation.

I have received the following telegram No. 32 of the 18th June from His Majesty's consul-general at Meshed:—

"On the 16th June Rukn-ed-Dowleh, the new governor-general, arrived, and on the 17th I called on him. The Nationalists still hold the city and the telegraph office, and the governor is for the present powerless.

[1610]

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"A further detachment of Russian cossacks destined for Meshed has now crossed the frontier."

It was at the suggestion of the two legations that Rukn-ed-Dowlah was appointed to this post. During his former tenure of this office previous to the outbreak of anarchy he governed satisfactorily.

[22971]

No. 713.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 19.)

(No. 181.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 19, 1900.

MOIN-UT-TUJJAR's steamers on the Karun.

Moin has declared that the report mentioned in your telegram No. 301 of the 17th June is entirely without foundation. He affirms that no foreigners, and least of all Germans, will be granted the management of his steamers on the Karun.

[22962]

No. 714.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 19.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, June 19, 1900.

ACTION of German consulate at Bushire.

Please inform me if any action on my telegram No. 374 of the 8th instant is taken at Berlin. I should not wish German Minister to think I had complained behind his back. Have you yet received the summary promised by His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire?

My copy has probably been stolen in transit through the post.

[22983]

No. 715.

Consul-General Cox to Sir G. Barclay.—(Received Foreign Office, June 19.)

(No. 620.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Bushire, June 19, 1900.

MOHAMMERAH. Foreign Office telegram No. 303 to you.

The matter is undoubtedly urgent, for, until the lease is signed, the sheikh can get none of the money of which he says in his letter that he is greatly in need.

I wrote informally to the sheikh before sending my telegram No. 610 of the 16th June. I informed him of his prospects of receiving 16,500*l.* before very long and of the attending circumstances, and I expressed the hope that in view of these prospects he would be able to wait for another three weeks. I promised to go to Mohammurah immediately I received the draft lease, when I hope matters would be brought to a speedy and satisfactory finish.

I thought when I sent my above-mentioned telegram that I could get any explanations I required when the draft was on its way, and that there would therefore be no need for any delay of this sort after it had been received.

There is no immediate need for action in the question of the reversion of the buildings. I hope that the solution indicated by yourself or the Foreign Office may settle the matter, but before discussing it with the sheikh and Haji Rais I cannot feel very confident. Before this discussion takes place I should like to be fully informed of the views of His Majesty's Government. The Bakhtiari agreement of the 11th December, 1905, may be familiar to the sheikh and his factotum, in which case they may refer me to it and enquire why differential treatment should be applied to the sheikh's territory. On the other hand, they may never have heard of or seen the terms of the agreement.

[22982]

No. 716.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 20.)

(No. 482.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

HORMUZ oxide.

Gulahek, June 20, 1900.

I fail to understand Ellinger's complaint, of which you inform me in your telegram No. 300 of the 17th June.

I made a promise to the Nationalists, in order to put an end to the stoppage of mining operations which they had brought about, that all payments for oxide would temporarily be held back. I did not, however, take any measures to ensure this, since to my knowledge no payments were at that time due. Now that matters have resumed their normal course I shall naturally not interfere.

Moin-ut-Tujjar has now expressed his gratitude for our action in this matter, and declares that he has made no complaint.

May I venture to suggest that you should ask Ellinger whether payments are in default, in which case you might ask Weir for an explanation.

[22984]

No. 717.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 20.)

(No. 483.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 20, 1900.

HIS Majesty's consul-general at Tabreez has telegraphed (No. 153) as follows:—

"From the roof of the house which figured in the recent incident a number of shots were fired last night in the direction of a house occupied by Russian soldiers in the neighbourhood of the Russian consulate-general. There were no casualties, though some of the windows were broken. The assailants escaped, and there is no indication of their identity. During the night Sattar Khan was absent from the Turkish consulate-general, it is said, in his own house. Early this morning, however, he returned to his former place of refuge.

"The importance of arriving at some arrangement as regards these bastis has been rendered more evident by this occurrence. A continuance of such incidents is to be expected so long as they are able to intrigue in safety.

"It is desired by the Russian military authorities to disarm any of the police whom there is reason to believe are feigning in disguise, and to destroy the house in question.

"M. Miller is telegraphing to St. Petersburg for instructions on this question."

For the moment our chief concern is to ensure the departure of the two leading bastis from this place of refuge. Any efforts in this direction will not, however, be facilitated by disarming police, who are notoriously their adherents, or by further demolition of houses.

As to the guarantees for these men mentioned in my telegram No. 451, no reply has yet been received from the Russian Government.

[22985]

No. 718.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 20.)

(No. 209.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Constantinople, June 20, 1900.

TABREEZ refugees.

I beg to state that the Minister for Foreign Affairs here has received from St. Petersburg the same news as that contained in Sir G. Barclay's telegrams Nos. 473 and 476, and that he has, in consequence, directed the Turkish consul-general at Tabreez to act with circumspection.

[23018]

No. 719.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 21.)(No. 367.)
Sir,*St. Petersburg, June 9, 1909.*

THE Persian Minister, Isaak Khan, called on me to-day. He said that he had heard that the Nasr-ul-Mulk had shown some hesitation as to returning to Persia. I said that it was true that his Excellency had wavered a little at first, and had been preoccupied with the health of his son, but that I understood that he was now prepared to proceed. Isaak Khan said that he knew the Nasr-ul-Mulk very well, and though he was an excellent and upright man and a good financier, he doubted if he had sufficient strength of character to undertake the responsible post of Prime Minister, and perhaps it might be better if he were to be content with the portfolio of the Ministry of Finance. Moreover, the Saad-ed-Dowleh might not be inclined to work under the Nasr-ul-Mulk, and as the former was a strong man, perhaps he might be given the Presidency of the Council of Ministers.

I asked Isaak Khan if he were not a relative of the Saad-ed-Dowleh. He said that he was his cousin, but that he never allowed family connections to affect his opinion. I observed that the Nasr-ul-Mulk was appointed President of the Council, and that there could be no question of going back on the appointment, and that the Saad-ed-Dowleh would have to work cordially with his colleague for the good of his country. The object of Isaak Khan's visit was pretty obvious and by whom it had been prompted.

I have, &c.
A. NICOLSON

[23021]

No. 720.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 21.)(No. 371.)
Sir,*St. Petersburg, June 12, 1909.*

I SPOKE to-day to M. Isvolsky in regard to the general situation in Persia, with especial reference to the reported Turkish encroachments in the western districts and the disorders at Meshed, and I read to him the substance of the telegrams which Sir George Barclay had been good enough to communicate to me. His Excellency said that he was awaiting some further information from Urumia as to what was actually occurring on and near to the frontier, and I will revert to the subject when I next see M. Isvolsky. As to Meshed, his Excellency had received practically the same information as that which had reached Sir George Barclay, and he added that the situation in that town would form the subject of discussion at a meeting to be held to-night of the Special Committee which dealt with Persian affairs. M. Klemm, who was formerly Russian consul-general at Meshed and now attached to the Ministry, was of opinion that it would not be necessary to despatch any considerable force to Meshed, as the inhabitants were far more manageable than those in the northern and western districts of Persia.

I asked M. Isvolsky whether he had received any recent news from Tabreez. He said that nothing of any fresh importance had reached him within the last day or two. He stated to me that he had now gone carefully into all the proceedings of General Shansky, and he was of opinion that the latter had not gone beyond his functions. The quarter of the town where the disturbances had occurred was close to the Russian camp, and certain conditions which General Shansky had laid down in consequence of the assault on a Russian entrenchment had not been fully carried out. Arms had not been delivered up and some barricades had not been destroyed, and therefore when a serious disturbance had broken out in close proximity to the Russian camp the General had thought it necessary to take certain measures. There had been absolutely no intention of intervening in any way with the internal affairs and disputes. He could, however, tell me that, in accordance with a suggestion from M. Sabline, he thought that the Russian Government would now reduce the number of Russian guards in Tabreez itself, and at the same time reduce the strength of the force outside of the town. He could not tell me the exact numbers and details of the reduction, as these matters would be decided at the committee meeting which was to be held to-night.

I said that I was glad to hear that the Russian force was to be reduced, as the

step would produce a good effect. As M. Isvolsky had given me good news, and as I understand he will communicate in writing a statement of the proceedings of the Russian general at Tabreez, I did not consider it necessary to enter into a discussion as to whether or not General Shansky had exceeded his functions, though the explanation given to me did not appear very convincing.

I have, &c.
A. NICOLSON.

[23025]

No. 721.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 21.)(No. 375.)
Sir,*St. Petersburg, June 14, 1909.*

ON the receipt of your telegram No. 739 of the 10th instant, I addressed a note to the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, of which I have the honour to transmit a copy. The terms of my note were in accord with the sentence of my telegram No. 96 relating to the exchange of the telegraph lines, on which you were good enough to authorize me to take action. After the despatch of my note I received your telegram No. 743, which intimated that it would be better to defer action on the exchange of the telegraph lines until the Arabistan convention had been ratified by the Persian Assembly. I would beg leave to submit that it would be undesirable to follow up my note of the 11th instant by another one which would appear to postpone to a somewhat nebulous date the initiation of negotiations for the exchange of the telegraph lines. Before the question of the Arabistan convention arose both Governments were desirous of taking advantage of the first favourable opportunity to approach the Persian Government for effecting the exchange. When the Arabistan convention was being dealt with the Russian Government, at the desire of His Majesty's Government, agreed to await its conclusion and to give it precedence, and, in fact, practically to suspend all treatment of other telegraph questions. Now that presumably the Arabistan convention has been signed, it might give rise to misunderstandings were we to propose that a further postponement should occur. It is, I submit, feasible to proceed without delay to the construction of the second wire from Tehran to Shahrud, as the matter appears to be practically settled with the Persian Government; and this work could doubtless be commenced before discussions were opened for the exchange of telegraph lines. It is proposed to leave to the two representatives at Tehran the choice of a favourable opportunity to commence discussions with the Persian Government as to the exchange, and it seems to me that it would be better to leave the matter in that position. The two questions to which the Russian Government apparently attach much importance are the exchange of the telegraph lines and the construction of the second wire to Shahrud. They have evinced good-will in meeting our wishes in other respects, and I should not like that they should consider that hesitation was being shown on our side to carry out an arrangement on which the two Governments came to an agreement nearly two years ago.

I would propose, therefore, to address a second note to the Russian Government simply stating that His Majesty's Government have no objection to the immediate construction of a second wire from Tehran to Shahrud, and that there are no accounts between the Persian Government and the Indo-European Telegraph Company as to the Tehran-Khauzkin line, which is worked entirely by the Persian Telegraph administration. I should be grateful if your views were kindly transmitted to this embassy by telegraph.

I have, &c.
A. NICOLSON.

Inclosure in No. 721.

Aide-mémoire.

HIS Britannic Majesty's Embassy had the honour to receive the *aide-mémoire* which the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs was good enough to address to it on the 16th (29th) May relative to telegraph lines in Persia.

His Majesty's Embassy is now in a position to inform the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's Government agree to the wording proposed in the

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above-mentioned *aide-mémoire* of the secret agreement to be made between the two Governments in respect to the employment, if necessary, of Russian signallers on the Arabian lines; and they also agree to a clause being added, as desired by the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs, that such signallers should be attached to the Indo-European Telegraph Department, and considered as employees of that department.

As to the exchange of the control over the Tehran-Meshed and Khaf-Nasrabad telegraph lines, His Majesty's Embassy would propose that the representatives of the two Governments at Tehran should be authorized to bring the question before the Persian Government at the first favourable opportunity.

His Majesty's Embassy will do itself the honour of addressing a further *aide-mémoire* to the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs in regard to the remaining points to which reference was made in the *aide-mémoire* of the 16th (29th) May.

St. Petersburg, May 20 (June 11), 1909.

[23030]

No. 722.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 21.)

(No. 330.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, June 16, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of an *aide-mémoire* which I have received from the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs, respecting the recent events in Tabreez and the conduct of the Russian general in that town.

I have, &c.

A. NICOLSON.

Inclosure in No. 722.

Aide-mémoire communicated to Sir A. Nicolson.

(Privé et confidentiel.)

LES renseignements parvenus au Ministère Impérial des Affaires Étrangères au sujet des derniers événements à Tauris ne laissent aucun doute que le chef du détachement russe dans cette ville n'a nullement transgressé les instructions dont il avait été muni, et que les mesures prises par lui n'ont en aucunement le caractère d'une immixtion dans les affaires intérieures de la Perse ni d'un appui accordé au Schah au détriment du parti nationaliste.

Le châtiment infligé par le Général Smarski au nommé Jonssouf et à son frère, dont les maisons ont été démolies, ainsi qu'à quelques autres partisans de Sattar Khan, a été provoqué par une infraction grave aux dispositions prises après l'agression commise contre une de nos sentinelles en vue de garantir l'ordre dans la ville et la sécurité de nos postes militaires. Le vice-gouverneur s'étant montré impuissant à effectuer la destruction des barricades élevées à proximité de notre camp et à empêcher une lutte armée dans les mêmes parages, le Général Smarski s'est vu obligé de prendre lui-même des mesures pour assurer la sécurité de nos troupes et des sujets russes et étrangers.

Pour ce qui est du fait que Sattar, Baghir, et quelques autres Nationalistes ont pris "best" au consulat général ottoman, les renseignements reçus par le Ministère Impérial des Affaires Étrangères établissent clairement que ce "best" a été le résultat des intrigues du conseil général de Turquie, et qu'on ne saurait l'attribuer aux mesures prises par nos autorités militaires. Les représentants consulaires de Russie et de la Grande-Bretagne à Tauris ont rendu compte à leurs Gouvernements des intrigues susmentionnées. D'ailleurs, il serait difficile d'expliquer autrement ce "best," vu que le Schah avait proclamé une amnistie générale à l'endroit de tous les délits politiques, et que quelques jours auparavant Sattar Khan avait adressé au consulat général de Russie la prière de lui accorder la protection du Gouvernement russe; cette prière avait été accueillie favorablement, et par conséquent le chef nationaliste n'avait rien à craindre, de la part du Gouvernement persan, ni de celle des autorités russes, et n'eût pu continuer à séjourner en toute sécurité à Tauris. Tout en estimant que le départ de Tauris de Sattar et de Baghir contribuait sans doute au rétablissement du calme, non seulement à Tauris, mais aussi dans l'Azerbaïdjan, et même dans la Perse tout entière, le Gouvernement Impérial n'a cependant jamais exigé leur expulsion. Le

Gouvernement ottoman ayant proposé de laisser ces individus quitter le territoire persan en leur assurant les moyens de le faire en parfaite sécurité, le Cabinet de Saint-Petersbourg s'est borné à accepter cette proposition. Le Gouvernement russe n'insiste nullement sur le départ de ces individus, mais s'ils quittaient le territoire persan de leur propre gré le libre passage par la voie du Caucase leur serait volontiers accordé.

L'état de choses à Tauris s'étant considérablement amélioré, il a été décidé que le nombre des troupes russes sera dès à présent réduit, et que les postes militaires russes dans les différents quartiers de la ville seront peu à peu retirés. Quant à la réduction ultérieure du nombre de ces troupes, vu l'absence d'une autorité locale suffisante pour maintenir l'ordre, elle sera effectuée graduellement. Le rappel définitif des forces russes aura lieu après l'arrivée à Tauris du nouveau gouverneur général, accompagné d'une force persane suffisante, et dès que l'on aura constaté que l'ordre et la sécurité des sujets russes et étrangers ont été suffisamment rétablis.

Saint-Petersbourg, le 2 (15) juin, 1909.

[23158]

No. 723.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 21.)

(No. 484.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 21, 1909.

TO-DAY I received a visit from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who emphasised the serious nature of the present situation, outlined in my telegram No. 472 of the 17th instant and my telegram No. 479 of yesterday. His Excellency stated that Sirdar Assad had been in correspondence with the nationalists at Kasvin and was now marching to Teheran at the head of a large force, nominally to compel the Government to put the constitution into force, although the latter have begun to carry out the Anglo-Russian programme without any loss of time. Saad-ed-Dowleh advised that the reason of his visit was that the Shah wished me to be informed that the patience of the Government was exhausted and it had been decided to dispatch Amir Mufkham, the Bakhshari chief, who was royalist, to summon his followers and offer a resistance to the Sirdar's advance.

This would amount to the reopening of civil war, and I therefore deprecated it, while advocating the adoption of conciliatory measures. I also told him of the telegraphic instructions which Mr. Grahame had received from the legation on this subject.

His Excellency replied that, as regards my suggestion that conciliatory measures should be adopted by Amir Mufkham, such a course would be to no purpose, but that the Government would wait two days before taking action, if I could discover any way of stopping the advance of Sirdar Assad. My answer to this was that I could do nothing further unless I received instructions from you, to whom, I added, I had already reported the action I had taken.

Mr. Grahame was obliged to send by letter my message to the Sirdar, as the latter had already started. I have not yet heard what effect it had on his Excellency. Supposing it were to fail in its object, I venture to suggest that the British and Russian consuls-general at Isfahan should be instructed to overtake him and to inform him that the two Governments advise him most seriously to return to Isfahan and abandon the demonstration, which can only be regarded as most foolish.

My private advice to Saad-ed-Dowleh was to get the new electoral law promulgated without a moment's delay. When it was shown to the provinces it called forth, it is true, criticism from the nationalists at Tabreez, but in spite of that it is a measure of a most democratic nature. I pointed out to Saad-ed-Dowleh that it was hopeless to expect to satisfy all sections of the community, that the electoral law had been drafted by an able committee, and that in the Anglo-Russian programme there was no stipulation that it should be submitted to the provinces. His Excellency assured me that he would have it promulgated on the 21st instant.

A telegram in the sense of the above is being dispatched to St. Petersburg by M. Sabline.

[23264]

No. 724.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 21.)

(No. 485.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 21, 1909.

RUSSIAN troops at Tabreez.

I have received the following telegram No. 159 of the 20th June from His Majesty's consul-general at Tabreez:—

"Two companies of infantry and a howitzer battery left for Russia yesterday, and to-day the bulk of troops have changed their quarters as foreshadowed in my telegram No. 153."

[23263]

No. 725.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 21.)

(No. 486.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 21, 1909.

ZIL-ES-SULTAN.

I learn from the Minister for Foreign Affairs that His Imperial Highness is about to return.

A short time ago he was offered by the Persian Government the governorship of Fars and invited to return to this country to take up his charge. Receiving no reply, the Government enquired telegraphically of the Persian Minister in Paris, who answered that His Imperial Highness was no longer there.

The Shah has now received a telegram from Berlin in which the Zil-es-Sultan thanks His Majesty and signifies his acceptance of the post offered him.

[23292]

No. 726.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 21.)

(No. 487.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 21, 1909.

WITH reference to my communication to Sirdar Assad—see my telegrams Nos. 479 and 484 of the 18th and 20th respectively—I have now received a reply to the effect that "constitutional purposes" necessitate his going to the capital, and that the presence of the forces which accompany him is for the purpose of securing the safety of his person.

Mr. Grahame informs me that the Bakhtiari are advancing by the Naizar road, which does not pass by Kashan. It would thus appear that they desire to avoid a conflict with the royalist troops in that town.

If it be the intention of Sirdar Assad merely to demonstrate on behalf of the constitution and thereby save his face, we may regard this move on his part as simply a mischievous and ill-timed prank, from which he may be dissuaded by our advice, and the advice which my Russian colleague and I have sent him. Should he, however, have some ulterior motive, it is improbable that he will be checked by our advice, and in that case we can do nothing more, but must let matters run their course; but I am of opinion that our assurances to the Shah oblige our affording His Majesty such support as is involved in the suggested advice.

I learn from a despatch recently received from Mr. Grahame that the garbled version of our programme to which I had the honour to draw your attention in my telegram No. 478 of the 19th June has been accepted as gospel by the Bakhtiari. It is certainly desirable that, before the Sirdar makes any further advance, we should put him right on this point.

[22706]

No. 727.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 304.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, June 21, 1909.

YOUR telegram No. 472 [of the 17th June: Bakhtiari and the constitution].
Action approved.

[22962]

No. 728.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 305.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 21, 1909.

ACTION of German consulate at Dushira. Your telegram of the 19th June.

I have not yet received the summary. If the necessity arises for taking any action at Berlin you will be informed.

[22854]

No. 729.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 307.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, June 21, 1909.

YOUR telegram No. 475 [of the 18th June: 'Turko-Persian frontier].

Proposed action approved.

[23158]

No. 730.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 308.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 21, 1909

BAKHTIARI advance on Tehran.

I approve the language held by you as reported in your telegram No. 484 of the 21st June.

You should carry out your suggestion and send the British consul-general after Sirdar Assad without delay, and request your Russian colleague also to act similarly.

[22961]

No. 731.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Garnett.

(No. 764.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 21, 1909.

IN view of the circumstances reported by Sir G. Barclay in his telegram No. 478 of the 19th June, it would presumably be better to allow the question of the publication of the Anglo-Russian representations to the Shah to drop, and you may inform the Russian Government that this is the opinion of His Majesty's Government.

[22945]

No. 732.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 179.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 21, 1909.

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith copy of a communication handed to Sir C. Harlinge by the Turkish chargé d'affaires on the 2nd instant relative to the protection accorded to Sattar and Bagher Khans by the Turkish consuls-general at Tabreez, and the view of the incident taken by the Sublime Porte.

It does not seem to me at all desirable that the presence at Tabreez of these two individuals, both of whom are Persian Nationalists, should be dependent on the whim

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of the Russian commander, and their expulsion by his orders would create a storm in this country.

Your Excellency will perceive that the point at issue is covered by the general terms of my telegram No. 713 of the 3rd instant.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Inclosure in No. 732.

Note communicated to Sir C. Hardinge by Djedat Beg, June 2, 1909.

LES chefs du parti libéral à Tabriz, Sattar et Bakir Khan, s'étant réfugiés au consulat général ottoman dans la dite ville, le Gouvernement Impérial a invité le titulaire de ce poste à leur accorder asile suivant l'usage consacré en Perse, et il lui a recommandé que si le commandant des forces russes voyait un inconvénient sérieux au séjour des dits réfugiés à Tabriz il leur fût permis en tout cas de quitter le territoire persan dans des conditions de sécurité absolue.

Ambassade Impériale de Turquie, Londres,
le 2 juin, 1909.

[23422] No. 733.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 22.)

(No. 488.)
(Telegraphic.) P. Gulahke, June 22, 1909.

MOHAMMERALI consulate.
I have addressed the following telegram to-day to His Majesty's consul at Mohammerah:—

"On the arrival of Lieutenant Wilson, until now in command of the oil guard, at Mohammerah, you should hand over your consulate to him, and yourself take charge of the consulate at Kermanshah, proceeding to that place with as little delay as possible."

[23483] No. 734.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 22.)

(No. 318)
(Telegraphic.) P. St. Petersburg, June 22, 1909.

TABREEZ. I was informed by Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day that his information tallied with that reported in Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 483. On my inquiring if the Russian General had demolished the house, as he had threatened to do, M. Isvolsky replied that he had not heard whether he had done so or not, but in his Excellency's opinion such an action would almost be justified, as steps would have to be taken to prevent further incidents of this nature. I pointed out that such an action would not have a reassuring effect on the "hastis" whom it was desirable to induce to leave the Turkish consulate-general.

Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me that the Russian Government had no quarrel against these persons, and that they were prepared to give them a safe-conduct. His Excellency added that he had spoken to the Turkish Ambassador in this sense.

[23495] No. 735.

Mr. Garnett to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 22.)

(No. 320.)
(Telegraphic.) P. St. Petersburg, June 22, 1909.

PERSIAN programme.

In reply to your telegram No. 761 of yesterday's date I have the honour to inform you that the Minister for Foreign Affairs agrees that it would be advisable to delay publication.

I have informed His Majesty's Minister at Tehran of the above.

[22287]

No. 736.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 309.)
(Telegraphic.) P. ARABISTAN irrigation.

Foreign Office, June 22, 1909.

India Office consider that it will be best only to give pledges of support and approval to sheikh in general terms, otherwise they agree to suggestion in your telegram No. 416 of the 25th May.

Cox's telegram No. 496 of the 18th May.

We can now answer sheikh's declaration, saying that His Majesty's Government take note of the assurances given by him in regard to the Ahwaz dam concession, as well as to the less important schemes under heading 2; and, further, that His Majesty's Government will support and approve him in applying for a concession for the construction of the dam when a favourable moment arises for making such an application.

[22982] No. 737.

Foreign Office to Messrs. Ellinger and Co.

Sir,
WITH reference to the letter from this department of the 17th instant I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to inform you that a telegram has been received from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran on the subject of Hormuz oxide.

Sir G. Barclay states that he does not clearly understand the nature of your complaint. Although, in order to terminate the stoppage of work by the Nationalists in Hormuz, he promised to ensure all payments for oxide to be retained temporarily, he did not actually take any steps in the matter, as he understood that there were no payments due; nor does he propose in the future to take any steps, as the local situation is now normal.

It appears that the Moins-ul-Tijjar declares that he made no complaint, and he has now expressed gratitude for the action taken by His Majesty's legation.

I am to enquire whether, as far as you are aware, any payments are in default; and, if so, I am to suggest that Messrs. Weir and Co. should be asked to furnish explanations on the subject.

I have, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[23530] No. 738.

Report on Situation in Tehran, Isfahan, and Tabreez.—(Communicated by Count Benckendorff, June 23, 1909.)

1. *Téhéran*.—La situation à Kazvin s'est aggravée et inspire de sérieuses appréhensions. Sepehdar s'est écarté de l'administration, laquelle serait entre les mains des Arméniens et des féodaux. Cette administration se réduit à des brigandages et des exactions d'impôts. Des orateurs venus de Kertela excitent les esprits contre l'intervention des Puissances.

En présence de nouvelles analogues reçues de diverses villes, le chargé d'affaires de Russie commence à redouter que le mouvement constitutionnel ne se mette à dégénérer en mouvement d'anarchie pure.

2. *Isfahan*.—La population, lasse du trouble, désire Zilli Sultan. Sa prompt nomination éviterait à Téhéran l'invasion des Bakhtiars; à Isfahan elle éviterait leur présence et rendrait la paix à la région.

3. *Tabreez*.—Les marchands du l'endroit demandent qu'on obtienne pour eux l'autorisation du Shah de se mettre temporairement sous la protection de la Russie par suite de l'impuissance du vice-gouverneur, et de les mettre à l'abri des exactions et des persécutions de la bande de Sattar et de Bagir. Les membres intransigeants du l'aujourd'hui cherchent à provoquer la fugitive à l'occasion du prochain transfert du camp russe à Bozestann.

Le gérant du consulat général de Russie a reçu la visite de son collègue de Turquie, qui explique le best de Satar et de Bagir, par la crainte d'une félonie de la part du Gouvernement persan au cas où celui-ci établirait son pouvoir dans l'Azerbaïdjan.

D'après les renseignements des consuls de Russie et de Grande-Bretagne, une réunion a eu lieu au consulat général de Turquie, au cours de laquelle des discours ont été prononcés contre leurs deux Gouvernements. La réunion a été peu nombreuse, malgré les efforts des partisans de Russie et de Bagir d'assembler le plus de monde possible à l'aide de menaces et même de la force. Aucune personne sérieuse ne s'y trouvait; trois membres de l'entourage étaient présents. Un pareil abus du droit d'inviolabilité paraît inadmissible. Les fédats de Kazvin ont télégraphié au Jemue Ture Ahmed Riza Bey d'être le défenseur du peuple persan auprès des Parlements du monde entier. La copie de leur télégramme suit par poste.

Cent quarante fédats environ, expulsés de Salmas par les Turcs, se sont établis dans trois villages voisins de Tavriz. Le sujet russe Heydar Khan, qui avait jeté une bombe contre le Schah et qui avait été à la légation, fait aussi partie de cette bande. Heydar Khan (*alias* Amu-Ogly) a eu une conférence avec Satar Khan. On est apparemment décidé à concentrer la bande dans le village de Lialia, le plus rapproché de Tavriz et où le consul général de Turquie compte passer l'été avec Satar et Bagir et leurs compagnons.

Usant de la force, ils se font délivrer par les habitants de Tavriz, précédemment dévalisés, des reçus comme quoi l'argent et les biens emportés auraient été restitués. Pendant deux semaines le gérant du consulat général de Russie a vainement insisté auprès du vice-gouverneur pour mettre les habitants du quartier de Houkmalad à l'abri des persécutions des gens de Satar. Les habitants de ce quartier ont décidé de prendre best dans notre camp. Tant que Satar et Bagir n'auront pas quitté l'Azerbaïdjan il ne saurait être question du rétablissement du calme dans la région.

[23572]

No. 730.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 23.)

(No. 489.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, June 23, 1909.

I HAVE been informed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs that a strong telegram has been received from Tabreez stating that the Minister, who openly says the Russians have come by his invitation, cannot be recognised. Saad-ed-Dowleh, who is the Minister referred to, is most unfairly regarded by the Nationalists as responsible for the troops continuing to remain at Tabreez. He has no doubt warred the dissatisfied that unless they remain quiet Russian intervention may possibly ensue.

Instructions have been sent to the Persian representatives in St. Petersburg and London to inform the two Governments that the Cabinet will be compelled to resign unless the Russian troops are withdrawn. A change of Cabinet at this juncture would be most unfortunate.

Until I told him the Minister for Foreign Affairs did not know that the withdrawal of troops had commenced. The Shah has, I think, his full share of the odium attaching to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

If the Bakhtiari are merely demonstrating, withdrawal of the troops would, I consider, be in the Shah's interests, while if they are in earnest withdrawal will not be effected one way or another by the situation.

[23588]

No. 740.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 23.)

(No. 490.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 23, 1909.

PLEASE refer to my telegram No. 489 of to-day.

In informing M. Sabline of the above-mentioned telegram, I expressed the view that very possibly the position of the Shah might be improved; and in any case no harm would be done if a considerable portion of the Russian troops at Tabreez were to be withdrawn immediately.

[23589]

No. 741.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 23.)

(No. 491.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 23, 1909.

I LEARN from M. Sabline that his news from Kazvii is bad. The scheme which he and the Government had been trying to bring to a successful issue has not succeeded; it was that the Sipahdar should be induced to come alone to the capital and make his peace with His Majesty, thus disassociating himself from the revolutionaries.

M. Sabline tells me that there are seventy Caucasians among the revolutionaries at Kazvin, who new number 1,700 that reinforcements from Resht are being summoned to join them.

[23292]

No. 742.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 310.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 23, 1909.

ANYTHING in the nature of intervention in the internal affairs of Persia must be avoided, but, short of this, the assurances which we have given oblige us to give the Shah moral support so long as he acts in accordance with the spirit of the constitution (see your telegram No. 487 of the 21st June). Every possible effort should be made to persuade Sirdar to abandon his advance on Tehran, and you should endeavour to explain to him the real nature of the programme of reforms proposed by the two Governments. I am trying to ascertain what are the views of the Russian Government as to the desirability of publishing the whole programme, and am urging them to give me an early reply.

[23292]

No. 743.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 773.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 23, 1909.

PROPOSED publication of programme of representations to Shah.

Please ascertain Russian Government's final views as to the entire programme being published. I am anxious to know, in view of Tehran telegram No. 487 of 21st June, last paragraph.

[23657]

No. 744.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 24.)

Sir,

Downing Street, June 23, 1909.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to transmit to you, for the consideration of Secretary Sir Edward Grey, with reference to your letter of the 15th instant, copy of a telegram on the subject of Peter Ellow, *alias* J. A. Day, at present Turkish consular agent at Urumia, in Persia.

I am, &c.

FRANCIS J. S. HOPWOOD.

Inclosure in No. 744.

The Officer administering the Government of Canada to the Earl of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.)

[Received June 21, 1909.]

YOUR telegram of the 16th June. Warrant issued for Peter Ellow, *alias* J. A. Day, March 1906, New Westminster and other places, on charges of obtaining money under false pretences. Principal Sipprell, Columbia College, says he can prove large number of charges. Fugitive is still wanted if he can be apprehended and delivered to British Columbia authorities.

[23668]

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 24.)

(No. 492.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulshiek, June 24, 1909.

PLEASE see my telegram No. 458 of the 10th June.
I have received the following telegram No. 34 of the 23rd June from His Majesty's consul-general at Meshed:—

"The situation here is controlled by the volunteers, whom the respectable members of the local assembly avow themselves unable to disarm. The governor-general has been officially warned by the Russian consul-general that unless he effectively disarms the townspeople he will take it upon himself to do so. The garrison are out of hand.

"Could the popular party at Tehran be induced to bring pressure to bear on the assembly here? If not, the only remaining course is for the governor-general to attack the volunteers, whence much bloodshed would inevitably result.

"Not being able to communicate with Tehran, the governor-general thinks that he would be made to suffer were he to take such strong measures unauthorised. He declares that unless something can be done he will resign, in which case my Russian colleague, who is exasperating the people of Meshed, will probably occupy the town with a large force called in from Russia.

"To-day the second sotnia of Cossacks is due to arrive."

I am persuading nationalists here to telegraph as suggested by Major Sykes, which will, I trust, tend towards the restoration of order. I am at the same time informing M. Sabline.

I trust that in the meantime immediate instructions may be sent from St. Petersburg to the Russian consul-general to adopt a more conciliatory attitude towards the populace for the avoidance of complications.

[23727]

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 24.)

(No. 493.)

(Telegraphic.) En clair.

Tehran, June 24, 1909.

SHAH signed electoral law yesterday.
(Sent to St. Petersburg.)

[23704]

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 24.)

(No. 494.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, June 24, 1909.

PUBLICATION of Anglo-Russian programme.

With reference to St. Petersburg telegram No. 320 of the 22nd June, our programme has been inserted by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in yesterday's inaugural edition of a Persian newspaper, which is the first to appear here.

The communiqué is in the form of a telegram in reply to one sent by the Tabreez nationalists protesting against the alleged arrangement (referred to in my telegram No. 478 of the 19th June) which was reported in the German press.

[23705]

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 24.)

(No. 495.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulshiek, June 24, 1909.

M. SABLINE does not fail to realize that the continued presence of Russian troops in Tabreez embarrasses the Cabinet here, but thinks that it might be attributed to Turkish pressure if his Government ordered any considerable reduction in their numbers at this moment.

Satur and Bagher would leave Tabreez if the guarantees which they claim were

accorded by the Russian Government, and in that case the question of Russian *amour-propre* could in great measure be eliminated from the question of the immediate reduction of the force.

I have pointed out in conversation with my Russian colleague that the Shah can at the present moment but ill afford all the odium of which he is the object so long as Russian troops remain at Tabreez.

[23706]

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 24.)

(No. 496.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulshiek, June 24, 1909.

I HAVE sent the following telegram to Major Sykes in reply to his telegram No. 34 (see my telegram No. 492):—

"It is some days now since the Russian chargé d'affaires received any news from your Russian colleague. M. Sabline is of opinion, however, that possibly there has been some mistake as regards the threat which the consul-general made to the governor-general, as reported in your telegram No. 31. Yesterday his legation learnt in an indirect manner that a protest had been addressed to the Russian consul-general against the presence of the Russian troops in Meshed, and that your colleague had replied to the assembly that it was necessary for him to be protected, as now the whole populace carried arms; if, however, the latter were no longer armed, he would not require the protection of Russian troops. It is stated that thereupon the assembly called upon every man by a proclamation to take up arms against the Russian troops. Your colleague is now being called upon to furnish a fuller report on the matter.

"I am not without hope that the nationalists at Meshed may shortly receive a telegram from Tehran counselling moderation."

[23686]

Mr. Garnett to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 24.)

(No. 323.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

St. Petersburg, June 24, 1909.

MY telegram No. 320 of the 22nd June and your telegram No. 773 of the 23rd June.

In view of the last paragraph of Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 487 of the 21st June, I pressed Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday to give me the final views of the Russian Government. His Excellency sends memorandum this morning to the effect that the Russian Government have no objection to the publication of the programme by the representatives of the two Governments at Tehran, in order to let Persian public know exact tenour of the document in question.

Imperial Government cannot, however, depart from their point of view regarding omission of point 6 when the programme is published, as this might be interpreted that the two Governments were not in accord as regards advance.

Russian chargé d'affaires at Tehran has been instructed to concert with His Majesty's Minister on the matter.

(Sent to Tehran.)

[23714]

Mr. Garnett to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 24.)

(No. 324.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, June 24, 1909.

MESHED.

At interview which I had with M. Klenm to-day at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs I read to him the greater portion of Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 492 of to-day's date. Klenm assured me that the necessary instructions should be sent at once, as desired, to the Russian chargé d'affaires at Tehran, who would inform the Russian consul-general at Meshed.

[23715]

No. 752.

Mr. Garnett to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 21.)

(No. 325.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

PERSIAN affairs.

In absence of both the Minister for Foreign Affairs and his assistant I read the substance of Sir G. Barclay's telegrams Nos. 489 and 490 of the 23rd instant to M. Klenm at the Ministry.

Klenm was informed yesterday by the Persian Minister that Cabinet would be obliged to resign if troops were not withdrawn. His Excellency left at the Ministry a copy of the telegraphic instructions he had received. Klenm replied that when the new governor-general reached his post the reduction of the troops would be continued, and not before, and that if the Persians had any complaints to make about the attitude of the Russian troops they must produce proofs to substantiate their complaints. M. Klenm stated to me that the question of the reduction of troops had been taken up by the Council of the Empire, and that it was no longer in M. Isvolsky's hands to settle it.

I then asked about the guarantees to the bastis in the Turkish consulate-general, and Klenm replied that he had already informed the Turkish Ambassador that the fullest guarantees would be given by the Russian authorities; he was certain that Turkish Pasha, who was a conscientious man, reported fully to the Turkish Government, but he observed that the fault was at Constantinople. If the refugees were to be got out of the Turkish consulate pressure must be exercised at the Porte, and I understand that instructions are being sent to the Russian Ambassador in London to consult with you as to making joint *démarches* at Constantinople.

St. Petersburg, June 24, 1900.

[22983]

No. 753.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 312.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 24, 1900.

PLEASE transmit the following to His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire:—

Lease of land by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company from the Sheikh of Mohammerrah (reference is to your telegram No. 620 of the 19th June).

You should try to arrange for Mr. Lloyd, who acts as agent in the company in Persia, to be at Mohammerrah during your visit to that place. He is fully authorised to settle the lease on the spot.

If the Sheikh alludes to the question of reversion of buildings, &c., it might be explained to him that it was understood that the property now in question, which is the same as that indicated in article 15 of the 1901 agreement with the Persian Government, was not referred to in the terms of the 1905 Bakhtiari agreement, but that the latter covered only buildings of a temporary nature that might remain at the expiration of the concession. If, however, the Sheikh does not touch on the question, I agree with you that it will not be necessary for us to take any action at present.

The two main points of difference between the two drafts are as follows:—

In the first place, although there is no mention in the new draft of reversion to the Khans of machinery and buildings, a representative of the company, whom I have since seen, assures me that he would not object to the agreement containing a simple statement to the effect that at the expiration of the concession machinery, buildings, &c., will be left in place, and accordingly a statement of this kind may be inserted. In this connection, without of course adding it to the agreement, you may, if necessary, give the assurance which Sir G. Barclay suggested in his telegram No. 460 of the 11th June.

In the second place, the term of the concession from the Persian Government, or of any renewal of that concession, shall determine the duration of the lease from the Sheikh.

[23572]

No. 754.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 313.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 24, 1900.

TABREEZ.

I HAVE received from the Persian Minister the representations mentioned in your telegram No. 489 of the 23rd June. I answered that the Persian Government must settle the matter direct with Russia, but that meanwhile Russian troops were being withdrawn, and that when the Governor arrived they would all be removed.

On the strength of information contained in your above-mentioned telegram, the Persian Minister is being told that Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs probably did not know that withdrawal of troops was proceeding when he ordered that these representations should be made, and further that the withdrawal of troops is actually going on.

[23702]

No. 755.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 314.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 24, 1900.

GERMAN competition at Mohammerrah (see your telegram No. 481 of the 19th June).

Please enquire at Mohammerrah as to report received by Strick from Bussorah, dated the 24th June, to the effect that an agency has been started at Mohammerrah by the Hamburg-Amerika line, who are also said to be working the Moiu-ut-Tujjar's steamers.

[23572]

No. 756.

Sir Edward Grey to the Persian Minister.

Sir.

Foreign Office, June 24, 1900.

WITH reference to your conversation with Mr. Mallet on the 23rd instant, I have the honour to inform you that a telegram has been received from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran to the effect that the withdrawal of the Russian troops at Tabreez has commenced.

I venture to assume that the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs was unaware of this step when he sent instructions for a representation to be made on the subject to His Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

E. GREY.

[23707]

No. 757.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 25.)

(No. 497.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 25, 1900.

SAAD-ED-DOWLEH has just sent a member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to inform me that he resigned office yesterday, that His Majesty had insisted on his remaining as Acting President of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs, but that he has refused to reconsider his decision.

His Excellency says that the refusal of the Cabinet to support him is the reason for this step. I am pretty certain, however, that the real cause is that he realizes that the populace consider him responsible for the Russians still remaining in Tabreez, and that his life may be endangered owing to the widespread hatred with which he is therefore regarded.

Owing to his extreme unpopularity, his Excellency is no longer useful. I shall not urge him to reconsider his decision, and I shall try to induce M. Sabine to act similarly, as I am of opinion that a *détente* may ensue from his Excellency's resignation.

[23708]

No. 758.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 25.)

(No. 498.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 25, 1909.

THE following is my reply to Mr. Wratislaw's telegram No. 160 repeated to you in my No. 499:—

"A fortnight ago M. Sabline telegraphed to his Government stating on what terms Sattar and Bagher Khaus would be ready to quit their present asylum, but the Russian Government has not yet replied.

"All the Nationalists throughout the country who enjoy any serious consideration are, I am afraid, giving their support to the 'noisy minority' at Tahreez."

[23709]

No. 759.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 25.)

(No. 499.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 25, 1909.

I HAVE received the following from Mr. Wratislaw, No. 160, of yesterday's date:—

"With reference to my telegram No. 158.

"An agitation is being made by a small but noisy party that the Russian forces should be withdrawn immediately. They have had correspondence with the Cabinet at Tehran who are alleged to hold their views on the subject.

"General anxiety is being caused by the intrigues of the bastis at the Turkish consulate-general. Is any means of solving this question in sight?"

[23710]

No. 760.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 25.)

(No. 500.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 25, 1909.

BAKHTIARI advance.

In Tehran both parties are panic-stricken. The Nationalists are in fear of some desperate stroke directed against them from the palace, and the reactionaries in terror of the arrival of the Kasvin revolutionaries and the Bakhtiari.

Sardar Assad is expected to reach Kum this afternoon, where His Majesty's consul-general at Isfahan arrived early this morning. To-night the Russian consul-general should also arrive there.

The Bakhtiari at Kum are reported to be some 500 in number. They recently sent a telegram—which was intercepted at Tehran—to the Sipahdar at Kasvin stating that 2,000 Bakhtiari are marching with Sardar Assad, who will place himself under the orders of the Sipahdar. This telegram has thrown the royalists into still greater panic, but I think that the strength of the force (2,000) is considerably exaggerated.

Consulate-general at Isfahan informs me that another batch of 1,000 Bakhtiari will in all probability wait there until they learn what result the meeting between the Sardar and the consuls-generals has had, although they are already being equipped and prepared.

[23712]

No. 761.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 25.)

(No. 502.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 25, 1909.

THIS Majesty's consul-general at Meshed has telegraphed to me to-day as follows:—

"(No. 37.)

"On the 23rd June Persian soldiers plundered the houses near their posts. On the following day an attack was made by volunteers and the garrison bombarded the

[23711]

No. 760*.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 25.)

(No. 501.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 25, 1909.

I AM informing Major Cox that I learn from the agent of Messrs. Lyueh that a sum of 120,000 kras has been supplied by the Sheikh of Mohammernah for the advance of the Bakhtiari on the capital.

The agent states that Sheikh Khazal wishes to obtain certain property on Ram Hornuz which is held by the Bakhtiari, and that possibly the money is a loan on the land in question.

city. On the same evening a Russian patrol proceeding to the bank was stopped and subsequently opened fire with a machine-gun. There has been no cessation of burning and pillage. Casualties, however, are not numerous.

"Foreigners are in little danger, but stray bullets may cause accidents."

The Russian consul-general has not as yet reported to M. Sabline on these incidents.

[23949]

No. 762.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 26.)

(No. 503.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, June 25, 1909.

FOLLOWING is the gist of telegram from Samsam to Sirdar Assad:—

"British and Russian consuls-general have gone to Kum to arrange reconciliation. Beware of any undertaking without cognisance 'there' and of Sipahdar and Tabreez."

The word "there" may possibly denote that the movement of Bakhtiari is part of a scheme with wider ramifications than we [?] suspect.

Sir A. Nicolson informed.

[23713]

No. 763.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 25.)

(No. 504.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulshuk, June 25, 1909.

PLEASE see my telegram No. 497 of to-day.

The reason for his resignation put forward by Saad-ed-Dowleh is the refusal of the Cabinet to adopt certain measures comprising the two following recommendations which the two legations had urged upon him: firstly, that the invitation to the French Government to select a treasurer-general and financial inspector should be confirmed by an official note; and, secondly, that the Government should not await the consent of the provincial assemblies to the electoral law, but should immediately promulgate it.

M. Sabline is, I find, more ready than I to believe in the sincerity of Saad-ed-Dowleh's assertion. We are endeavouring to find out privately from other members exactly what occurred at the meeting of the Cabinet which preceded his resignation.

[23880]

No. 764.

Messrs. Ellinger and Co. to Foreign Office.—(Received June 26.)

Sir,

28, Oxford Street, Manchester, June 24, 1909.

WE are in receipt of your letter of the 22nd instant, and note with pleasure that, the situation as regards Ormuz oxide being now normal, Sir G. Barclay does not propose to take any steps in the future to carry out the arrangement with the Nationalists to retain temporarily all payments for oxide, and that the Moin-ut-Tujjar has now expressed his gratitude for the action taken by His Majesty's Legation.

We note also that Sir G. Barclay states that he does not clearly understand the nature of our complaint, and we shall be obliged if you will assure Sir G. Barclay of our sincere appreciation of his constant efforts to safeguard our interests in this business, and explain to him that under the contract between the Moin-ut-Tujjar, Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co., and ourselves, all moneys payable by the buyers, Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co., in respect of oxide shipped from the island of Ormuz, are payable by this firm to us in England and not to the Moin-ut-Tujjar, and the sequestration of such moneys at any time, if it could be enforced, would inflict a very grievous injury upon us, irrespective of our position as the Moin-ut-Tujjar's agents, as it would deprive us of our rights under the contract to receive certain specified amounts of money at specified dates, on which we rely in other dealings between the Moin-ut-Tujjar and ourselves.

We are, &c.

ELLINGER AND CO.

[23860]

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 26.)

Sir,

India Office, June 25, 1909.

IN reply to your letter dated the 20th February, 1909, making certain proposals with a view to the reduction of expenditure on consular establishments in Persia, I am directed to enclose herewith, to be laid before the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a despatch which Viscount Morley has addressed to the Government of India on the subject.

As regards the Residency and consulate-general at Bagdad, I am to point out that though the cost of this post was taken into account in making the arrangement of 1900, the amount of increases or decreases of expenditure is not included in the annual statement on which the yearly adjustment between the British and Indian Exchequers is based. But presumably there is no immediate need to consider the modifications of existing arrangements that may be necessary hereafter if the post is transferred to the Levant consular service.

I am, &c.

A. GODLEY.

Inclosure in No. 765.

Viscount Morley to the Government of India.

(Secret.)

My Lord,

India Office, June 25, 1909.

IN continuation of my Secret despatch dated the 8th January, 1909, as to the reduction of expenditure on British consular establishments in Persia, I transmit herewith copy of further correspondence relating to certain proposals on the subject made by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.*

2. It will be seen that Sir E. Grey, being strongly impressed by the striking contrast in cost between the appointments in Persia filled from the Levant service and the Indian Political Department respectively, proposes to meet the difficulty caused by the high scale of expenditure on the Indian establishments by transferring to the Levant service, as suitable candidates become available, all the inland appointments now filled by Indian officers, with the exception of those in Seistan, the military attaché at Meshed, and possibly the medical appointment at that place. It is also proposed to transfer to the Levant service the appointment of political resident and consul-general at Bagdad, in view of the change in the political situation consequent on the Anglo-Russian agreement, and on a consideration of the efficiency displayed during the recent critical period by officers of the Levant service at Tabreez and Isfahan, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is satisfied that the proposed transfer can be carried out without detriment to Imperial or Indian interests.

3. Apart from the force of the arguments based on economy to which Sir E. Grey has referred, I consider it expedient on principles of policy that, except in places such as Seistan and the Gulf littoral, where the local circumstances render the employment of Indian officers desirable, the conduct of consular affairs in Persia should rest with the Foreign Office and in the hands of its officers of the Levant service. If in any particular post, such as Bagdad, a practical need arises for the services of an official acquainted with any Indian language, it can be met by the employment of an Indian officer in a subordinate position such as Mr. Gaskin now fills. I approve, therefore, of the proposal to transfer as the opportunity occurs to the Levantine service all the posts indicated, with the exception of those connected with Bushire and the Persian Gulf littoral, Meshed, and Seistan. As regards Meshed, I recognise that an alteration of the present system involves consideration of our relations with Afghanistan, and before I finally agree to the transfer of the appointments there other than that of military attaché, I shall await an expression of your Excellency's views, which I desire to receive with the least possible delay.

4. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs further recommends as an immediate measure that the consulate at Turbat-i-Hindari should be reduced to the status of a native agency, such as existed prior to 1903, on the ground that the conditions have altered so materially since the consulate was created that he would no longer feel

* Foreign Office, February 20; to ditto, June 25, 1909.

justified in asking the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury to bear a moiety of the cost involved. This recommendation, it should be observed, has been made after a consideration of the views expressed in paragraph 4 of your Secret letter of the 8th October, 1908. I request that you will reconsider the question in the light of the conclusions at which Sir E. Grey has arrived, and I shall be glad to receive your views on it with the least possible delay, as also on the proposal that the requirements of Birjand should be met by the appointment of a telegraph officer as vice-consul, and that, if it is considered indispensable to station a medical officer there, "the occupants of the post should be dependent on Seistan, be provided with a limited travelling allowance, and be in charge of any medical work connected with the latter place."

5. In connection with my Secret despatch of the 8th January, 1909, your Excellency in council will not fail to notice that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs suggests that expenditure on Seistan should be reduced forthwith by one-half. I am aware that the Seistan post, owing to its isolated frontier position and the duties which devolve upon its officers in connection with Indian trade, sanitary measures, and the arms traffic, cannot be compared with other posts where the services rendered are less varied and more economically performed. The telegraph charges are also to be taken into account. But I am disposed to agree with Sir E. Grey that the expenditure can be reduced, and I request that you will proceed at once to consider what material reductions can be immediately effected.

I have, &c.

MORLEY OF BLACKBURN.

[23928]

No. 766.

Anglo-Persian Oil Company to Foreign Office.—(Received June 26.)

6

*Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London,
June 25, 1909.*

Sir,

IN the course of discussing the Bakhtiari Agreement with Mr. J. R. Preece in connection with your Office letter of the 15th June, 1909, and of my letter to you of the 18th June, 1909, Mr. Preece said that though he had no reason to doubt the accuracy of the English translation—the only one in our possession—and though he was sure that it substantially represented the original Persian, yet he could not commit himself to vouching for its literal accuracy.

The original concession was executed in Persian and in French, and it contains a proviso that in case of doubt the French is to take precedence. But the Bakhtiari agreement was executed in Persian only, and if by any mischance it does not absolutely convey the Persian meaning in any detail or details, it may lead to avoidable trouble.

May I ask for your assistance in this connection?

A copy, an authenticated copy I understand, of the Persian original is filed in the chancery of His Majesty's Legation at Tehran. Do you happen to have in your Office a translation sent home from there—a translation made independently of the one that we have here?

If you have, will you allow me to see it?

If you have not, may I ask of you the favour that in one of your early letters you request His Majesty's legation in Tehran to have such a translation made (if it has not been already made) and a copy sent home to you for us?

I shall of course be glad to repay any expense that this may involve.

I am, &c.

C. W. WALLACE,

Vice-Chairman.

[23967]

No. 767.

*M. Isolsky to Count Benckendorff.—(Communicated by Count Benckendorff,
June 26, 1909.)*

(Télégraphique.)

EN vue d'une attaque possible de Téhéran par les Bakhtiariis d'Isfahan et les fidèles de Kazwini, le Colonel Lukhoff a consulté le chargé d'affaires de Russie sur l'attitude à observer par les officiers russes dans la résistance qu'aurait éventuellement à présenter à cette occasion la Brigade de Cosaques du Selah.

[1640]

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Si l'on prend en considération que le Schah se conforme, consciencieusement aux conseils de la Russie et de la Grande-Bretagne et que le Gouvernement représentatif peut être considéré comme rétabli de fait en Perse, le mouvement en question des fidaïs et des Bakhtiariis se présente comme un acte injustifié d'hostilité contre la constitution et contre les droits du Gouvernement du Schah. Ce mouvement semble avoir, ainsi que le suppose M. Schline, un caractère antidyname.

A peine est-il besoin d'insister sur les calamités qui seraient réservées à la population de Téhéran et sur les dangers qui menaceraient les légations et les étrangers au cas de l'arrivée dans cette ville des nomades et des anarchistes qui marchent contre elle.

Aux termes des instructions, les officiers russes de la brigade persane avaient pour mission de prendre des mesures pour la sauvegarde du Schah et de sa famille; ce devoir leur incombait encore plus, actuellement, en raison des promesses de garantie de sécurité personnelle récemment renouvelées au Schah par les légations russe et britannique et aussi par la circonstance que le Schah a accepté tous les conseils donnés par les Puissances et s'y est conformé, ce qui lui donne des droits de compter sur leur protection. De plus, les officiers russes ne sont plus au service actif de leur pays, et se trouvent ainsi subordonnés au Schah plus directement qu'auparavant.

Aux considérations sommairement exposées ci-dessus s'ajoute la crainte que si les officiers russes viennent à abandonner la direction des Cosaques persans dans les engagements éventuels contre les fidaïs et les Bakhtiariis cela ne manquerait pas de produire un effet démoralisateur sur ce corps militaire, le seul régulièrement organisé en Perse; il pourrait s'ensuivre un état de choses de nature à réclamer une intervention directe de la Russie.

Dans ces conditions il paraît au Gouvernement Impérial que les officiers russes ac doivent pas renoncer à la direction des opérations de la brigade au cas d'une attaque, et c'est dans ce sens que des indications leur sont transmises de Saint-Petersbourg.

Ce qui précède est destiné à être porté à la connaissance du Cabinet de Londres.

[23943]

No. 768.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey. (Received June 26.)

(No. 505.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 26, 1909.

RESIGNATION of Saad-ed-Dowleh, reported in my telegram No. 497 of yesterday.

I now learn from his Excellency that he has consented to remain, at least temporarily, in office. The reason for this step is the pressure which His Majesty has exercised on him.

[23945]

No. 769.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey. (Received June 26.)

(No. 506.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 26, 1909.

MAJOR SYKES has reported to me as follows, in his telegram No. 38 of the 26th instant:—

The troops here are mutinous, and show marked hostility towards the governor-general, as he is prepared to come to terms with the Assembly, and has endeavoured, moreover, to prevent looting. His Excellency is in despair, and is accused by the Assembly—not without cause—of bad faith. I have copies of letters from the Russian consul-general, in which he demands that the strongest measures be taken, and holds the governor-general responsible. The latter is desirous of taking part in this consulate-general, as he considers his life in danger. At present I am inducing him not to do so, but if he persists in the matter I will try to arrange that joint protection be afforded him in his bast.

I am telegraphing to His Majesty's consul-general that his action meets with my approval.

No. 770.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

[24433]

(No. 362.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 26, 1909.

TABREEZ: Action of Turkish consul-general.

Please give strong support to your Russian colleague in urging Turkish Government to instruct their consul-general to abandon without delay action which is making Turkish consulate a centre of agitation for refugees, who have no right to be allowed shelter there; and also point out to Minister for Foreign Affairs that this attitude on the part of Turkish consul-general and his encouragement of the unnecessary disturbances created by Sattar and Bagher and their men is proving a most serious matter for Russia and ourselves.

You might mention that our reform programme has been agreed to and the electoral law published, which removes all cause for agitation among the Nationalists. Russian troops are already being withdrawn, and when the governor-general arrives they will all be removed, and agitation such as that fostered by Turkish consulate can only hamper the progress thus made.

Guarantees have already been given, in response to Turkey's requests, by the Russian Government that Bagher and Sattar shall leave the country in security should they wish to go. However, Russia does not demand that they should leave Persia, and they have nothing to fear from Russia. Indeed, Sattar has received protection from the Russians, at his own request.

[23657]

No. 771.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 365.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 26, 1909.

PETER ELLOW.

See telegram No. 463 of the 11th June from Tehran.

Peter Ellow is still wanted by the authorities of British Columbia. The warrant was issued, according to the Canadian Government, in March 1906 at various places, including New Westminster, for Peter Ellow, alias J. A. Day. He was charged with fraudulently obtaining money, and a large number of these charges can be proved against him, in the opinion of Professor Sippell, of Columbia College.

The Porte should be informed of these facts, and you should suggest that he should be withdrawn from his post at Urumia, where he is the Turkish consular agent.

[21613]

No. 772.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Nicolson.

(No. 187.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 26, 1909.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 360 of the 5th instant on the subject of recent events at Tabreez.

I approve the language held by you to M. Ievolsky, as well as the terms of the private and confidential memorandum which you handed to him on the 4th ultimo.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[23950]

No. 773.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey. (Received June 27.)

(No. 507.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 27, 1909.

I HAVE received following telegram from Major Cox, dated the 24th June, on the subject of Karun irrigation:—

"Please refer to the last enclosure from Sir W. Willocks in my letter of the 4th April last, No. 829.

"I have received a complete report on the Kerkha project from Mr. Wilson, who has done the preliminary computation, thanks to co-operation of the sheikh. Since he returned he has again seen the sheikh, to whom the scheme offers great attractions, owing to its simplicity and clearness. In view of fact that the sheikh's Arabs know Wilson well, the former has asked him to survey the work now, in order to draw up a scheme and work out the estimates in the course of this summer. Sheikh added that when this hot weather was over, he would borrow some engineers from the Government, who should both estimate cost of the work and examine site for the new dam. The old one was built of stone and brick.

"I trust that full advantage will be taken of sheikh's present mood, which is eminently favourable. I should like to gain time, and to this end would suggest my being authorized to send to Willocks, who is at Bagdad, copy of the report at same time as I send it to Government. I would then ask him to advise me or Government direct about such work of a preliminary nature as might with advantage be undertaken forthwith and about winter arrangements.

"I am informed by Lieutenant Wilson that if Sir William would like to go with him to see Kut Nahr Ihashin, he has only to name his own convenience."

In view of all the circumstances of the case, I have ventured to approve the proposal in Major Cox's telegram that he should communicate with Sir W. Willocks direct, asking his advice on the report, of which he will send him a copy.

[23951]

No. 774.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 27.)

(No. 508.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 27, 1900.

MESHED situation.

I have received the following telegram, No. 39, dated to-day from His Majesty's consul-general at Meshed:

"Yesterday the governor-general wrote to my Russian colleague and myself, notifying us of his resignation and begging us to take, jointly, immediate steps for his protection. I waited some time for a communication from the Russian consul-general and, receiving none, sent the military attaché to him to convey a proposal that a combined Anglo-Russian force should escort the governor-general to a house and guard him there. Prince Dabija was most unwilling to accept my proposal, desiring to keep the governor-general in the fortress under guard. I, however, for obvious reasons, objected to this course.

"The Russian consul-general eventually, however, agreed to my proposal, but not without attempting almost openly to induce Ruku-ed-Dowleh not to accede to it, wishing, as he did, to place him under a Russian guard in the fortress until he should receive instructions from the Russian legation.

"All danger of a hostile demonstration was averted by the suddenness of our action. The governor-general has expressed great gratitude to me, and now begs that he may be immediately recalled to Tehran, fearing grave danger to himself should he remain longer here.

"I am reporting fully by letter."

(Reference is to my telegram No. 506 of the 26th June.)

[23952]

No. 775.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 27.)

(No. 509.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, June 27, 1900.

CONSULS-GENERAL had a long interview with Sirdar Assad yesterday, urging that two legations regarded his march to Kumm as ill-aimed, and as complicating the situation. If he disregarded our advice, we should have to consider that it was deliberate intention to increase present difficulties, and we should hold him personally responsible for consequences. Constitution had been restored, and preliminary work for the convocation of the Assembly was proceeding on lines recommended by the two Powers. Consuls made it quite plain that our programme involved no entailment of Persian independence.

Gist of Sirdar Assad's reply was that legations were grossly deceived, and that all that was being done was a sham. He said, however, but not in a very convincing manner, that he would not advance beyond Kumm, but would remain at or near there until the Assembly met. He declared that his intentions were pacific and he had stopped reinforcements from Isfahan; he could, [group omitted] with his 700 men and one mountain gun. He was about to formulate certain demands, which were not his but those of Tabreez, Resht, Meshed, and other places, and which he hoped would obtain for him. Consuls report that he talked foolishly, but that, though his intellect seemed clouded, he was evidently possessed by a fixed idea.

Under our instructions consuls will repeat to him to-day that the constitution has in very fact been restored, and that the work for Parliament is proceeding, and will point out again [? great] responsibility he incurs if he neglects our advice. They will promise to wait till Tuesday midday to learn his demands, after which they will return to Isfahan.

Whether or not advice is followed by Sirdar, we should have been bound to tender it by our assurances to the Shah. To persist further on the same lines if the advice is disregarded would hardly seem consistent with our dignity, whilst to use stronger language would seem contrary to spirit of Anglo-Russian convention, and we shall therefore not interpose further without instructions.

At the same time we feel it right to state our opinion that dissatisfaction still prevailing, notwithstanding progress made in preparatory work for parliamentary government and the evident understanding between centres of discontent, constitute a danger for the Shah, who may, if any further advance on Tehran occurs, be frightened into seeking asylum at a legation.

(Sent to St. Petersburg.)

[24163]

No. 776.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 28.)

(No. 252.)

Sir,

Paris, June 26, 1900.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a memorandum, by Mr. Carnegie, of a conversation which he had with the Persian Minister last night, after a dinner at the Servian Legation.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS BERTIE.

Inclosure in No. 776.

Memorandum by Mr. Carnegie.

I HAD a conversation with the Persian Minister last night, after dinner at the Servian Legation. Sanad Khan began by asking me whether the Russians were going to withdraw their troops from Tabreez. I said that I believed so, but did not know whether any definite decision had been come to as to when, and in what manner, the withdrawal would be effected, i.e., whether all the troops would go at once, or gradually.

Talking of the programme presented by England and Russia—which, as he said, the Shah has accepted, but not yet acted on—Sanad Khan remarked that it was of no use having the Amir Baladur Jang simply removed from his duties as Minister of War, for he would remain in command of the main body of the troops, especially of those told off to guard the Shah, and when relieved of his ministerial duties he would, in his military and semi-private capacity be in a freer position to exert his baneful influence at Court. The other man mentioned in the programme, Minsir-es-Sultaneh, was a man of straw, and powerless for good or evil.

He went on to say that the Zil-es-Sultan was returning to Persia, taking back with him the jewels of which, we had heard so much. The Shah was anxious to get him back, as he was very rich, and was independent of the revenues of the province he would be called on to govern. Usually the governor of a province paid a certain percentage to the Court on what he could squeeze out of the inhabitants. The Zil would pay up a handsome amount out of his own purse, and would not be compelled to squeeze his

[1649]

5 F

province in order to do so. He thought that the Nasr-ul-Mulk would return to Persia in due course.

Samad Khan then said that he wondered whether M. Polevski would after all be appointed Russian Minister in Tehran. Russian diplomacy badly wanted young blood and a new school of diplomatists. The old school always acted too much on their own responsibility. Although the British and Russian Governments might be in perfect accord, the representatives of the latter were much too apt to take a line of their own in order to advance what they considered the interests of their country, quite independently of the instructions they received. For instance, since M. de Hartwig had left Tehran the British and Russian legations had worked together in complete harmony. He quite understood the opposition of the reactionaries in Russia to the appointment of M. Pokrovski.

I understood the Minister to say that he thought that the Shah, while acting up to the letter of the engagements involved by his acceptance of the programme, would contrive to disregard it in spirit and would manage to keep all the real power in his own hands.

Paris, June 26, 1909.

[24082]

No. 777.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 28.)

(No. 510.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulshak, June 28, 1909.

PERSIAN Cabinet.

At the request of His Majesty the Minister for Foreign Affairs has enquired of me, with a view to a possible reconstitution of the Cabinet, whether I have any news of a definite intention to return to Persia on the part of Nasr-ul-Mulk. I have told Saad-ed-Dowleh that our information is that he proposes to return at the end of July.

A precise declaration of his intentions is at this moment much to be desired, since without this some attempt may be made to dispose otherwise of the office destined for him.

[24291]

No. 778.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 28.)

(No. 511.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulshak, June 28, 1909.

THE acting consul-general at Isfahan, in Mr. Grahame's absence, informs me that a reconciliation has been effected between the two Bakhtiari parties. Samsam-es-Sultaneh, who is at Isfahan, is to be joined on the 29th instant by Sirdar Mutashina. It is believed that the latter proposes to join Sirdar Assad very soon.

[24292]

No. 779.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 28.)

(No. 512.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulshak, June 28, 1909.

SIR WRATISLAW telegraphs from Tabreez (No. 161, Confidential, of to-day's date) as follows:—

"Instructions have been received by the general in command of the Russian forces that the withdrawal is to be suspended for the present."

[24264]

No. 780.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 28.)

(No. 218.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Constantinople, June 28, 1909.

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier.

With reference to your telegram No. 365 of the 26th June.

I am informed by Rifaat Pasha that the new Turkish Consul at Urumia left here for that place on the 20th instant.

Telegram No. 463 from Tehran has not reached me.

[24265]

No. 781.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 28.)

(No. 219.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Constantinople, June 28, 1909.

TABREEZ. With reference to your two telegrams of the 26th instant, I beg to state that I learn from Rifaat Pasha that strict orders have been sent by the authorities here to the Turkish acting consul-general at Tabreez, forbidding him to do anything likely to give encouragement to agitators, or to interfere in any way with local politics.

[24082]

No. 782.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 403.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 28, 1909.

PLEASE enquire when the Nasr-ul-Mulk intends to leave for Persia.

See Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 510 of to-day's date.

[22803]

No. 783.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 92.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 28, 1909.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 45 of the 4th March last on the subject of the negotiations with the Moin-ut-Tujjar as to the Shellieh property leased to Messrs. Lynch by Sheikh Murtaza.

The substance of your covering despatch was communicated to the Persian Transport Company, and I transmit to you a copy of their reply.

I shall be glad if you will take such action in the matter as may seem proper to you.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[23657]

No. 784.

Foreign Office to Colonial Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 28, 1909.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 23rd instant, containing information respecting Peter Ellow alias J. A. Day, at present Turkish consular agent at Urumia.

I am to request that the Earl of Crews will be so good as to ascertain, and to cause Sir E. Grey to be informed with as little delay as possible, whether the individual in question is a British subject.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[22238]

No. 785.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, June 28, 1900.*
 WITH reference to previous correspondence, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, for any observations which the Secretary of State for India may have to offer, translations of undertakings given by the Sheikh of Mohammerah in regard to the proposed British Karun Irrigation Concession.*

I am, &c.
 (Signed) LOUIS MALLET

[22238]

No. 786.

Foreign Office to Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

Sir, *Foreign Office, June 28, 1900.*
 WITH reference to previous correspondence, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, for any observations which you may have to offer, a translation of an undertaking given by the Sheikh of Mohammerah in regard to the purchase of land, &c., by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company for the purpose of constructing a pipe line and oil refinery in his territory.

I am, &c.
 (Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[24407]

No. 787.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 29.)

Sir, *India Office, June 25, 1900.*
 WITH reference to your letter of the 15th instant, I am directed by Viscount Morley to forward herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a despatch which has been addressed to the Viceroy intimating that, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, the proposal, that defence works should be constructed for the protection of His Majesty's Consulate in Seistan, had better be dropped.

I am, &c.
 A. GODLEY.

Inclosure in No. 787.

Viscount Morley to Governor-General the Earl of Minto.

(No. 17. Secret.)

My Lord, *India Office, June 25, 1900.*
 WITH reference to your Excellency's telegram of the 3rd ultimo recommending the adoption of Major Kennion's scheme for the construction of defence works for the protection of the consulate in Seistan, I have to acquaint you that, after full consideration of the matter in consultation with His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, His Majesty's Government are of opinion that the proposal had better be dropped.

A copy of correspondence which has passed with the Foreign Office on the subject is inclosed for the information of your Excellency's Government.

I have, &c.
 MORLEY.

* Inclosures 2 and 3 in No. 666.

† Inclosure 1 in No. 666.

[24461]

No. 788.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 29.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a Secret despatch, dated the 25th June, 1900, to the Government of India, regarding the salutes of certain chiefs in the Persian Gulf.

A copy has been sent to the Admiralty.

India Office, June 28, 1900.

Inclosure 1 in No. 788.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Secret.)

My Lord.

India Office, June 25, 1900.

WITH reference to the letter of your Excellency's Government in the foreign department (Secret), dated the 18th March, 1900, recommending an alteration in the scale of salutes accorded to the Sheikhs of Mohammerah, Koweit, and Bahrein, and the grant of a salute to the eldest sons of those sheikhs on occasions when they visit one of His Majesty's ships as their fathers' representatives, I forward herewith copy of correspondence with the Foreign Office and Admiralty, from which you will observe that His Majesty's Government approve your proposals.

2. I concur in the suggestions made in paragraph 7 of your letter under reply, that it should be left to the discretion of the political resident in the Persian Gulf to decide when it would be opportune to make the announcement to the sheikhs concerned. In this connection it seems desirable that Major Cox should consult Sir G. Barclay as to how far the proposal to increase the salute of the Sheikh of Mohammerah is affected by the sheikh's position as a Persian subject.

3. I request that I may be furnished with a report of your proceedings in due course. It will be seen that the Admiralty have requested to be officially informed of the date when the arrangements come into force.

I have, &c.
 MORLEY OF BLACKBURN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 788.

India Office to Foreign Office, dated April 28, 1900.

[Already printed.]

Inclosure 3 in No. 788.

Foreign Office to India Office, dated May 13, 1900.

[Already printed.]

Inclosure 4 in No. 788.

India Office to Admiralty.

Sir,

India Office, May 25, 1900.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to enclose, to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, copy of correspondence* as to the proposed increase from five to twelve guns of the salutes of the Sheikhs of Mohammerah and Koweit, and from five to eleven of that of the Sheikh of Bahrein, the salutes to be

* Inclosures Nos. 2 and 3.

personal in all three cases to the present chiefs; also, as to the grant of a salute of five guns to the eldest sons of the Sheikhs of Mohammurah and Koweit, and of three guns to the eldest son of the Sheikh of Bahrein, on the occasions when they visit one of His Majesty's ships as their fathers' representatives.

Subject to any observations which the Lords Commissioners may have to offer, Viscount Morley would propose to approve the introduction of these changes, and to leave it to the discretion of the political resident in the Persian Gulf to decide, in consultation with His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, when it would be opportune to make the announcement to the sheikhs concerned.

I am, &c.
A. GODLEY.

Inclosure 5 in No. 788.

Admiralty to India Office.

(Confidential.)
Sir,

Admiralty, June 10, 1909.

IN reply to your letter of the 25th May, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to request you will inform the Secretary of State for India in Council that they concur in the proposal of the Indian Government to increase from five to twelve guns the salutes of the Sheikhs of Mohammurah and Koweit, and from five to eleven that of the Sheikh of Bahrein, the salutes to be personal in all three cases to the present chiefs; and in the grant of a salute of five guns to the eldest sons of the Sheikhs of Mohammurah and Koweit, and three guns to the eldest son of the Sheikh of Bahrein, on occasions when they visit one of His Majesty's ships as their fathers' representatives. The salutes will be fired, as are the existing salutes of these sheikhs, on the termination of an official visit.

2. My Lords will be glad to be informed officially of the date when the above arrangements should come into force, in order that the necessary instructions may be given to the commander-in-chief on the East Indies station, and that record may be kept in office. They have, however, directed the commander-in-chief to instruct the commanding officers of His Majesty's ships in the Persian Gulf to act on the above scale of salutes when requested to do so by the political resident in the Persian Gulf.

I am, &c.
C. F. THOMAS.

[24293] No. 780.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 29.)

(No. 513.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 23, 1909.

I LEARNED from the Russian legation that 900 fedai from Kasvin are not 40 miles away from the capital. Panic has seized the Cabinet, which now expects us to advance money and save them from their quandary. I think M. Sabline realises that the terms of our programme preclude him from giving money until after the promulgation of the electoral law, and then only in accordance with some financial programme to be agreed upon. He and I now think that matters should be allowed to run their course; if the Shah is inclined to take any measures we shall certainly not throw cold water on them.

Should His Majesty call on us for further help, our reply will be to the effect that things would never have reached this crisis if he had paid attention to our advice at the end of last year, and that we have left nothing undone either at Kum or Kasvin in our efforts to induce the fedai not to advance on the capital.

Mr. Grahame has been told by the Sirdar that a formidable conspiracy exists amongst the Nationalists of Tehran for taking possession of the town upon the arrival of his Excellency and the Bakhtiari forces.

Please consider following as very confidential:—

I think that M. Sabline new would most certainly like to see Russian troops sent here, and I should not be surprised if he has advised this step being taken in order to secure that the road to Resht shall remain open and foreigners in the capital be protected.

[24494]

No. 790.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 29.)

(No. 514.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 29, 1909.

BAKHTIARI advance.

The demands of Sirdar Assad not yet being forthcoming (see my telegram No. 509 of the 27th instant).

Mr. Grahame and his Russian colleague start to-day on their return from Kum to Ispahan. Mr. Grahame was approached by an intermediary this morning, who said that he would give them to him upon Mr. Grahame undertaking to keep them hidden from the Russians. I approved Mr. Grahame's proposal to refuse to hear them on such conditions. Sirdar Assad's intermediary then enquired what was the explanation of the action taken by the Russians at Meshed. His Majesty's consul-general replied that the advice which I and my Russian colleague had already given to the Sirdar was the only communication I had to make to his Excellency.

On the 28th instant Mr. Grahame received a visit from the Sirdar. The latter said that to hesitate now would be impossible. Much money had been spent. He could never expect forgiveness from the Shah. Fear of intervention by Russia alone prevented him from deposing the Shah, and that in any case he proposed to cripple His Majesty. His Excellency observed in conclusion that it was known that the Shah, being desirous of intervention by Russia, had made plans for the murder of some foreigners.

The reports from Mr. Grahame and his Russian colleague give me the impression that the Sirdar will not be deterred from his scheme by anything short of fear of intervention on behalf of His Majesty.

His Excellency is in communication with the Sipahdar, and has received a telegram reporting that the latter is advancing on the capital.

[24486]

No. 791.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 29.)

(No. 515.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 29, 1909.

I LEARN from His Majesty's consul at Mohammurah, in reply to enquiry contained in your telegram No. 314, that there is no foundation for the report except that Wouckhans' agency is at the present time in charge of a German.

[24493]

No. 792.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 29.)

(No. 330.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, June 29, 1909.

AFFAIRS in Persia.

I am informed by the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs that a telegram has been received from the Russian chargé d'affaires at Tehran asking whether, in view of the threatened advance of the Bakhtiari and Fedais, it would not be advisable that the Russian Government should consider the question of making some preparations for the eventual dispatch of Russian troops to the capital in view of the possibility of this step becoming necessary.

M. Sazonov remarked that, while the Imperial Government would regret the necessity for such action, and while they had no desire to intervene in the internal struggle which was being waged in Persia, yet their subjects and the foreign missions must be protected; he added that if the threatened advance on Tehran were to take place the Persian Cossack guard did not seem adequate to cope with the situation, and if the troops were to arrive too late it would be a great misfortune. He said that the preparatory measures which the Russian Government had in contemplation consisted in getting vessels ready at Baku to carry troops across the Caspian to a Persian port. The subject is to be discussed in consultation to-day at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

I observed that it would be a serious matter for Russian troops to be dispatched to Tehran, and I pointed out that in Persia we had constantly seen comparatively insignificant results follow from apparently threatening situations. I suggested that the advance of the Bakhtiari might probably prove to be a case in point.

[24295]

No. 793.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 317.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, June 29, 1909.

YOUR telegram No. 513 [of the 28th June]: Advance on Tehran.

Your action approved.

[24494]

No. 794.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 318.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 29, 1909.

ADVANCE on Tehran.

For reference, see your telegram No. 514 of the 29th June and St. Petersburg telegram No. 330 of the same date which has been repeated to you.

It would appear that the Bakhtiari might be stopped by a threat of Russian intervention. It would, however, be impossible for you to convey such a threat to their leader without implying that His Majesty's Government acquiesce in such a course. Would it be possible by indirect means to warn Sirdar Assad?

[24292]

No. 795.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.

(No. 790.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 29, 1909.

ASCERTAIN truth of report in telegram No. 512 of the 29th June from Tehran that withdrawal of Russian troops from Tahrroz has been suspended. Is it possible that Mr. Wratelaw has been misinformed?

[24629]

No. 796.

Mr. W. Arey to Foreign Office.—(Received June 30.)

Dear Sir Charles,

42, Grosvenor Square, W., June 29, 1909.

ON 12th instant M. Mallet wrote M. Prece that the present Imperial Commissioner for the Persian Petroleum Concession (Sadigh-es-Saltanah) was about to be recalled, and that on his arrival in Tehran a successor would be appointed and the legation in Tehran informed.

I have been speaking to Mr. C. W. Wallace about this and he and I very much wish that, if possible, Vincent Kitabi Khan should be appointed the commissioner in the place of the present one. You very kindly secured him for me once before by cabling to the legation in Tehran, and if it is not asking you too much, I should be very deeply obliged if you would do the same again. It makes all the difference in working the concession having a competent and intelligent commissioner, and the present man is a no-account. I may mention that Kitabi was received after the Atabak was assassinated.

With many apologies for again troubling you.

Yours very truly,

W. K. DARCY.

[24596]

No. 797.

Notes on Conversation with General Sami Pasha, of the Turkish Mission.—(Communicated by Lieutenant-Colonel Maunsell, June 30, 1909.)

WHILE in the train on the way to Dovor with the Turkish mission last Sunday, General Sami Pasha, mentioning the presence of the Duma in England, referred to recent Russian movements in Northern Persia.

He thought these constituted a very serious menace to Turkey, and the security of that frontier of the Empire.

He thought that England should at once take steps to counteract the movement by occupying parts of Southern Persia, especially the ports of Bashire and Mohammerah.

He laid special stress on Mohammerah, the place, as he said, being the gateway of rich districts along the Karan, extending up to Shuster and Dizful.

The Pasha spoke at some length on the fortility of these districts in South-West Persia, and said they would become of great value if developed.

The Pasha carefully avoided the slightest reference to Bagdad and the adjoining Turkish districts of Mesopotamia.

It may be mentioned that the Pasha is a native of Bagdad, has travelled to Nejd, and knows all that country intimately.

F. R. MAUNSELL.

[24876]

No. 798.

Memorandum communicated by Tewfik Pasha, June 30, 1909.

VOTRE Excellence sait que nous avions placé depuis assez longtemps de petites garnisons à Roumié, Hoi, et Solman, en Perse, pour protéger nos consulats et nos nationaux, qui avaient subi des attaques sanglantes, ainsi que pour défendre les étrangers résidant dans ces parages. Nous apprenons que le Gouvernement russe a envoyé un détachement de troupes à Roumié. La présence simultanée des deux troupes sous différents commandements peut occasionner des difficultés que les deux Gouvernements sont sans doute désireux d'éviter. Je prie votre Excellence de vouloir bien en causer avec le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères pour lui expliquer les inconvénients de cette situation et l'amener à faire retirer de Roumié le contingent russe, en nous confiant la protection des étrangers domiciliés aux environs de la frontière turco-persane. Nos propres sujets constituent la majeure partie des dits étrangers. Vous voudrez bien assurer son Excellence de notre sincère désir de voir la situation en Perse retourner à un état normal. Nous prêterons, avec plaisir, tout notre concours au Gouvernement russe pour arriver à ce but. Je vous prie de dire également à son Excellence que nous envoyons un nouveau consul général à Tauris, en lui donnant pour instructions de s'employer de toutes ses forces au rétablissement de l'ordre dans la ville. Nous donnons des ordres catégoriques à notre consul à Tauris de cesser toute protection en faveur des sujets russes, de ne point permettre aux réfugiés persans se trouvant au consulat d'en faire un foyer d'agitation, et de se borner enfin à protéger nos nationaux et les Persans qui y chercheraient asile.

*Ambassade Impériale de Turquie, Londres,
le 30 juin, 1909.*

[24497]

No. 799.

Sir P. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 30.)

[By Post.]

(No. 85.)

(Telegraphic.) En clair.

Paris, June 29, 1909.

YOUR telegram No. 403 of the 28th June.

I telegraphed to Nars-ul-Mulk at Evian to ascertain date of his departure for Persia, and I have received the following telegram in reply:—

"Cure my son begin last week: departure, as agreed, depends naturally result thereof. If new has happened am unaware. With many thanks.—(Signed) ABOLKASSEM."

[24586]

No. 800.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 30.)

(No. 516.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 30, 1900.

SIRDAR ASSAD has received at Kum a telegram from London, signed "Isma'il." It bids him, for fear of the foreigners, to bring the matter to an end.

The Zil-es-Sultan has a son named Isma'il. Can it be he? Perhaps Proeco could say whether he is now in London.

As regards His Imperial Highness himself, I have no information as to whether he has arrived in this country or no.

[24605]

No. 801.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 30.)

(No. 517.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Gulahek, June 30, 1900.

CAPTAIN ZAPOLSKY is at Korrdji with 350 Cossacks and some quick-firing guns, and he may find himself obliged to take part in hostilities if the nationalist force from Kasvin makes any further advance.

I am calling the attention of my Russian colleague to the fact that if the captain were to fight a very bad impression would be produced, although it is true that he is no longer on the active list of the Russian army.

M. Sabline will, I fear, reply that Captain Zapolsky is not under his orders. I have not yet received his reply, but being desirous of gaining time I am telegraphing this without waiting for it.

[24639]

No. 802.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 30.)

(No. 518.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, June 30, 1900.

MY telegram No. 513 of 28th June.

Russian chargé d'affaires tells me Liakhoff's instructions from Russian military authorities are that, as movement of Bakhtiari and revolutionaries is an unwarrantable attack on Shah's constitutional Government and is a danger to the dynasty, Liakhoff and his officers, who are no longer in Russian service, are to use all efforts to defend Shah against Bakhtiari and revolutionaries, and can therefore command all movements against them.

(Sent to St. Petersburg.)

[24640]

No. 803.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 30.)

(No. 519.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

BAKHTIARI advice.

Gulahek, June 30, 1900.

Mr. O'Beirne's telegram No. 330.

There is no safe channel for any indirect communication between His Majesty's legation and Sirdar Assad. Moreover, I have seen a telegram dispatched from Kum to Paris, which states that the Bakhtiari forces have started for the capital from the former place.

[24641]

No. 804.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 30.)

(No. 332.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, June 30, 1900.

PERSIA.

With reference to my telegram No. 330 of yesterday's date, I now learn from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs that, as a result of yesterday's consultation, it has been decided that preparatory measures with a view to the eventual dispatch of Russian troops to Kasvin shall be taken. The objects of such an expedition would be to keep entire control of the road to Tehran, to disperse the revolutionaries at Kasvin, and thereby to avoid the necessity for proceeding to an occupation of Tehran, to which latter step he said that the Russian Government were most averse.

The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs also showed me a telegram, which had, however, been received after the consultation of yesterday, from the Russian chargé d'affaires, in which the situation at Tehran is described as alarming. In this telegram M. Sabline dwells on the weakness of the Cossack brigade, and the probability of the Shah taking refuge at one of the two legations. M. Sabline finally urges that, under pretext of strengthening the consular guard, Cossacks should be dispatched to Kasvin.

In reply to my question as to what were the exact dangers to be apprehended in the event of the advance of the Bakhtiari, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs said that there was the danger of the Russian bank being plundered, in addition to that which foreign subjects and missions would incur, and he also remarked that now that the Shah had followed our advice we were under a moral obligation to support His Majesty.

I pointed out to his Excellency that the Shah had been promised protection for his person and family, and I reminded him that the two Powers had particularly avoided doing more than this. I said that were a Russian force to go to Kasvin the whole of Persia, except a few royalists, would be against Russia, and I asked what would become of the policy of non-intervention in that case.

In reply to M. Sazonov's question as to what steps we would suggest should be taken, I said that His Majesty's Minister at Tehran could be consulted on that point. I added that personally I thought that if it were really so that the Cossack brigade were not strong enough for the protection of the Shah's person and of the foreign missions, the natural remedy for Russia to adopt was to reinforce her legation guards to the extent necessary.

The force which it is contemplated to send amounts to about 1,500 men, and M. Sazonov added that there would be no secrecy in regard to the preparations. The expedition would be dropped if the advance of the Bakhtiari were abandoned, and in any case the Russian Government were prepared to give the clearest pledges regarding the ultimate withdrawal of any force sent.

[24642]

No. 805.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 30.)

(No. 333.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

St. Petersburg, June 30, 1900.

In reply to your telegram No. 790 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to report that the Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that the Russian Government have decided to suspend the reduction of their military forces at Tabreez.

His Excellency observed that the situation in that town was at present too disturbed to allow of further reductions in the number of troops being made. I remarked that the information we had received went to show that, except for isolated incidents of little importance, things were quiet there. I added that anti-Russian manifestations would continue so long as the Russian troops remained, and I asked what the Russian Government were now waiting for? Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs answered that, in the first place, the Russian Government were awaiting the arrival of a new governor-general and the establishment of his authority. The Russian Government had said that they would withdraw their troops, and they intended to do so, but were they to withdraw them at the present moment the result would be a condition of anarchy which would, in all probability, oblige them to dispatch the troops back to Tabreez again. Brigands like Sattar and Baghir Khans might regain control of the situation, and this the Russian Government could not allow.

No. 806.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 320.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, June 30, 1909.

YOUR telegram No. 510 of the 28th June.

Nasr-ul-Mulk, now at Evian, states that his son's cure began last week, and date of his departure depends on result.

No. 807.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.

(No. 797.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, June 30, 1909.

IN conversation with the Russian Ambassador to-day I told his Excellency that I felt sure that the less foreign interference which took place in the affairs of Persia the better, though I fully realised the difficulty of the present situation at Tehran. If a Russian force were to occupy Tehran, I had no doubt that order would be produced there, but effect of this would be that all Persians would consider that the Shah depended on the support of Russia alone, and all the rest of the country would disown the Shah's Government and break up. My opinion is that any great disaster can be prevented by the Persian Cossacks, who are strong enough to effect this. I told Count Benckendorff that I fully recognised the specially difficult position in which the proximity of Persia to her own frontier placed Russia. The present situation was of such a nature that I did not wish my observations to be considered as otherwise than tentative, but it seemed to me that the spread of disorder to the Russian frontier from Kazvin or Tehran would be automatically prevented by the position already held by Russia at Tabreez.